Category Archives: Polls

Consumer sentiment, presidential approval and the midterms

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Consumer sentiment helped Trump in his 1st term, is damaging him now

At the risk of becoming repetitive, the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment hit another record low in May, falling to 44.8, down from 49.8 in April. The new final estimate for May is itself down from the preliminary estimate earlier in the month of 48.2, suggesting continuing decline throughout the month.

This is the lowest reading in the history of the Michigan survey, which stretches back to 1952. The previous low was 50 in June 2022, at the peak of the 2021-2022 inflation surge.

The political importance of this extremely low economic sentiment is seen in the yellow highlights in the figure. In the run-up to the midterms in the first Trump administration, consumer sentiment was consistently high, averaging 97.5 over the first two years of Trump 1. In the second term, that same measure of economic outlook is vastly lower, averaging just 55.0, and recently declining.

Consumer sentiment turned sharply negative in Biden’s summer of 2022, only beginning to rebound before his midterm in November 2022. So far, Trump’s second term looks notably worse.

Folks follow the presidential approval trends closely, but I think it is important to also consider other trends that either support or depress approval, and which are indicative of broader social and economic forces. In this case, economic opinion was quite positive throughout Trump’s first term leading to the midterm (and after, until Covid arrived). Trump’s approval fell steadily in his first year, but recovered a bit in his second year in 2018. While underwater in 2018 he was in better shape than his first year approval showed. The good economic sentiment surely provided support for him and for the GOP in the midterms, despite the eventual loss of 42 seats in the house.

Compare Obama’s 2010 midterm. His job approval in 2010 averaged 47.0% with disapproval at 45.7%, for a net +1.3. But consumer sentiment in his first 2 years averaged 71.6, considerably lower than Trump’s first two year average of 97.5. Despite slightly positive net approval, Democrats lost 64 House seats in 2010.

Trump’s net approval is currently -21.0, with consumer sentiment averaging 55.0 since the start of the second term. Both economic sentiment and approval are falling with just over 5 months until the midterms.

Trump’s approval recovery in his second year of 2018 shows no signs of recurring in 2026. And the economic pessimism is similarly declining without immediate signs of recovery. Together this points out that economic attitudes were a positive force among the public in his first term, helping approval to recover from the lows of 2017. Now those economic attitudes are an anchor pulling approval ever lower.

This does not mean we will see 60+ GOP seats lost in 2026, similar to Democratic losses in 2010. The GOP majority is far smaller than that enjoyed by Democrats going into 2010, and the number of tossup or lean seats are much smaller now than 16 years ago. As Amy Walter at the Cook Political Report reminds us, for a true wave election Republicans will have to lose seats in districts Trump won by 20 points or more in 2024. Not impossible, but much harder to do now with more seats designed for larger partisan majorities through redistricting.

The depressed economic sentiment does point to further trials for Trump’s approval and for support for Trump and GOP policies, making any policy agenda difficult.

I’ll close with a note on the Democratic “autopsy” that just came to light. A glance back to the consumer sentiment chart tells a clear story about the predicament Biden, Harris and the Democrats faced in 2024. While sentiment had recovered some from the lows of summer 2022, it never passed an index of 80 and fell in the months leading to Nov. 2024. In my polling and in every other poll, inflation and the cost of living topped the most important issue charts constantly from late 2021 through the 2024 election. I’m tired of the Carville quote, but you can’t ignore it: “It’s the economy, stupid.” What sunk Biden and Harris is now the same anchor around Trump and the GOP. There are others, of course, but the economy fundamentally helped Trump in term 1, and it is hurting him badly in term 2.

See also Elliott Morris on the Democratic autopsy’s incredible omission of inflation as a factor in Trump’s victory in 2024:

When we boot up the data, it’s obvious the main reason Harris lost — and the reason I am going to explore here, at this website, it being a data-driven website — is that 2024 simply had too much inflation-induced anti-incumbent sentiment for the incumbent party to overcome. This is curiously missing from its main diagnosis. The word “inflation” isn’t mentioned in the autopsy a single time (except in the context of inflation-adjusted ad spending).

See Elliott’s full post here.

And as a note: my Substack is free because I have a day job and the Substack is a great way for me to share findings from my polling that otherwise don’t make it in news stories on the poll. But if I’m free that’s all the more reason for you to support the many great people who are making Substack their full time job. I have paying subscriptions to a number of Substacks from both the right and the left because I’m very interested in their analysis and the variety of viewpoints. I encourage you to find some sites that you enjoy, and hopefully learn from, and to subscribe as a paying member.

How to spend a surplus

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Property tax relief, schools, both? For now, the answer is neither.

On May 13, the Wisconsin Senate defeated a proposal from Democratic Gov. Tony Evers, Republican Senate Majority leader Devin LeMahieu and Republican Assembly Speaker Robin Vos to use $1.8 billion of a projected $2.5 billion state surplus to provide additional funding for special education, about a 5% reduction of school property taxes, plus direct payments of $300 to each income tax payer in the state. This compromise had been long in the making with Republicans favoring more direct payments to taxpayers and the governor favoring more for schools. Neither side got everything. Both sides got something.

The bill was defeated in the Wisconsin Senate with 3 Republicans and every Democrat voting no. The Assembly easily passed the measure with all Republicans plus 10 Democrats voting yes.

There was also unusual bipartisan opposition from Republican gubernatorial candidate U.S. Rep. Tom Tiffany, and almost all Democratic candidates for governor, including Francesca Hong, a self-described democratic socialist, and Kelda Roys, who was recently endorsed by the state teachers union, WEAC.

The vote complicates messaging around affordability, property taxes and school funding for the fall campaign in which Republican Tiffany seeks to replace the two-term Democratic governor and Democrats aim to flip both Senate and Assembly after 16 years of Republican majorities.

The compromise spending bill was announced and voted on over just three days, leaving little time for public opinion to form, or for interest groups to mobilize. But we have polling on the central issues from February and March when similar arguments were circulating from Evers and Republicans during the regular legislative session.

A majority of Wisconsin registered voters have come to say holding down property taxes is a greater priority than providing funding to K-12 schools. As of March, 58% said reducing property taxes was more important, while 41% said funding schools was more important. This balance has shifted dramatically since 2018 when 37% wanted property tax cuts while 58% favored school spending. This reversal has been one of the most striking changes in public opinion over the past eight years, and followed a surge in support for public school funding during the previous administration of Gov. Scott Walker.

Funding for special education costs has been a major concern for school districts and was addressed in the previous budget, though rising costs have produced a shortfall in coverage that was partially addressed by the proposed compromise plan. Across 5 polls taken since 2019, more than 70% have favored “a major increase” in state funding for special education, most recently 71% in June 2025.

Concern for property taxes and for special education funding are not mutually exclusive. In the 2025 surveys of February and June, 59% of those more concerned about property taxes also favored more funding for special education, as did 96% of those who place greater priority on school spending over property tax reductions.

As for returning the projected surplus to tax-payers, voters were evenly divided in March, with 47% in favor of a one-time payment to offset property taxes while 52% favored an ongoing increase in state aid to schools to reduce property taxes. There was a considerable partisan divide on this question, though not as enormous as on many issues: 68% of Republicans favored a one-time payment, as did 60% of independents, while 80% of Democrats favored increased state aid to schools.

The amount of the projected surplus that should be used for a property tax reduction divided the state about evenly in February, with 29% saying all or 3/4s should go to property tax reduction, 34% saying about half, and 37% saying 1/4 or none. Here too the partisan divide is clear, though not extreme.

There is a larger partisan divide over state aid to schools. Overall, 51% say the legislature had failed to provide enough funding for schools, while 49% say schools must learn to live within their budget limits. Partisans divide more sharply on this question.

The compromise bill reflected aspects of public opinion by providing some property tax relief, increased aid for special education, and some direct payments to individual income tax payers, while spending about 3/4 of the projected surplus. The lack of extreme partisan divides on these issues also suggest public openness to compromise. The bill did not address the issue of ongoing state aid to schools which would also reduce property taxes, an issue certain to face the new legislature and governor in January.

Affordability, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top concern of 35% of Wisconsin voters. Property taxes are the top concern of 7% and public schools are the top issue for 5%, as of the March Marquette Law School Poll. Costs and broad financial concerns are also reflected by concern with health insurance, 11%, jobs and the economy, 9%, and the affordability of housing, 6%.

Both parties claim they will address voters’ concern about the cost of living. In different ways the positions of Tiffany, Democratic candidates for governor, and Democratic legislators, conflict with their public commitments to property tax reductions, support for school spending and affordability promises, leaving none of them with clean attacks on the other side’s positions on the surplus bill. Both sides positioned themselves against more money for special education and against property tax relief in this bill. Complicated explanations of why may not convince voters of the underlying wisdom of the strategies.

It is too soon to know what voters think about this, or whether this vote will be an issue in the fall campaigns. But I’d love to hear what candidates hear “on the doors” over the next few weeks.

A GOP problem in one response

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Even among Trump loyalists the cost of living is a problem

This open-ended response is a good illustration of the challenge rising prices pose for the GOP now and in November.

The kicker is that this was from our January Marquette Law School Poll national survey. Back then gas prices were a sweet spot for cost of living, with 50%. saying the price of a gallon was down. Today, 93% say the price is up. (I’m curious where the 7% who say no change or down are living, and can I get gas there?)

We often portray Trump’s support as unwavering, his base as uncritical. But in our open-ended responses we actually see a lot of Trump supporters who also mention a dislike, such as this one, or more commonly some variation of “how he talks” or “his tweets.” This is not to say these folks are ready to switch to Democrats, but portraying them as blind to all criticism or shortcomings is not the case for quite a few who nonetheless approve of Trump. This response is important because the dislike is not about his style but about core economic outcomes and pain.

About half of adults say both something they like and something they dislike. Only 12% (as of December) say only something they like while 35% say only things they dislike. This isn’t a new development.

The cost of living was a huge weight around Biden’s and then Harris’ necks. Now Trump is wearing that necklace.

Boys and girls! Young and old! And Donald Trump

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All but the olds soured on Trump in 2025

Much has been made about Donald Trump’s gains in 2024, especially among young men and Hispanic voters. That is mostly true. Today’s focus is how his appeal had waxed and waned among young and old, men and women.

I use net favorability to Trump because it applies when he was out of office as well as since he returned for his second term. Net favorability is generally pretty close to net approval. In my April Marquette Law School Poll national survey, Trump’s net favorability was -22 percentage points and his net approval was -21 points.

Trump’s net favorability was negative with all combinations of sex and age in 2021 and 2022 polls. There were at most slight gains during this period. But in 2023 his net ratings rose with all groups except for older women. In 2024 men of all ages further increased their net ratings, becoming net positive with men 45-59 and 60+, and momentarily with men 30-44. The youngest men became more favorable but peaked short of becoming net positive.

Among women, the increased favorability of 2023 continued into at least part of 2024, with older women’s favorable ratings increasing for the first time in 2024. Unlike the men, no age group of women reached net positive territory despite the general improved views of Trump.

In 2025 and 2026, however, all groups except for men and women 60 or older, who have remained stable, turned sour on Trump. The timing of the turn down varies a bit, with young women declining sooner than others, but for both sexes and all age groups under 60, 2025-26 has seen a steady downward trend in net favorability.

As of April, all gender and age groups are net negative to Trump except for men age 60 and older. Women of each age group are more negative than men of the same age, a pattern seen throughout the last five years.

For all the chatter about young men under 30 moving to Trump in 2024, the decline in net favorability has been steepest with this group in 2025. The emphasis on changing views of young men was correct in saying that they had rising support for Trump in 2024 and he gained votes in this group. But that is also a bit misleading in suggesting that young men became strong supporters of Trump. In fact they never reached net positive favorability. In Pew’s validated voter surveys Trump lost men under 30 by 5 points in 2024, an improvement over losing this group by 14 points in 2020. Among women under 30, Trump lost by 29 points in 2024 and by 35 points in 2020. Net gains of 9 points with young men and 6 points among young women are notable, but fall short of a major realignment of preferences. Exit polls in 2024 show young men voting for Trump by 1 point, 49% to 48%, and young women voting against Trump, 38%-61%. I think Pew’s data are more reliable for this analysis, but at the most Trump barely won young men, doing significantly less well than with older men in the exit poll. Pew data are here and the exit data are at the very bottom here.

The takeaway is that young men were not the key to Trump’s victory in 2024, though he improved with them over 2020. However, the fortunes of the GOP in 2026 have far more to do with Trump’s falling favor among all age groups under 60 than with any single sex or age group. Declining favorability is widespread across the population, and isolated strength is not enough to power a midterm victory. How many seats change in the House and Senate rests on the limited number of closely contested seats, before and after recent redistricting, but also depends on how unpopular the sitting president is. At this point, he is considerably less popular than at the start of his second term, including among young men.

Cease-fire good; war bad

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New MULawPoll national survey finds widespread dissatisfaction with the Iran war

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey is out this morning. We were in the field April 8-16, starting the day after the cease-fire agreement with Iran went into place.  In today’s post I focus on the results related to the war. Tomorrow I’ll turn to the economy and how President Donald Trump is handling various aspects of his job. 

TLDR? Cease-fire popular, war not. Haven’t accomplished goals, not sufficient reasons for the war. Trump approval on war: 32%. And among Republicans 65% approve of war, that’s 13 points below Republican approval of how he handles his job in general, itself the lowest among Republicans in the second term.

The Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds 75% approve of the cease-fire in the U.S.-Iran war and 24% disapprove. At the same time, only 21% say the U.S. has achieved its goals in the war, while 78% say the goals have not been met. The public overall does not think that there were sufficient reasons for the war, with 63% saying there were not sufficient reasons and 36% saying there were.

There is bipartisan approval of the cease-fire that went into effect on April 7. Among Republicans, 82% approve of the cease-fire, as do 71% of Democrats and 67% of independents. There is also a bipartisan sentiment, with some partisan variation, that the goals of the war have not been achieved. Among Republicans, 64% say the United States has failed to achieve its goals, compared to 94% of Democrats and 78% of independents.

Bipartisanship breaks down on the question of the justification for the war. Seventy-one percent of Republicans say there was sufficient reason for the war, while 94% of Democrats say there was not. Among independents, 75% say there was not enough reason to go to war.

Thirty-two percent approve of the way President Donald Trump has handled the war, while 68% disapprove. Among Republicans, approval for Trump’s handling of the war stands at 65%, which is notably less than the 78% of Republicans who approve of Trump’s handling of his job as president in general. Among independents, 82% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war, along with 96% of Democrats.

The survey was conducted April 8-16, 2026, interviewing 982 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. For registered voters, the sample size was 870, with a margin of error of +/-3.6. For likely voters, the sample size was 576, with a margin of error of +/-4.4 percentage points.

Feelings toward Iran are quite negative, with 12% having a favorable opinion, 73% holding unfavorable views, and 14% saying they haven’t heard enough to say. The U.S. partner in the war, Israel, is seen favorably by 33% and unfavorably by 54%, with 14% who say they haven’t heard enough. Views of Israel have turned more negative over the past year. In March 2025, 43% held favorable views of Israel, compared to 43% unfavorable, with 14% lacking an opinion.

Trump threatened to bomb bridges and power plants across Iran in the days before the cease-fire went into effect. These are seen as legitimate military targets by 38% of respondents, while 62% say they are primarily civilian infrastructure that should not be attacked. Sixty-six percent of Republicans view these as legitimate military targets, while 34% disagree. Among independents, 70% say these are civilian locations and should not be attacked, as do 88% of Democrats.

The Iran war comes after the United States has destroyed dozens of alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, sent military forces into Venezuela to seize President Nicolás Maduro in January, and threatened to take control of Greenland. Respondents were asked whether they support or oppose Trump’s use of the military to force change in other countries.

  • Thirty-two percent support this use of the military, while 68% are opposed. 
  • As with approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran war, Republicans divide, though not evenly, with 64% in support of forcing change in other countries and 36% opposed. 
  • Eighty-three percent of independents and 94% of Democrats are opposed to such use of military force.
  • In this poll, 68% of Republicans are favorable to MAGA and 30% are not favorable to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Among Republicans favorable to the MAGA movement, 78% support using the military to force countries to change, while among Republicans who are not favorable to MAGA, 34% support this use of the military. 

The public does not see the United States as a force for stability in the world. While 39% say the U.S. is a force for stability, 60% say it is causing instability. Here, too, there is a partisan divide, with 73% of Republicans who say the U.S. is a stabilizing force, while 72% of independents and 90% of Democrats say it is causing instability.

A majority, 57%, say it is better for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, while 43% say it is better to stay out of world affairs. Support for an active role peaked in March 2025 when 64% favored an active role in the world—the highest in 18 Marquette Law School Poll national surveys since 2022.

Partisan views of the U.S. role in the world have shifted during Trump’s second term. In February 2025, 55% of Republicans said the U.S. should be active in the world. That rose to 68% in this poll. Independents are most reluctant to support an international role, with support among independents declining from 54% in early 2025 to 32% this month. Democrats have consistently been most supportive of an active role across the previous 17 polls since 2022, but have shifted substantially, especially since the Iran war began. In February 2025, 71% favored an active role; that fell to 64% in January 2026 and to 54% in April.

Attention to news about the Iran war

The public has paid substantial attention to the Iran war. In April, 76% had read or heard a lot about the war, 21% had heard a little, and 3% had heard nothing at all. That is more attention than was paid to the U.S. airstrikes on Iran nuclear facilities in June 2025, when 63% said they had heard a lot in July.

The only comparably high levels of attention in polling during Trump’s second term have been to the imposition of tariffs in April 2025, when 81% said they had heard a lot, and the fatal shooting of Renee Good by an ICE officer in Minneapolis in January, when 76% had heard a lot. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to say they heard a lot about the current Iran war, 82% and 80% respectively, while independents have paid considerably less attention, with 51% hearing a lot.

Attention is also relatively high concerning Iran limiting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Sixty percent say have heard a lot about this, 27% have heard a little, and 13% have heard nothing at all. As with the war in general, Democrats and Republicans are equally attentive, while independents are much less so.

Significantly fewer Americans paid close attention to the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose airplane was shot down over Iran, leading to a large number of ground troops being dispatch inside Iran to rescue the second airman. About this, only 45% said they had heard a lot, 34% heard a little, and 21% heard nothing. While 58% of Republicans heard a lot about this, 39% of Democrats did, and just 24% of independents.

The toplines and crosstabs for the poll are on the poll website here.  Tomorrow I’ll run down views of the economy and of Trump’s handling of various issues.

Second Term Worse than the First

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Consumer sentiment is far worse in 2nd term than in 1st

Analysts of President Donald Trump’s second term, and the outlook for the midterm elections on Nov. 3, have reasonably focused on Trump’s job approval. After holding above the first term approval trend, the second term approval fell below the first term in January and has recently fallen more after the start of the Iran war.

This is well known and I have nothing to add.

What is less often considered are opinions of the economy and especially the comparison of first and second term opinion. This deserves more attention.

The University of Michigan’s index of consumer sentiment is a long-running monthly survey of how Americans feel about the economy. As an index, high values reflect optimism and positive feelings, low values show pessimism and negative feelings. An index value of 100 (where the index stood in 1966) reflects quite positive views of the economy including current conditions and future expectations. As an index, values can be above or below 100, i.e. this is not a percentage.

On April 10, the Michigan survey reported consumer sentiment at 47.6, a record low in polling dating back to 1952. Four of the 5 lowest values ever have come in the last 4 years, with two in the Biden administration in June and July 2022 at 50.0 and 51.5 respectively (at the peak of the inflation surge), and in November 2025 with an index at 51.0, in addition to the current all time low. The 5th lowest index ever was 51.7 in May 1980. In short, despite objective measures of GDP, unemployment and inflation having been far worse in some earlier years, Americans are stunningly sour on the economy,

The comparison of consumer sentiment in the first Trump administration and in the second is the point of this post. The chart highlights the first term up to the 2018 midterms and the second term so far. The average sentiment in the first 23 months of term 1 was 97.5. The average so far in term 2 is 55.5, with the most recent reading at 47.6. That is a 42 point drop from average to average and a 49.9 point drop from average to current reading.

To state the obvious: economic sentiment was a tremendous advantage in the first Trump term and is a tremendous burden in the second.

Sentiment plummeted when the Covid pandemic arrived in early 2020, then began to recover into 2021 before the spike in inflation in the second half of 2021 drove sentiment to the then all-time low of 50 in June 2022. Sentiment recovered somewhat through most of the 2nd half of the Biden administration though it dipped in the run-up to the 2024 election. That persistent negative view of the economy was a constant weight on Biden’s support and ultimately on Harris’ vote.

During Trump’s second term the trend has been sharply down from a peak of 74.0 in December 2024 immediately after his reelection, to 64.7 in the first month of the new term with irregular month to month movements and an overall downward trend.

The low consumer sentiment index means the economy is virtually guaranteed to remain the top concern for voters, and therefore the issue all candidates have to discuss (and claim to fix, with more or less persuasiveness). Above all, this economic gloom will be the atmosphere of the election.

Whatever Trump’s approval rating was in the first term, he could count on an electorate optimistic about the economy. In the second term economic pessimism can only be a drag on his approval and the fortunes of the Republican party in November.

Low consumer sentiment doesn’t guarantee big GOP seat losses in November. While it is correlated with seat loss the fit is quite loose. Presidential approval is a better predictor of seat loss. But economic concerns write the script for the 2026 election.

Let’s do take a moment to reiterate what all have said before: compare Trump approval in term 1 and term 2. While there has been steady decline in net approval in the second term, the first year of the first term was lower and reached what is still the lowest point of either term at -19.4. My estimate of the lowest net approval of the second term is -16.8 on April 6. As of April 9 the net approval estimate is -16.5. You can, of course, consult the many other websites on Substack and elsewhere for alternate estimates of the approval trends. These are mine. Some are a little better for Trump and some a little worse. We all tell the same qualitative story and show very similar bumps and wiggles.

I’ve added annotation for some significant events around the times of movement in approval. See Elliott Morris’s look at consequential events for Trump 2 approval at his Strength in NumbersSubstack. I have slightly different notable events based on my judgement rather than statistical fits.

In the first term approval fell around Trump’s effort to replace Obamacare, and continued down until the passage of the Ryan tax cut package in December 2017. After that, net approval rose until it stabilized at about -10 where it remained through the midterms.

In the second term so far, we’ve not seen a sustained recovery in net approval. After the negative reaction to “Liberation Day” tariffs, approval declined until Trump announced he was pausing the tariffs and negotiating. That bought back some approval points in the late spring, only to again start declining by June. Likewise the October government shutdown coincided with a drop in approval, with some recovery after the shutdown ended. The most recent period of decline has not seen a similar recovery period so far.

This is not to say there can be no approval recovery. We know not what events may occur over the next 207 days until the election. But we do know that inflation and the cost of living has been the most important problem in surveys since the inflation spike in 2021-22, and it has remained the number one problem throughout Trump’s second term. The vast difference in consumer sentiment in the second term compared to the first shows vividly that the economy is not the life preserver the president and his party seek.

Opinion of the Iran War in Wisconsin

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Most groups oppose the war; Trump loyalists approve

Today I take a look at opinion of the Iran war in the swing state of Wisconsin. As I wrote this, President Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran. And the liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court won by 20 points (with 95% of the vote in), double the margin in each of the three previous Court races. While I doubt the Court vote was directly driven by opinion of the war, opposition to the war, and to Trump, almost certainly played a role in motivating Democrats to turn out.

In my March 11-18 Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters we asked if the respondent approved or disapproved of the war with Iran. Overall, 39% approved of the war and 61% disapproved.

Today I want to show how a number of demographic and attitudinal groups line up on the war. There are some groups that are strongly supportive of the war. These groups are also mostly part of the core Trump base. They include Republicans who are also favorable to MAGA, those who describe themselves as very conservative, Trump 2024 voters, and Republicans in general. Even among these and other Trump base groups there is variation in support for the war. For example 88% of MAGA Republicans approve of the war. That slips to 75% among all Republicans and to 61% among born-again protestants.

At the opposite end of high opposition to the war, almost all Democratic groups are over 95% opposed to the war, as are both somewhat liberal and very liberal groups.

There is more interesting variation within some categories. White, males, without a college degree are fairly supportive of the war, 56% approve. But their white, female, non-college counterparts are solidly opposed, 61%, which is similar to white, males with a college degree, 64%, while white, female college grads are still more opposed, 68%. Given the support for Trump from white, non-college women in 2024 (51% for Trump in the MULawPoll, 53% in the Wisconsin exit poll) this is notable slippage among an important swing group.

The war evenly divides rural Wisconsin voters while those in the suburbs are solidly opposed, 66%, and those in urban areas more opposed, 70%. Trump won rural voters in Wisconsin by 23 percentage points and by 2 points in the suburbs, losing urban voters by 21 points.

There is a considerable split by age with those 45 and older only slightly opposed to the war while those under 45 are strongly opposed.

By ideology the expected liberal and conservative alignments are strong, but among moderates, 75% disapprove of the war, as do 73% of independents.

The chart shows these groups and more. It provides a review of many crosstabs in a single figure. At the top are those groups that most approve of the war with decreasing approval as one reads down the rows.

The cease-fire, assuming it holds, will allow the end of active bombing and a resumption of oil shipments, perhaps reducing the oil shock of the past five and a half weeks. It is a long 210 days to election day as I write this. Will memories of an unpopular war and its economic price tag linger for some seven months, or will we have moved on to new topics by the fall? At this moment, there are few groups of Wisconsin voters who can be said to have thought the war a good idea.

Public approval of the Supreme Court

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Dobbs sharply damaged the Court’s standing. New erosion since Jan. 2025.

The Supreme Court has been at the center of disputes over President Donald Trump’s executive orders and other actions over the last 14 months, most recently hearing oral arguments over birthright citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment on April 1. Trump has bitterly complained about the justices recently.

Public opinion of the Court has varied sharply since 2020 when my Marquette Law School Poll began regularly polling on approval of the Court. Overall approval of the Court has ranged from a high of 66% in September 2020 to a low of 38% in July 2022. Decisions related to abortion seem to have driven the sharp declines in the fall of 2021 through summer of 2022.

On Sept. 1, 2021 the Court allowed Texas’ “heartbeat” bill to take effect which bans abortion once cardiac activity is detected, typically after about 6 weeks of gestation. This was followed by a -11 point drop in approval in the late September poll. Approval subsequently rose modestly but then took a sharp drop when the Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade was leaked to Politico on May 2, 2022, falling -10 points in the following May poll. After the Dobbs decision was officially handed down on June 24 approval fell an additional -6 points to the low of 38%.

Approval only slightly improved in 2023 and the first half of 2024, after which it rose to over 50% in the first half of 2025, before falling off in the second half of 2025 to the current 44% as of Jan. 2026.

These shifting opinions are shown in the chart.

Partisan divisions in views of the Court are substantial. As of Jan. 2026 78% of Republicans approve of the job the Court as doing, while 26% of independents and just 17% of Democrats approve.

This large split wasn’t the case in 2020 or the summer of 2021. In those polls majorities of Republicans, independents and Democrats all approved of the Court. In Sept. 2019 80% of Republicans approved as did 64% of independents and 57% of Democrats. In July 2021 it was 57% for Republicans, 61% for independents and 59% for Democrats. That was impressive lack of partisanship. It didn’t last.

After the Court allowed Texas to move forward with it’s ban on abortions after six weeks of gestation GOP approval hardly moved but independent approval dropped -13 percentage points and approval among Democrats fell -17 points. After a partial recovery, approval again fell sharply in May 2022 following the Dobbs leak, declining -13 points among independents and -24 points among Democrats. Then another drop for Democrats after the Dobbs decision was officially announced, -13 points.

The net change from July 2021 to July 2022 was a gain of 14 points among Republicans and a decline of -23 points among independents and drop of -31 points among Democrats.

During the second half of 2022 through the first half of 2024 approval among all partisans remained fairly stable between about 60% and 70% among Republicans, between about 30% and 40% among independents and between about 25% and 35% among Democrats. There were modest gains in late 2024 that peaked in early 2025 but since then approval has steadily declined among independents and Democrats while holding fairly steady among Republicans. The partisan gap has widened over the first year of Trump’s second term.

An open question is how the Court’s current docket may affect these opinions. As of the January survey the Court had ruled against the Trump administration in two fairly visible cases concerning due process in deportation proceedings and the deployment of National Guard troops in Chicago, though also ruling for the administration on many procedural decisions. Since the January poll the Court ruled against Trump’s imposition of tariffs, and has heard but not decided a case on birthright citizenship. Stay tuned for new polls as we track response to those decisions.

In recent months about 56% say they think the Court has been going out of it’s way to avoid ruling against Trump, with 44% saying the Court is not avoiding such a ruling. Those perceptions have remained quite stable in polls of Sept. and Nov. 2025 and Jan. 2026. Opinion has likewise been stable within partisan camps, though with a considerable party split. Among Republicans in January 32% think the Court is avoiding ruling against Trump, but 61% of independents and 78% of Democrats think it is avoiding ruling against the president. We will see in the April poll if the tariff decision shifted this perception in any way.

On one measure I have found very substantial majority agreement, and agreement across party lines. The Court continues to enjoy great legitimacy if it rules against the president. The question asks

If the Supreme Court rules against the president in a case, does the president have the power to ignore that ruling, or is the president required to do as the ruling says?

We’ve asked this since 2019, though not in each survey. In Jan. 2026 82% say the president must obey a Supreme Court decision. This support has been stable and across the parties since 2019. It is one demonstration that approval or disapproval of the Court doesn’t have much relationship with belief in the authority of the Court’s decisions.

President Trump’s criticism of judges, and more recently of the Supreme Court, have not yet driven down Republican approval of the Court. After the tariff decision his complaints became more severe and more frequent. If Republicans follow Trump’s lead and become less positive to the Court overall approval may decline further, since their nearly 80% approval rate is helping keep overall approval in the mid-40s. Conversely, it is possible Democratic support might rise if the Court rules against Trump in more major cases this spring. By the end of June we will know.

The paradox that an unpopular Democratic party keeps winning

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Democrats have reservations about their party but unite in opposing Trump

The Democratic party is less popular than the Republican party in both Wisconsin and national Marquette Law School polls since Jan. 2025. Yet Democrats keep strongly over-performing in both general and special elections in 2025 and 2026. Most recently Democrats flipped the Florida legislative seat that includes Mar-a-Lago, a district that went +11 for Trump in 2024 but went +2 for the Democratic legislative candidate on March 24. How can this paradox be explained?

I previously looked at this in my national polling here. Today let’s look at the most competitive state in the nation since 2016, Wisconsin. Data are from Marquette Law School polls of registered voters in October 2025, and February and March 2026.

Both parties are underwater, but Democrats more so

Both parties have net negative favorability ratings, meaning more have unfavorable than favorable views of each party. Since October there has been little change in overall favorability for each, with Democratic party favorability more net negative than for the Republican party. GOP net favorability has been around -10 points while Democratic net favorability has been twice as large, in the -20s.

Where does this added negativity to the Democrats come from? Not from the opposite party. Republicans have extremely negative views of Democrats and Democrats return the favor with equally net negative views of Republicans. Likewise this difference between parties doesn’t come from independents, who strongly dislike both parties though they give Republicans an 8 point more net negative rating than they give Democrats.

The partisan gap comes in feelings about voters’ own party. Republicans give the GOP a net positive +74 point rating, but Democrats give their party just a +56 point rating. Our partisans hate the other party equally but don’t love themselves equally.

As in horror movies, “the call is coming from inside the house.”

The same result is seen in my national polling where we also ask about approval of the job Democrats in Congress and Republicans in Congress are doing. Partisans strongly disapprove of the other congressional party but Democrats are less approving of congressional Democrats while Republicans are more approving of their party in Congress. Democratic discontent applies equally to favorability of the party in general and specifically to the job performance of the congressional party.

This asymmetry in partisan views take a different turn when the question is about President Donald Trump. Across the three polls since October Trump’s overall approval is 44% and disapproval is 54%, for a net rating of -10 percentage points. Here, though, Democrats are stunningly united in disapproval. Republicans strongly approve but not so much as Democrats disapprove. And independents are also strong in their disapproval of the president. This negative balance, seen in both Wisconsin and national Marquette polls, explains why Republican candidates have suffered in elections in 2025 and 2026 despite Trump winning the presidency in 2024.

Democrats are less thrilled with their party but virtually all are agreed in their dislike for Trump. This, plus strong independent dissatisfaction with Trump, has powered Democratic over-performance and wins in the 2025 general elections in Virginia and New Jersey and in special elections throughout the country.

Where dissatisfaction comes from within each party

Which Democrats are less satisfied with their party, and where does Republican dissatisfaction arise in the GOP?

Very few Republicans consider themselves to be liberal or very liberal, and very few Democrats describe themselves as conservative or very conservative. I lump these few outliers in with moderates in each party. (To see how that has changed over the past 15 years in Wisconsin see my earlier post here.)

Here we look at very conservative to moderate Republicans and at moderate to very liberal Democrats and their favorability to their own parties.

In the GOP those who are very conservative have the highest net positive feelings for the Republican party, and those who are conservative are almost as positive. Where there is less positivity is with moderate Republicans, who remain solidly positive but considerably less so than either type of conservative.

For the Democrats, those who are very liberal are the least positive to the party, just +24 points net favorable, while liberals are most positive and moderates pretty positive but not enormously so. Comparing Democrats with Republicans, very liberal Democrats are much less favorable to the Democratic party than very conservative Republicans are to their party. And liberal Democrats are less positive than conservative Republicans to their respective parties. Only among moderates does the Democratic party enjoy a modest advantage in net favorability, a +56 vs +45 among Republicans.

The asymmetry between parties is not only with one ideological camp, but the strikingly low favorability among very liberal Democrats reflects the ongoing debate within the party between those urging moderation and those pushing for a more clearly liberal or progressive party.

Some of these discrepancies are likely due to the natural frustration of a minority party unable to control the congressional agenda and able at best to block or stall legislation in the Senate. But the differences by ideology also point to a divide over the direction of the Democratic party.

These are the things that explain why the Democratic party has consistently less favorable ratings than the Republican party, and that the discrepancy is substantially due to differences within the parties.

The paradox unriddled

The paradox of strong electoral performance by the less popular party is driven by opposite forces. Democrats differ about themselves but they nearly unanimously oppose Donald Trump, and they are joined by solid opposition to Trump among independents. Republicans have maintained very strong support for Trump within their party, but not so strong as Democratic opposition and with quite weak appeal among independents.

Democrats may not agree on what they are for, and are frustrated by their party’s inability to block Trump, but they absolutely know what (or who) they are against. This has provided a strong electoral advantage when Republican candidates across the country have so closely tied themselves to President Trump, and where dissent brings presidential condemnation and primary challenges. November is seven months away and the details of candidates and issues are not yet certain, but it is against this background that the less popular party nonetheless enjoys a midterm advantage.

What Wisconsin Independents Think

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Dislike Republicans, Democrats and Donald Trump

We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the independents. (See the first post on the Republicans here, and the post on the Democrats here.

The first thing that jumps out about the opinions of independents is that they are much less lopsided than either Republicans or Democrats. For the partisans a number of opinions were held by over 80% of the party, but for independents only a handful approach that level of consensus.

The one item where independents are nearly unanimous is whether tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Only 5% think the do.

Independents are united in not liking the parties and related groups. Only 17% are favorable to the Democratic party and 18% are favorable to the Republican party.

Opinions related to ICE are quite negative, with 19% favorable to ICE, and 24% who approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws. Twenty-two percent say the shooting of Alex Pretti was justified.

President Donald Trump gets a 23% approval rating from independents and MAGA is viewed favorably by 22%. Twenty-four percent think Trump’s policies will reduce inflation and 25% say they are better off than a year ago. Forty-one percent say they are living comfortably rather than just getting by or struggling.

The chart shows independent opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.

On policies, independents are skeptical of data centers, with 24% saying their benefits outweigh the costs. Online sports betting is favored by 25%.

On immigration issues one-in-four, 25%, favor deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record, though 59% favor deporting those in the country illegally when the question doesn’t mention length of residence or criminal records. Forty-five percent think the U.S. is mostly deporting immigrants who have criminal records.

A number of school related issues are more evenly divided among independents. Thirty-nine percent say schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid and opinion is evenly divided on Evers’ 400-year veto which requires annual increases in per-pupil expenditures. A majority, 55%, say they are more concerned with holding down property taxes rather than increasing school spending, though 58% are satisfied with the job their local public schools are doing.

Thirty-seven percent approve of the job the legislature is doing and 46% approve of how Evers is handling his job as governor. Fifty-one percent approve of how the Wisconsin Supreme Court is doing its job.

Most important concerns

The top issue concern for independents is health insurance, closely followed by inflation and the cost of living. A bit less concern is expressed for taxes in general and for electricity costs, followed by gun violence.

Independents are somewhat less concerned about jobs and the economy, and abortion policy. While taxes ranked third in concern at 51%, property taxes specifically ranked next to last at 33%. And immigration and border security ranked last, with just 22% of independents saying they were very concerned about this.

Independents are more like Democrats in ranking health insurance and inflation as their top two issues. Democrats rank inflation first and then health insurance. And independents differ from Republican issue priorities by putting property taxes and immigration at the bottom of their concerns, while Republicans rank immigration first and property taxes second.

While partisans are extremely united on a number of issues, independents are more varied in their views, meaning that for virtually all issues there is at least a significant minority view on every issue for independents while the minority views among partisans are often much smaller, with a more unified majority opinion.

There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.

Next time: Comparing partisan and independent opinions.