This is the 2nd GOP retirement in a competitive Assembly seat
State Rep Jessie Rodriguez announced May 7 that she will not seek reelection in November. She is the 9th Republican and 12th member of the assembly to not seek reelection. The three Democrats not returning are all seeking higher office, two for the state senate and one for governor.
Rodriguez, who was born in El Salvador, was first elected in a 2013 special election, winning reelection each cycle since 2014.
While most retiring Republicans are from rather safe districts, Rodriguez was seen as a top race for Democrats seeking to flip the Assembly majority. Republicans currently hold 54 of 99 seats, leaving Democrats looking for a net 5 seat pickup.
Members not seeking reelection are shown in the table below. Rodriguez won the 21st district by 930 votes in 2024, a 2.8 percentage point margin. At the same time, Kamala Harris won the district by 4 points. Democrats also won the district 2022 for both governor and U.S. Senate. (The past votes are calculated for the current district boundaries following redistricting in 2024.)
In the current boundaries, the district has consistently voted Democratic in statewide races since 2018, with Republican wins or extremely close Democratic wins from 2012-2016. Rodriguez’s win in 2024 stands out against a string of blue.
A visual look at these votes over time makes it clear how the district has evolved from somewhat Republican leaning to the recent strong Democratic performance.
The 21st sits on the south side of Milwaukee county, a traditionally more conservative area relative to the county.
Demographically the district is predominantly white with a significant Hispanic population, 16%, which is double the state’s percentage, and a small Black population. It has slightly more college graduates, 36%, than the state as a whole, 33%. Median income is about $10,000 above the statewide income.
As a now open seat, this should be one of the most closely competitive districts and a pickup opportunity for Democrats.
Six of 12 Republican incumbents up in 2026 are now retiring
Wisconsin state Senator Andre Jacque (R – New Franken) became the 6th Republican to announce he will not seek reelection. There are 12 incumbent Republicans up for election this year, so half have now announced they will not seek reelection. There are 18 sitting GOP senators, so there will be at least 1/3 of the caucus new in 2027.
Republicans currently hold an 18-15 majority in the Senate. Democrats need a net gain of two seats to take the majority for the first time since 2010.
Of the GOP retirements two are in quite competitive seats (the 5th & 21st)), both in districts Harris won in 2024, while 4 are in relatively safe Republican seats, based on recent elections for statewide office. A third competitive seat, the 17th, has an incumbent Republican, Howard Marklein, seeking reelection in a considerably changed district following redistricting in 2024.
Jacque’s 1st district is solidly Republican. The district includes Door county plus parts of counties to the south of the Door peninsula in north-eastern Wisconsin.
The recent voting in the district has been solidly Republican. with the southern part of the district quite red and the northern part of Door county blue.
The full set of Senate seats up, with retirements and splits between incumbent party and 2024 presidential result is shown in the table blow.
Creates open seat in one of the most competitive districts
Rep. Dean Kaufert, R-Neenah, announced his retirement from the 53rd district on April 27th. He is the 11th member of the Assembly, and the 8th Republican, to announce they will not seek reelection. Three Assembly Democrats are seeking other offices, two for state Senate and one for Governor.
Kaufert is the only retiring Republican representative in a district Harris won in 2024. Kaufert won in 2024 by 364 votes, a 1.2 percentage point margin, while Harris won the district by 4.4 percentage points. Gov. Tony Evers carried it by 8.6 points in 2022 and Sen. Tammy Baldwin won it by 3.9 points that same year. (These past votes are calculated for the current district boundaries, following the 2024 redistricting.)
The district includes Neenah and Menasha, and part of Appleton, in northeastern Wisconsin.
The vote in the current 53rd district has been trending Democratic in recent years. From 2012 to 2016 Republicans won it in 2012 and 2014 governor races, and 2016 presidential and Senate races, though Obama and Baldwin won it in 2012. Since 2016 the district has voted Democratic in each of the major statewide races. Kaufert’s win in 2024 was an exceptional GOP victory.
The top Assembly seats for majority control include the 53rd plus four other seats Republicans narrowly won in 2024, each of which Harris also won. The Assembly is currently 54R-45D. The most competitive Democratic held seat is the 94th which Rep. Steve Doyle won in 2024 by 217 votes, 0.6 percentage points, while Trump carried the district by 2.1 points. The other three potentially competitive Democratic held seats were relatively close for both assembly and president but were Harris victories as well as Democratic Assembly wins.
As candidates are now circulating nomination papers for access to the ballot, the time for retirement announcements would seem to be drawing to a close. So far, the announced retirements have come in less competitive districts, with the exception of Kaufert’s decision today. Thus, the competition for the majority depends more on close seats with incumbent Republicans seeking reelection in Harris districts, plus the one split decision in a Democratic seat.
Liberal Chris Taylor sweeps conservative Maria Lazar in Supreme Court race
In Wisconsin we have the historically crucial and very red WOW counties (Washington, Ozaukee, Waukesha) and the usually competitive BOW (Brown, Outagamie, Winnebago) and Lake Superior’s blue BAD (Bayfield, Ashland, Douglas) counties. This morning, add one more mnemonic trio.
In 2024, Donald Trump won 34 of 72 Wisconsin counties with 60% or more. On April 7th, 2026, the conservative Supreme Court candidate won only 3 counties by 60% or more: Washington, Taylor, Florence. The WTF counties.
The liberal candidate swept the BAD counties with over 60% in each, and all three BOW counties with 57%, 58% & 60% respectively. And the WOW counties split with 62% for the conservative in Washington (the highest in the state), 54% in Waukesha (a historically low share) while the liberal carried Ozaukee with 52% (Trump got 54% there in 2024.)
True to expectations, the liberal candidate dominated the MD counties (dare I call them DOC counties?) of Milwaukee and Dane with 76% and 84%. Together those two counties also provided 26% of the total statewide vote.
It all adds up to a 60.1% to 39.8% win for liberal Chris Taylor over conservative Maria Lazar, doubling the liberal margins seen in each of the previous three Court elections, which themselves were considered large margins in highly competitive Wisconsin.
Results are unofficial but nearly complete.
You can remember me from my mnemonic: PAV, PollsAndVotes.
Democrats must virtually run the table of competitive races to win a majority of seats
The redistricting of 2024 created a more competitive landscape for Wisconsin Democrats in the state Assembly. However, Republicans held on to the majority in 2024, winning 54 seats to 45 for Democrats. Prior to redistricting, in 2022 Republicans held 64 seats to 35 for Democrats. The ten seat swing has put the chamber in competitive territory for the first time since 2010, but Democrats must pick up five more seats to take the majority. To do that they must virtually run the table of competitive races.
The 2024 district lines, drawn from a plan of Democratic Gov. Tony Evers, made substantial changes to the 2022 lines, which were in turn very similar to the 2011 map adopted by the Republican trifecta under Gov. Scott Walker. The new maps have a more nearly even party balance given the voting history of the districts, with a slight Republican lean. The figure shows how each of the 99 districts has voted in 13 statewide races since 2012, plus the outcome of the 2024 Assembly election. Each open circle is a statewide race and the solid dots are the 2024 Assembly vote.
Districts are ordered by the number of Democratic victories in the 14 races, and by average Democratic minus Republican margin within the number of Democratic wins. There are 38 seats that have been won only by Republicans since 2012, and 35 that only Democrats have won. The potentially competive seats that have had mixed partisan outcomes amount to 26 districts, just over a quarter of the Assembly.
These mixed outcome seats produced 16 Republican wins and 10 for Democrats in 2024 under the new maps.
The next figure zooms in on just the mixed outcome seats. The asterisks mark the 9 seats that seem to potentially be the most competitive. Challengers, and potential incumbent retirements, are not yet clear across the races, so this analysis is simply looking at the voting history in these district.
Five of the nine most competitive seats are held by Republicans, with 4 Democrats. The table shows these seats and recent outcomes, sorted by Assembly vote margin in 2024. None won by as much as 3.5 percentage points, and all five Republicans are from districts Kamala Harris won in 2024, while one Democrat’s district was won by Donald Trump. On actual vote margin, all nine won by less than 1,200 votes.
Four of the five Republicans are from districts that voted for the Democrat for president in 2024 and for governor and U.S. Senate in 2022. One Republican district voted Republican for the Senate but Democratic in the other recent races. One Democrat is from a Trump district which split the 2022 vote, Democrat for governor but Republican for Senate. The other three Democrats are from districts with consistent Democratic majorities recently.Despite their somewhat Democratic leaning districts, each of these Republicans won in 2024. The Republican with the most challenging district, Todd Novak, in fact won with the largest margin of any of these races. Novak has successfully held a Democratic leaning district under the previous district lines as well. A reminder that candidates can win even in less congenial settings.
Some of these districts have been shifting over time, putting incumbents more at risk. The next figure shows how each district has voted since 2012, with the 2024 Assembly vote highlighted for comparison.
Four of the Republican seats have an obvious shift towards the Democrats over time: the 21st-Rodriguez, the 53rd-Kaufert, the 61st-Donovan, and the 88th-Franklin. Novak’s 51st is quite Democratic but hasn’t trended up or down since 2012. Based on the statewide races and trends, Franklin has the most competitive seat, while the other four Republicans are at significant disadvantage. Yet they each outperformed their party in 2024. Franklin’s extremely close race was still slightly better than Trump’s performance.
Of the Democrats, none of the districts are trending in a Republican direction, with all moving at least somewhat more Democratic. These Democratic incumbents closely matched Harris in 2024, while Doyle in the 94th did just enough better to win despite a 2-point Trump win. Whereas the Republican incumbents all outperformed their party, the Democrats fell a bit below where the partisan trend in their districts would expect.
Given the lean and trends in the districts, these five Republicans each face uphill battles in 2026, especially if they should draw strong Democratic challengers. Their incumbency advantage will be put to the test. For the Democrats, they have lagged their party a bit but don’t face hostile partisan environments.
Why not some other races?
The other districts that have a history of mixed-party outcomes could produce some competitive races in 2026, but their partisan environments are much less likely to flip a seat. The next figure shows the other 19 seats with mixed histories. Note the vertical scale is about twice as large as the previous figure, a tip-off that these are overall much less competitive seats even if they once in a while vote for both parties in statewide races.
Only a few of these suggest close districts, and none reveal a clear mismatch of incumbent and partisan lean. The ones that bear attention include Zimmerman in the 31st, Snyder in the 85th and Moses in the 92nd. Recent elections in Zimmerman’s seat have been close, with a slight Republican advantage, one that Zimmerman overperformed a little in 2024. Snyder’s 85th has a slight trend in a Democratic direction, though recent statewide races have all be close, with Snyder overperforming a bit. The 92nd, with Moses, shows a consistently close district with no trend up or down. Close enough to be potentially competitive in 2026.
Of the Democratic incumbents in the figure, Palmeri in the 54th somewhat underperformed in a pretty solidly Democratic district that shows no signs of moving toward the GOP. Likewise, Rivera-Wagner had a closer 2024 race than partisan patterns would suggest. In both these cases the significant partisan lean of the districts make it seem unlikely these would be good Republican pick-up opportunities.
The table shows these three Republican “maybe” seats, in the same format as above for the top races. While average margins have been relatively tight, only Gov. Tony Evers has managed to eke out two Democratic wins recently, and those by tiny margins. If incumbents retire, these might be Democratic pick up opportunities, but with a need for both good candidates and favorable national and statewide forces.
Bottom line
While Democrats have a shot at the Assembly majority, to do so they need to flip five Republican seats and not lose any current Democratic seats. The five Republican incumbents in the most competitive districts could provide those seats, though Doyle’s 94th district is a tough one for Democrats to hold on to. There could potentially be a close race in the “maybe” category of districts, but they are close districts with small GOP tilts. Possible retirements and quality of challengers will also make these races more (or less) competitive. There are also national and state level forces at play which favored Democrats in the 2025 elections elsewhere in the country. In short, the Democrats need a good year to run the table in competitive districts, and Republicans have a decent chance of preventing that given their candidates’ overperformances in the 2024 Assembly races.
State Presidential vote trends, 1980-2024. Which states have shifted? Which are now in reach for either party? You need a large screen, at least a tablet, and zoom in. Pick your top 2 states to flip for each side. This year’s 7 swing states don’t count.
Here is a simple guide to the county votes for president and Senate in Wisconsin on November 5, 2024.
Donald Trump won 59 Wisconsin counties while Kamala Harris won 13.
Where does the vote come from and how much? The Democratic net vote comes with huge margins in Dane and Milwaukee counties, followed by much smaller margins in 11 other counties. The large Republican margins come from Waukesha and Washington. The many smaller Republican leaning counties collectively provide Republican strength, offsetting the fewer counties with Democratic majorities, despite the large margins in Dane and Milwaukee.
Harris improved over Biden’s 2020 vote percentage margin in only four counties, Washington, Ozaukee, Waukesha (the legendary Republican WOW counties around Milwaukee) and Door. She did a bit worse than Biden in Eau Claire, Dane and (especially) La Crosse, usually Democratic strong holds.
County vote margins for Senate
Baldwin won 14 counties, including Sauk which Trump won, while Hovde won 58.
While Baldwin only narrowly out-performed Harris, winning by .9 percentage points while Harris lost by .9 percentage points, Baldwin outperformed the presidential ticket in all but four counties: Menominee, Ozaukee, Waukesha and Washington.
It took 15 ballots to elect a speaker, the most in 100 years. In the end, Kevin McCarthy won.
Notably, McCarthy’s support remained quite steady throughout the voting. Opposition held as well but cast votes for a variety of alternations to McCarthy across all the ballots.
Here are the total votes for each candidate on each round of balloting.
Democrats remained united behind Hakeem Jeffries throughout, with one Democratic member elect missing one vote (due to surgery.)
Here are the votes among Republicans who voted for someone other than McCarthy on at least one ballot.
The current conventional wisdom is for the midterm to be somewhat better than average for the president’s party in the House. (I set aside the Senate here.) The fundamentals doubt that, as we’ll see.
The “fundamentals” provide a helpful baseline, even if “non-fundamentals” such as polling, candidate quality, unique issues, may modify that baseline. So let’s only look at historical relationships here.
The starting point is that Democrats currently hold 220 seats in the House, Republicans have 212 and 3 seats are vacant. 218 seats are the minimal majority with no vacancies. 2 of the vacancies were held by Democrats, 1 by a Republican, so call it 222-113 now.
The average loss for the presidents party since 1946 is 26.4 seats. That would put Dems at 196 and Reps at 239. (Note there is very little difference in 1st and 2nd midterm losses on average.)
Losses tend to be larger with less popular presidents. Biden average approval is 41.5% at FiveThirtyEight.com today and 42.4% at RealClearPolitics.com. Let’s call it 42%. It is now October. See the orange line for seat loss by October approval. That fit is a 40 seat loss.
Losing 40 of 222 seats would give Dems 182 seats are Reps 253 seats, considerably worse than an “average” loss of 26 seats. So 196 Dem seats if average, 182 Dem seats if as presidential approval would suggest.
Do note the variation around the orange line. It includes far larger losses, as 1994, and far smaller losses, as 2014. While the best estimate is -40 seats, for a president at 42% approval we see a lot of variation in seat loss, hence uncertainty.
A third fundamental approach combines the loss of popular vote for the House candidates of the president’s party in the prior presidential year and in the midterm. In 2020 Dem House candidates won 51.6% nationwide. But that implies they win only 47.8% in the midterm.
Again notice the variation around the blue line, and we haven’t seen a presidential year close to 51.6% since 1946. So more uncertainty here, but best estimate is a drop on nearly 4 percentage points in popular vote.
So how does popular vote translate to share of seats?
DemSeats% = -25.07 + 1.47*DemVote%
At 47.8% of the vote we’d expect Dems to win 45.2% of the seats, or 197 seats. That is back to an “average” loss, not the larger one based on approval.
There are other factors, even fundamentals, not considered here. The size of the current majority is rather small historically, at least for Democrats. So there are fewer seats and risk, and Dems lost rather than gained seats in 2020.
But there are issues pushing one way (inflation) and issues pushing the other way (abortion). Those are fit topics for a “beyond the fundamentals” analysis, but are not my topic here.
The conclusion is that simple fundamentals suggest a loss of 25 to 40 seats for the Democrats, giving them between 182 and 197 seats and the Republicans between 253 and 238 respectively. Anything in that range would be a strong GOP majority.
I stressed twice above the uncertainty in these estimates. For a given approval or a given national vote share there is considerable uncertainty in the share of seats that result. But if you want to consider the fundamentals, that’s what this gives.
For a “non-fundamental” take, consider the latest CBS News model, based on polling but with a sophisticated model for seats from that poll. As of Oct 16, CBS News estimates 211 Dem seats, a loss of just 11, to 224 Rep seats.
Most of the country saw modest shifts in vote margin from 2016 to 2020. The Texas border stands out for the intensity and breadth of the pro-Republican shift. Miami is also attention getting, but here we focus on Texas.
It isn’t that the Texas border counties gave majorities to Trump. Most didn’t. But the swing in these counties, many with large Hispanic populations, was unexpected.
Democratic gains in urban and suburban counties were partially offset by GOP gains along the border.
The Texas border counties stand out nationally, not just in the state. This chart shows 2020 vote margin by 2016 margin, with the Texas border counties highlighted in red.
And I mentioned Miami earlier. It’s the big gray circle below the diagonal near the Texas counties.
For Texas to become a competitive state would be quite a thing. To do so, Democrats must consolidate gains and stop the loses. For Republicans, the prospect of balancing urban/suburban loss with border and western gains is a possible solution for continued hold on statewide offices.
