Tag Archives: public opinion

Cease-fire good; war bad

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New MULawPoll national survey finds widespread dissatisfaction with the Iran war

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey is out this morning. We were in the field April 8-16, starting the day after the cease-fire agreement with Iran went into place.  In today’s post I focus on the results related to the war. Tomorrow I’ll turn to the economy and how President Donald Trump is handling various aspects of his job. 

TLDR? Cease-fire popular, war not. Haven’t accomplished goals, not sufficient reasons for the war. Trump approval on war: 32%. And among Republicans 65% approve of war, that’s 13 points below Republican approval of how he handles his job in general, itself the lowest among Republicans in the second term.

The Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds 75% approve of the cease-fire in the U.S.-Iran war and 24% disapprove. At the same time, only 21% say the U.S. has achieved its goals in the war, while 78% say the goals have not been met. The public overall does not think that there were sufficient reasons for the war, with 63% saying there were not sufficient reasons and 36% saying there were.

There is bipartisan approval of the cease-fire that went into effect on April 7. Among Republicans, 82% approve of the cease-fire, as do 71% of Democrats and 67% of independents. There is also a bipartisan sentiment, with some partisan variation, that the goals of the war have not been achieved. Among Republicans, 64% say the United States has failed to achieve its goals, compared to 94% of Democrats and 78% of independents.

Bipartisanship breaks down on the question of the justification for the war. Seventy-one percent of Republicans say there was sufficient reason for the war, while 94% of Democrats say there was not. Among independents, 75% say there was not enough reason to go to war.

Thirty-two percent approve of the way President Donald Trump has handled the war, while 68% disapprove. Among Republicans, approval for Trump’s handling of the war stands at 65%, which is notably less than the 78% of Republicans who approve of Trump’s handling of his job as president in general. Among independents, 82% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war, along with 96% of Democrats.

The survey was conducted April 8-16, 2026, interviewing 982 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. For registered voters, the sample size was 870, with a margin of error of +/-3.6. For likely voters, the sample size was 576, with a margin of error of +/-4.4 percentage points.

Feelings toward Iran are quite negative, with 12% having a favorable opinion, 73% holding unfavorable views, and 14% saying they haven’t heard enough to say. The U.S. partner in the war, Israel, is seen favorably by 33% and unfavorably by 54%, with 14% who say they haven’t heard enough. Views of Israel have turned more negative over the past year. In March 2025, 43% held favorable views of Israel, compared to 43% unfavorable, with 14% lacking an opinion.

Trump threatened to bomb bridges and power plants across Iran in the days before the cease-fire went into effect. These are seen as legitimate military targets by 38% of respondents, while 62% say they are primarily civilian infrastructure that should not be attacked. Sixty-six percent of Republicans view these as legitimate military targets, while 34% disagree. Among independents, 70% say these are civilian locations and should not be attacked, as do 88% of Democrats.

The Iran war comes after the United States has destroyed dozens of alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, sent military forces into Venezuela to seize President Nicolás Maduro in January, and threatened to take control of Greenland. Respondents were asked whether they support or oppose Trump’s use of the military to force change in other countries.

  • Thirty-two percent support this use of the military, while 68% are opposed. 
  • As with approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran war, Republicans divide, though not evenly, with 64% in support of forcing change in other countries and 36% opposed. 
  • Eighty-three percent of independents and 94% of Democrats are opposed to such use of military force.
  • In this poll, 68% of Republicans are favorable to MAGA and 30% are not favorable to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Among Republicans favorable to the MAGA movement, 78% support using the military to force countries to change, while among Republicans who are not favorable to MAGA, 34% support this use of the military. 

The public does not see the United States as a force for stability in the world. While 39% say the U.S. is a force for stability, 60% say it is causing instability. Here, too, there is a partisan divide, with 73% of Republicans who say the U.S. is a stabilizing force, while 72% of independents and 90% of Democrats say it is causing instability.

A majority, 57%, say it is better for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, while 43% say it is better to stay out of world affairs. Support for an active role peaked in March 2025 when 64% favored an active role in the world—the highest in 18 Marquette Law School Poll national surveys since 2022.

Partisan views of the U.S. role in the world have shifted during Trump’s second term. In February 2025, 55% of Republicans said the U.S. should be active in the world. That rose to 68% in this poll. Independents are most reluctant to support an international role, with support among independents declining from 54% in early 2025 to 32% this month. Democrats have consistently been most supportive of an active role across the previous 17 polls since 2022, but have shifted substantially, especially since the Iran war began. In February 2025, 71% favored an active role; that fell to 64% in January 2026 and to 54% in April.

Attention to news about the Iran war

The public has paid substantial attention to the Iran war. In April, 76% had read or heard a lot about the war, 21% had heard a little, and 3% had heard nothing at all. That is more attention than was paid to the U.S. airstrikes on Iran nuclear facilities in June 2025, when 63% said they had heard a lot in July.

The only comparably high levels of attention in polling during Trump’s second term have been to the imposition of tariffs in April 2025, when 81% said they had heard a lot, and the fatal shooting of Renee Good by an ICE officer in Minneapolis in January, when 76% had heard a lot. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to say they heard a lot about the current Iran war, 82% and 80% respectively, while independents have paid considerably less attention, with 51% hearing a lot.

Attention is also relatively high concerning Iran limiting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Sixty percent say have heard a lot about this, 27% have heard a little, and 13% have heard nothing at all. As with the war in general, Democrats and Republicans are equally attentive, while independents are much less so.

Significantly fewer Americans paid close attention to the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose airplane was shot down over Iran, leading to a large number of ground troops being dispatch inside Iran to rescue the second airman. About this, only 45% said they had heard a lot, 34% heard a little, and 21% heard nothing. While 58% of Republicans heard a lot about this, 39% of Democrats did, and just 24% of independents.

The toplines and crosstabs for the poll are on the poll website here.  Tomorrow I’ll run down views of the economy and of Trump’s handling of various issues.

Opinion of the Iran War in Wisconsin

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Most groups oppose the war; Trump loyalists approve

Today I take a look at opinion of the Iran war in the swing state of Wisconsin. As I wrote this, President Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran. And the liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court won by 20 points (with 95% of the vote in), double the margin in each of the three previous Court races. While I doubt the Court vote was directly driven by opinion of the war, opposition to the war, and to Trump, almost certainly played a role in motivating Democrats to turn out.

In my March 11-18 Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters we asked if the respondent approved or disapproved of the war with Iran. Overall, 39% approved of the war and 61% disapproved.

Today I want to show how a number of demographic and attitudinal groups line up on the war. There are some groups that are strongly supportive of the war. These groups are also mostly part of the core Trump base. They include Republicans who are also favorable to MAGA, those who describe themselves as very conservative, Trump 2024 voters, and Republicans in general. Even among these and other Trump base groups there is variation in support for the war. For example 88% of MAGA Republicans approve of the war. That slips to 75% among all Republicans and to 61% among born-again protestants.

At the opposite end of high opposition to the war, almost all Democratic groups are over 95% opposed to the war, as are both somewhat liberal and very liberal groups.

There is more interesting variation within some categories. White, males, without a college degree are fairly supportive of the war, 56% approve. But their white, female, non-college counterparts are solidly opposed, 61%, which is similar to white, males with a college degree, 64%, while white, female college grads are still more opposed, 68%. Given the support for Trump from white, non-college women in 2024 (51% for Trump in the MULawPoll, 53% in the Wisconsin exit poll) this is notable slippage among an important swing group.

The war evenly divides rural Wisconsin voters while those in the suburbs are solidly opposed, 66%, and those in urban areas more opposed, 70%. Trump won rural voters in Wisconsin by 23 percentage points and by 2 points in the suburbs, losing urban voters by 21 points.

There is a considerable split by age with those 45 and older only slightly opposed to the war while those under 45 are strongly opposed.

By ideology the expected liberal and conservative alignments are strong, but among moderates, 75% disapprove of the war, as do 73% of independents.

The chart shows these groups and more. It provides a review of many crosstabs in a single figure. At the top are those groups that most approve of the war with decreasing approval as one reads down the rows.

The cease-fire, assuming it holds, will allow the end of active bombing and a resumption of oil shipments, perhaps reducing the oil shock of the past five and a half weeks. It is a long 210 days to election day as I write this. Will memories of an unpopular war and its economic price tag linger for some seven months, or will we have moved on to new topics by the fall? At this moment, there are few groups of Wisconsin voters who can be said to have thought the war a good idea.

What Wisconsin Independents Think

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Dislike Republicans, Democrats and Donald Trump

We often look at polls for the toplines, the balance of opinion across the full population. But it is important to understand the very substantial divisions in our politics that are masked by that single topline. Today I continue a series of posts on what partisans and independents in Wisconsin think. I’m doing them one at a time to stay focused on each party. We’ll come back with some comparisons in the final post. Today let’s look at the independents. (See the first post on the Republicans here, and the post on the Democrats here.

The first thing that jumps out about the opinions of independents is that they are much less lopsided than either Republicans or Democrats. For the partisans a number of opinions were held by over 80% of the party, but for independents only a handful approach that level of consensus.

The one item where independents are nearly unanimous is whether tariffs help Wisconsin farmers. Only 5% think the do.

Independents are united in not liking the parties and related groups. Only 17% are favorable to the Democratic party and 18% are favorable to the Republican party.

Opinions related to ICE are quite negative, with 19% favorable to ICE, and 24% who approve of how ICE is enforcing immigration laws. Twenty-two percent say the shooting of Alex Pretti was justified.

President Donald Trump gets a 23% approval rating from independents and MAGA is viewed favorably by 22%. Twenty-four percent think Trump’s policies will reduce inflation and 25% say they are better off than a year ago. Forty-one percent say they are living comfortably rather than just getting by or struggling.

The chart shows independent opinion on 23 topics covered in my Feb. 11-19, 2026 Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin registered voters.

On policies, independents are skeptical of data centers, with 24% saying their benefits outweigh the costs. Online sports betting is favored by 25%.

On immigration issues one-in-four, 25%, favor deporting immigrants in the U.S. illegally including long term residents with no criminal record, though 59% favor deporting those in the country illegally when the question doesn’t mention length of residence or criminal records. Forty-five percent think the U.S. is mostly deporting immigrants who have criminal records.

A number of school related issues are more evenly divided among independents. Thirty-nine percent say schools must live within their budgets rather than receive more state aid and opinion is evenly divided on Evers’ 400-year veto which requires annual increases in per-pupil expenditures. A majority, 55%, say they are more concerned with holding down property taxes rather than increasing school spending, though 58% are satisfied with the job their local public schools are doing.

Thirty-seven percent approve of the job the legislature is doing and 46% approve of how Evers is handling his job as governor. Fifty-one percent approve of how the Wisconsin Supreme Court is doing its job.

Most important concerns

The top issue concern for independents is health insurance, closely followed by inflation and the cost of living. A bit less concern is expressed for taxes in general and for electricity costs, followed by gun violence.

Independents are somewhat less concerned about jobs and the economy, and abortion policy. While taxes ranked third in concern at 51%, property taxes specifically ranked next to last at 33%. And immigration and border security ranked last, with just 22% of independents saying they were very concerned about this.

Independents are more like Democrats in ranking health insurance and inflation as their top two issues. Democrats rank inflation first and then health insurance. And independents differ from Republican issue priorities by putting property taxes and immigration at the bottom of their concerns, while Republicans rank immigration first and property taxes second.

While partisans are extremely united on a number of issues, independents are more varied in their views, meaning that for virtually all issues there is at least a significant minority view on every issue for independents while the minority views among partisans are often much smaller, with a more unified majority opinion.

There are other issues not covered in this poll that could also become important in the fall elections, but will await new polling.

Next time: Comparing partisan and independent opinions.

Was the Iraq war worth fighting

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Some perspective on public opinion and the endless war

A look at the way back machine. The public was quite supportive of the Iraq war initially. Opinion shifted through the first year to a majority saying it was not worth fighting. That reached a stable equilibrium by 2008 which has remained since.

Some perspective.

Highest highs and lowest lows: Gallup 1937-2025

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Closing the books on Gallup presidential approval

When I refreshed my presidential approval database in January, I wondered when Gallup would update their measure from December. They usually release approval in mid-month, but there wasn’t an update as of Jan. 20. I assumed it would come soon.

Now we learn that there won’t be any more Gallup presidential approval polls. As reported in the Washington Post and the New York Times on Feb. 11, Gallup has decided to discontinue their approval polling. Gallup made a similar decision in 2015 to discontinue their presidential horse race polls.

This is a loss to the public. The Gallup organization has the longest running, and most voluminous, time series of approval, dating back to 1937. While their methodology has evolved over time, they have always used what was “state of the art” methods for the time, and their question wording has been stable for decades, after evolving a bit in the early years. That means when we want to make the best apples-to-apples comparison across presidents and decades, Gallup is the indispensable source.

Here is what I now realize to be my final update of all the 2846 Gallup approval polls since Roosevelt in Aug. 1937 to Trump in Dec. 2025.

There are plenty of high quality national polls available now, so Gallup is hardly the only game in town. The polling averages from Silver Bulletin, FiftyPlusOne, New York Times, RealClearPolitics and others are now widely recognized as a better way to track the full measure of approval across dozens of pollsters rather than rely on a single pollster.

When George Gallup started the poll in the 1930s there was money to be made in public opinion polling. Newspapers across the country subscribed to his polls and distributed his results to a national audience. Gallup actually offered newspapers a money back guarantee that his 1936 presidential horse race poll would outperform the Literary Digest poll that year, which it did. The poll also survived embarrassing errors, most notably the 1948 presidential election.

These days, there isn’t such a financial interest in providing opinion data to the public. Private polling for interest groups, parties and candidates remains financially viable, but those polls serve private, not public, interests. News organizations either run their own polls, contracting the work through various pollsters, or report on polls they don’t produce themselves but also don’t pay for. Universities (like my Marquette Law School Poll) produce public polls in the public interest and for the publicity value. Gallup is reported to say they are refocusing their business away from approval polling, which is sad but understandable.

This moment of closure lets us make one final list of the lows and highs of Gallup approval results over the decades.

The all time lowest low goes to Harry Truman, at 22%. John F. Kennedy has the highest low, never falling below 56%. And as for highs, George W. Bush owns that record at 90%, eclipsing his father, George H.W. Bush by one point. As for the lowest high, that belongs to the current president, at 47% in his second term, two points lower than his high in the first term. No other president has failed to reach 50% on their best days.

That all time low for Truman was misreported for some decades as a point higher, 23%. I found the discrepancy in 2006, tracked down the evidence, and presented it to Gallup’s then Editor in Chief, Frank Newport, who was gracious enough to review my results and confirm the new low of 22%. I told that story in a post in July 2006. To my surprise, the post still lives at my first website, Political Arithmetik

Presidents can tie their highs or lows in multiple polls on different days. The next table shows all the lows and highs and the dates on which those polls were taken. Some of the dates are instructive. Trump’s second term high came 7 days after his inauguration. And his first term highs were all during the early months of the Covid pandemic. Biden’s low came about the time he dropped out of the presidential race in 2024. For George W. Bush and Franklin D. Roosevelt, their highest marks came after attacks on the United States, after Sept. 11, 2001 and after Dec. 7, 1941.

As for largest range from high to low, that honor is shared by George W. Bush and Harry S Truman, both with a 65 point range, Bush from 90-25 and Truman from 87-22. (Truman lacks a middle name, just an initial, hence no period after the S, a lesson I learned from my 12th grade government teacher, Dr. Austin F. Staples. The great Google AI tells me official documents include a period, but I trust Dr. Staples on this.)

So there you have it. An end of a polling era. “Official” highs and lows will no longer have a consistent standard to use. This means as a practical problem that the highs and lows going forward will come from outliers– the rare poll with an exceptionally high approval and the exceptionally low ones. That, I think, is a loss.

1 year of Trump 2.0

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Trump’s approval is bad enough. No need to exaggerate.

It’s the one year mark of Trump’s second term and everyone is posting year in review pieces. Here is mine.

The chart shows how all presidents in the polling era have varied in approval over their entire terms, plus year 1 of Trump 2.0. The boxes cover the middle 50% of all polls, and the “whiskers” extend out to their all time highs and lows of approval in Gallup polls. The bar in the box is the median poll, the 50th percentile. I stick to Gallup for consistency over time and for their unmatched historical depth.

What jumps out is the approval ratings of the last four presidents have varied considerably less than those of their predecessors. Trump 1.0 has the least variation (smallest standard deviation) of any of the other 14 presidents, with 2.0 the second smallest, so far. Both Obama and Biden varied a little more, but considerably less than either Bushes, Clinton, or Reagan. Trump’s median in 1.0 ties with Truman for the lowest median approval, 39%. So far, Trump 2.0 is the 3rd lowest, at 40.5%. (Truman, by the way, set the record for all time low at 22%. Trump hasn’t come close, with a low of 33%, so far.)

This shrinkage of variation in approval is one consequence of polarization, leading the out-party since George W. Bush’s 2nd term to consistently give approval ratings below 10%, while the in-party gives high approval, typically in the 80s, no matter what. The poor independents are left to shift the balance a bit between two largely unmovable partisan camps. V.O. Key famously said voters were “a rational god of vengeance and reward”, but that breaks down when one side will never reward good performance and the other will never condemn bad outcomes. Trump may never approach the lows of Truman, Nixon, Carter or both Bushes, all of whom had low points in the 20s. But he will never approach the highs of Obama, Clinton or Reagan either.

Here is a more conventional look at approval of each of the elected presidents from the polling era. The trends here are smoothed trend estimates. Gallup now polls approval only once a month, so Trump 2.0 is not smoothed, just the raw polls. Also, Gallup hasn’t released the January results, so December is the most recent reading.

Trump 2.0 has run a little better than 1.0 in Gallup’s data. The December point at 36% is a bit of an outlier. The major polling averages put Trump’s approval between 40% and 42% as of Jan. 20, 2026.

An alternate view breaks out each president for readability. Here I’m showing raw poll results with no smoothing.

Here is my polling average for all Trump polls in 2025. My trend estimate is 41.4% approval. For comparison, FiftyPlusOne.news has it at 40.0%, SilverBulletin is 42.0%, NYTimes is 42.0% and RealClearPolitics is 42.4%.

You will note dips below the general downward trend in April after the tariff announcement, then a little recovery after backing off those original “liberation day” tariffs. Then the downward trend returns, until another dip during and after the government shutdown in October and November. A bit of a rise in early December after which the general downtrend returns. This is steady, nearly linear, decline with a couple of short-term wiggles.

I have a beef with headlines that shout “Trump at all time low” or “Approval cratering.” Those either cherry pick particularly low polls, or exaggerate small departures from the general downward trend. Trump’s approval is bad enough. Historically low for other presidents at the end of one year. But the message I read in this trend is a steady decline in approval for an unpopular president, signaling a challenging midterm, and with no sustained upturn in the last 12 months. No need to exaggerate the problems this poses for the White House or Republicans generally.

Attention to news in 2025

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What we noticed and what we ignored

Time for a look back at the news of 2025 and what the public paid attention to and what it largely ignored. The year has not lacked for news, especially political news as Donald Trump expanded his authority through executive orders, followed by litigation over those orders.

My Marquette Law School Poll asks how much people have heard or read about recent events in the news in each poll:

Here are some recent topics in the news. How much have you heard or read about each of these?

Polls are conducted every other month, six times a year. This is not a comprehensive review of news events but provides a look at how much attention the public gave to a wide variety of mostly political news. Topics are picked from recent events that have received significant coverage and raise important political issues, with more emphasis on news stories published within a few weeks of each poll’s field dates.

Figure 1 shows the 32 topics asked about over the year.

The top topic of the year, by a substantial margin, is tariffs. The May survey came a month after Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement of tariffs on April 2 and the subsequent changes made in rates and implementation dates. Fully 81% of U.S. adults said they had heard or read a lot about the tariffs.

The second most attention went to Trump’s plans for deportation of immigrants in the U.S. illegally, with 70% hearing a lot about this in the first month of the administration. Subsequent items concerning immigration issues varied in visibility, with the mistaken deportation of a man, Kilmar Abrego Garcia, who was sent to El Salvador in March ranking as the 7th most followed event, with 63% hearing a lot. When Garcia was returned to the U.S. in June, only 37% heard a lot about that, ranking 25th of 32 news items.

Cuts to the federal workforce ranked 3rd most followed story, with 67% hearing a lot as of May. Rounding out the top five news items were the war between Israel and Iran in June and the contentious meeting between Trump and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28th in the Oval Office. U.S. airstrikes on nuclear facilities in Iran ranked 6th.

At the bottom of the chart are Trump’s attempts to remove a member of the Federal Reserve Board and the firing of the director of the Centers for Disease Control, followed closely by 30% and 29% respectively.

If you follow politics enough to be reading this post you will probably to shocked that attention to the November elections for governor in New Jersey and Virginia ranks 31st of 32 events, with only 28% hearing a lot about this. For us political junkies, it is a reminder that much of the public doesn’t follow politics closely, and especially not elections in states other than their own.

The honor of being the least followed of the 32 stories is Trump’s extended diplomatic trip to Asia in late October, during the shutdown of the federal government, with only 24% who paid a lot of attention to that trip.

Attention to news by party

Figure 2 shows attention to these news topics by party. A higher percentage of Democrats than Republicans say they have read or heard a lot about most of the news events covered during 2025. By comparison to either party, independents are considerably less likely to have followed news across every item.

Highly visible events receive more attention across all partisan lines while more obscure events are also followed less by each party group. The correlation of attention for Democrats and Republicans is .78. Independent attention correlates with Democratic attention at .91, and with Republican attention at .85. In short, news tends to penetrate each partisan group in similar ways though with generally lower attention from Republicans and especially independents.

Republican vs Democratic attention to news

Figure 3 shows the attention gap between Republicans and Democrats across the 32 topics, arranged by size of the difference between Republican and Democratic attention. For the news items we asked about, Democrats say they have heard or read more than do Republicans for 24 items, Republicans more for 5 items and the parties are tied for 3 items.

It is notable that the items with greater attention from Republicans are closely tied to Trump. Attention to his inaugural address shows the largest Republican advantage over Democrats in attention, 27-percentage points, followed by Trump’s speech to a joint session of Congress (don’t call it a State of the Union address) with an 11-point GOP lead in attention. Other topics with a Republican advantage closely concern Trump–the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas and the U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

At the opposite end of the partisan attention gap, Democrats paid much more attention to the “No Kings” protests in October, by 23-points, and to a measles outbreak in Texas and New Mexico in the winter by 20-points. Democrats also paid substantially more attention than Republicans to the firing of the CDC director and reductions in the federal workforce.

Perhaps surprisingly, Democrats paid considerably more attention in September to the potential release of the Jeffrey Epstein files than did Republicans, by 16-points. (This does not cover the actual release of the files in December, after our final poll of 2025 in November.) Coverage of this issue has emphasized pressure from Republicans and MAGA activists for the release, though Democrats also supported the law to require the files to be made public.

This invites the question of whether Democrats simply pay more attention to politics than do Republicans.

In fact, attention to politics is virtually identical for Republicans and Democrats, while independents are much less attentive in general. We ask

Some people seem to follow what’s going on in politics most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. How often do you follow what’s going on in politics…?

Forty-nine percent of Democrats say they follow politics most of the time, as do 48% of Republicans, a trivial difference. In contrast, only 26% of independents say they follow politics most of the time. The lower attention from independents is reflected in their notably lower levels of attention to news events, but this can’t account for Republican and Democratic differences across news items. Table 1 shows attention to politics by partisanship in 2025 surveys.

One plausible explanation is that partisans follow different news sources, and those sources give different emphasis to specific news events. I don’t have data on the actual content of various news sources, but in my data there are only small (typically 3-4 point differences) in awareness of news events between Republicans who follow only conservative news sources and those who follow a mix of conservative and liberal sources, and a similarly small difference for Democrats who follow only liberal sources versus a mix of liberal and conservative sources. This casts some doubt on the idea that it is differences in content that drives differential awareness, and suggests that partisanship has more to do with what news people pay attention to, and remember. More on this in a future post.

The data tables

For those who want to see the numbers in detail here you go. Table 2 shows those who heard or read a lot, a little and nothing at all for each news event. While there is some variation, the most prominent news items have high “heard a lot” and low “nothing at all”, and the less prominent items reverse this.

Table 3 shows high attention to news by party identification.

Public opinion on U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Oct. 2024 term

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Cases of the Oct. 2024 term

Links to SCOTUSBlog page for each case

Classified documents

A federal judge in Florida has dismissed the case charging Trump with illegally retaining classified documents and obstructing government efforts to recover the documents. The judge ruled that the appointment of the special counsel violated the Constitution. Do you favor or oppose this ruling?

Poll datesFavorOpposeDon’t know
7/24-8/1/24374319
Party IDPoll datesFavorOpposeDon’t know
Republican7/24-8/1/24661221
Independent7/24-8/1/24253045
Democrat7/24-8/1/24127612

TikTok Ban

TikTok v. Garland

In January the Supreme Court upheld a law requiring the social media app TikTok, which is owned by a Chinese company, to be sold or banned in the U.S. How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
1/27-2/6/256238
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican1/27-2/6/257327
Independent1/27-2/6/255347
Democrat1/27-2/6/255446

Halt Trump criminal sentencing

Trump v. New York

In January the Supreme Court rejected Donald Trump’s request to halt his criminal sentencing in New York where he was convicted in May on 34 felony counts, allowing sentencing to proceed. How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
1/27-2/6/256535
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican1/27-2/6/254357
Independent1/27-2/6/257030
Democrat1/27-2/6/258712

Texas porn access

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

In January the Supreme Court heard arguments concerning a Texas law meant to prevent minors from accessing sexual materials on the internet, through a requirement that adults prove they are 18 or over by submitting government-issued IDs in order to access sexually oriented websites. Do you think the court should uphold this law or strike it down for infringing on the rights of adults?

Poll datesUphold the lawStrike it down
1/27-2/6/256931
Party IDPoll datesUphold the lawStrike it down
Republican1/27-2/6/257822
Independent1/27-2/6/257426
Democrat1/27-2/6/255743

Freeze foreign aid payments

Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition

[In March, the Supreme Court rejected President Trump’s request to freeze nearly $2 billion in foreign aid, sending the case back to a lower court for further proceedings.] How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
3/17-27/255842
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican3/17-27/253961
Independent3/17-27/256040
Democrat3/17-27/257624

EPA regulation limits

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

[In March, the Supreme Court ruled that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was entitled to impose specific requirements on permit holders to prevent pollution but not to make the permit holders responsible simply because water quality has fallen below the agency’s standards.] How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
3/17-27/254852
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican3/17-27/255941
Independent3/17-27/254555
Democrat3/17-27/253862

Religious charter school

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond

[In April, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case asking whether a state that generally funds charter schools as alternatives to traditional public schools may refuse to fund a charter school simply because it is explicitly religious.] How do you think the Court should rule?

Poll datesThe state may refuse to fund the religious charter schoolThe state is required to fund a religious charter school
3/17-27/255743
Party IDPoll datesThe state may refuse to fund the religious charter schoolThe state is required to fund a religious charter school
Republican3/17-27/254555
Independent3/17-27/256040
Democrat3/17-27/256832

Ban transition treatment for minors

United States v. Skrmetti

[In December, the Supreme Court heard arguments challenging a Tennessee law that prohibits medical providers from prescribing puberty-delaying medication or performing gender transition surgery for youth under 18.] How do you think the Court should rule?

Poll datesUphold the Tennessee lawOverturn the law
3/17-27/257227
5/5-15/257030
Party IDPoll datesUphold the Tennessee lawOverturn the law
Republican3/17-27/259010
Republican5/5-15/25928
Independent3/17-27/257921
Independent5/5-15/257327
Democrat3/17-27/255248
Democrat5/5-15/254456

Trump administration must facilitate return of Kilmar Abrego Garcia

Noem v. Abrego Garcia

In April, the Supreme Court ruled that federal law requires the Trump administration to facilitate the return of a man erroneously deported to El Salvador. How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
5/5-15/256733
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican5/5-15/254159
Independent5/5-15/256534
Democrat5/5-15/25946

Must provide due process before deportation

Trump v. J.G.G.

In April, the Supreme Court said that those the administration is seeking to deport under the Alien Enemies Act must receive notice that they are subject to deportation within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek court review before such deportation occurs. How much do you favor or oppose this decision?

Poll datesFavorOppose
5/5-15/256535
Party IDPoll datesFavorOppose
Republican5/5-15/254357
Independent5/5-15/256139
Democrat5/5-15/259010

Parents can opt kids out of LGBTQ readings

Mahmoud v. Taylor

In April, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case asking whether parents of elementary school students should be able to opt their children out of reading classes concerning stories about LGBTQ+ characters, if those stories conflict with the families’ religious beliefs. How do you think the Court should rule?

Poll datesParents should be able to opt outThe schools should set the curriculum for all
5/5-15/257030
Party IDPoll datesParents should be able to opt outThe schools should set the curriculum for all
Republican5/5-15/25919
Independent5/5-15/256931
Democrat5/5-15/254852

Cases not yet polled

Reverse Discrimination

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule — which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim — cannot be squared with either the text of Title VII or the Supreme Court’s precedents.

Judgment: Vacated and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Justice Jackson on June 5, 2025. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Smith & Wesson v Mexico

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act bars the lawsuit.

Judgment: Reversed, 9-0, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on June 5, 2025. Justices Thomas and Jackson filed concurring opinions.

Police excessive use of force

Barnes v. Felix

Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s moment-of-threat rule — a framework for evaluating police shootings which requires a court to look only to the circumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived the threat inducing him to shoot — improperly narrows the Fourth Amendment analysis of police use of force.

Judgment: Vacated and Remanded , 9-0, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on May 15, 2025. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Regulation of Flavored Vapes

Food and Drug Administration v. Wages and White Lion Investments

Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred in setting aside as arbitrary and capricious the FDA’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products pursuant to The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009; the 5th Circuit also relied on an incorrect standard to reject the FDA’s claim of harmless error regarding the agency’s failure to consider marketing plans submitted by respondents.

Judgment: Vacated and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Justice Alito on April 2, 2025. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Ghost guns

Garland v. VanDerStok

Emergency application for stay is granted on Aug. 8, 2023. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would deny the application for stay.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas baring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives from enforcing a 2022 rule regulating “ghost guns” as firearms.

Birthright Citizenship or Universal Injunction

Trump v. CASA

Emergency application for partial stay

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts’ nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s Jan. 20 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.

Race and Congressional districting

Louisiana v. Callais

Issue: (1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court in this case erred in finding that race predominated in the Louisiana legislature”s enactment of S.B. 8; (2) whether the majority erred in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny; (3) whether the majority erred in subjecting S.B. 8 to the preconditions specified in Thornburg v. Gingles; and (4) whether this action is non-justiciable.

Trump indictments, revisited

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In my previous post I argued that the indictments of former president Donald Trump did not in fact boost his standing with voters, despite the often repeated claim that they did.

Two folks I respect pushed back on the NY indictment, though agreeing the others had no effect. Here I respond, and agree in part. In any case, I think this shows a positive discussion is possible over such matters! My bottom line is Trump may have gained support in the GOP primary following the NY indictment. But I don’t find evidence of any gain in overall favorability with all registered voters. My new analysis (thanks to Philip and Sam) finds some evidence that the Florida indictment lowered his support and favorability, something I did not mention in my original post..

Since my original post, Philip Bump at The Washington Post published a nice story looking at my claim, and concluding there was in fact a boost from the first indictment in New York but agreeing there were no boosts from the subsequent indictments. See his piece here. (Link should not be paywalled.)

Sam Wang posted a similar point on Bluesky (sorry, don’t know how to copy a link to that)

Let’s start with the strong case, a rise in Trump GOP primary support following the NY indictment. Here is Trump’s percentage i.n GOP primary polls before and after each indictment. (I’ve updated the most recent polls since my original post, which affects only the post-GA data.)

We all agree the post-New York support is higher than pre-indictment. The only disagreement is that there was a trend of rising Trump primary support before the indictment and that rise continued for over a month after the indictment. My original post claimed the post-NY increase was primary due to the pre-existing trend, rather than an indictment effect. Bump and Wang disagree and see an indictment effect. Here is the chart with the full trend.

The red line shows the overall trend across all polls, the dots are individual polls. The high-frequency polls from YouGov (85 in all) make up the dense set of dots mostly above the red trend line. Those dense dots DO show a bump up immediately after the NY indictment. In my original post I discounted that, thinking the red line was increasing before and after and I gave more weight to that. But I discounted the dense set of polls that do rise. Wang raises the point but Bump dives into this and does more substantial analysis that I now think supports a NY indictment effect.

Here are my finding on this, in response to their points, and finding myself now agreeing there was an independent effect of the NY indictment even considering the trend before and after.

I fit several models, but here are the two that make me conclude NY had an effect. The dependent variable is Trump percent in primary polls. You do NOT want to use his margin over DeSantis because the latter has been declining steadily, so the margin confounds Trump support with DeSantis’ weakening. As you can see in the chart, Trump has been pretty flat since mid-May.

The models I fit are a polynomial in time, which allows for the curve of the support trend, which rises, then flattens. Obviously not a constant linear trend. I fit one quadratic and one cubic fit (the latter probably overfitting the trend but our focus in on the coefficients for the indictments.)

The first model is the quadratic trend.

The NY coefficient is a 4.12 percentage point increase in Trump support after the indictment, and is a statistically significant effect. So this agrees with Bump and Wang, and shows I dismissed this effect too quickly.

The model also suggests that the Florida indictment may have lowered Trump’s support by 2.8 points, a marginally statistically significant result. There is no evidence that DC or GA indictments changed his support. Both have negative but non-significant estimates.

An issue is whether the quadratic trend is sufficient to capture the trend over time, independent of the indictments. As a check I reestimate the model with a cubic in time. That model is shown next.

The NY effect here is a 4.8 point increase, which remains statistically significant. The Florida effect remains negative but falls short of statistical significance. So either way, the NY indictment seems to have boosted Trump with GOP primary voters over and above the trend leading up to the indictment.

On the other hand, Trump’s favorability ratings with all registered voters don’t seem to have gone up with NY, but may have declined slightly with the FL indictment.

Here the trend is nearly flat since January, so I estimate one model that is linear in time, and one that is quadratic as a robustness check. The linear time model is

The time trend is virtually flat, with no evidence of a NY indictment effect. However, the Florida indictment seems to have lowered favorability by 3.6 points.

Using a quadratic in time is similar:

The Florida estimate is a 3.8 point decrease in favorability, and marginally significant, with no evidence for a more complicated time trend. As a final check I ran a cubic time trend with the FL coefficient of -3.5, but p=.056 so not as convincing an effect.

Bottom line is the NY indictment didn’t show any evidence of boosting Trump’s favorability among all registered voters, but it does seem to have improved his standing in the GOP primary by 4.1 to 4.8 points depending on the model.

My thanks to Philip and Sam for pushing this point and adding to the analysis.

Trump polling and his indictments

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To cut to the chase, the indictments of Donald Trump have not boosted him in the polls, either for favorability or for his support in the GOP primary. This claim keeps being repeated as if the data support it. It does not.

Net favorability nationally

Trump’s net favorability (percent favorable minus percent unfavorable) inched up 1.5-2 points following the first indictment in New York on March 30, 2023, from a median of -14.0 to -12.5, and mean of -14.2 to -12.2. This is the only period of a (slight) improvement compared to the pre-indictment period (Jan. 1 to Mar. 29), Following the Florida indictment the median fell to -18, then -19 after the DC indictment and rose -17.5 after Georgia. (Table of full results below.)

The net favorability is for the national population, so perhaps Trump gained substantially among Republican voters, but not the full population. His support in the GOP primary vote gives us that test.

Trump GOP Primary support

Compared to pre-indictment, Trump did have higher support among Republicans in the primary vote following the New York indictment, a median of 49% prior to the NY indictment and 57% after NY but before Florida. There was no further change after Florida (still 57%), or after DC (still 57%.) After the Georgia indictment the median is 58%. If there was in indictment effect boost at all (see below for why you should doubt that) it was over by the Florida documents case indictment.

The remaining doubt about indictment effects is provided by the trend chart below. Trump’s support for the nomination had been rising steadily since Jan. 1 through the spring. It rose at the same rate following the New York indictment as it had been rising prior to the indictment. The trend levels off in early May, a month after the NY indictment and about a month before the Florida indictment. Since mid-may there has been very little trend in Trump’s primary vote. (Each point in the chart is a national poll and the red line is a local regression trend estimate.) Trump’s margin over DeSantis has continued to climb but that is due entirely to DeSantis’ collapse in the polls, not to any gains by Trump since May. Trump’s current 58% support is more than enough to win the nomination. But it hasn’t been increasing for four months.

There are reports of surges in donations following the indictments. But if so, that hasn’t been reflected in the polling for either favorability or for GOP primary support.

The table below shows the median, mean and number of national polls used in the charts above. Note there are only 4 favorability polls completed between the DC and GA indictments, though there were 16 primary polls in the same interval.

“Indictments help Trump” is folklore that needs to be corrected. There is no polling evidence the indictments help, or hurt, Trump. Any effect of criminal trials remains to be seen.

Reference