Category Archives: Party ID

If Democrats are so unpopular, why are they winning?

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Discontent doesn’t mean defection

The Democratic party has spent the last year with a net favorability rating considerably worse than that of the Republican party. Yet the Democrats have had strong successes in picking up seats in the Virginia and New Jersey legislative races in 2025 and in special elections around the country. How can the more unpopular party be winning?

Here is the net favorability rating for the Democratic and Republican parties since early 2025. While both parties have had net negative ratings all year, the Democrats have been consistently worse, with a net rating hovering around -30 percentage points, except in November. Republicans by contrast have generally been around -14 with a recent decline to almost -20 points.

The one brighter moment for the Democrats was in November when their net favorability rose about 13 points and momentarily matched the GOP, before sinking again in January. The November poll was conducted during the shutdown. Democrats benefited, if briefly.

Why is the Democratic party so unpopular relative to the Republican party? Do Republicans give especially unfavorable ratings to the Democrats? Yes, of course they do. Just as Democrats deeply dislike the Republicans. Is it that independents are especially sour on the Democrats? No. Independents dislike both parties but by about the same amount. So the answer lies within the Democratic base. Democrats have much lower net favorability of their own party than Republicans do have for their party.

Republican net approval for their party has been as high as +80 points and remains above +60 points all year. And their disdain for Democrats is strong, consistently a net -80 points or lower.

Democrats return the favor by giving Republicans net negative ratings of close to -90 points. But when it comes to their own party, Democrats give a net favorably rating of just about +30 points, or about 30 points worse than Republicans give their party. This is who is pulling down Democratic party ratings. It is coming from inside the house.

The exception is November, when Democrat’s net favorability toward their party rose not quite 25 points, falling only a little short of Republican favorability of the GOP. But it was short lived. The shutdown ended and Democrats who were buoyed by their party’s shutdown stand, once more settled into discontent.

A party with weak ratings from its own base voters would not expect promising electoral outcomes. One partisan group is relatively pleased with their party’s performance, the other relatively displeased. Seems like a bad omen, yes? No. The actual performance of Democratic candidates has been quite strong for a year, with a number of seat pickups and general over-performance of 2024 margins even in losses. What gives?

Democratic partisans are, indeed, disappointed with their party, while Republicans are not. But disappointment is not producing defection. The same Democrats who are unfavorable to their party are nearly unanimous in their dislike of Donald Trump. Here is Trump favorability by party ID. Within each panel the green line is people with a favorable view of the Democratic party while the purple line is those with an unfavorable view. In the right-most panel we see that among Democrats the profound dislike of Trump is virtually identical no matter how one feels about the Democratic party. Less than 10% feel favorable to Trump.

On the Republican side, those who dislike the Democrats give Trump favorability ratings in the high 80s. The small number of Republicans who are favorable to the Democrats (this is just 6% of all Republicans), however, have shown a steady loss of affection for Trump, sinking to under 50% favorable in January. This shows that there can be defection within a party, and ironically it comes in the GOP where support for Trump is often said to be unshakable. Not to make to much of this. It is only 6% of Republicans with a liking for the Democratic party– hardly a collapse within the party. But the contrast with the Democrats is striking. Some 35% of Democrats have an unfavorable view of their party, but virtually none of them are defecting and saying they like Trump.

How about looking to November’s midterm election? My Marquette Law School Poll has asked the generic ballot question only twice so far, in November and January. Here are those results.

Net support for the Democratic congressional candidate among Democrats is nearly identical regardless of how Democratic partisans feel about their party, with a net vote in the high 80s or low 90s in both November and January. Party disaffection doesn’t matter.

For Republicans though, disaffection does matter. Among contented Republicans who dislike the Democratic party, net loyalty is also around 90 points, a mirror image of Democrats. But in that sliver of 6% of Republicans who are favorable to the Democratic party, substantial vote support goes to the Democratic candidate, at least on the hypothetical generic ballot. That defection seems to have jumped in January, but caution is in order—this 6% of Republicans is a very small sample and the January movement could just be noise.

Independents give a somewhat firmer foundation. Those independents who are favorable to the Democratic party give Democratic candidates a substantial vote margin. But even those independents unfavorable to the Democratic party produce a net margin in favor of the Democratic candidate.

Lots of people, including me, have pointed to the poor favorability rating of the Democratic party relative to the Republican party this year but haven’t tried to explain how the more unpopular party can be outperforming their rival in elections. I think the solution is here. Democrats are disappointed with their party’s performance in Congress. If we switch from favorability to approval of how each congressional party is handling it’s job we get results virtually identical to these. Disappointment doesn’t produce defection because Democrats are united in their abhorrence of the Trump administration and the GOP. The disappointment comes from the inability of the congressional Democrats to do anything. That’s why the shutdown produced a brief embrace of the party. But when the congressional Democrats settled for an end to the shutdown, with little to show for it, disaffection returned.

So far the Democratic base is unified by the negative: they are deeply against Trump and the GOP Congress. They are joined by a majority of independents who also are supporting Democratic candidates, even if they dislike each party about equally.

So long as disappointment doesn’t produce defection, Democrats can win even if they are unusually grumpy about their party.

Party identification, leaners and strength

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Gallup has an update on partisanship trends today. Links at end of this thread

I want to address the “leaned” vs “unleaded” party issue. Do “partisans” include independents who lean to a party, or not. Similarly, does “independents” include leaners or not, a how it matters

Gallup question wording is slightly different from the wording many academics use. “In politics as of today” vs “generally speaking” has modest difference but not the issue I care about which is how much difference is there between leaners and partisans.

Rep leaners are 11% and Dem leaners 13%. That close symmetry has been pretty stable. You get more partisans (obviously) if you include leaners as partisans, and more independents if you call them independents. The Gallup headline is based on calling them independent.

The “academic” question wording also asks partisans if they are “strong” or “not very strong” (ie “weak”) partisans. Here you also see 11-12% are weak & just under 20% are strong for each party.

Here are Gallup’s party ID trends since 2004, with leaners separate from partisans or pure independents.

How do these groups differ?

Some claim leaners are “really partisans”. That isn’t right.

They are more partisan than pure independents, but not as partisan as those who pick a party on the 1st question. I know nuance is hard, but leaners are indeed leaners and not committed partisans.

You also see lack of partisan commitment in the “someone else” and “wouldn’t vote” percentages that rise to the middle of the PID scales.

Also note how “weak” are different from “strong” partisans. Sometimes less partisan than lean, sometimes not.

Here is Biden approval by partisan lean and strength. Similar to the vote choice above, though Reps and lean Rep are quite similarly negative, and “weak Reps” a little more approving. More monotonic w Dem strength.

Here is a comparison of favorably to Trump and to Biden by Party ID with leaners.

Both partisans and leaners equally despise the other party’s guy.

But note in both parties leaners are less favorable to their party’s guy than are partisans.

Negative partisanship is strong.

Another big difference is attention to politics. More partisan means more attention, with pure independents especially less attentive, though “weak” partisans are close to pure inds

Among other things this means leaners & weak are slower to pick up on issues and candidates

It’s easy to focus on size of each group. Inds tend to grow in non-election years, then decline close to elections

But “are they independent or hidden partisans” is important & the answer is learners are in between. Less party loyalty in votes than partisans, but clearly lean.

In an election, partisans vote w party >90% but leaners typically in the 80s. They can also push that up or down depending on the candidates. They aren’t “swing voters” but that lower loyalty and potential for more or less loyalty is important in election outcomes.

Links to Gallup trends in partisanship, showing 49% “independent” but that includes leaners!

The tables are great and go back to 2004. Also have table w leaners as partisans. 43R-43D-14 Ind

Gallup trends link here

This Axios story is misleading. It combines independents who lean to a party with “purely” inds. Dem & Rep are modestly down, leaners up a bit, pure Ind still low teens. See full data 2004-23 below. Leaners vote w party but less than partisans

Axios story link here:

Philip Bump also has a story on this, in part emphasizing the changes are much less than the Axios headline.

Washington Post story link here

I don’t care for the WaPo headline. These aren’t “independents who vote party” but people who say they are independents AND who say they lean to a party and mostly vote that way, but less so than partisans, more so than independents who don’t lean.

Most important just look at the full data and there are not sharp or sudden shifts. Relative stability over 19 years with some modest but important shifts (a bit more leaners, bit fewer partisans) and little change in pure independents.

Ignore “big change” headlines.

Party ID Trend, midyear update

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The net balance of party identification has shifted in the Republican direction in 2022, by a little in Kaiser and Marist polls, but a lot in NBC and Quinnipiac polls. One might debate the size but the trend is clear. What it means is perhaps not quite as clear.

Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend

The party balance might most obviously shift because people are moving away from the Democratic Party and (likely) into independents, and (likely) from independents and into Republican. In short, real change in the margin.

Democratic approval of Biden has fallen over the year, while Republicans are united in disapproval of Biden (almost unanimously). Inflation is a dominant issue which favors Republicans and damages Democrats. And a Democratic congress has failed to deliver as much as many Democrats had hoped for in early 2021. That is all a recipe for marginal shifts in the party balance, especially at the boundaries between “independent” and either partisan group.

Or the shifts could be because Democrats are “discouraged” by the national political environment (largely for the same reason as above) and are just less anxious to talk to pollsters about politics. In this story the “real” party balance hasn’t changed but Democrats just don’t feel like talking about it. This is cold comfort to Democrats though, since discouraged Democrats not talking to pollsters are also likely Democrats less likely to vote in November, which is also damaging to party prospects.

The recent changes in margin between Democrats and Republican identification are rather large in comparison to shifts we’ve seen earlier in the time series for each pollster. Such trends could reverse before the elections, but time is growing short. And Biden’s job approval has shown no signs of improving, indeed his average continues to slowly decline, now below 40% approval.

Races for Senate and governor may hinge on candidates and the campaigns, so these partisan trends are not the whole story but they add to the national forces that are a drag on Democrats everywhere and a boost to Republicans.

Notes: I look here are “unleaned” party identification, those who say they are “Republicans” or “Democrats”, not including those who say they are independents who lean to either party. This is in part due to limits in the party measures reported by pollsters, with “unleaned” party being the lowest common denominator.

I also use high quality telephone polls that do NOT weight their samples to party ID. This has historically been the “standard” party measure. Most online polls, including Pew, now weight their samples to a party balance estimated from recent telephone polls, which makes tracking trends with samples weighted to party a complicated issue.

Here are the trends for Kaiser, Marist, NBC and Quinnipiac, first for each party and then for the net margin between the parties. Data include the latest polls as of July 5, 2022.

Kaiser Party ID Trend
Marist Party ID Trend
NBC Hart/Public Opinion Strategies Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Party ID Trend
Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
Marist Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Net Party ID Trend

Individual change in party identification, 2016-2020

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Recently I tweeted about shifts in aggregate party ID, following Gallup’s release of shifts in their polls. I find 4 other pollsters showing the D-R margin tightening, though not as much as Gallup. Blog version: pollsandvotes.com/?p=217

But what about individual change?

For tracking individual change we need panel data. Thanks to Democracy Fund and Voter Study Group we have a public panel from 2011 through 2020.

I prefer fresh cross sections for tracking aggregate shifts, but panels are THE thing for individual change.

See (or rather hear) the @FiveThirtyEight podcast of Jan 31 for a discussion that includes issues about party leaners that we’ll see in about one tweet here. How much more movable are leaners? Here strength of partisanship matters.

VSG uses the “Michigan” party id item: “Generally speaking do you think of yourself as…” followed by “strong or not so strong” or by “lean to Dem or Rep” to make a 7 point scale.

Below is the 2016-2020 panel turnover. Rows 2016, columns 2020.

Strong partisans are different from any of the 5 middle groups. Strong partisans are 90% likely to still be in same category after 4 years. The middle 5 groups are about 64% likely to be same category.

If you think party is forever, you are thinking about strong partisans.

Weak partisans (“not very strong”) either stay there (62% or 66%) or are more likely to shift into strong (19% or 20%) though 15-20% scatters toward the other party. These are pretty partisan but 1/5 weaken or shift direction. Similar for both D & R.

Leaners D (61%) & R (66%) stay leaners but some (D 12%, R 14%) jump to strong for the party. About as many (D 14%, R 13%) shift to pure independent. Add weak and about 20% become stronger partisans, 12-14 pure independent and 5%D and 2%R shift to other party

And pure independents also remain 62% unchanged. Those who shifted in this 2016-20 period were a bit more likely to shift toward R, though shifting into lean was most common (D10%, R16%)

This seems consistent w Trump attracting previously less involved voters, esp pure Inds.

Party is sticky & especially so for strong partisans. Leaners are more apt to move toward their party but a few move away. Inds also stick as much as weak & leaners, but were drawn to GOP a little more in 2016-20

There was a lot of symmetry in the movements but a slight GOP edge.

Party ID Trends, Jan. 2022

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So I, as many of you, woke up Monday to Gallup’s latest party ID numbers with a sharp move towards GOP. The full article is here and I strongly recommend reading it all. It is more nuanced than Twitter headlines might sound.

Let’s look at 4 other high frequency live phone polls from Marist, Quinnipiac, Kaiser, and NBC/Wall Street Journal since 2014.

First Ds and Rs w/o leaners, same scales.

Now the Dem minus Rep margin since 2014, again without leaners.

Finally, the percent who are neither Dems nor Reps. This is 100-Rep-Dem, so it includes Inds, other, dk, refused. Polls aren’t consistent in reporting these, so just the Not D and Not R seems the most consistent practice here.

As with Gallup, the Dem minus Rep margin has tightened in all 3 sets of polls here. Gallup has Ds & Rs both at 28% unleaned in both 3rd & 4th quarter, and Ds had 30-25 and 31-26 in 1st 2 qtrs. Their leaned party has Rs ahead in 4th qtr.

Leaned party is not readily available for some polling organizations, so I’ve used the unleaned which are comparable across all. Shifts among leaners are not uncommon but can clearly tilt the balance. It would be nice if all reported both unleaned and leaned every time.

The big headline is right: The balance of Ds vs Rs has shifted over 2021 to a smaller D advantage. We see this in all 4 sets of surveys.

Do note that inds+other rise and fall with the election cycle, so both parties tend to decline between elections as the non-partisans rise.

But the parties aren’t losing supporters at the same rate. In 2021 it was the Dems who lost support a bit faster than the Reps.

Bottom line is the 4 polls I’ve collected for 2014-2022, QPoll, Marist, KFF and NBC all agree the Dem-Rep margin has tightened but all still have at least a small D advantage. Trending down, so that could change but it hasn’t yet, though for Gallup it has crossed over.

Some technical details

There are two different wordings that are most often used for measuring party identification. The “Michigan” wording is from the UM Survey Research Center work used in The American Voter, a cornerstone of political science:

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?

In contrast the long-standing wording in Gallup polls is

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?

(Modern surveys randomize the order of parties in the questions.)

Both items are often followed by a strength question (especially for Michigan wordings for partisans) and a lean question for independents (both styles do this most of the time).

Quinnipiac and NBC/WSJ use the Michigan wording and Kaiser uses the Gallup wording. I’ve not been able to find the wording used by Marist as they don’t publish the full survey instrument including demographics on their website.

In the 1980s and 1990s there was a debate in political science about whether party identification moved in response to party performance or issue positions or other “short term forces”. These debates, among other things, considered the different dynamic properties of measures from the two question wordings.

This point was raised in my Twitter thread by https://twitter.com/bcburden and https://twitter.com/drjjdyck provided a pointer to one important article that compared the dynamics of the two measures:

Abramson and Ostrom 1991 argued that the Gallup wording produced more short-term variation and should be used with extreme caution. Seems like this still holds. https://t.co/gSpsqqH2wQ— Joshua J. Dyck (@drjjdyck) January 18, 2022

I would say that research that is crucially dependent on the dynamic properties of the different measures should consider Abramson and Ostrom’s warning, though I might dissent from “extreme caution” and say “with full awareness of possible differences.” Their work was part of a debate over the responsiveness of partisanship and which measure was “really” capturing it. I’d say we aren’t too wrapped up in that issue these days. As the charts above show, both measures are showing similar trends, and for my purposes that seems the fundamental point.

Given the rise in partisan polarization it might be time to update the comparative analysis of these two wordings, but that isn’t my task today.