Category Archives: Polls

Satisfaction with the country and party ID

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We are OK when our guy is in office; things are terrible with the other guy

It is hardly a surprise that Americans see the country through profoundly strong partisan lenses. Republicans think things are going well with a Republican in the White House, and Democrats do the same when a Democrat is in the Oval Office. But there has been a shift over the last 20 years in how deeply negative we’ve become when the other party is in power. That wasn’t so true in the Clinton years and in the first term of George W. Bush, or earlier.

This chart shows data from Pew on satisfaction with how things are going in the country. The partisan differences are obvious and change abruptly with changes in the presidency. A minor note is also that the change happens immediately after the election, without waiting for the inauguration to actually install the new president.

The partisan effect is very clear. The thing I want to point out is how this changed in Bush’s second term and how very low and very flat satisfaction has been among the out-party in the Obama, Trump 1, Biden and Trump 2 years.

In the Clinton years, satisfaction was higher with Democrats than Republicans, but the lines move in parallel though the 8 years Clinton was in office. In the second term Republican satisfaction was higher than it had been for Democrats in the first term. 

In Bush’s first term Democratic satisfaction fell from the Clinton years but remained well above 20% until late in the first term, then stayed in the teens throughout the second term. In part that reflected the spike following 9/11 but satisfaction declined relatively slowly through the first term. GOP satisfaction remained high in the first term. In the second term, Republicans reacted to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the onset of the Great Recession with a substantial decline in their satisfaction.

In each administration since Bush, the out-party had held satisfaction in the teens throughout, regardless of what happened during the administration. Nothing Obama did, or regardless of events during his term, Republican satisfaction remained in the low teens. For Trump’s first term, Democrats remained in the low teens, and for Biden Republican satisfaction always held at about 10%. Now in Trump 2 it is the Democrats turn to be extremely dissatisfied.

This suggests that in the Clinton years and first four years of Bush, there was some common response across party lines to national conditions. The out-party was less satisfied than the in-party, but both moved together up or down. That broke down in Bush’s second term and has never returned since.

The in-party does show some meaningful variation, with Democratic satisfaction rising through Obama’s two terms, as the economy recovered from the Great Recession, and Republican satisfaction drops with the Covid pandemic. In Biden’s term, initially high Democratic satisfaction declined as inflation rose in late 2021 through 2022, recovering only modestly. And so far in Trump 2 GOP satisfaction is high but has been trending down. None of this moved the out-party in those administrations.

V.O. Key’s classic The Responsible Electorate argued voters were not perfectly informed rational actors, steeped in policy, but instead were “not fools”. Voters, Key said, rewarded good performance and punished bad performance. The modern trends shown here since 2009 (and perhaps since 2006) show that for the out-party there is no reward, only stolid unhappiness. That leaves independents, perhaps, to respond to performance, and the in-party can express disappointment, but a major chunk of the electorate is no longer offering any rewards.

The picture is not quite so bleak if we turn from the direction of the country to reactions to the economy. Here too there are large in-party vs out-party differences, but a bit more parallel movement even in recent administrations.

The University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment is a monthly measure of economic perceptions of the current and future economy. Their data by party is only available since 2006 so offers no details of the Clinton administration or the first term of Bush, but the data otherwise gives a good look during the recent period when satisfaction with the direction of the country has remained at rock bottom among out-partisans.

As with satisfaction, there are large partisan differences, and these change abruptly with each change in administration, as does satisfaction. It is notable that no “real” economic conditions change this abruptly on Election Day or on Inauguration Day, so this is a good measure of how powerfully partisanship distorts our perception of “reality.” It is also clear that these shifts begin before the new president takes office. 

What is a bit different here, however, is that the partisan lines (and independents too) continue to move in rough parallel across all these administrations, while satisfaction stopped doing that in 2006 or so. The late Bush second term, when these data begin, shows parallel declines. Through Obama’s two terms all partisans showed increasing sentiment. In the pre-Covid Trump 1 term, the lines are each fairly flat and relatively high, then when Covid arrives all show a sharp drop. In Biden’s term Democrats, independents and Republicans all become more negative about the economy as inflation rises to its peak in June 2022, then all three groups become more positive in most of the remainder of Biden’s term. With Trump 2 so far, independents and Democrats are quite negative while Republicans have remained quite positive, which violates the general parallelism earlier.

This economic data shows that Key’s electorate as the god of reward and punishment may not be dead, at least with respect to the economy. All do seem to respond in similar ways though at different levels. Whether this translates into votes is a topic for another day, but similar responsiveness is a precondition for exacting reward or punishment.

It may be that questions about satisfaction with how things are going in the country are simply so saturated by politics now that they elicit a more explicitly partisan response than was the case in the 1990s and before. A similar trend holds for the “right direction or wrong track” question, a favorite of political pollsters who held it to be a great indicator of whether an administration was in good shape or bad shape. With large majorities saying “wrong track” for administrations since Bush, we see the same out-party nearly all saying wrong track and large partisan divides.

As political division has overrun broader considerations of what it means to be “satisfied with the direction of the country”, we are deeply divided indeed. The remaining responsiveness to economic conditions at least suggests the public may yet respond to good or bad times, if less so that they did in Key’s day, or in the late 1900s. For the 2000s, that responsiveness is at least lessened by universal disapprobation by the out-party.

(Thanks to Pew for making the satisfaction data available. See their report on the sour mood of the country here.)

Comparing adults, registered and likely voters

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Generally modest differences but a few notable shifts

People are interested in the differences between samples of all adults, registered and likely voters. Here is a table showing these comparisons for my Marquette Law School Poll national survey, May 20-26, 2026. For adults, n=1001, MOE=+/-3.4. For registered voters, n=857, MOE=+/-3.6. For likely voters, n=576, MOE=+/-4.4.

For most variables there are modest differences between adults, registered and likely voters. Trump approval shows a larger difference, as does right direction/wrong track. A significant part of the answer to “why” is in the last panel of the table. MAGA Republicans are notably more likely to vote than non-MAGA Republicans. Further, MAGA Republicans are exceptionally approving of Trump, 93%, and pleased with the direction of the country, 78%. This contrasts sharply with non-MAGA Republicans whose approval of Trump is only 36% and few of whom think the country is headed in the right direction, 29%. MAGA Republicans are more likely to say they are certain to vote, 67%, than are non-MAGA Republicans, 43%. These differences also explain much of the success of Trump endorsed candidates in GOP primaries. Among all Republicans, MAGA makes up 72% and non-MAGA 28% of the party.

That said, here are the comparisons across samples. (It is a long table if you are on a small screen.)

Trump approval is low overall, but on the economy and inflation it is terrible

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Inflation is #1 and economy is #2 most important issue

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds Donald Trump’s overall job approval at 38%, with disapproval at 62%, for a net -24 points underwater. This is the lowest in Marquette polls of the second term. “New low” has been the theme of Trump approval polling this spring, and my poll is no exception.

It is approval on specific issues that reveals more of what is driving down the overall ratings and why the things he is weakest on are also the most important things.

The most obvious is also the most important: The issue rated most important for people is inflation and the cost of living, at 37%, with the economy #2 at 19%. So together this is 56% of the public. And inflation & cost of living has been #1 since 2022.  

So where are Trump’s approval ratings on these most important issues? 30% on the economy and 22% on inflation. Only his handling of gas prices is lower, 19% approval.

And approval on inflation among Republicans has fallen to 45% on inflation, with single digits for independents and, of course, Democrats. GOP approval on the economy is at only 60%, 17 points below Republican approval overall. When the most important problems are your weakest issues you have a problem.

Moreover, confidence in Trump’s ability to reduce inflation has declined since the 2024 election. In December 2024, 41% thought his policies would reduce inflation in the second term. Now just 22% believe that.  And among his Republican Party, in Dec. 2024 76% thought he’d lower inflation. Now less than half, 44%, say his policies are reducing inflation.

None of this is new, but the consistency across polls, pollsters and over time is important. I’ve criticized headlines that say Trump’s support is “cratering,” “collapsing,” or “plunging” because that isn’t what the data in the second term has shown. It has shown something in many ways worse: a steady decline, month after month, each month worse than the previous one. The cumulative effect some 16 months into the second term is approval at or below his lowest of the first term, and unlike the first term when there was some recovery in the second year, 2018, there has been no period of sustained recovery in the second term, except briefly in May 2025 when he backed off on tariffs.

Which party is better?

As for the parties, people have a pretty negative view of both: 36% have a favorable view of the Democratic party and 38% are favorable to the Republican Party. As for which party would be better on various issues, Republicans have a clear advantage on crime, immigration and national defense, Democrats have clear advantages on Medicare and Social Security and on health care.

But an important shift since January is that now slightly more see the Democrats as better on the economy (by 3 percentage points) and see the Democrats as better by 7 points on inflation. The two most important issues with voters, and two that Republicans had small advantages on in January. 

Traditional Republican advantages on handling the deficit and on taxes are mere shadows of their former selves, +2 on taxes and +4 on the deficit.

Republicans still hold a sizable advantage on immigration and border security, where Trump’s approval, though below 50%, is above his overall approval. However, look back to the most important problems table and see that the immigration issue has fallen to #5, with just 6% rating it most important. It was considerably higher in 2024, but is less powerful now.

There is some importance in the substantial percentage of people who see either no difference between the parties on all issues or see neither party as good on an issue, together accounting for 28% to 50% of the public. The 50% is on handling the deficit, a view in line with a long history of both parties failing to deal with the deficit back to the brief success of the Clinton administration balancing the budget at the end of the 1990s.

The full poll results are on the Marquette Law School Poll website here. On June 4 we will release national poll results on views of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Dem vs. Dem and Rep vs. Rep

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Wisconsin budget surplus bill gets both bipartisan support and opposition

On May 11 Wisconsin Democratic Gov. Tony Evers and Republican Senate and Assembly leaders announced they had reached a compromise that would spend about 72% of a projected $2.5 billion budget surplus on schools and property tax relief. The bill increased funding for special education, reduced property taxes by about 5% and sent rebate checks to income taxpayers of $300 per individual, $600 per couple. It also eliminated state taxes on tips and overtime.

Evers and GOP leaders had negotiated over the compromise bill since January. When announced on Monday, May 11, it was presented as a done deal. On Tuesday legislative committees held hearings and sent the bill to the floor for votes on Wednesday. Where the bill died.

What is unique, in deeply polarized Wisconsin, is that a bipartisan compromise bill was met with bipartisan opposition. While Evers and GOP leaders supported the bill, both Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates opposed it. In the legislature, the bill passed the Assembly with bipartisan (though far from unanimous) support while in the Senate it was defeated buy opposition from three Republicans and all 15 Democrats, while 15 Republicans voted for passage. That a popular Democratic governor could not get one (let alone the two needed for passage) Democratic senators to support his bill is a telling statement about relations between the governor and his legislative caucus.

The opponents of the bill emphasized uncertainty about the anticipated future budget surplus the bill was tapping. They pointed to the uncertainty of revenues, a possible economic downturn, and “fiscal responsibility.” A subsequent Legislative Audit Bureau report concluded the bill would leave a near $3 billion structural deficit in the budget to be adopted in 2027. Supporters of the bill noted this estimate assumes no revenue growth, and so is a quite conservative estimate. (Such estimates are customary for the Audit Bureau.)   Opponents also noted that Evers and both Republican leaders are retiring, so any mess they leave will be up to someone else to clean up.

In addition to bipartisan opposition in the Senate, several Democratic gubernatorial candidates strongly opposed the bill, others were tepid and only one strongly supported it. And the only major Republican candidate, Rep. Tom Tiffany (WI-7th) also opposed it. News reports say Tiffany aids made calls to senators raising criticisms of the bill. In interviews Tiffany said he would not sign it if he were governor.

And so this is how polarized Wisconsin found bipartisanship break out, yet on both sides of a compromise bill. Supporters say it gave money to schools and property tax relief and cash to voters. Opponents say it wasn’t enough for schools, or for property tax relief or for cash to voters, and pointed to possible future deficits. Unsaid, for the most part, is that each side imagines how they would like to spend the $2.5 billion next year if they control the governorship and the legislature. For Democrats, after 16 years of GOP legislative control, a possible majority in 2027 offers opportunity for proposals that have been stymied since 2011. For Republicans, the chance to win back the governorship after 8 years of Evers is tantalizing. So, with the defeat of the bill, they will get their wish for money to play with. With the one small challenge of actually winning control in November.

Tensions remain now, approaching 3 weeks after the bill was defeated, with governor and legislative Democrats sniping at one another, and some Republican criticism of the three GOP senators who sunk the bill that 15 Republicans voted for. For the gubernatorial candidates the issue of who is in favor of school funding and of property tax relief in the fall will live in the shadow of opposition to a bill that provided some of that. 

After the bill died my Marquette Law School poll asked Wisconsin voters what they thought of the bill. They liked it. Eighty percent said the bill should have been passed, with 11% opposed and 9% didn’t know. In a second question that raised the opponents concerns about future deficits, 69% still favored the bill with 21% opposed and 9% didn’t know. More remarkable was the complete lack of a partisan divide on either question. The tables show opinion on each question.

Surprised? I’m always surprised when partisan divides are absent in Wisconsin. But as the Wisconsin State Journal editorial cartoon put it, maybe I shouldn’t be.

If you have an insatiable desire for more on this very Wisconsin story, see this interview with Wisconsin Public Television’s Here and Now with Frederica Freyberg.

Or listen to a longer radio interview with WCLO in Janesville. 

And you can see the full results of the poll at my Marquette Law School Poll website here.

Consumer sentiment, presidential approval and the midterms

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Consumer sentiment helped Trump in his 1st term, is damaging him now

At the risk of becoming repetitive, the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment hit another record low in May, falling to 44.8, down from 49.8 in April. The new final estimate for May is itself down from the preliminary estimate earlier in the month of 48.2, suggesting continuing decline throughout the month.

This is the lowest reading in the history of the Michigan survey, which stretches back to 1952. The previous low was 50 in June 2022, at the peak of the 2021-2022 inflation surge.

The political importance of this extremely low economic sentiment is seen in the yellow highlights in the figure. In the run-up to the midterms in the first Trump administration, consumer sentiment was consistently high, averaging 97.5 over the first two years of Trump 1. In the second term, that same measure of economic outlook is vastly lower, averaging just 55.0, and recently declining.

Consumer sentiment turned sharply negative in Biden’s summer of 2022, only beginning to rebound before his midterm in November 2022. So far, Trump’s second term looks notably worse.

Folks follow the presidential approval trends closely, but I think it is important to also consider other trends that either support or depress approval, and which are indicative of broader social and economic forces. In this case, economic opinion was quite positive throughout Trump’s first term leading to the midterm (and after, until Covid arrived). Trump’s approval fell steadily in his first year, but recovered a bit in his second year in 2018. While underwater in 2018 he was in better shape than his first year approval showed. The good economic sentiment surely provided support for him and for the GOP in the midterms, despite the eventual loss of 42 seats in the house.

Compare Obama’s 2010 midterm. His job approval in 2010 averaged 47.0% with disapproval at 45.7%, for a net +1.3. But consumer sentiment in his first 2 years averaged 71.6, considerably lower than Trump’s first two year average of 97.5. Despite slightly positive net approval, Democrats lost 64 House seats in 2010.

Trump’s net approval is currently -21.0, with consumer sentiment averaging 55.0 since the start of the second term. Both economic sentiment and approval are falling with just over 5 months until the midterms.

Trump’s approval recovery in his second year of 2018 shows no signs of recurring in 2026. And the economic pessimism is similarly declining without immediate signs of recovery. Together this points out that economic attitudes were a positive force among the public in his first term, helping approval to recover from the lows of 2017. Now those economic attitudes are an anchor pulling approval ever lower.

This does not mean we will see 60+ GOP seats lost in 2026, similar to Democratic losses in 2010. The GOP majority is far smaller than that enjoyed by Democrats going into 2010, and the number of tossup or lean seats are much smaller now than 16 years ago. As Amy Walter at the Cook Political Report reminds us, for a true wave election Republicans will have to lose seats in districts Trump won by 20 points or more in 2024. Not impossible, but much harder to do now with more seats designed for larger partisan majorities through redistricting.

The depressed economic sentiment does point to further trials for Trump’s approval and for support for Trump and GOP policies, making any policy agenda difficult.

I’ll close with a note on the Democratic “autopsy” that just came to light. A glance back to the consumer sentiment chart tells a clear story about the predicament Biden, Harris and the Democrats faced in 2024. While sentiment had recovered some from the lows of summer 2022, it never passed an index of 80 and fell in the months leading to Nov. 2024. In my polling and in every other poll, inflation and the cost of living topped the most important issue charts constantly from late 2021 through the 2024 election. I’m tired of the Carville quote, but you can’t ignore it: “It’s the economy, stupid.” What sunk Biden and Harris is now the same anchor around Trump and the GOP. There are others, of course, but the economy fundamentally helped Trump in term 1, and it is hurting him badly in term 2.

See also Elliott Morris on the Democratic autopsy’s incredible omission of inflation as a factor in Trump’s victory in 2024:

When we boot up the data, it’s obvious the main reason Harris lost — and the reason I am going to explore here, at this website, it being a data-driven website — is that 2024 simply had too much inflation-induced anti-incumbent sentiment for the incumbent party to overcome. This is curiously missing from its main diagnosis. The word “inflation” isn’t mentioned in the autopsy a single time (except in the context of inflation-adjusted ad spending).

See Elliott’s full post here.

And as a note: my Substack is free because I have a day job and the Substack is a great way for me to share findings from my polling that otherwise don’t make it in news stories on the poll. But if I’m free that’s all the more reason for you to support the many great people who are making Substack their full time job. I have paying subscriptions to a number of Substacks from both the right and the left because I’m very interested in their analysis and the variety of viewpoints. I encourage you to find some sites that you enjoy, and hopefully learn from, and to subscribe as a paying member.

How to spend a surplus

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Property tax relief, schools, both? For now, the answer is neither.

On May 13, the Wisconsin Senate defeated a proposal from Democratic Gov. Tony Evers, Republican Senate Majority leader Devin LeMahieu and Republican Assembly Speaker Robin Vos to use $1.8 billion of a projected $2.5 billion state surplus to provide additional funding for special education, about a 5% reduction of school property taxes, plus direct payments of $300 to each income tax payer in the state. This compromise had been long in the making with Republicans favoring more direct payments to taxpayers and the governor favoring more for schools. Neither side got everything. Both sides got something.

The bill was defeated in the Wisconsin Senate with 3 Republicans and every Democrat voting no. The Assembly easily passed the measure with all Republicans plus 10 Democrats voting yes.

There was also unusual bipartisan opposition from Republican gubernatorial candidate U.S. Rep. Tom Tiffany, and almost all Democratic candidates for governor, including Francesca Hong, a self-described democratic socialist, and Kelda Roys, who was recently endorsed by the state teachers union, WEAC.

The vote complicates messaging around affordability, property taxes and school funding for the fall campaign in which Republican Tiffany seeks to replace the two-term Democratic governor and Democrats aim to flip both Senate and Assembly after 16 years of Republican majorities.

The compromise spending bill was announced and voted on over just three days, leaving little time for public opinion to form, or for interest groups to mobilize. But we have polling on the central issues from February and March when similar arguments were circulating from Evers and Republicans during the regular legislative session.

A majority of Wisconsin registered voters have come to say holding down property taxes is a greater priority than providing funding to K-12 schools. As of March, 58% said reducing property taxes was more important, while 41% said funding schools was more important. This balance has shifted dramatically since 2018 when 37% wanted property tax cuts while 58% favored school spending. This reversal has been one of the most striking changes in public opinion over the past eight years, and followed a surge in support for public school funding during the previous administration of Gov. Scott Walker.

Funding for special education costs has been a major concern for school districts and was addressed in the previous budget, though rising costs have produced a shortfall in coverage that was partially addressed by the proposed compromise plan. Across 5 polls taken since 2019, more than 70% have favored “a major increase” in state funding for special education, most recently 71% in June 2025.

Concern for property taxes and for special education funding are not mutually exclusive. In the 2025 surveys of February and June, 59% of those more concerned about property taxes also favored more funding for special education, as did 96% of those who place greater priority on school spending over property tax reductions.

As for returning the projected surplus to tax-payers, voters were evenly divided in March, with 47% in favor of a one-time payment to offset property taxes while 52% favored an ongoing increase in state aid to schools to reduce property taxes. There was a considerable partisan divide on this question, though not as enormous as on many issues: 68% of Republicans favored a one-time payment, as did 60% of independents, while 80% of Democrats favored increased state aid to schools.

The amount of the projected surplus that should be used for a property tax reduction divided the state about evenly in February, with 29% saying all or 3/4s should go to property tax reduction, 34% saying about half, and 37% saying 1/4 or none. Here too the partisan divide is clear, though not extreme.

There is a larger partisan divide over state aid to schools. Overall, 51% say the legislature had failed to provide enough funding for schools, while 49% say schools must learn to live within their budget limits. Partisans divide more sharply on this question.

The compromise bill reflected aspects of public opinion by providing some property tax relief, increased aid for special education, and some direct payments to individual income tax payers, while spending about 3/4 of the projected surplus. The lack of extreme partisan divides on these issues also suggest public openness to compromise. The bill did not address the issue of ongoing state aid to schools which would also reduce property taxes, an issue certain to face the new legislature and governor in January.

Affordability, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top concern of 35% of Wisconsin voters. Property taxes are the top concern of 7% and public schools are the top issue for 5%, as of the March Marquette Law School Poll. Costs and broad financial concerns are also reflected by concern with health insurance, 11%, jobs and the economy, 9%, and the affordability of housing, 6%.

Both parties claim they will address voters’ concern about the cost of living. In different ways the positions of Tiffany, Democratic candidates for governor, and Democratic legislators, conflict with their public commitments to property tax reductions, support for school spending and affordability promises, leaving none of them with clean attacks on the other side’s positions on the surplus bill. Both sides positioned themselves against more money for special education and against property tax relief in this bill. Complicated explanations of why may not convince voters of the underlying wisdom of the strategies.

It is too soon to know what voters think about this, or whether this vote will be an issue in the fall campaigns. But I’d love to hear what candidates hear “on the doors” over the next few weeks.

A GOP problem in one response

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Even among Trump loyalists the cost of living is a problem

This open-ended response is a good illustration of the challenge rising prices pose for the GOP now and in November.

The kicker is that this was from our January Marquette Law School Poll national survey. Back then gas prices were a sweet spot for cost of living, with 50%. saying the price of a gallon was down. Today, 93% say the price is up. (I’m curious where the 7% who say no change or down are living, and can I get gas there?)

We often portray Trump’s support as unwavering, his base as uncritical. But in our open-ended responses we actually see a lot of Trump supporters who also mention a dislike, such as this one, or more commonly some variation of “how he talks” or “his tweets.” This is not to say these folks are ready to switch to Democrats, but portraying them as blind to all criticism or shortcomings is not the case for quite a few who nonetheless approve of Trump. This response is important because the dislike is not about his style but about core economic outcomes and pain.

About half of adults say both something they like and something they dislike. Only 12% (as of December) say only something they like while 35% say only things they dislike. This isn’t a new development.

The cost of living was a huge weight around Biden’s and then Harris’ necks. Now Trump is wearing that necklace.

Boys and girls! Young and old! And Donald Trump

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All but the olds soured on Trump in 2025

Much has been made about Donald Trump’s gains in 2024, especially among young men and Hispanic voters. That is mostly true. Today’s focus is how his appeal had waxed and waned among young and old, men and women.

I use net favorability to Trump because it applies when he was out of office as well as since he returned for his second term. Net favorability is generally pretty close to net approval. In my April Marquette Law School Poll national survey, Trump’s net favorability was -22 percentage points and his net approval was -21 points.

Trump’s net favorability was negative with all combinations of sex and age in 2021 and 2022 polls. There were at most slight gains during this period. But in 2023 his net ratings rose with all groups except for older women. In 2024 men of all ages further increased their net ratings, becoming net positive with men 45-59 and 60+, and momentarily with men 30-44. The youngest men became more favorable but peaked short of becoming net positive.

Among women, the increased favorability of 2023 continued into at least part of 2024, with older women’s favorable ratings increasing for the first time in 2024. Unlike the men, no age group of women reached net positive territory despite the general improved views of Trump.

In 2025 and 2026, however, all groups except for men and women 60 or older, who have remained stable, turned sour on Trump. The timing of the turn down varies a bit, with young women declining sooner than others, but for both sexes and all age groups under 60, 2025-26 has seen a steady downward trend in net favorability.

As of April, all gender and age groups are net negative to Trump except for men age 60 and older. Women of each age group are more negative than men of the same age, a pattern seen throughout the last five years.

For all the chatter about young men under 30 moving to Trump in 2024, the decline in net favorability has been steepest with this group in 2025. The emphasis on changing views of young men was correct in saying that they had rising support for Trump in 2024 and he gained votes in this group. But that is also a bit misleading in suggesting that young men became strong supporters of Trump. In fact they never reached net positive favorability. In Pew’s validated voter surveys Trump lost men under 30 by 5 points in 2024, an improvement over losing this group by 14 points in 2020. Among women under 30, Trump lost by 29 points in 2024 and by 35 points in 2020. Net gains of 9 points with young men and 6 points among young women are notable, but fall short of a major realignment of preferences. Exit polls in 2024 show young men voting for Trump by 1 point, 49% to 48%, and young women voting against Trump, 38%-61%. I think Pew’s data are more reliable for this analysis, but at the most Trump barely won young men, doing significantly less well than with older men in the exit poll. Pew data are here and the exit data are at the very bottom here.

The takeaway is that young men were not the key to Trump’s victory in 2024, though he improved with them over 2020. However, the fortunes of the GOP in 2026 have far more to do with Trump’s falling favor among all age groups under 60 than with any single sex or age group. Declining favorability is widespread across the population, and isolated strength is not enough to power a midterm victory. How many seats change in the House and Senate rests on the limited number of closely contested seats, before and after recent redistricting, but also depends on how unpopular the sitting president is. At this point, he is considerably less popular than at the start of his second term, including among young men.

Cease-fire good; war bad

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New MULawPoll national survey finds widespread dissatisfaction with the Iran war

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey is out this morning. We were in the field April 8-16, starting the day after the cease-fire agreement with Iran went into place.  In today’s post I focus on the results related to the war. Tomorrow I’ll turn to the economy and how President Donald Trump is handling various aspects of his job. 

TLDR? Cease-fire popular, war not. Haven’t accomplished goals, not sufficient reasons for the war. Trump approval on war: 32%. And among Republicans 65% approve of war, that’s 13 points below Republican approval of how he handles his job in general, itself the lowest among Republicans in the second term.

The Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds 75% approve of the cease-fire in the U.S.-Iran war and 24% disapprove. At the same time, only 21% say the U.S. has achieved its goals in the war, while 78% say the goals have not been met. The public overall does not think that there were sufficient reasons for the war, with 63% saying there were not sufficient reasons and 36% saying there were.

There is bipartisan approval of the cease-fire that went into effect on April 7. Among Republicans, 82% approve of the cease-fire, as do 71% of Democrats and 67% of independents. There is also a bipartisan sentiment, with some partisan variation, that the goals of the war have not been achieved. Among Republicans, 64% say the United States has failed to achieve its goals, compared to 94% of Democrats and 78% of independents.

Bipartisanship breaks down on the question of the justification for the war. Seventy-one percent of Republicans say there was sufficient reason for the war, while 94% of Democrats say there was not. Among independents, 75% say there was not enough reason to go to war.

Thirty-two percent approve of the way President Donald Trump has handled the war, while 68% disapprove. Among Republicans, approval for Trump’s handling of the war stands at 65%, which is notably less than the 78% of Republicans who approve of Trump’s handling of his job as president in general. Among independents, 82% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war, along with 96% of Democrats.

The survey was conducted April 8-16, 2026, interviewing 982 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. For registered voters, the sample size was 870, with a margin of error of +/-3.6. For likely voters, the sample size was 576, with a margin of error of +/-4.4 percentage points.

Feelings toward Iran are quite negative, with 12% having a favorable opinion, 73% holding unfavorable views, and 14% saying they haven’t heard enough to say. The U.S. partner in the war, Israel, is seen favorably by 33% and unfavorably by 54%, with 14% who say they haven’t heard enough. Views of Israel have turned more negative over the past year. In March 2025, 43% held favorable views of Israel, compared to 43% unfavorable, with 14% lacking an opinion.

Trump threatened to bomb bridges and power plants across Iran in the days before the cease-fire went into effect. These are seen as legitimate military targets by 38% of respondents, while 62% say they are primarily civilian infrastructure that should not be attacked. Sixty-six percent of Republicans view these as legitimate military targets, while 34% disagree. Among independents, 70% say these are civilian locations and should not be attacked, as do 88% of Democrats.

The Iran war comes after the United States has destroyed dozens of alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, sent military forces into Venezuela to seize President Nicolás Maduro in January, and threatened to take control of Greenland. Respondents were asked whether they support or oppose Trump’s use of the military to force change in other countries.

  • Thirty-two percent support this use of the military, while 68% are opposed. 
  • As with approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran war, Republicans divide, though not evenly, with 64% in support of forcing change in other countries and 36% opposed. 
  • Eighty-three percent of independents and 94% of Democrats are opposed to such use of military force.
  • In this poll, 68% of Republicans are favorable to MAGA and 30% are not favorable to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Among Republicans favorable to the MAGA movement, 78% support using the military to force countries to change, while among Republicans who are not favorable to MAGA, 34% support this use of the military. 

The public does not see the United States as a force for stability in the world. While 39% say the U.S. is a force for stability, 60% say it is causing instability. Here, too, there is a partisan divide, with 73% of Republicans who say the U.S. is a stabilizing force, while 72% of independents and 90% of Democrats say it is causing instability.

A majority, 57%, say it is better for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, while 43% say it is better to stay out of world affairs. Support for an active role peaked in March 2025 when 64% favored an active role in the world—the highest in 18 Marquette Law School Poll national surveys since 2022.

Partisan views of the U.S. role in the world have shifted during Trump’s second term. In February 2025, 55% of Republicans said the U.S. should be active in the world. That rose to 68% in this poll. Independents are most reluctant to support an international role, with support among independents declining from 54% in early 2025 to 32% this month. Democrats have consistently been most supportive of an active role across the previous 17 polls since 2022, but have shifted substantially, especially since the Iran war began. In February 2025, 71% favored an active role; that fell to 64% in January 2026 and to 54% in April.

Attention to news about the Iran war

The public has paid substantial attention to the Iran war. In April, 76% had read or heard a lot about the war, 21% had heard a little, and 3% had heard nothing at all. That is more attention than was paid to the U.S. airstrikes on Iran nuclear facilities in June 2025, when 63% said they had heard a lot in July.

The only comparably high levels of attention in polling during Trump’s second term have been to the imposition of tariffs in April 2025, when 81% said they had heard a lot, and the fatal shooting of Renee Good by an ICE officer in Minneapolis in January, when 76% had heard a lot. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to say they heard a lot about the current Iran war, 82% and 80% respectively, while independents have paid considerably less attention, with 51% hearing a lot.

Attention is also relatively high concerning Iran limiting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Sixty percent say have heard a lot about this, 27% have heard a little, and 13% have heard nothing at all. As with the war in general, Democrats and Republicans are equally attentive, while independents are much less so.

Significantly fewer Americans paid close attention to the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose airplane was shot down over Iran, leading to a large number of ground troops being dispatch inside Iran to rescue the second airman. About this, only 45% said they had heard a lot, 34% heard a little, and 21% heard nothing. While 58% of Republicans heard a lot about this, 39% of Democrats did, and just 24% of independents.

The toplines and crosstabs for the poll are on the poll website here.  Tomorrow I’ll run down views of the economy and of Trump’s handling of various issues.

Second Term Worse than the First

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Consumer sentiment is far worse in 2nd term than in 1st

Analysts of President Donald Trump’s second term, and the outlook for the midterm elections on Nov. 3, have reasonably focused on Trump’s job approval. After holding above the first term approval trend, the second term approval fell below the first term in January and has recently fallen more after the start of the Iran war.

This is well known and I have nothing to add.

What is less often considered are opinions of the economy and especially the comparison of first and second term opinion. This deserves more attention.

The University of Michigan’s index of consumer sentiment is a long-running monthly survey of how Americans feel about the economy. As an index, high values reflect optimism and positive feelings, low values show pessimism and negative feelings. An index value of 100 (where the index stood in 1966) reflects quite positive views of the economy including current conditions and future expectations. As an index, values can be above or below 100, i.e. this is not a percentage.

On April 10, the Michigan survey reported consumer sentiment at 47.6, a record low in polling dating back to 1952. Four of the 5 lowest values ever have come in the last 4 years, with two in the Biden administration in June and July 2022 at 50.0 and 51.5 respectively (at the peak of the inflation surge), and in November 2025 with an index at 51.0, in addition to the current all time low. The 5th lowest index ever was 51.7 in May 1980. In short, despite objective measures of GDP, unemployment and inflation having been far worse in some earlier years, Americans are stunningly sour on the economy,

The comparison of consumer sentiment in the first Trump administration and in the second is the point of this post. The chart highlights the first term up to the 2018 midterms and the second term so far. The average sentiment in the first 23 months of term 1 was 97.5. The average so far in term 2 is 55.5, with the most recent reading at 47.6. That is a 42 point drop from average to average and a 49.9 point drop from average to current reading.

To state the obvious: economic sentiment was a tremendous advantage in the first Trump term and is a tremendous burden in the second.

Sentiment plummeted when the Covid pandemic arrived in early 2020, then began to recover into 2021 before the spike in inflation in the second half of 2021 drove sentiment to the then all-time low of 50 in June 2022. Sentiment recovered somewhat through most of the 2nd half of the Biden administration though it dipped in the run-up to the 2024 election. That persistent negative view of the economy was a constant weight on Biden’s support and ultimately on Harris’ vote.

During Trump’s second term the trend has been sharply down from a peak of 74.0 in December 2024 immediately after his reelection, to 64.7 in the first month of the new term with irregular month to month movements and an overall downward trend.

The low consumer sentiment index means the economy is virtually guaranteed to remain the top concern for voters, and therefore the issue all candidates have to discuss (and claim to fix, with more or less persuasiveness). Above all, this economic gloom will be the atmosphere of the election.

Whatever Trump’s approval rating was in the first term, he could count on an electorate optimistic about the economy. In the second term economic pessimism can only be a drag on his approval and the fortunes of the Republican party in November.

Low consumer sentiment doesn’t guarantee big GOP seat losses in November. While it is correlated with seat loss the fit is quite loose. Presidential approval is a better predictor of seat loss. But economic concerns write the script for the 2026 election.

Let’s do take a moment to reiterate what all have said before: compare Trump approval in term 1 and term 2. While there has been steady decline in net approval in the second term, the first year of the first term was lower and reached what is still the lowest point of either term at -19.4. My estimate of the lowest net approval of the second term is -16.8 on April 6. As of April 9 the net approval estimate is -16.5. You can, of course, consult the many other websites on Substack and elsewhere for alternate estimates of the approval trends. These are mine. Some are a little better for Trump and some a little worse. We all tell the same qualitative story and show very similar bumps and wiggles.

I’ve added annotation for some significant events around the times of movement in approval. See Elliott Morris’s look at consequential events for Trump 2 approval at his Strength in NumbersSubstack. I have slightly different notable events based on my judgement rather than statistical fits.

In the first term approval fell around Trump’s effort to replace Obamacare, and continued down until the passage of the Ryan tax cut package in December 2017. After that, net approval rose until it stabilized at about -10 where it remained through the midterms.

In the second term so far, we’ve not seen a sustained recovery in net approval. After the negative reaction to “Liberation Day” tariffs, approval declined until Trump announced he was pausing the tariffs and negotiating. That bought back some approval points in the late spring, only to again start declining by June. Likewise the October government shutdown coincided with a drop in approval, with some recovery after the shutdown ended. The most recent period of decline has not seen a similar recovery period so far.

This is not to say there can be no approval recovery. We know not what events may occur over the next 207 days until the election. But we do know that inflation and the cost of living has been the most important problem in surveys since the inflation spike in 2021-22, and it has remained the number one problem throughout Trump’s second term. The vast difference in consumer sentiment in the second term compared to the first shows vividly that the economy is not the life preserver the president and his party seek.