Liberal Chris Taylor sweeps conservative Maria Lazar in Supreme Court race
In Wisconsin we have the historically crucial and very red WOW counties (Washington, Ozaukee, Waukesha) and the usually competitive BOW (Brown, Outagamie, Winnebago) and Lake Superior’s blue BAD (Bayfield, Ashland, Douglas) counties. This morning, add one more mnemonic trio.
In 2024, Donald Trump won 34 of 72 Wisconsin counties with 60% or more. On April 7th, 2026, the conservative Supreme Court candidate won only 3 counties by 60% or more: Washington, Taylor, Florence. The WTF counties.
The liberal candidate swept the BAD counties with over 60% in each, and all three BOW counties with 57%, 58% & 60% respectively. And the WOW counties split with 62% for the conservative in Washington (the highest in the state), 54% in Waukesha (a historically low share) while the liberal carried Ozaukee with 52% (Trump got 54% there in 2024.)
True to expectations, the liberal candidate dominated the MD counties (dare I call them DOC counties?) of Milwaukee and Dane with 76% and 84%. Together those two counties also provided 26% of the total statewide vote.
It all adds up to a 60.1% to 39.8% win for liberal Chris Taylor over conservative Maria Lazar, doubling the liberal margins seen in each of the previous three Court elections, which themselves were considered large margins in highly competitive Wisconsin.
Results are unofficial but nearly complete.
You can remember me from my mnemonic: PAV, PollsAndVotes.
Most groups oppose the war; Trump loyalists approve
Today I take a look at opinion of the Iran war in the swing state of Wisconsin. As I wrote this, President Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran. And the liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court won by 20 points (with 95% of the vote in), double the margin in each of the three previous Court races. While I doubt the Court vote was directly driven by opinion of the war, opposition to the war, and to Trump, almost certainly played a role in motivating Democrats to turn out.
In my March 11-18 Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters we asked if the respondent approved or disapproved of the war with Iran. Overall, 39% approved of the war and 61% disapproved.
Today I want to show how a number of demographic and attitudinal groups line up on the war. There are some groups that are strongly supportive of the war. These groups are also mostly part of the core Trump base. They include Republicans who are also favorable to MAGA, those who describe themselves as very conservative, Trump 2024 voters, and Republicans in general. Even among these and other Trump base groups there is variation in support for the war. For example 88% of MAGA Republicans approve of the war. That slips to 75% among all Republicans and to 61% among born-again protestants.
At the opposite end of high opposition to the war, almost all Democratic groups are over 95% opposed to the war, as are both somewhat liberal and very liberal groups.
There is more interesting variation within some categories. White, males, without a college degree are fairly supportive of the war, 56% approve. But their white, female, non-college counterparts are solidly opposed, 61%, which is similar to white, males with a college degree, 64%, while white, female college grads are still more opposed, 68%. Given the support for Trump from white, non-college women in 2024 (51% for Trump in the MULawPoll, 53% in the Wisconsin exit poll) this is notable slippage among an important swing group.
The war evenly divides rural Wisconsin voters while those in the suburbs are solidly opposed, 66%, and those in urban areas more opposed, 70%. Trump won rural voters in Wisconsin by 23 percentage points and by 2 points in the suburbs, losing urban voters by 21 points.
There is a considerable split by age with those 45 and older only slightly opposed to the war while those under 45 are strongly opposed.
By ideology the expected liberal and conservative alignments are strong, but among moderates, 75% disapprove of the war, as do 73% of independents.
The chart shows these groups and more. It provides a review of many crosstabs in a single figure. At the top are those groups that most approve of the war with decreasing approval as one reads down the rows.
The cease-fire, assuming it holds, will allow the end of active bombing and a resumption of oil shipments, perhaps reducing the oil shock of the past five and a half weeks. It is a long 210 days to election day as I write this. Will memories of an unpopular war and its economic price tag linger for some seven months, or will we have moved on to new topics by the fall? At this moment, there are few groups of Wisconsin voters who can be said to have thought the war a good idea.
Dobbs sharply damaged the Court’s standing. New erosion since Jan. 2025.
The Supreme Court has been at the center of disputes over President Donald Trump’s executive orders and other actions over the last 14 months, most recently hearing oral arguments over birthright citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment on April 1. Trump has bitterly complained about the justices recently.
Public opinion of the Court has varied sharply since 2020 when my Marquette Law School Poll began regularly polling on approval of the Court. Overall approval of the Court has ranged from a high of 66% in September 2020 to a low of 38% in July 2022. Decisions related to abortion seem to have driven the sharp declines in the fall of 2021 through summer of 2022.
On Sept. 1, 2021 the Court allowed Texas’ “heartbeat” bill to take effect which bans abortion once cardiac activity is detected, typically after about 6 weeks of gestation. This was followed by a -11 point drop in approval in the late September poll. Approval subsequently rose modestly but then took a sharp drop when the Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade was leaked to Politico on May 2, 2022, falling -10 points in the following May poll. After the Dobbs decision was officially handed down on June 24 approval fell an additional -6 points to the low of 38%.
Approval only slightly improved in 2023 and the first half of 2024, after which it rose to over 50% in the first half of 2025, before falling off in the second half of 2025 to the current 44% as of Jan. 2026.
These shifting opinions are shown in the chart.
Partisan divisions in views of the Court are substantial. As of Jan. 2026 78% of Republicans approve of the job the Court as doing, while 26% of independents and just 17% of Democrats approve.
This large split wasn’t the case in 2020 or the summer of 2021. In those polls majorities of Republicans, independents and Democrats all approved of the Court. In Sept. 2019 80% of Republicans approved as did 64% of independents and 57% of Democrats. In July 2021 it was 57% for Republicans, 61% for independents and 59% for Democrats. That was impressive lack of partisanship. It didn’t last.
After the Court allowed Texas to move forward with it’s ban on abortions after six weeks of gestation GOP approval hardly moved but independent approval dropped -13 percentage points and approval among Democrats fell -17 points. After a partial recovery, approval again fell sharply in May 2022 following the Dobbs leak, declining -13 points among independents and -24 points among Democrats. Then another drop for Democrats after the Dobbs decision was officially announced, -13 points.
The net change from July 2021 to July 2022 was a gain of 14 points among Republicans and a decline of -23 points among independents and drop of -31 points among Democrats.
During the second half of 2022 through the first half of 2024 approval among all partisans remained fairly stable between about 60% and 70% among Republicans, between about 30% and 40% among independents and between about 25% and 35% among Democrats. There were modest gains in late 2024 that peaked in early 2025 but since then approval has steadily declined among independents and Democrats while holding fairly steady among Republicans. The partisan gap has widened over the first year of Trump’s second term.
An open question is how the Court’s current docket may affect these opinions. As of the January survey the Court had ruled against the Trump administration in two fairly visible cases concerning due process in deportation proceedings and the deployment of National Guard troops in Chicago, though also ruling for the administration on many procedural decisions. Since the January poll the Court ruled against Trump’s imposition of tariffs, and has heard but not decided a case on birthright citizenship. Stay tuned for new polls as we track response to those decisions.
In recent months about 56% say they think the Court has been going out of it’s way to avoid ruling against Trump, with 44% saying the Court is not avoiding such a ruling. Those perceptions have remained quite stable in polls of Sept. and Nov. 2025 and Jan. 2026. Opinion has likewise been stable within partisan camps, though with a considerable party split. Among Republicans in January 32% think the Court is avoiding ruling against Trump, but 61% of independents and 78% of Democrats think it is avoiding ruling against the president. We will see in the April poll if the tariff decision shifted this perception in any way.
On one measure I have found very substantial majority agreement, and agreement across party lines. The Court continues to enjoy great legitimacy if it rules against the president. The question asks
If the Supreme Court rules against the president in a case, does the president have the power to ignore that ruling, or is the president required to do as the ruling says?
We’ve asked this since 2019, though not in each survey. In Jan. 2026 82% say the president must obey a Supreme Court decision. This support has been stable and across the parties since 2019. It is one demonstration that approval or disapproval of the Court doesn’t have much relationship with belief in the authority of the Court’s decisions.
President Trump’s criticism of judges, and more recently of the Supreme Court, have not yet driven down Republican approval of the Court. After the tariff decision his complaints became more severe and more frequent. If Republicans follow Trump’s lead and become less positive to the Court overall approval may decline further, since their nearly 80% approval rate is helping keep overall approval in the mid-40s. Conversely, it is possible Democratic support might rise if the Court rules against Trump in more major cases this spring. By the end of June we will know.
Democrats have reservations about their party but unite in opposing Trump
The Democratic party is less popular than the Republican party in both Wisconsin and national Marquette Law School polls since Jan. 2025. Yet Democrats keep strongly over-performing in both general and special elections in 2025 and 2026. Most recently Democrats flipped the Florida legislative seat that includes Mar-a-Lago, a district that went +11 for Trump in 2024 but went +2 for the Democratic legislative candidate on March 24. How can this paradox be explained?
I previously looked at this in my national polling here. Today let’s look at the most competitive state in the nation since 2016, Wisconsin. Data are from Marquette Law School polls of registered voters in October 2025, and February and March 2026.
Both parties are underwater, but Democrats more so
Both parties have net negative favorability ratings, meaning more have unfavorable than favorable views of each party. Since October there has been little change in overall favorability for each, with Democratic party favorability more net negative than for the Republican party. GOP net favorability has been around -10 points while Democratic net favorability has been twice as large, in the -20s.
Where does this added negativity to the Democrats come from? Not from the opposite party. Republicans have extremely negative views of Democrats and Democrats return the favor with equally net negative views of Republicans. Likewise this difference between parties doesn’t come from independents, who strongly dislike both parties though they give Republicans an 8 point more net negative rating than they give Democrats.
The partisan gap comes in feelings about voters’ own party. Republicans give the GOP a net positive +74 point rating, but Democrats give their party just a +56 point rating. Our partisans hate the other party equally but don’t love themselves equally.
As in horror movies, “the call is coming from inside the house.”
The same result is seen in my national polling where we also ask about approval of the job Democrats in Congress and Republicans in Congress are doing. Partisans strongly disapprove of the other congressional party but Democrats are less approving of congressional Democrats while Republicans are more approving of their party in Congress. Democratic discontent applies equally to favorability of the party in general and specifically to the job performance of the congressional party.
This asymmetry in partisan views take a different turn when the question is about President Donald Trump. Across the three polls since October Trump’s overall approval is 44% and disapproval is 54%, for a net rating of -10 percentage points. Here, though, Democrats are stunningly united in disapproval. Republicans strongly approve but not so much as Democrats disapprove. And independents are also strong in their disapproval of the president. This negative balance, seen in both Wisconsin and national Marquette polls, explains why Republican candidates have suffered in elections in 2025 and 2026 despite Trump winning the presidency in 2024.
Democrats are less thrilled with their party but virtually all are agreed in their dislike for Trump. This, plus strong independent dissatisfaction with Trump, has powered Democratic over-performance and wins in the 2025 general elections in Virginia and New Jersey and in special elections throughout the country.
Where dissatisfaction comes from within each party
Which Democrats are less satisfied with their party, and where does Republican dissatisfaction arise in the GOP?
Very few Republicans consider themselves to be liberal or very liberal, and very few Democrats describe themselves as conservative or very conservative. I lump these few outliers in with moderates in each party. (To see how that has changed over the past 15 years in Wisconsin see my earlier post here.)
Here we look at very conservative to moderate Republicans and at moderate to very liberal Democrats and their favorability to their own parties.
In the GOP those who are very conservative have the highest net positive feelings for the Republican party, and those who are conservative are almost as positive. Where there is less positivity is with moderate Republicans, who remain solidly positive but considerably less so than either type of conservative.
For the Democrats, those who are very liberal are the least positive to the party, just +24 points net favorable, while liberals are most positive and moderates pretty positive but not enormously so. Comparing Democrats with Republicans, very liberal Democrats are much less favorable to the Democratic party than very conservative Republicans are to their party. And liberal Democrats are less positive than conservative Republicans to their respective parties. Only among moderates does the Democratic party enjoy a modest advantage in net favorability, a +56 vs +45 among Republicans.
The asymmetry between parties is not only with one ideological camp, but the strikingly low favorability among very liberal Democrats reflects the ongoing debate within the party between those urging moderation and those pushing for a more clearly liberal or progressive party.
Some of these discrepancies are likely due to the natural frustration of a minority party unable to control the congressional agenda and able at best to block or stall legislation in the Senate. But the differences by ideology also point to a divide over the direction of the Democratic party.
These are the things that explain why the Democratic party has consistently less favorable ratings than the Republican party, and that the discrepancy is substantially due to differences within the parties.
The paradox unriddled
The paradox of strong electoral performance by the less popular party is driven by opposite forces. Democrats differ about themselves but they nearly unanimously oppose Donald Trump, and they are joined by solid opposition to Trump among independents. Republicans have maintained very strong support for Trump within their party, but not so strong as Democratic opposition and with quite weak appeal among independents.
Democrats may not agree on what they are for, and are frustrated by their party’s inability to block Trump, but they absolutely know what (or who) they are against. This has provided a strong electoral advantage when Republican candidates across the country have so closely tied themselves to President Trump, and where dissent brings presidential condemnation and primary challenges. November is seven months away and the details of candidates and issues are not yet certain, but it is against this background that the less popular party nonetheless enjoys a midterm advantage.
Lots of turnover, but mostly in safe seats and across the ideological spectrum
(You can read my posts here or at my Substack. Both are, and forever will be, free)
As of 2026-03-11 there have been 56 members of the House of Representatives who have announced they will not seek reelection in 2026. That is well above recent years. At this time in 2024 42 had announced they would not seek reelection, as had 45 in 2022, 34 in 2020 and 46 in 2018.
Quite a few of these are seeking other offices. Sixteen are seeking a Senate seat, 11 are running for governor and 1 is a candidate for state attorney general. A total of 28 are retiring from politics.
While a large number of retirements (including those seeking other office) might seem to signal large seat changes in November, that is too hasty a conclusion to reach. It certainly speaks to the desirability of a House career (or lack of desirability) but most of these members are from pretty safe seats. Of the 35 retiring Republicans, only 4 won by 10 percentage points or less in 2024, and of the 21 retiring Democrats only 2 won by 10 points or less. (These are based on their 2024 districts, not new 2026 districts in those states that have redistricted in the last year.) So if most of these seats are likely to stay in the hands of the current party the greater number of Republican than Democratic retirements is unlikely to result in a significant gain of Democratic seats. A swing at the ballot box in November can certainly shift the party balance, but that will come predominantly among the closely contested seats, not from these more secure retirement seats.
There is a lot of ideological diversity in the retirements as well. Republican retirees range from the 3rd most moderate to the 2nd most conservative members of the GOP caucus and are spread pretty evenly across the Republican ideological spectrum. The same holds for Democratic retirees who range from the most moderate to not quite the most liberal. In neither party is ideological location nor 2024 vote margin significantly related to retirement, nor is age.
In short, retirements are all over the place and higher than in recent years but they aren’t coming from especially vulnerable seats or from members ideologically out of step with their party.
The chart shows all House members with retirees highlighted by solid dots. Along the horizontal axis is 2024 election margin from most Democratic to most Republican. The vertical axis shows ideology from most liberal at the bottom to most conservative at the top, based on analysis of roll call voting by each member.
The retirements do guarantee one thing about the House in 2027: regardless of election defeats in November there will be a lot of new faces next January. Change in the party and ideological balance, though, will come more from the ballot box than from retirements.
We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the independents. (See the first post on the Republicans here, and the post on the Democrats here.
The first thing that jumps out about the opinions of independents is that they are much less lopsided than either Republicans or Democrats. For the partisans a number of opinions were held by over 80% of the party, but for independents only a handful approach that level of consensus.
The one item where independents are nearly unanimous is whether tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Only 5% think the do.
Independents are united in not liking the parties and related groups. Only 17% are favorable to the Democratic party and 18% are favorable to the Republican party.
Opinions related to ICE are quite negative, with 19% favorable to ICE, and 24% who approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws. Twenty-two percent say the shooting of Alex Pretti was justified.
President Donald Trump gets a 23% approval rating from independents and MAGA is viewed favorably by 22%. Twenty-four percent think Trump’s policies will reduce inflation and 25% say they are better off than a year ago. Forty-one percent say they are living comfortably rather than just getting by or struggling.
The chart shows independent opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.
On policies, independents are skeptical of data centers, with 24% saying their benefits outweigh the costs. Online sports betting is favored by 25%.
On immigration issues one-in-four, 25%, favor deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record, though 59% favor deporting those in the country illegally when the question doesn’t mention length of residence or criminal records. Forty-five percent think the U.S. is mostly deporting immigrants who have criminal records.
A number of school related issues are more evenly divided among independents. Thirty-nine percent say schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid and opinion is evenly divided on Evers’ 400-year veto which requires annual increases in per-pupil expenditures. A majority, 55%, say they are more concerned with holding down property taxes rather than increasing school spending, though 58% are satisfied with the job their local public schools are doing.
Thirty-seven percent approve of the job the legislature is doing and 46% approve of how Evers is handling his job as governor. Fifty-one percent approve of how the Wisconsin Supreme Court is doing its job.
Most important concerns
The top issue concern for independents is health insurance, closely followed by inflation and the cost of living. A bit less concern is expressed for taxes in general and for electricity costs, followed by gun violence.
Independents are somewhat less concerned about jobs and the economy, and abortion policy. While taxes ranked third in concern at 51%, property taxes specifically ranked next to last at 33%. And immigration and border security ranked last, with just 22% of independents saying they were very concerned about this.
Independents are more like Democrats in ranking health insurance and inflation as their top two issues. Democrats rank inflation first and then health insurance. And independents differ from Republican issue priorities by putting property taxes and immigration at the bottom of their concerns, while Republicans rank immigration first and property taxes second.
While partisans are extremely united on a number of issues, independents are more varied in their views, meaning that for virtually all issues there is at least a significant minority view on every issue for independents while the minority views among partisans are often much smaller, with a more unified majority opinion.
There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.
Next time: Comparing partisan and independent opinions.
Some perspective on public opinion and the endless war
A look at the way back machine. The public was quite supportive of the Iraq war initially. Opinion shifted through the first year to a majority saying it was not worth fighting. That reached a stable equilibrium by 2008 which has remained since.
Extremely unified in opposition to Trump and his works
We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the Democrats. (See the first post on the Republicans here.)
Democrats are intensely opposed to President Donald Trump and (almost) all of his policies. Literally no Democrats, zero percent, think tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Three percent or less are favorable to MAGA, think Trump will reduce inflation, approve of Trump’s handling of his job, believe the Alex Pretti shooting was justified, view ICE favorably or approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws, or view the Republican party favorably.
Just slightly more, 6%, favor deporting immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record. Ten percent think they are better off now than a year ago. And 10% think we are deporting mostly criminals.
In state affairs, 15% of Democrats think the benefits of data centers outweigh their cost, and 88% approve of how Gov. Tony Evers is handling his job.
The chart shows Democratic opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.
There is a larger minority view among Democrats on school funding with 21% saying schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid, and 25%, one in four Democrats, favor deporting immigrants in the country illegally (without mention of length of residence or non-criminal status.) Majorities mirror the school budget item with 79% favoring Evers’ 400 year veto and 78% satisfied with their local public schools. And 77% are favorable to the Democratic party.
The minority faction of the party passes 30% for approving of the (Republican controlled) legislature, favoring online sports betting, and saying it is more important to hold down property taxes than to increase K-12 funding. Of course majorities of the party take the opposite view on these topics but here there is considerably less unanimity than when Trump is involved.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court gets a 65% approval rating, with 15% lacking an opinion.
Finally, 46% say they are living comfortably, as opposed to just getting by or struggling.
Most important concerns
The top issue concern for Democrats is inflation and the cost of living, followed by health insurance. Close behind are gun violence, jobs and the economy and abortion policy. Topics of less concern are the cost of electricity, taxes in general, and property taxes specifically. The topic of least concern to Democrats is illegal immigration and border security.
While Democrats are incredibly united in opposition to national issues related to Trump and his policies, there is a bit less unity on state issues surrounding schools and property taxes. To be sure there are sizable majorities in favor of school funding but a fifth to a third of Democrats favor constraints on school budgets and prioritize holding down property taxes. And one in four favor deportations, except when asked if that includes those with no criminal record.
Democratic issue priorities stress inflation and health care but rank illegal immigration at the very bottom of concerns, with taxes only a little higher.
There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.
United on deportations, support for Trump, property taxes
We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I start a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s start with the Republicans.
Republicans in Wisconsin are most united in support of deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally, reducing property taxes, supporting President Donald Trump and approving of the way ICE is going about enforcing immigration laws. Between 87% an 95% of Republicans embrace these four topics.
Republicans are also united in disliking the Democratic party, Gov. Tony Evers and his 400-year school funding veto.
The chart shows Republican opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.
The GOP is almost as united on believing that most deportees have criminal records, having a favorable view of ICE, being favorable to the Republican party (though less so than to Trump), and believing that public schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid. Each of these opinions are embraced by 80%-83% of Republicans.
Solid majorities say that the shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis was justified, that immigrants in the U.S. illegally should be deported even if they have been here a long time and have no criminal record and that Trump’s policies will decrease inflation.
Similar majorities oppose online sports betting, and disapprove of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Only 35% think tariffs are helping Wisconsin farmers, though a similar number think tariffs have no effect. On this topic opinion is less solid than it appears.
Then there is a set of issues that are less consensual with only small majorities: 57% say they are living comfortably and 55% say they are better off than a year ago; 53% approve of the job the legislature is doing and 51% are satisfied with their local public school. And 43% think the benefits of data centers outweigh their costs.
Simplifying, the GOP backs Trump and his policies (with some doubts on tariff effects) and wants to rein in property taxes and school spending. And they don’t care for Democrats or Tony Evers (no surprise there.)
Most important concerns
The priorities Republican have across issues largely mirror the unifying issues above. The top issue concern is illegal immigration and border security followed by property taxes. Those are followed by inflation and the cost of living and taxes more generally.
Further down the concerns, with less than 50% saying they are very concerned, are health insurance and the cost of electricity. Still further down are abortion policy and jobs and the economy. Ranked last is concern over gun violence.
The Wisconsin GOP is strongly united on issues of national politics centered on President Trump, and in state politics concerning property taxes and school funding. Also in opposition to Democrats.
There is less unity on new issues like data centers and online sports betting. And just over half say they are getting along well financially or better than before while there is some significant concern with inflation and the effect of tariffs.
There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.
In November 2025 just 24% of American adults thought the U.S. “should attempt to remove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power” while 76% said the U.S. should “not get involved in Venezuela”. Among Republicans, 63% said we should not get involved, as did 79% of independents and 88% of Democrats. That was bipartisan lopsided opposition to military intervention to depose a foreign leader.
Then on January 3, 2026 President Donald Trump ordered military action that removed Maduro from power. In my January 21-28, 2026 Marquette Law School poll support for removing Maduro changed dramatically, more than doubling, with 55% saying removing Maduro was the right thing to do, and 45% saying it was the wrong thing to do. Among Republicans support skyrocketed to 87% and opposition cratered to 13%. Support among independents rose to 51% and even among Democrats support rose to 23%. See the chart.
This illustrates how weakly held opinions can change dramatically with presidential leadership and weak opposition messaging. See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.
Not all issues are like this, with weak initial positions followed by one-sided flows of information without countervailing narratives. Not all, but many, foreign policy matters are like this—remote from the daily concerns of most Americans and a realm of special presidential influence.
But what was the domestic political consequence of Trump’s success in removing Maduro? Did his deposing a foreign president, with support from a majority of the public (after the fact), win him accolades at home? Nope. Approval of Trump’s handling of his job slipped by a point, from 43% in Nov. to 42% in Jan. And approval among partisans similarly hardly changed at all, despite the large increase in support for removing Maduro seen above. GOP approval ticked down 2 points, independents down 2 points and Democrats up 1 point.
Most folks lack strong opinions about rare foreign policy events, but they have very strong views of Trump’s handling of his job. Even big moves in the former leave the latter untouched.
A similar result appears for the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites on June 21, 2025. We don’t have a pre-bombing opinion measure, but after the bombing in my July 7-16 national poll, 52% supported the air strikes while 48% opposed them. And 85% of Republicans supported them as did 43% of independents and 22% of Democrats. Not much different from the post-Maduro opinion in January.
But did this shift opinion of Trump’s handling of his job? It did not. Republican approval slipped a tad, independent approval rose a little and Democrats approved just a little less.
Nor did this military success in Iran translate to approval specifically of Trump’s handling of the Israel-Iran war. In fact, Republicans in July were a little less approving of Trump’s handling of the war than they were of his handling of his job overall, 79% approval for handling the war to 86% approval for Trump’s job overall. Independents were 1 point more approving of his handling the war than his job in general and Democrats showed a bigger difference–13% approval on the war, to 8% approval overall.
Nor did views of Trump’s handling of foreign policy shift at all from May to July: 43% approved and 57% disapproved in both months. And partisans hardly budged.
So what?
Long wars can be devastating to a presidency. Ask Lyndon Johnson or George W. Bush. And short ones can boost a president, at least temporarily. Ask George H. W. Bush. And short disasters can certainly be damaging. Ask Jimmy Carter about Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw.)
But even brief military actions that are seen as successes have surprisingly little effect on the broader approval of a president. Ask Barack Obama about killing Osama bin Laden.
Trump’s quick successes in bombing Iran nuclear sites in June and removing Maduro in January received majority, albeit slight majority, support after the fact, support above that of his overall job rating. But neither translated into any meaningful improvement in his overall job or his foreign policy job or his handling of the Israel-Iran war.
The question still on the table is will this new Iran war be a quick success or a prolonged engagement with declining support? By the initial polls, more people oppose the new Iran war than support it, with quite a few undecided. That’s not a position of strength with public opinion. A success and rapid deescalation could boost support for the decision to use military force. But the evidence above shows that even that best outcome won’t necessarily translate into higher approval of the president. I guess we’ll know in a month or six. If it is six months, and not a quick success, we will learn very close to election day.
