The paradox that an unpopular Democratic party keeps winning

Democrats have reservations about their party but unite in opposing Trump

The Democratic party is less popular than the Republican party in both Wisconsin and national Marquette Law School polls since Jan. 2025. Yet Democrats keep strongly over-performing in both general and special elections in 2025 and 2026. Most recently Democrats flipped the Florida legislative seat that includes Mar-a-Lago, a district that went +11 for Trump in 2024 but went +2 for the Democratic legislative candidate on March 24. How can this paradox be explained?

I previously looked at this in my national polling here. Today let’s look at the most competitive state in the nation since 2016, Wisconsin. Data are from Marquette Law School polls of registered voters in October 2025, and February and March 2026.

Both parties are underwater, but Democrats more so

Both parties have net negative favorability ratings, meaning more have unfavorable than favorable views of each party. Since October there has been little change in overall favorability for each, with Democratic party favorability more net negative than for the Republican party. GOP net favorability has been around -10 points while Democratic net favorability has been twice as large, in the -20s.

Where does this added negativity to the Democrats come from? Not from the opposite party. Republicans have extremely negative views of Democrats and Democrats return the favor with equally net negative views of Republicans. Likewise this difference between parties doesn’t come from independents, who strongly dislike both parties though they give Republicans an 8 point more net negative rating than they give Democrats.

The partisan gap comes in feelings about voters’ own party. Republicans give the GOP a net positive +74 point rating, but Democrats give their party just a +56 point rating. Our partisans hate the other party equally but don’t love themselves equally.

As in horror movies, “the call is coming from inside the house.”

The same result is seen in my national polling where we also ask about approval of the job Democrats in Congress and Republicans in Congress are doing. Partisans strongly disapprove of the other congressional party but Democrats are less approving of congressional Democrats while Republicans are more approving of their party in Congress. Democratic discontent applies equally to favorability of the party in general and specifically to the job performance of the congressional party.

This asymmetry in partisan views take a different turn when the question is about President Donald Trump. Across the three polls since October Trump’s overall approval is 44% and disapproval is 54%, for a net rating of -10 percentage points. Here, though, Democrats are stunningly united in disapproval. Republicans strongly approve but not so much as Democrats disapprove. And independents are also strong in their disapproval of the president. This negative balance, seen in both Wisconsin and national Marquette polls, explains why Republican candidates have suffered in elections in 2025 and 2026 despite Trump winning the presidency in 2024.

Democrats are less thrilled with their party but virtually all are agreed in their dislike for Trump. This, plus strong independent dissatisfaction with Trump, has powered Democratic over-performance and wins in the 2025 general elections in Virginia and New Jersey and in special elections throughout the country.

Where dissatisfaction comes from within each party

Which Democrats are less satisfied with their party, and where does Republican dissatisfaction arise in the GOP?

Very few Republicans consider themselves to be liberal or very liberal, and very few Democrats describe themselves as conservative or very conservative. I lump these few outliers in with moderates in each party. (To see how that has changed over the past 15 years in Wisconsin see my earlier post here.)

Here we look at very conservative to moderate Republicans and at moderate to very liberal Democrats and their favorability to their own parties.

In the GOP those who are very conservative have the highest net positive feelings for the Republican party, and those who are conservative are almost as positive. Where there is less positivity is with moderate Republicans, who remain solidly positive but considerably less so than either type of conservative.

For the Democrats, those who are very liberal are the least positive to the party, just +24 points net favorable, while liberals are most positive and moderates pretty positive but not enormously so. Comparing Democrats with Republicans, very liberal Democrats are much less favorable to the Democratic party than very conservative Republicans are to their party. And liberal Democrats are less positive than conservative Republicans to their respective parties. Only among moderates does the Democratic party enjoy a modest advantage in net favorability, a +56 vs +45 among Republicans.

The asymmetry between parties is not only with one ideological camp, but the strikingly low favorability among very liberal Democrats reflects the ongoing debate within the party between those urging moderation and those pushing for a more clearly liberal or progressive party.

Some of these discrepancies are likely due to the natural frustration of a minority party unable to control the congressional agenda and able at best to block or stall legislation in the Senate. But the differences by ideology also point to a divide over the direction of the Democratic party.

These are the things that explain why the Democratic party has consistently less favorable ratings than the Republican party, and that the discrepancy is substantially due to differences within the parties.

The paradox unriddled

The paradox of strong electoral performance by the less popular party is driven by opposite forces. Democrats differ about themselves but they nearly unanimously oppose Donald Trump, and they are joined by solid opposition to Trump among independents. Republicans have maintained very strong support for Trump within their party, but not so strong as Democratic opposition and with quite weak appeal among independents.

Democrats may not agree on what they are for, and are frustrated by their party’s inability to block Trump, but they absolutely know what (or who) they are against. This has provided a strong electoral advantage when Republican candidates across the country have so closely tied themselves to President Trump, and where dissent brings presidential condemnation and primary challenges. November is seven months away and the details of candidates and issues are not yet certain, but it is against this background that the less popular party nonetheless enjoys a midterm advantage.

House retirements in 2026

Lots of turnover, but mostly in safe seats and across the ideological spectrum

(You can read my posts here or at my Substack. Both are, and forever will be, free)

As of 2026-03-11 there have been 56 members of the House of Representatives who have announced they will not seek reelection in 2026. That is well above recent years. At this time in 2024 42 had announced they would not seek reelection, as had 45 in 2022, 34 in 2020 and 46 in 2018.

Quite a few of these are seeking other offices. Sixteen are seeking a Senate seat, 11 are running for governor and 1 is a candidate for state attorney general. A total of 28 are retiring from politics.

While a large number of retirements (including those seeking other office) might seem to signal large seat changes in November, that is too hasty a conclusion to reach. It certainly speaks to the desirability of a House career (or lack of desirability) but most of these members are from pretty safe seats. Of the 35 retiring Republicans, only 4 won by 10 percentage points or less in 2024, and of the 21 retiring Democrats only 2 won by 10 points or less. (These are based on their 2024 districts, not new 2026 districts in those states that have redistricted in the last year.) So if most of these seats are likely to stay in the hands of the current party the greater number of Republican than Democratic retirements is unlikely to result in a significant gain of Democratic seats. A swing at the ballot box in November can certainly shift the party balance, but that will come predominantly among the closely contested seats, not from these more secure retirement seats.

There is a lot of ideological diversity in the retirements as well. Republican retirees range from the 3rd most moderate to the 2nd most conservative members of the GOP caucus and are spread pretty evenly across the Republican ideological spectrum. The same holds for Democratic retirees who range from the most moderate to not quite the most liberal. In neither party is ideological location nor 2024 vote margin significantly related to retirement, nor is age.

In short, retirements are all over the place and higher than in recent years but they aren’t coming from especially vulnerable seats or from members ideologically out of step with their party.

The chart shows all House members with retirees highlighted by solid dots. Along the horizontal axis is 2024 election margin from most Democratic to most Republican. The vertical axis shows ideology from most liberal at the bottom to most conservative at the top, based on analysis of roll call voting by each member.

The retirements do guarantee one thing about the House in 2027: regardless of election defeats in November there will be a lot of new faces next January. Change in the party and ideological balance, though, will come more from the ballot box than from retirements.

What Wisconsin Independents Think

Dislike Republicans, Democrats and Donald Trump

We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the independents. (See the first post on the Republicans here, and the post on the Democrats here.

The first thing that jumps out about the opinions of independents is that they are much less lopsided than either Republicans or Democrats. For the partisans a number of opinions were held by over 80% of the party, but for independents only a handful approach that level of consensus.

The one item where independents are nearly unanimous is whether tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Only 5% think the do.

Independents are united in not liking the parties and related groups. Only 17% are favorable to the Democratic party and 18% are favorable to the Republican party.

Opinions related to ICE are quite negative, with 19% favorable to ICE, and 24% who approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws. Twenty-two percent say the shooting of Alex Pretti was justified.

President Donald Trump gets a 23% approval rating from independents and MAGA is viewed favorably by 22%. Twenty-four percent think Trump’s policies will reduce inflation and 25% say they are better off than a year ago. Forty-one percent say they are living comfortably rather than just getting by or struggling.

The chart shows independent opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.

On policies, independents are skeptical of data centers, with 24% saying their benefits outweigh the costs. Online sports betting is favored by 25%.

On immigration issues one-in-four, 25%, favor deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record, though 59% favor deporting those in the country illegally when the question doesn’t mention length of residence or criminal records. Forty-five percent think the U.S. is mostly deporting immigrants who have criminal records.

A number of school related issues are more evenly divided among independents. Thirty-nine percent say schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid and opinion is evenly divided on Evers’ 400-year veto which requires annual increases in per-pupil expenditures. A majority, 55%, say they are more concerned with holding down property taxes rather than increasing school spending, though 58% are satisfied with the job their local public schools are doing.

Thirty-seven percent approve of the job the legislature is doing and 46% approve of how Evers is handling his job as governor. Fifty-one percent approve of how the Wisconsin Supreme Court is doing its job.

Most important concerns

The top issue concern for independents is health insurance, closely followed by inflation and the cost of living. A bit less concern is expressed for taxes in general and for electricity costs, followed by gun violence.

Independents are somewhat less concerned about jobs and the economy, and abortion policy. While taxes ranked third in concern at 51%, property taxes specifically ranked next to last at 33%. And immigration and border security ranked last, with just 22% of independents saying they were very concerned about this.

Independents are more like Democrats in ranking health insurance and inflation as their top two issues. Democrats rank inflation first and then health insurance. And independents differ from Republican issue priorities by putting property taxes and immigration at the bottom of their concerns, while Republicans rank immigration first and property taxes second.

While partisans are extremely united on a number of issues, independents are more varied in their views, meaning that for virtually all issues there is at least a significant minority view on every issue for independents while the minority views among partisans are often much smaller, with a more unified majority opinion.

There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.

Next time: Comparing partisan and independent opinions.

Was the Iraq war worth fighting

Some perspective on public opinion and the endless war

A look at the way back machine. The public was quite supportive of the Iraq war initially. Opinion shifted through the first year to a majority saying it was not worth fighting. That reached a stable equilibrium by 2008 which has remained since.

Some perspective.

What Wisconsin Democrats Think

Extremely unified in opposition to Trump and his works

We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the Democrats. (See the first post on the Republicans here.)

Democrats are intensely opposed to President Donald Trump and (almost) all of his policies. Literally no Democrats, zero percent, think tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Three percent or less are favorable to MAGA, think Trump will reduce inflation, approve of Trump’s handling of his job, believe the Alex Pretti shooting was justified, view ICE favorably or approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws, or view the Republican party favorably.

Just slightly more, 6%, favor deporting immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record. Ten percent think they are better off now than a year ago. And 10% think we are deporting mostly criminals.

In state affairs, 15% of Democrats think the benefits of data centers outweigh their cost, and 88% approve of how Gov. Tony Evers is handling his job.

The chart shows Democratic opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.

There is a larger minority view among Democrats on school funding with 21% saying schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid, and 25%, one in four Democrats, favor deporting immigrants in the country illegally (without mention of length of residence or non-criminal status.) Majorities mirror the school budget item with 79% favoring Evers’ 400 year veto and 78% satisfied with their local public schools. And 77% are favorable to the Democratic party.

The minority faction of the party passes 30% for approving of the (Republican controlled) legislature, favoring online sports betting, and saying it is more important to hold down property taxes than to increase K-12 funding. Of course majorities of the party take the opposite view on these topics but here there is considerably less unanimity than when Trump is involved.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court gets a 65% approval rating, with 15% lacking an opinion.

Finally, 46% say they are living comfortably, as opposed to just getting by or struggling.

Most important concerns

The top issue concern for Democrats is inflation and the cost of living, followed by health insurance. Close behind are gun violence, jobs and the economy and abortion policy. Topics of less concern are the cost of electricity, taxes in general, and property taxes specifically. The topic of least concern to Democrats is illegal immigration and border security.

While Democrats are incredibly united in opposition to national issues related to Trump and his policies, there is a bit less unity on state issues surrounding schools and property taxes. To be sure there are sizable majorities in favor of school funding but a fifth to a third of Democrats favor constraints on school budgets and prioritize holding down property taxes. And one in four favor deportations, except when asked if that includes those with no criminal record.

Democratic issue priorities stress inflation and health care but rank illegal immigration at the very bottom of concerns, with taxes only a little higher.

There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.

Next time: What Independents think.

What Wisconsin Republicans Think

United on deportations, support for Trump, property taxes

We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I start a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s start with the Republicans.

Republicans in Wisconsin are most united in support of deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally, reducing property taxes, supporting President Donald Trump and approving of the way ICE is going about enforcing immigration laws. Between 87% an 95% of Republicans embrace these four topics.

Republicans are also united in disliking the Democratic party, Gov. Tony Evers and his 400-year school funding veto.

The chart shows Republican opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.

The GOP is almost as united on believing that most deportees have criminal records, having a favorable view of ICE, being favorable to the Republican party (though less so than to Trump), and believing that public schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid. Each of these opinions are embraced by 80%-83% of Republicans.

Solid majorities say that the shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis was justified, that immigrants in the U.S. illegally should be deported even if they have been here a long time and have no criminal record and that Trump’s policies will decrease inflation.

Similar majorities oppose online sports betting, and disapprove of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Only 35% think tariffs are helping Wisconsin farmers, though a similar number think tariffs have no effect. On this topic opinion is less solid than it appears.

Then there is a set of issues that are less consensual with only small majorities: 57% say they are living comfortably and 55% say they are better off than a year ago; 53% approve of the job the legislature is doing and 51% are satisfied with their local public school. And 43% think the benefits of data centers outweigh their costs.

Simplifying, the GOP backs Trump and his policies (with some doubts on tariff effects) and wants to rein in property taxes and school spending. And they don’t care for Democrats or Tony Evers (no surprise there.)

Most important concerns

The priorities Republican have across issues largely mirror the unifying issues above. The top issue concern is illegal immigration and border security followed by property taxes. Those are followed by inflation and the cost of living and taxes more generally.

Further down the concerns, with less than 50% saying they are very concerned, are health insurance and the cost of electricity. Still further down are abortion policy and jobs and the economy. Ranked last is concern over gun violence.

The Wisconsin GOP is strongly united on issues of national politics centered on President Trump, and in state politics concerning property taxes and school funding. Also in opposition to Democrats.

There is less unity on new issues like data centers and online sports betting. And just over half say they are getting along well financially or better than before while there is some significant concern with inflation and the effect of tariffs.

There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.

Next time: What Democrats think.

Opinion of Trump’s military actions are malleable

… but approval of Trump barely budges

In November 2025 just 24% of American adults thought the U.S. “should attempt to remove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power” while 76% said the U.S. should “not get involved in Venezuela”. Among Republicans, 63% said we should not get involved, as did 79% of independents and 88% of Democrats. That was bipartisan lopsided opposition to military intervention to depose a foreign leader.

Then on January 3, 2026 President Donald Trump ordered military action that removed Maduro from power. In my January 21-28, 2026 Marquette Law School poll support for removing Maduro changed dramatically, more than doubling, with 55% saying removing Maduro was the right thing to do, and 45% saying it was the wrong thing to do. Among Republicans support skyrocketed to 87% and opposition cratered to 13%. Support among independents rose to 51% and even among Democrats support rose to 23%. See the chart.

This illustrates how weakly held opinions can change dramatically with presidential leadership and weak opposition messaging. See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Not all issues are like this, with weak initial positions followed by one-sided flows of information without countervailing narratives. Not all, but many, foreign policy matters are like this—remote from the daily concerns of most Americans and a realm of special presidential influence.

But what was the domestic political consequence of Trump’s success in removing Maduro? Did his deposing a foreign president, with support from a majority of the public (after the fact), win him accolades at home? Nope. Approval of Trump’s handling of his job slipped by a point, from 43% in Nov. to 42% in Jan. And approval among partisans similarly hardly changed at all, despite the large increase in support for removing Maduro seen above. GOP approval ticked down 2 points, independents down 2 points and Democrats up 1 point.

Most folks lack strong opinions about rare foreign policy events, but they have very strong views of Trump’s handling of his job. Even big moves in the former leave the latter untouched.

A similar result appears for the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites on June 21, 2025. We don’t have a pre-bombing opinion measure, but after the bombing in my July 7-16 national poll, 52% supported the air strikes while 48% opposed them. And 85% of Republicans supported them as did 43% of independents and 22% of Democrats. Not much different from the post-Maduro opinion in January.

But did this shift opinion of Trump’s handling of his job? It did not. Republican approval slipped a tad, independent approval rose a little and Democrats approved just a little less.

Nor did this military success in Iran translate to approval specifically of Trump’s handling of the Israel-Iran war. In fact, Republicans in July were a little less approving of Trump’s handling of the war than they were of his handling of his job overall, 79% approval for handling the war to 86% approval for Trump’s job overall. Independents were 1 point more approving of his handling the war than his job in general and Democrats showed a bigger difference–13% approval on the war, to 8% approval overall.

Nor did views of Trump’s handling of foreign policy shift at all from May to July: 43% approved and 57% disapproved in both months. And partisans hardly budged.

So what?

Long wars can be devastating to a presidency. Ask Lyndon Johnson or George W. Bush. And short ones can boost a president, at least temporarily. Ask George H. W. Bush. And short disasters can certainly be damaging. Ask Jimmy Carter about Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw.)

But even brief military actions that are seen as successes have surprisingly little effect on the broader approval of a president. Ask Barack Obama about killing Osama bin Laden.

Trump’s quick successes in bombing Iran nuclear sites in June and removing Maduro in January received majority, albeit slight majority, support after the fact, support above that of his overall job rating. But neither translated into any meaningful improvement in his overall job or his foreign policy job or his handling of the Israel-Iran war.

The question still on the table is will this new Iran war be a quick success or a prolonged engagement with declining support? By the initial polls, more people oppose the new Iran war than support it, with quite a few undecided. That’s not a position of strength with public opinion. A success and rapid deescalation could boost support for the decision to use military force. But the evidence above shows that even that best outcome won’t necessarily translate into higher approval of the president. I guess we’ll know in a month or six. If it is six months, and not a quick success, we will learn very close to election day.

Opposition to data centers surges in Wisconsin

A partisan divide has emerged since October

Opposition to data centers in Wisconsin rose dramatically from October to February, one of the most sudden changes in public opinion we’ve seen in 14 years of Marquette Law School polling. In October opinion of data centers was mildly opposed, with 55% who said the costs outweigh the benefits and 44% who said the benefits outweigh the costs. In February opposition jumped to 70% seeing costs as greater and only 29% seeing benefits as greater.

In October there was virtually no partisan divide on data centers, a rarity in the most competitive state in the union. By February Republicans had hardly changed their view of data centers, remaining mildly opposed, but opposition among independents and Democrats had soared.

Respondents were asked what they saw as the most important benefits and costs of data centers, choosing up to two each from five benefits and five costs. Among benefits, jobs for technical and other workers was most often cited as a benefit, followed by local tax revenues. Construction jobs ranked third and establishing a new industry in the state was fourth. The least cited benefit was developing artificial intelligence.

On the cost side, water use was most frequently mentioned, with over half choosing this, followed by those saying we should not develop artificial intelligence. The effect of data centers on the cost of electricity, and the potential for requiring new electric generating plants lagged in third and fourth place. The shift from agricultural to industrial land use was the least mentioned cost of data centers.

One substantial difference in views is shown by the fact that 22% saw no benefits at all from data centers while only 4% saw no costs.

Doubts about artificial intelligence play a role in opposition to data centers as the second most-cited cost, while developing AI in order to lead the world ranked last among perceived benefits.

Those who said the use of AI is moving too quickly are more opposed to data centers, while those who say AI is developing at about the right pace or too slowly see benefits outweighing costs by a small margin. Overall, 73% say AI is moving too quickly.

Concern about the cost of electricity in general is only modestly related to the balance of benefits and costs of data centers. Concern for electricity costs also ranked tied for last of 9 concerns covered in the poll.

There is only moderate variation in views of data centers across urban, suburban and rural areas of Wisconsin, with majority opposition in each of the three areas.

While a substantial majority say the costs outweigh the benefits of data centers, most admit they haven’t heard a lot about the issue. Just 20% say they have heard a lot about data centers, 62% have heard a little and 18% have heard nothing at all. The amount heard about data centers, however, is not related to views of costs and benefits. Seventy-four of those who heard a lot say the costs outweigh the benefits, and among those who have heard little or nothing 69% also say the costs outweigh the benefits.

Bottom line

Opposition to data centers has been fought in city or county councils and planning commissions in Wisconsin, not (yet) at the state level. Those local officials have faced large and vocal opposition to data centers and to the way development has been negotiated, often with non-disclosure agreements that lack transparency.

As the critics have been vocal, proponents of the value of data centers have been soft spoken if not silent. In the past, economic development debates in Wisconsin have often fallen along partisan lines with equally assertive arguments from both sides. In the case of data centers political champions have been far less visible than opponents. With the governor’s race looming this year, and a majority, if a small one, of Republicans opposed to data centers, it is unclear who will emerge as advocates for the centers. At the same time the large majority of Democrats opposed to data centers will make it difficult for any of the Democratic candidates for governor or the legislature to advocate for the benefits of these developments. So far, a handful of mayors have been the primary voices for the local benefits data centers can provide.

If opposition were based solely on local zoning or location or utility costs or tax payments, then alternative arrangements might be negotiated. As the data above show, some of these are important considerations for people and may yet lead to compromises on development. But opposition to the development of AI looms large on the cost side, and that is a much harder divide to bridge.

Public opinion favors Supreme Court decision striking down Trump tariffs

In Jan. 63% said Court should rule against Trump, including 33% of Republicans

On Feb. 20 the United State Supreme Court ruled against President Trump’s authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. The case is Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump.

Public views of the case have been consistently in favor of upholding limits on the tariff authority since the Marquette Law School national poll first asked about this case in September. The table shows opinion over three national surveys.

The partisan divide on the tariff case is somewhat less stark than on many issues, with a significant minority of Republicans opposing the president’s position. A third of Republicans in the January poll wanted the Court to strike down the tariffs, an increase from 26% in November. More than two-thirds of independents favored overturning Trump’s use of tariffs, as did an overwhelming 92% of Democrats.

Approval of Trump’s handling of tariffs has consistently been below his overall approval rating in Marquette Law School national polls, with approval on tariffs below 40% in each of five polls since May 2025. In January, 26% of Republicans disapproved of Trump’s handling of tariffs, as did 71% of independents and 95% of Democrats.

A majority of the public, 56% say that tariffs hurt the U.S. economy, while 30% think they help the economy and 14% say tariffs don’t make much difference. Views of the effect of tariffs are related to opinion of how the Court should rule, as shown in the table below. Those who think tariffs help the economy are in favor of overturning the limits on the president’s authority, 77%, though even among this group more than one-in-five think the president’s authority should be limited, 23%. Among those who say tariffs harm the economy, 89% think the Court should limit presidential authority. Opinion is evenly divided among those who say tariffs don’t make much difference.

The Court and the President

A large majority of adults believe that the president must obey a Supreme Court decision, 82% with 17% who say the president can ignore a decision with which he disagrees. These views have been quite stable in 10 Marquette polls since 2019, never dipping below 76% saying the president must obey the Court, and not below 83% since Jan. 2025.

This belief in the authority of the Court is not a partisan matter. Among Republicans 76% say the president must obey the Court, as do 79% of independents and 90% of Democrats.

In January, a majority, 57% said the Court was going out of it’s way to avoid ruling against Trump, while 43% said the Court was not doing so. Among Republicans 34% thought the Court was avoiding ruling against Trump, as did 59% of independents and 78% of Democrats.

Approval of the Supreme Court

Approval of the U.S. Supreme Court has fallen since September, from 50% to 44% in January. Approval fell sharply in 2022 following the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision which overturned abortion rights established in Roe v. Wade. Net approval, the percentage approval minus disapproval, remained negative throughout the remainder of 2022 and through 2024. In January 2025 net approval moved up into positive territory before turning down in July. The table shows approval of the Court since September 2020.

About the Marquette Law School Poll

The survey was conducted Jan. 21-28, 2026, interviewing 1003 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points.

Interviews were conducted using the SSRS Opinion Panel, a national probability sample with interviews conducted online. The detailed methodology statement, survey instrument, topline results, and crosstabs for this release are available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/category/results-and-data/

Highest highs and lowest lows: Gallup 1937-2025

Closing the books on Gallup presidential approval

When I refreshed my presidential approval database in January, I wondered when Gallup would update their measure from December. They usually release approval in mid-month, but there wasn’t an update as of Jan. 20. I assumed it would come soon.

Now we learn that there won’t be any more Gallup presidential approval polls. As reported in the Washington Post and the New York Times on Feb. 11, Gallup has decided to discontinue their approval polling. Gallup made a similar decision in 2015 to discontinue their presidential horse race polls.

This is a loss to the public. The Gallup organization has the longest running, and most voluminous, time series of approval, dating back to 1937. While their methodology has evolved over time, they have always used what was “state of the art” methods for the time, and their question wording has been stable for decades, after evolving a bit in the early years. That means when we want to make the best apples-to-apples comparison across presidents and decades, Gallup is the indispensable source.

Here is what I now realize to be my final update of all the 2846 Gallup approval polls since Roosevelt in Aug. 1937 to Trump in Dec. 2025.

There are plenty of high quality national polls available now, so Gallup is hardly the only game in town. The polling averages from Silver BulletinFiftyPlusOneNew York TimesRealClearPolitics and others are now widely recognized as a better way to track the full measure of approval across dozens of pollsters rather than rely on a single pollster.

When George Gallup started the poll in the 1930s there was money to be made in public opinion polling. Newspapers across the country subscribed to his polls and distributed his results to a national audience. Gallup actually offered newspapers a money back guarantee that his 1936 presidential horse race poll would outperform the Literary Digest poll that year, which it did. The poll also survived embarrassing errors, most notably the 1948 presidential election.

These days, there isn’t such a financial interest in providing opinion data to the public. Private polling for interest groups, parties and candidates remains financially viable, but those polls serve private, not public, interests. News organizations either run their own polls, contracting the work through various pollsters, or report on polls they don’t produce themselves but also don’t pay for. Universities (like my Marquette Law School Poll) produce public polls in the public interest and for the publicity value. Gallup is reported to say they are refocusing their business away from approval polling, which is sad but understandable.

This moment of closure lets us make one final list of the lows and highs of Gallup approval results over the decades.

The all time lowest low goes to Harry Truman, at 22%. John F. Kennedy has the highest low, never falling below 56%. And as for highs, George W. Bush owns that record at 90%, eclipsing his father, George H.W. Bush by one point. As for the lowest high, that belongs to the current president, at 47% in his second term, two points lower than his high in the first term. No other president has failed to reach 50% on their best days.

That all time low for Truman was misreported for some decades as a point higher, 23%. I found the discrepancy in 2006, tracked down the evidence, and presented it to Gallup’s then Editor in Chief, Frank Newport, who was gracious enough to review my results and confirm the new low of 22%. I told that story in a post in July 2006. To my surprise, the post still lives at my first website, Political Arithmetik

Presidents can tie their highs or lows in multiple polls on different days. The next table shows all the lows and highs and the dates on which those polls were taken. Some of the dates are instructive. Trump’s second term high came 7 days after his inauguration. And his first term highs were all during the early months of the Covid pandemic. Biden’s low came about the time he dropped out of the presidential race in 2024. For George W. Bush and Franklin D. Roosevelt, their highest marks came after attacks on the United States, after Sept. 11, 2001 and after Dec. 7, 1941.

As for largest range from high to low, that honor is shared by George W. Bush and Harry S Truman, both with a 65 point range, Bush from 90-25 and Truman from 87-22. (Truman lacks a middle name, just an initial, hence no period after the S, a lesson I learned from my 12th grade government teacher, Dr. Austin F. Staples. The great Google AI tells me official documents include a period, but I trust Dr. Staples on this.)

So there you have it. An end of a polling era. “Official” highs and lows will no longer have a consistent standard to use. This means as a practical problem that the highs and lows going forward will come from outliers– the rare poll with an exceptionally high approval and the exceptionally low ones. That, I think, is a loss.