How to spend a surplus

Property tax relief, schools, both? For now, the answer is neither.

On May 13, the Wisconsin Senate defeated a proposal from Democratic Gov. Tony Evers, Republican Senate Majority leader Devin LeMahieu and Republican Assembly Speaker Robin Vos to use $1.8 billion of a projected $2.5 billion state surplus to provide additional funding for special education, about a 5% reduction of school property taxes, plus direct payments of $300 to each income tax payer in the state. This compromise had been long in the making with Republicans favoring more direct payments to taxpayers and the governor favoring more for schools. Neither side got everything. Both sides got something.

The bill was defeated in the Wisconsin Senate with 3 Republicans and every Democrat voting no. The Assembly easily passed the measure with all Republicans plus 10 Democrats voting yes.

There was also unusual bipartisan opposition from Republican gubernatorial candidate U.S. Rep. Tom Tiffany, and almost all Democratic candidates for governor, including Francesca Hong, a self-described democratic socialist, and Kelda Roys, who was recently endorsed by the state teachers union, WEAC.

The vote complicates messaging around affordability, property taxes and school funding for the fall campaign in which Republican Tiffany seeks to replace the two-term Democratic governor and Democrats aim to flip both Senate and Assembly after 16 years of Republican majorities.

The compromise spending bill was announced and voted on over just three days, leaving little time for public opinion to form, or for interest groups to mobilize. But we have polling on the central issues from February and March when similar arguments were circulating from Evers and Republicans during the regular legislative session.

A majority of Wisconsin registered voters have come to say holding down property taxes is a greater priority than providing funding to K-12 schools. As of March, 58% said reducing property taxes was more important, while 41% said funding schools was more important. This balance has shifted dramatically since 2018 when 37% wanted property tax cuts while 58% favored school spending. This reversal has been one of the most striking changes in public opinion over the past eight years, and followed a surge in support for public school funding during the previous administration of Gov. Scott Walker.

Funding for special education costs has been a major concern for school districts and was addressed in the previous budget, though rising costs have produced a shortfall in coverage that was partially addressed by the proposed compromise plan. Across 5 polls taken since 2019, more than 70% have favored “a major increase” in state funding for special education, most recently 71% in June 2025.

Concern for property taxes and for special education funding are not mutually exclusive. In the 2025 surveys of February and June, 59% of those more concerned about property taxes also favored more funding for special education, as did 96% of those who place greater priority on school spending over property tax reductions.

As for returning the projected surplus to tax-payers, voters were evenly divided in March, with 47% in favor of a one-time payment to offset property taxes while 52% favored an ongoing increase in state aid to schools to reduce property taxes. There was a considerable partisan divide on this question, though not as enormous as on many issues: 68% of Republicans favored a one-time payment, as did 60% of independents, while 80% of Democrats favored increased state aid to schools.

The amount of the projected surplus that should be used for a property tax reduction divided the state about evenly in February, with 29% saying all or 3/4s should go to property tax reduction, 34% saying about half, and 37% saying 1/4 or none. Here too the partisan divide is clear, though not extreme.

There is a larger partisan divide over state aid to schools. Overall, 51% say the legislature had failed to provide enough funding for schools, while 49% say schools must learn to live within their budget limits. Partisans divide more sharply on this question.

The compromise bill reflected aspects of public opinion by providing some property tax relief, increased aid for special education, and some direct payments to individual income tax payers, while spending about 3/4 of the projected surplus. The lack of extreme partisan divides on these issues also suggest public openness to compromise. The bill did not address the issue of ongoing state aid to schools which would also reduce property taxes, an issue certain to face the new legislature and governor in January.

Affordability, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top concern of 35% of Wisconsin voters. Property taxes are the top concern of 7% and public schools are the top issue for 5%, as of the March Marquette Law School Poll. Costs and broad financial concerns are also reflected by concern with health insurance, 11%, jobs and the economy, 9%, and the affordability of housing, 6%.

Both parties claim they will address voters’ concern about the cost of living. In different ways the positions of Tiffany, Democratic candidates for governor, and Democratic legislators, conflict with their public commitments to property tax reductions, support for school spending and affordability promises, leaving none of them with clean attacks on the other side’s positions on the surplus bill. Both sides positioned themselves against more money for special education and against property tax relief in this bill. Complicated explanations of why may not convince voters of the underlying wisdom of the strategies.

It is too soon to know what voters think about this, or whether this vote will be an issue in the fall campaigns. But I’d love to hear what candidates hear “on the doors” over the next few weeks.

A GOP problem in one response

Even among Trump loyalists the cost of living is a problem

This open-ended response is a good illustration of the challenge rising prices pose for the GOP now and in November.

The kicker is that this was from our January Marquette Law School Poll national survey. Back then gas prices were a sweet spot for cost of living, with 50%. saying the price of a gallon was down. Today, 93% say the price is up. (I’m curious where the 7% who say no change or down are living, and can I get gas there?)

We often portray Trump’s support as unwavering, his base as uncritical. But in our open-ended responses we actually see a lot of Trump supporters who also mention a dislike, such as this one, or more commonly some variation of “how he talks” or “his tweets.” This is not to say these folks are ready to switch to Democrats, but portraying them as blind to all criticism or shortcomings is not the case for quite a few who nonetheless approve of Trump. This response is important because the dislike is not about his style but about core economic outcomes and pain.

About half of adults say both something they like and something they dislike. Only 12% (as of December) say only something they like while 35% say only things they dislike. This isn’t a new development.

The cost of living was a huge weight around Biden’s and then Harris’ necks. Now Trump is wearing that necklace.

Ninth Republican incumbent retires in Wisconsin Assembly

This is the 2nd GOP retirement in a competitive Assembly seat

State Rep Jessie Rodriguez announced May 7 that she will not seek reelection in November. She is the 9th Republican and 12th member of the assembly to not seek reelection. The three Democrats not returning are all seeking higher office, two for the state senate and one for governor.

Rodriguez, who was born in El Salvador,  was first elected in a 2013 special election, winning reelection each cycle since 2014.

While most retiring Republicans are from rather safe districts, Rodriguez was seen as a top race for Democrats seeking to flip the Assembly majority. Republicans currently hold 54 of 99 seats, leaving Democrats looking for a net 5 seat pickup. 

Members not seeking reelection are shown in the table below. Rodriguez won the 21st district by 930 votes in 2024, a 2.8 percentage point margin. At the same time, Kamala Harris won the district by 4 points. Democrats also won the district 2022 for both governor and U.S. Senate. (The past votes are calculated for the current district boundaries following redistricting in 2024.)

In the current boundaries, the district has consistently voted  Democratic in statewide races since 2018, with Republican wins or extremely close Democratic wins from 2012-2016. Rodriguez’s win in 2024 stands out against a string of blue. 

A visual look at these votes over time makes it clear how the district has evolved from somewhat Republican leaning to the recent strong Democratic performance.

The 21st sits on the south side of Milwaukee county, a traditionally more conservative area relative to the county.

Demographically the district is predominantly white with a significant Hispanic population, 16%, which is double the state’s percentage, and a small Black population. It has slightly more college graduates, 36%, than the state as a whole, 33%. Median income is about $10,000 above the statewide income. 

As a now open seat, this should be one of the most closely competitive districts and a pickup opportunity for Democrats.

Boys and girls! Young and old! And Donald Trump

All but the olds soured on Trump in 2025

Much has been made about Donald Trump’s gains in 2024, especially among young men and Hispanic voters. That is mostly true. Today’s focus is how his appeal had waxed and waned among young and old, men and women.

I use net favorability to Trump because it applies when he was out of office as well as since he returned for his second term. Net favorability is generally pretty close to net approval. In my April Marquette Law School Poll national survey, Trump’s net favorability was -22 percentage points and his net approval was -21 points.

Trump’s net favorability was negative with all combinations of sex and age in 2021 and 2022 polls. There were at most slight gains during this period. But in 2023 his net ratings rose with all groups except for older women. In 2024 men of all ages further increased their net ratings, becoming net positive with men 45-59 and 60+, and momentarily with men 30-44. The youngest men became more favorable but peaked short of becoming net positive.

Among women, the increased favorability of 2023 continued into at least part of 2024, with older women’s favorable ratings increasing for the first time in 2024. Unlike the men, no age group of women reached net positive territory despite the general improved views of Trump.

In 2025 and 2026, however, all groups except for men and women 60 or older, who have remained stable, turned sour on Trump. The timing of the turn down varies a bit, with young women declining sooner than others, but for both sexes and all age groups under 60, 2025-26 has seen a steady downward trend in net favorability.

As of April, all gender and age groups are net negative to Trump except for men age 60 and older. Women of each age group are more negative than men of the same age, a pattern seen throughout the last five years.

For all the chatter about young men under 30 moving to Trump in 2024, the decline in net favorability has been steepest with this group in 2025. The emphasis on changing views of young men was correct in saying that they had rising support for Trump in 2024 and he gained votes in this group. But that is also a bit misleading in suggesting that young men became strong supporters of Trump. In fact they never reached net positive favorability. In Pew’s validated voter surveys Trump lost men under 30 by 5 points in 2024, an improvement over losing this group by 14 points in 2020. Among women under 30, Trump lost by 29 points in 2024 and by 35 points in 2020. Net gains of 9 points with young men and 6 points among young women are notable, but fall short of a major realignment of preferences. Exit polls in 2024 show young men voting for Trump by 1 point, 49% to 48%, and young women voting against Trump, 38%-61%. I think Pew’s data are more reliable for this analysis, but at the most Trump barely won young men, doing significantly less well than with older men in the exit poll. Pew data are here and the exit data are at the very bottom here.

The takeaway is that young men were not the key to Trump’s victory in 2024, though he improved with them over 2020. However, the fortunes of the GOP in 2026 have far more to do with Trump’s falling favor among all age groups under 60 than with any single sex or age group. Declining favorability is widespread across the population, and isolated strength is not enough to power a midterm victory. How many seats change in the House and Senate rests on the limited number of closely contested seats, before and after recent redistricting, but also depends on how unpopular the sitting president is. At this point, he is considerably less popular than at the start of his second term, including among young men.

Another GOP retirement in Wisconsin Senate

Six of 12 Republican incumbents up in 2026 are now retiring

Wisconsin state Senator Andre Jacque (R – New Franken) became the 6th Republican to announce he will not seek reelection. There are 12 incumbent Republicans up for election this year, so half have now announced they will not seek reelection. There are 18 sitting GOP senators, so there will be at least 1/3 of the caucus new in 2027. 

Republicans currently hold an 18-15 majority in the Senate. Democrats need a net gain of two seats to take the majority for the first time since 2010.

Of the GOP retirements two are in quite competitive seats (the 5th & 21st)), both in districts Harris won in 2024, while 4 are in relatively safe Republican seats, based on recent elections for statewide office. A third competitive seat, the 17th, has an incumbent Republican, Howard Marklein, seeking reelection in a considerably changed district following redistricting in 2024.

Jacque’s 1st district is solidly Republican. The district includes Door county plus parts of counties to the south of the Door peninsula in north-eastern Wisconsin.

The recent voting in the district has been solidly Republican. with the southern part of the district quite red and the northern part of Door county blue.

The full set of Senate seats up, with retirements and splits between incumbent party and 2024 presidential result is shown in the table blow.

Wisconsin Assembly Rep. Kaufert (R-53rd) retires

Creates open seat in one of the most competitive districts

Rep. Dean Kaufert, R-Neenah, announced his retirement from the 53rd district on April 27th. He is the 11th member of the Assembly, and the 8th Republican, to announce they will not seek reelection. Three Assembly Democrats are seeking other offices, two for state Senate and one for Governor. 

Kaufert is the only retiring Republican representative in a district Harris won in 2024. Kaufert won in 2024 by 364 votes, a 1.2 percentage point margin, while Harris won the district by 4.4 percentage points. Gov. Tony Evers carried it by 8.6 points in 2022 and Sen. Tammy Baldwin won it by 3.9 points that same year. (These past votes are calculated for the current district boundaries, following the 2024 redistricting.)

The district includes Neenah and Menasha, and part of Appleton, in northeastern Wisconsin.

The vote in the current 53rd district has been trending Democratic in recent years. From 2012 to 2016 Republicans won it in 2012 and 2014 governor races, and 2016 presidential and Senate races, though Obama and Baldwin won it in 2012. Since 2016 the district has voted Democratic in each of the major statewide races. Kaufert’s win in 2024 was an exceptional GOP victory. 

The top Assembly seats for majority control include the 53rd plus four other seats Republicans narrowly won in 2024, each of which Harris also won. The Assembly is currently 54R-45D. The most competitive Democratic held seat is the 94th which Rep. Steve Doyle won in 2024 by 217 votes, 0.6 percentage points, while Trump carried the district by 2.1 points. The other three potentially competitive Democratic held seats were relatively close for both assembly and president but were Harris victories as well as Democratic Assembly wins. 

As candidates are now circulating nomination papers for access to the ballot, the time for retirement announcements would seem to be drawing to a close. So far, the announced retirements have come in less competitive districts, with the exception of Kaufert’s decision today. Thus, the competition for the majority depends more on close seats with incumbent Republicans seeking reelection in Harris districts, plus the one split decision in a Democratic seat. 

Cease-fire good; war bad

New MULawPoll national survey finds widespread dissatisfaction with the Iran war

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey is out this morning. We were in the field April 8-16, starting the day after the cease-fire agreement with Iran went into place.  In today’s post I focus on the results related to the war. Tomorrow I’ll turn to the economy and how President Donald Trump is handling various aspects of his job. 

TLDR? Cease-fire popular, war not. Haven’t accomplished goals, not sufficient reasons for the war. Trump approval on war: 32%. And among Republicans 65% approve of war, that’s 13 points below Republican approval of how he handles his job in general, itself the lowest among Republicans in the second term.

The Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds 75% approve of the cease-fire in the U.S.-Iran war and 24% disapprove. At the same time, only 21% say the U.S. has achieved its goals in the war, while 78% say the goals have not been met. The public overall does not think that there were sufficient reasons for the war, with 63% saying there were not sufficient reasons and 36% saying there were.

There is bipartisan approval of the cease-fire that went into effect on April 7. Among Republicans, 82% approve of the cease-fire, as do 71% of Democrats and 67% of independents. There is also a bipartisan sentiment, with some partisan variation, that the goals of the war have not been achieved. Among Republicans, 64% say the United States has failed to achieve its goals, compared to 94% of Democrats and 78% of independents.

Bipartisanship breaks down on the question of the justification for the war. Seventy-one percent of Republicans say there was sufficient reason for the war, while 94% of Democrats say there was not. Among independents, 75% say there was not enough reason to go to war.

Thirty-two percent approve of the way President Donald Trump has handled the war, while 68% disapprove. Among Republicans, approval for Trump’s handling of the war stands at 65%, which is notably less than the 78% of Republicans who approve of Trump’s handling of his job as president in general. Among independents, 82% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war, along with 96% of Democrats.

The survey was conducted April 8-16, 2026, interviewing 982 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. For registered voters, the sample size was 870, with a margin of error of +/-3.6. For likely voters, the sample size was 576, with a margin of error of +/-4.4 percentage points.

Feelings toward Iran are quite negative, with 12% having a favorable opinion, 73% holding unfavorable views, and 14% saying they haven’t heard enough to say. The U.S. partner in the war, Israel, is seen favorably by 33% and unfavorably by 54%, with 14% who say they haven’t heard enough. Views of Israel have turned more negative over the past year. In March 2025, 43% held favorable views of Israel, compared to 43% unfavorable, with 14% lacking an opinion.

Trump threatened to bomb bridges and power plants across Iran in the days before the cease-fire went into effect. These are seen as legitimate military targets by 38% of respondents, while 62% say they are primarily civilian infrastructure that should not be attacked. Sixty-six percent of Republicans view these as legitimate military targets, while 34% disagree. Among independents, 70% say these are civilian locations and should not be attacked, as do 88% of Democrats.

The Iran war comes after the United States has destroyed dozens of alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, sent military forces into Venezuela to seize President Nicolás Maduro in January, and threatened to take control of Greenland. Respondents were asked whether they support or oppose Trump’s use of the military to force change in other countries.

  • Thirty-two percent support this use of the military, while 68% are opposed. 
  • As with approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran war, Republicans divide, though not evenly, with 64% in support of forcing change in other countries and 36% opposed. 
  • Eighty-three percent of independents and 94% of Democrats are opposed to such use of military force.
  • In this poll, 68% of Republicans are favorable to MAGA and 30% are not favorable to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Among Republicans favorable to the MAGA movement, 78% support using the military to force countries to change, while among Republicans who are not favorable to MAGA, 34% support this use of the military. 

The public does not see the United States as a force for stability in the world. While 39% say the U.S. is a force for stability, 60% say it is causing instability. Here, too, there is a partisan divide, with 73% of Republicans who say the U.S. is a stabilizing force, while 72% of independents and 90% of Democrats say it is causing instability.

A majority, 57%, say it is better for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, while 43% say it is better to stay out of world affairs. Support for an active role peaked in March 2025 when 64% favored an active role in the world—the highest in 18 Marquette Law School Poll national surveys since 2022.

Partisan views of the U.S. role in the world have shifted during Trump’s second term. In February 2025, 55% of Republicans said the U.S. should be active in the world. That rose to 68% in this poll. Independents are most reluctant to support an international role, with support among independents declining from 54% in early 2025 to 32% this month. Democrats have consistently been most supportive of an active role across the previous 17 polls since 2022, but have shifted substantially, especially since the Iran war began. In February 2025, 71% favored an active role; that fell to 64% in January 2026 and to 54% in April.

Attention to news about the Iran war

The public has paid substantial attention to the Iran war. In April, 76% had read or heard a lot about the war, 21% had heard a little, and 3% had heard nothing at all. That is more attention than was paid to the U.S. airstrikes on Iran nuclear facilities in June 2025, when 63% said they had heard a lot in July.

The only comparably high levels of attention in polling during Trump’s second term have been to the imposition of tariffs in April 2025, when 81% said they had heard a lot, and the fatal shooting of Renee Good by an ICE officer in Minneapolis in January, when 76% had heard a lot. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to say they heard a lot about the current Iran war, 82% and 80% respectively, while independents have paid considerably less attention, with 51% hearing a lot.

Attention is also relatively high concerning Iran limiting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Sixty percent say have heard a lot about this, 27% have heard a little, and 13% have heard nothing at all. As with the war in general, Democrats and Republicans are equally attentive, while independents are much less so.

Significantly fewer Americans paid close attention to the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose airplane was shot down over Iran, leading to a large number of ground troops being dispatch inside Iran to rescue the second airman. About this, only 45% said they had heard a lot, 34% heard a little, and 21% heard nothing. While 58% of Republicans heard a lot about this, 39% of Democrats did, and just 24% of independents.

The toplines and crosstabs for the poll are on the poll website here.  Tomorrow I’ll run down views of the economy and of Trump’s handling of various issues.

Second Term Worse than the First

Consumer sentiment is far worse in 2nd term than in 1st

Analysts of President Donald Trump’s second term, and the outlook for the midterm elections on Nov. 3, have reasonably focused on Trump’s job approval. After holding above the first term approval trend, the second term approval fell below the first term in January and has recently fallen more after the start of the Iran war.

This is well known and I have nothing to add.

What is less often considered are opinions of the economy and especially the comparison of first and second term opinion. This deserves more attention.

The University of Michigan’s index of consumer sentiment is a long-running monthly survey of how Americans feel about the economy. As an index, high values reflect optimism and positive feelings, low values show pessimism and negative feelings. An index value of 100 (where the index stood in 1966) reflects quite positive views of the economy including current conditions and future expectations. As an index, values can be above or below 100, i.e. this is not a percentage.

On April 10, the Michigan survey reported consumer sentiment at 47.6, a record low in polling dating back to 1952. Four of the 5 lowest values ever have come in the last 4 years, with two in the Biden administration in June and July 2022 at 50.0 and 51.5 respectively (at the peak of the inflation surge), and in November 2025 with an index at 51.0, in addition to the current all time low. The 5th lowest index ever was 51.7 in May 1980. In short, despite objective measures of GDP, unemployment and inflation having been far worse in some earlier years, Americans are stunningly sour on the economy,

The comparison of consumer sentiment in the first Trump administration and in the second is the point of this post. The chart highlights the first term up to the 2018 midterms and the second term so far. The average sentiment in the first 23 months of term 1 was 97.5. The average so far in term 2 is 55.5, with the most recent reading at 47.6. That is a 42 point drop from average to average and a 49.9 point drop from average to current reading.

To state the obvious: economic sentiment was a tremendous advantage in the first Trump term and is a tremendous burden in the second.

Sentiment plummeted when the Covid pandemic arrived in early 2020, then began to recover into 2021 before the spike in inflation in the second half of 2021 drove sentiment to the then all-time low of 50 in June 2022. Sentiment recovered somewhat through most of the 2nd half of the Biden administration though it dipped in the run-up to the 2024 election. That persistent negative view of the economy was a constant weight on Biden’s support and ultimately on Harris’ vote.

During Trump’s second term the trend has been sharply down from a peak of 74.0 in December 2024 immediately after his reelection, to 64.7 in the first month of the new term with irregular month to month movements and an overall downward trend.

The low consumer sentiment index means the economy is virtually guaranteed to remain the top concern for voters, and therefore the issue all candidates have to discuss (and claim to fix, with more or less persuasiveness). Above all, this economic gloom will be the atmosphere of the election.

Whatever Trump’s approval rating was in the first term, he could count on an electorate optimistic about the economy. In the second term economic pessimism can only be a drag on his approval and the fortunes of the Republican party in November.

Low consumer sentiment doesn’t guarantee big GOP seat losses in November. While it is correlated with seat loss the fit is quite loose. Presidential approval is a better predictor of seat loss. But economic concerns write the script for the 2026 election.

Let’s do take a moment to reiterate what all have said before: compare Trump approval in term 1 and term 2. While there has been steady decline in net approval in the second term, the first year of the first term was lower and reached what is still the lowest point of either term at -19.4. My estimate of the lowest net approval of the second term is -16.8 on April 6. As of April 9 the net approval estimate is -16.5. You can, of course, consult the many other websites on Substack and elsewhere for alternate estimates of the approval trends. These are mine. Some are a little better for Trump and some a little worse. We all tell the same qualitative story and show very similar bumps and wiggles.

I’ve added annotation for some significant events around the times of movement in approval. See Elliott Morris’s look at consequential events for Trump 2 approval at his Strength in NumbersSubstack. I have slightly different notable events based on my judgement rather than statistical fits.

In the first term approval fell around Trump’s effort to replace Obamacare, and continued down until the passage of the Ryan tax cut package in December 2017. After that, net approval rose until it stabilized at about -10 where it remained through the midterms.

In the second term so far, we’ve not seen a sustained recovery in net approval. After the negative reaction to “Liberation Day” tariffs, approval declined until Trump announced he was pausing the tariffs and negotiating. That bought back some approval points in the late spring, only to again start declining by June. Likewise the October government shutdown coincided with a drop in approval, with some recovery after the shutdown ended. The most recent period of decline has not seen a similar recovery period so far.

This is not to say there can be no approval recovery. We know not what events may occur over the next 207 days until the election. But we do know that inflation and the cost of living has been the most important problem in surveys since the inflation spike in 2021-22, and it has remained the number one problem throughout Trump’s second term. The vast difference in consumer sentiment in the second term compared to the first shows vividly that the economy is not the life preserver the president and his party seek.

A new Wisconsin counties mnemonic 

Liberal Chris Taylor sweeps conservative Maria Lazar in Supreme Court race

In Wisconsin we have the historically crucial and very red WOW counties (Washington, Ozaukee, Waukesha) and the usually competitive BOW (Brown, Outagamie, Winnebago) and Lake Superior’s blue BAD (Bayfield, Ashland, Douglas) counties. This morning, add one more mnemonic trio.

In 2024, Donald Trump won 34 of 72 Wisconsin counties with 60% or more. On April 7th, 2026, the conservative Supreme Court candidate won only 3 counties by 60% or more: Washington, Taylor, Florence. The WTF counties.

The liberal candidate swept the BAD counties with over 60% in each, and all three BOW counties with 57%, 58% & 60% respectively. And the WOW counties split with 62% for the conservative in Washington (the highest in the state), 54% in Waukesha (a historically low share) while the liberal carried Ozaukee with 52% (Trump got 54% there in 2024.)

True to expectations, the liberal candidate dominated the MD counties (dare I call them DOC counties?) of Milwaukee and Dane with 76% and 84%. Together those two counties also provided 26% of the total statewide vote.

It all adds up to a 60.1% to 39.8% win for liberal Chris Taylor over conservative Maria Lazar, doubling the liberal margins seen in each of the previous three Court elections, which themselves were considered large margins in highly competitive Wisconsin.

Results are unofficial but nearly complete.

You can remember me from my mnemonic: PAV, PollsAndVotes.

Map credit: NYTimes.

Screenshot

Opinion of the Iran War in Wisconsin

Most groups oppose the war; Trump loyalists approve

Today I take a look at opinion of the Iran war in the swing state of Wisconsin. As I wrote this, President Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran. And the liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court won by 20 points (with 95% of the vote in), double the margin in each of the three previous Court races. While I doubt the Court vote was directly driven by opinion of the war, opposition to the war, and to Trump, almost certainly played a role in motivating Democrats to turn out.

In my March 11-18 Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters we asked if the respondent approved or disapproved of the war with Iran. Overall, 39% approved of the war and 61% disapproved.

Today I want to show how a number of demographic and attitudinal groups line up on the war. There are some groups that are strongly supportive of the war. These groups are also mostly part of the core Trump base. They include Republicans who are also favorable to MAGA, those who describe themselves as very conservative, Trump 2024 voters, and Republicans in general. Even among these and other Trump base groups there is variation in support for the war. For example 88% of MAGA Republicans approve of the war. That slips to 75% among all Republicans and to 61% among born-again protestants.

At the opposite end of high opposition to the war, almost all Democratic groups are over 95% opposed to the war, as are both somewhat liberal and very liberal groups.

There is more interesting variation within some categories. White, males, without a college degree are fairly supportive of the war, 56% approve. But their white, female, non-college counterparts are solidly opposed, 61%, which is similar to white, males with a college degree, 64%, while white, female college grads are still more opposed, 68%. Given the support for Trump from white, non-college women in 2024 (51% for Trump in the MULawPoll, 53% in the Wisconsin exit poll) this is notable slippage among an important swing group.

The war evenly divides rural Wisconsin voters while those in the suburbs are solidly opposed, 66%, and those in urban areas more opposed, 70%. Trump won rural voters in Wisconsin by 23 percentage points and by 2 points in the suburbs, losing urban voters by 21 points.

There is a considerable split by age with those 45 and older only slightly opposed to the war while those under 45 are strongly opposed.

By ideology the expected liberal and conservative alignments are strong, but among moderates, 75% disapprove of the war, as do 73% of independents.

The chart shows these groups and more. It provides a review of many crosstabs in a single figure. At the top are those groups that most approve of the war with decreasing approval as one reads down the rows.

The cease-fire, assuming it holds, will allow the end of active bombing and a resumption of oil shipments, perhaps reducing the oil shock of the past five and a half weeks. It is a long 210 days to election day as I write this. Will memories of an unpopular war and its economic price tag linger for some seven months, or will we have moved on to new topics by the fall? At this moment, there are few groups of Wisconsin voters who can be said to have thought the war a good idea.