Trump indictments, revisited

In my previous post I argued that the indictments of former president Donald Trump did not in fact boost his standing with voters, despite the often repeated claim that they did.

Two folks I respect pushed back on the NY indictment, though agreeing the others had no effect. Here I respond, and agree in part. In any case, I think this shows a positive discussion is possible over such matters! My bottom line is Trump may have gained support in the GOP primary following the NY indictment. But I don’t find evidence of any gain in overall favorability with all registered voters. My new analysis (thanks to Philip and Sam) finds some evidence that the Florida indictment lowered his support and favorability, something I did not mention in my original post..

Since my original post, Philip Bump at The Washington Post published a nice story looking at my claim, and concluding there was in fact a boost from the first indictment in New York but agreeing there were no boosts from the subsequent indictments. See his piece here. (Link should not be paywalled.)

Sam Wang posted a similar point on Bluesky (sorry, don’t know how to copy a link to that)

Let’s start with the strong case, a rise in Trump GOP primary support following the NY indictment. Here is Trump’s percentage i.n GOP primary polls before and after each indictment. (I’ve updated the most recent polls since my original post, which affects only the post-GA data.)

We all agree the post-New York support is higher than pre-indictment. The only disagreement is that there was a trend of rising Trump primary support before the indictment and that rise continued for over a month after the indictment. My original post claimed the post-NY increase was primary due to the pre-existing trend, rather than an indictment effect. Bump and Wang disagree and see an indictment effect. Here is the chart with the full trend.

The red line shows the overall trend across all polls, the dots are individual polls. The high-frequency polls from YouGov (85 in all) make up the dense set of dots mostly above the red trend line. Those dense dots DO show a bump up immediately after the NY indictment. In my original post I discounted that, thinking the red line was increasing before and after and I gave more weight to that. But I discounted the dense set of polls that do rise. Wang raises the point but Bump dives into this and does more substantial analysis that I now think supports a NY indictment effect.

Here are my finding on this, in response to their points, and finding myself now agreeing there was an independent effect of the NY indictment even considering the trend before and after.

I fit several models, but here are the two that make me conclude NY had an effect. The dependent variable is Trump percent in primary polls. You do NOT want to use his margin over DeSantis because the latter has been declining steadily, so the margin confounds Trump support with DeSantis’ weakening. As you can see in the chart, Trump has been pretty flat since mid-May.

The models I fit are a polynomial in time, which allows for the curve of the support trend, which rises, then flattens. Obviously not a constant linear trend. I fit one quadratic and one cubic fit (the latter probably overfitting the trend but our focus in on the coefficients for the indictments.)

The first model is the quadratic trend.

The NY coefficient is a 4.12 percentage point increase in Trump support after the indictment, and is a statistically significant effect. So this agrees with Bump and Wang, and shows I dismissed this effect too quickly.

The model also suggests that the Florida indictment may have lowered Trump’s support by 2.8 points, a marginally statistically significant result. There is no evidence that DC or GA indictments changed his support. Both have negative but non-significant estimates.

An issue is whether the quadratic trend is sufficient to capture the trend over time, independent of the indictments. As a check I reestimate the model with a cubic in time. That model is shown next.

The NY effect here is a 4.8 point increase, which remains statistically significant. The Florida effect remains negative but falls short of statistical significance. So either way, the NY indictment seems to have boosted Trump with GOP primary voters over and above the trend leading up to the indictment.

On the other hand, Trump’s favorability ratings with all registered voters don’t seem to have gone up with NY, but may have declined slightly with the FL indictment.

Here the trend is nearly flat since January, so I estimate one model that is linear in time, and one that is quadratic as a robustness check. The linear time model is

The time trend is virtually flat, with no evidence of a NY indictment effect. However, the Florida indictment seems to have lowered favorability by 3.6 points.

Using a quadratic in time is similar:

The Florida estimate is a 3.8 point decrease in favorability, and marginally significant, with no evidence for a more complicated time trend. As a final check I ran a cubic time trend with the FL coefficient of -3.5, but p=.056 so not as convincing an effect.

Bottom line is the NY indictment didn’t show any evidence of boosting Trump’s favorability among all registered voters, but it does seem to have improved his standing in the GOP primary by 4.1 to 4.8 points depending on the model.

My thanks to Philip and Sam for pushing this point and adding to the analysis.

Trump polling and his indictments

To cut to the chase, the indictments of Donald Trump have not boosted him in the polls, either for favorability or for his support in the GOP primary. This claim keeps being repeated as if the data support it. It does not.

Net favorability nationally

Trump’s net favorability (percent favorable minus percent unfavorable) inched up 1.5-2 points following the first indictment in New York on March 30, 2023, from a median of -14.0 to -12.5, and mean of -14.2 to -12.2. This is the only period of a (slight) improvement compared to the pre-indictment period (Jan. 1 to Mar. 29), Following the Florida indictment the median fell to -18, then -19 after the DC indictment and rose -17.5 after Georgia. (Table of full results below.)

The net favorability is for the national population, so perhaps Trump gained substantially among Republican voters, but not the full population. His support in the GOP primary vote gives us that test.

Trump GOP Primary support

Compared to pre-indictment, Trump did have higher support among Republicans in the primary vote following the New York indictment, a median of 49% prior to the NY indictment and 57% after NY but before Florida. There was no further change after Florida (still 57%), or after DC (still 57%.) After the Georgia indictment the median is 58%. If there was in indictment effect boost at all (see below for why you should doubt that) it was over by the Florida documents case indictment.

The remaining doubt about indictment effects is provided by the trend chart below. Trump’s support for the nomination had been rising steadily since Jan. 1 through the spring. It rose at the same rate following the New York indictment as it had been rising prior to the indictment. The trend levels off in early May, a month after the NY indictment and about a month before the Florida indictment. Since mid-may there has been very little trend in Trump’s primary vote. (Each point in the chart is a national poll and the red line is a local regression trend estimate.) Trump’s margin over DeSantis has continued to climb but that is due entirely to DeSantis’ collapse in the polls, not to any gains by Trump since May. Trump’s current 58% support is more than enough to win the nomination. But it hasn’t been increasing for four months.

There are reports of surges in donations following the indictments. But if so, that hasn’t been reflected in the polling for either favorability or for GOP primary support.

The table below shows the median, mean and number of national polls used in the charts above. Note there are only 4 favorability polls completed between the DC and GA indictments, though there were 16 primary polls in the same interval.

“Indictments help Trump” is folklore that needs to be corrected. There is no polling evidence the indictments help, or hurt, Trump. Any effect of criminal trials remains to be seen.

Reference

The Public & the Supreme Court

It is “big decisions” week at the U.S. Supreme Court. While most people have an opinion about how the Court is handling its job, the details are often obscure to a substantial share of the public. This week’s decisions will come as surprises to many who don’t follow the Court’s docket.

The Court has suffered a substantial decline in approval since 2020, when fully 66% approved of the job the Court was doing. As of May, 2023, approval stands at 41%. All the data reported here is from the Marquette Law School Poll national surveys of adults.

Approval of the Court differs sharply by party identification, with Republicans maintaining a high approval rating around 60% but independents dropping into the 30s and Democrats into the 20s.

There has been considerable stability in views of the Dobbs decision, which struck down Roe v Wade in June 2022, at least among those who have an opinion on the case (more on those without an opinion below.) About 2/3rds oppose overturning Roe, while 1/3rd support the Dobbs decision.

Approval has changed in “sensible” directions, following party and shifting as the Court has issued major decisions. Disagreement with outcomes drives approval down, agreement with outcomes increases approval. Few of the public are aware of the details of legal reasoning in decision, though elite discourse may emphasize textualism or originalism or “history, text, and tradition” based arguments.

The limits of public attention to the Court is vividly illustrated by awareness of the balance of justices nominated by Republican and by Democratic presidents. Nominations have been intensely contested for over a decade (arguably longer) and the three Trump appointments followed in the wake of Obama’s nominee being denied hearings or a vote in 2016 following Justice Scalia’s death. If a lot of politics has been “all about the judges”, much of the public hasn’t followed the story.

Despite a long standing Republican-appointed majority on the Court, and the current 6-3 majority, 30% of the public believes a majority of the justices were appointed by Democratic presidents. About 40% say a majority was “probably” appointed by Republican presidents, and just 30% say a majority was “definitely” appointed by Republican presidents.

In the wake of the Dobbs decision there was a 10 point rise in the percent saying “definitely” Republican appointed majority, and a drop of 10 points in the percent incorrectly believing Democrats had appointed a majority. But this increased information has declined over the year since Dobbs, giving up all those gains to return to where it was, with 30% saying definitely Republican majority and 30% thinking Democratic appointees are the majority.

For those following, or reporting on, the Court, the share of the public unaware of the makeup of the majority is striking. Discussion of the Court generally assumes some facts are universally known, but this is not the case.

The Dobbs decision has shifted the policy landscape after 50 years of settled law, and has made abortion a central issue in many campaigns as state legislatures have adopted sharply differing laws, replacing the basic national standards for abortion rights under Roe and Casey that had prevailed.

The Dobbs case was clearly on the horizon for months before it was decided. Yet when we (the Marquette Law School Poll) asked about it in Sept. 2021, 30% said they “haven’t heard enough to have an opinion.”

Pre-decision
Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Overturn Roe versus Wade, thus strike down the 1973 decision that made abortion legal in all 50 states.

Post-decision
Do you favor or oppose the following recent Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Overturned Roe versus Wade, thus striking down the 1973 decision that made abortion legal in all 50 states.

The leak of the Dobbs opinion raised awareness about 8 points while the actual decision increased awareness another 10 points. By the fall of 2022, about 10% said they hadn’t heard of the Dobbs decision. This is an example of how an extraordinarily salient decision can reach almost all of the public, certainly more than the typical case or of the Court majority above.

This week, we expect a decision on the use of race as a factor in college admissions. This issue has been with us at least since the Bakke case in 1978, and has been revisited since, notably in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).

As of May, just over half of our national sample say they haven’t heard about the case or not enough to have an opinion.

Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Rule that colleges cannot use race as one of several factors in deciding which applicants to admit.

Whatever decision the Court reaches, it will come as something of a surprise to half the public. When we poll in July, it will be interesting to see how many remain unaware of this decision. Will that fall sharply, as in Dobbs, or will a substantial minority remain unaware of the decision?

A similar lack of familiarity is clear in another much talked about case (among Court watchers), 303 Creative, which concerns a business owner’s right, based on 1st Amendment speech or religious liberty grounds, to deny services to LGBTQ customers. Here too, about 45% lack awareness of the pending decision.

While a plurality favor banning the use of race in admissions, a plurality oppose allowing businesses to deny services. But in both cases the largest group is those not familiar with the case.

Views of the justices

Despite recent coverage of the justices, most of the public says they either haven’t heard of each justice, or haven’t heard enough to have a favorable or unfavorable opinion. Here we encourage respondents to say if they lack an opinion. Our question reads:

Some justices of the Supreme Court are better known than others. For each of these names have you never heard of them, heard of them but don’t know enough to have an opinion of them, have a favorable opinion or have an unfavorable opinion?

In other surveys (including ours for different questions) “haven’t heard enough” or “don’t know” may not be an explicit option. Many respondents will offer an opinion in this case. Those responses may also contain valuable information, encouraging reluctant respondents to still venture an opinion. In light of our finding on awareness of the majority on the Court, and on specific cases, we choose to frame the question in a way that explicitly acknowledges the possibility that not every justice is well known.

As the chart makes clear, many people lack opinions of each justice. There is variation, with some better known than others, but the share of “haven’t heard enough” is higher than either favorable or unfavorable for all, if only slightly so for Justice Thomas.

More than 60% say they don’t have an opinion of Justice Alito. In November 2022 we asked respondents for their best guess as to which justice authored the Dobbs decision. A quarter correctly picked Alito, with another quarter picking Thomas, and a scattering among the other justices. This is a very difficult question for the general public, who do not as a rule rush to read opinions by their favorite justices. Perhaps it is impressive that as many as 1/4 got Alito right, and Thomas is not a bad guess, given his concurrence. Still, the point is most people don’t have specific information about individual justices even in the most visible decisions.

The May 2023 survey was conducted after a series of news stories concerning Justice Thomas’ financial disclosure statements, which did not report a real estate sale or certain travel expenses paid by others. Thirty-three percent said they had heard a lot about this, while 32% had heard a little and 35% had heard nothing at all. This was a prominent story in “Washington circles” but while 1/3rd heard a lot about it, just over 1/3rd heard nothing at all.

There is a substantial difference in awareness of the Court among those who generally pay attention to politics, which is nicely illustrated by awareness of the stories about Justice Thomas’s disclosure statements. About 36% in the May survey said they paid attention to politics “most of the time” while 64% pay attention less frequently.

News stories about Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’ financial disclosure reports. (Here are some recent topics in the news. How much have you heard or read about each of these?) By attention to politics.

Attention to politicsHeard a lotA littleNothing at all
Most of the time602812
Less often183448

In the most attentive 1/3rd of the public, awareness of the stories about Thomas’ disclosures were quite well known, but this dropped precipitously once we move beyond those most attentive to politics generally.

The lesson is an old one. Most people don’t pay as much attention to either politics or the Court as you, dear reader, or I. This means public reaction to Court decisions may not follow what elite expectations may be, simply because much of the public wasn’t expecting the cases to be decided. Even in Dobbs, a substantial 30% didn’t see the case coming as late as March 2022.

Further, given how much partisanship affects perceptions of the Court, the 25-30% who believe there is a majority appointed by Democratic presidents will have curiously distorted opinions of the court. In May, among Republicans who eroneously believed a majority of the Court were appointed by Democratic presidents, 57% disapproved of the Court. Among Democrats with the same misperception, 60% approved of the Court. Compare that with Republicans correctly saying there is definitely a Republican appointed majority: 76% approve, while among Democrats also saying there is definitely a Republican appointed majority: 14% approve.

There is a reporting and messaging lesson here. A substantial share of the audience you are trying to reach is likely unaware of some facts you take for granted. It is important to expand awareness of those facts by making them part of your story, even if they seem “obvious.”

A more isolationist GOP?

GOP candidates have struggled a bit to find positions on Russia and international affairs they can be consistent on and that GOP voters want

The shift from the Reagan party to today is striking, but we might consider the future in which the GOP is America first, isolationist.

This comment by @StuPolitics prompted me to share data from my @MULawPoll _National_ data on opinion concerning Ukraine aid and the US role in the world.

“It really is amazing how quickly the GOP position on foreign policy/int’l relations has flipped. It has gone from tough against the USSR to soft and squishy against Russia.” — @StuPolitics

On aid to Ukraine, the balance of opinion hasn’t moved much since Nov. The largest group, 40-45%, says we are giving about the right amount, some 30-35% say too much and just under 25% say not enough aid.

The partisan divide though is pretty strong but also stable. Reps most likely to say too much, Dems least and inds in the middle. Roughly half Reps and Rep leaners say we are giving too much aid to Ukraine

Note the Lean Reps are slightly more anti-aid than Reps. More on that below.

We’ve also asked @MULawPoll respondents about the US role in the world.

Most say it is better for the future of the country if we play an active role in the world, 55-60%, with 40-45% saying stay out of world affairs. A little tightening on this since Nov. 2022.

When we look at the “stay out of world affairs” by party ID, those independents who lean Rep and pure independents jump to the top of the chart as the most isolationist, at 58-64%

Reps are less so, though still at near 50%

And Lean Dems are about 40%, with Dems under 30%

Back to @StuPolitics comment, consider the international successes of nuclear arms reduction under Reagan, collapse of USSR under GHWBush and the seeming spread of democracy under Clinton.

The last 23 years have not had much to claim as big success stories for either party.

Those negative views of the US role among independents and leaners (esp Rep leaners) represent an opportunity for “isolationism” to grow, most likely in GOP but possibly with Dems too

Leadership can shape these views, exploit them, or follow the crowd. It ain’t the 1980s no more.

Party identification, leaners and strength

Gallup has an update on partisanship trends today. Links at end of this thread

I want to address the “leaned” vs “unleaded” party issue. Do “partisans” include independents who lean to a party, or not. Similarly, does “independents” include leaners or not, a how it matters

Gallup question wording is slightly different from the wording many academics use. “In politics as of today” vs “generally speaking” has modest difference but not the issue I care about which is how much difference is there between leaners and partisans.

Rep leaners are 11% and Dem leaners 13%. That close symmetry has been pretty stable. You get more partisans (obviously) if you include leaners as partisans, and more independents if you call them independents. The Gallup headline is based on calling them independent.

The “academic” question wording also asks partisans if they are “strong” or “not very strong” (ie “weak”) partisans. Here you also see 11-12% are weak & just under 20% are strong for each party.

Here are Gallup’s party ID trends since 2004, with leaners separate from partisans or pure independents.

How do these groups differ?

Some claim leaners are “really partisans”. That isn’t right.

They are more partisan than pure independents, but not as partisan as those who pick a party on the 1st question. I know nuance is hard, but leaners are indeed leaners and not committed partisans.

You also see lack of partisan commitment in the “someone else” and “wouldn’t vote” percentages that rise to the middle of the PID scales.

Also note how “weak” are different from “strong” partisans. Sometimes less partisan than lean, sometimes not.

Here is Biden approval by partisan lean and strength. Similar to the vote choice above, though Reps and lean Rep are quite similarly negative, and “weak Reps” a little more approving. More monotonic w Dem strength.

Here is a comparison of favorably to Trump and to Biden by Party ID with leaners.

Both partisans and leaners equally despise the other party’s guy.

But note in both parties leaners are less favorable to their party’s guy than are partisans.

Negative partisanship is strong.

Another big difference is attention to politics. More partisan means more attention, with pure independents especially less attentive, though “weak” partisans are close to pure inds

Among other things this means leaners & weak are slower to pick up on issues and candidates

It’s easy to focus on size of each group. Inds tend to grow in non-election years, then decline close to elections

But “are they independent or hidden partisans” is important & the answer is learners are in between. Less party loyalty in votes than partisans, but clearly lean.

In an election, partisans vote w party >90% but leaners typically in the 80s. They can also push that up or down depending on the candidates. They aren’t “swing voters” but that lower loyalty and potential for more or less loyalty is important in election outcomes.

Links to Gallup trends in partisanship, showing 49% “independent” but that includes leaners!

The tables are great and go back to 2004. Also have table w leaners as partisans. 43R-43D-14 Ind

Gallup trends link here

This Axios story is misleading. It combines independents who lean to a party with “purely” inds. Dem & Rep are modestly down, leaners up a bit, pure Ind still low teens. See full data 2004-23 below. Leaners vote w party but less than partisans

Axios story link here:

Philip Bump also has a story on this, in part emphasizing the changes are much less than the Axios headline.

Washington Post story link here

I don’t care for the WaPo headline. These aren’t “independents who vote party” but people who say they are independents AND who say they lean to a party and mostly vote that way, but less so than partisans, more so than independents who don’t lean.

Most important just look at the full data and there are not sharp or sudden shifts. Relative stability over 19 years with some modest but important shifts (a bit more leaners, bit fewer partisans) and little change in pure independents.

Ignore “big change” headlines.

The Iraq War at 20

March 20 marks the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War. Initially, the war had substantial majority support, saying it was “worth it”. But that fell rapidly and by July 2004 as many said it was “not worth it”. By 2008 we reached near 65% not worth it, which is little changed.

Three aspects of Iraq War opinion. (Created 11/5/2007).

Partisan issues

Republicans and Democrats have very different issue concerns in 2022.

GOP pollster Bill McInturff nails it, and my @MULawPoll data in Wisconsin agrees. Reps care about one set of issues, Dems a different set, with little overlap.

Here is Bill’s full quote. The link includes a link to the longer @RonBrownstein story at CNN. politicalwire.com/2022/08/31/bon… h/t Taegan Goddard @politicalwire for the quote.

If you see Republicans talking about border security/illegal immigration and Dems talking climate change, just look here to see why Compare “Crime”, “Crime in your community” and “Gun violence” for sharp differences by party. Also note less concern by all for crime in your community.

And credit to gganimate for making the gif.

Party ID Trend, midyear update

The net balance of party identification has shifted in the Republican direction in 2022, by a little in Kaiser and Marist polls, but a lot in NBC and Quinnipiac polls. One might debate the size but the trend is clear. What it means is perhaps not quite as clear.

Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend

The party balance might most obviously shift because people are moving away from the Democratic Party and (likely) into independents, and (likely) from independents and into Republican. In short, real change in the margin.

Democratic approval of Biden has fallen over the year, while Republicans are united in disapproval of Biden (almost unanimously). Inflation is a dominant issue which favors Republicans and damages Democrats. And a Democratic congress has failed to deliver as much as many Democrats had hoped for in early 2021. That is all a recipe for marginal shifts in the party balance, especially at the boundaries between “independent” and either partisan group.

Or the shifts could be because Democrats are “discouraged” by the national political environment (largely for the same reason as above) and are just less anxious to talk to pollsters about politics. In this story the “real” party balance hasn’t changed but Democrats just don’t feel like talking about it. This is cold comfort to Democrats though, since discouraged Democrats not talking to pollsters are also likely Democrats less likely to vote in November, which is also damaging to party prospects.

The recent changes in margin between Democrats and Republican identification are rather large in comparison to shifts we’ve seen earlier in the time series for each pollster. Such trends could reverse before the elections, but time is growing short. And Biden’s job approval has shown no signs of improving, indeed his average continues to slowly decline, now below 40% approval.

Races for Senate and governor may hinge on candidates and the campaigns, so these partisan trends are not the whole story but they add to the national forces that are a drag on Democrats everywhere and a boost to Republicans.

Notes: I look here are “unleaned” party identification, those who say they are “Republicans” or “Democrats”, not including those who say they are independents who lean to either party. This is in part due to limits in the party measures reported by pollsters, with “unleaned” party being the lowest common denominator.

I also use high quality telephone polls that do NOT weight their samples to party ID. This has historically been the “standard” party measure. Most online polls, including Pew, now weight their samples to a party balance estimated from recent telephone polls, which makes tracking trends with samples weighted to party a complicated issue.

Here are the trends for Kaiser, Marist, NBC and Quinnipiac, first for each party and then for the net margin between the parties. Data include the latest polls as of July 5, 2022.

Kaiser Party ID Trend
Marist Party ID Trend
NBC Hart/Public Opinion Strategies Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Party ID Trend
Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
Marist Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Net Party ID Trend

Abortion and motivation to vote

Abortion policy, issue concern and enthusiasm to vote

Are abortion policy preferences linked to motivation to vote and to concern about the issue of abortion, and what role does partisanship play? I assess this using data from the Marquette Law School Poll of 803 Wisconsin registered voters, conducted June 14-20, 2022, a week before the US Supreme Court struck down the Roe v Wade decision on June 24, but well after the draft opinion in this case became public in May.

There has been a consistent majority of Wisconsin registered voters who favor legal abortions in all or most cases, and a minority who say abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. Surveys over the past decade have shown very little change in opinion, as shown in Table 1.

Poll datesLegal in all casesLegal in most casesIllegal in most casesIllegal in all cases
9/13-16/1226342313
9/27-30/1225352312
10/11-14/1225342512
10/25-28/1228322312
10/21-24/1326362510
10/23-26/1424342415
7/11-15/1827361811
9/12-16/182636219
10/24-28/1826292414
2/19-23/2018372215
10/26-31/2123382311
6/14-20/2227312411
Table 1: Trend in abortion policy preference, 2012-2022

There is little difference in enthusiasm to vote except among those who think abortion should be illegal in most cases. Those in the two pro-abortion categories, and those with the most anti-abortion preference are all equally motivated to vote. This gives no support for the idea that the abortion issue would be uniquely motivating to pro-abortion voters. Of course this could change, but the draft opinion does not appear to have motivated supporters of abortion to greater political engagement. Rather those who say abortion should be illegal in most cases are the more enthusiastic to vote in these data.

Abortion policy preferenceVery enthusiasticLess enthusiasticDK/Ref
Legal in all cases56422
Legal in most cases56421
Illegal in most cases68320
Illegal in all cases57430
Table 2: Enthusiasm to vote by abortion policy preference

Abortion policy preference and concern about the issue

Those who think abortion should always be legal or always be illegal are the most concerned about abortion policy, while those in the middle categories of legal in most cases or illegal in most cases are substantially less concerned.

Those with the strongest anti-abortion preference express more concern for abortion policy than do the strongest pro-abortion advocates by a small margin.

Abortion policy preferenceVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
Legal in all cases66340
Legal in most cases53461
Illegal in most cases51427
Illegal in all cases73270
Table 3: Concern about the issue of abortion by abortion policy preference

Age and abortion preference and concern

There is virtually no relationship between age and abortion preference. Only those 70 years old or older are a bit less supportive of abortion than the other age groups.

AgeLegal in all or mostIllegal in all or mostDon’t know
18-2962381
30-3960306
40-4960345
50-5960355
60-6957355
70+51407
Table 4: Abortion policy preference by age

Concern over the abortion issue is also not associated with age. Concern fluctuates across age groups but is not consistently higher among the young than it is among their elders. These results suggest it is unlikely that the abortion issue will be uniquely motivating for younger voters in the fall elections.

AgeVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
18-2962380
30-3946540
40-4955433
50-5966331
60-6955414
70+64324
Table 5: Concern about abortion policy by age

Partisanship and concern about abortion policy

Democrats say they are more concerned about the abortion issue, followed by Republicans while independents express less concern about the issue.

Party IDVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
Republican57412
Independent49492
Democrat73261
Table 6: Abortion policy concern by party identification

While Democrats express more concern about abortion, they are less likely than Republicans to say they are very enthusiastic about voting in November.

Party IDVery enthusiasticLess enthusiasticDK/Ref
Republican74260
Independent49491
Democrat60391
Table 7: Enthusiasm to vote by party identification

Enthusiasm to vote by party and abortion policy preference

Enthusiasm to vote is highest among Republicans, and equally so for pro- and anti-abortion policy preferences. Among independents, those opposed to abortion are more enthusiastic than those supporting abortion. Among Democrats who are pro-abortion, enthusiasm is less than among Republicans. There are very few Democrats who are anti-abortion, but among this group enthusiasm is low, about the same as for pro-abortion independents.

Party IDAbortion policyVery enthusiasticLess enthusiastic
RepublicanLegal all or most cases7327
RepublicanIllegal all or most cases7327
IndependentLegal all or most cases4553
IndependentIllegal all or most cases5743
DemocratLegal all or most cases6138
DemocratIllegal all or most cases4852
Table 8: Enthusiasm to vote by abortion policy preference and party identification

Conclusion

A week before the Supreme Court struck down Roe v Wade, Wisconsin Republicans were more motivated to vote than Democrats, and pro-abortion policy preference was not associated with greater enthusiasm to vote. Enthusiasm was higher among those saying abortion should be illegal in most cases while quite similar among those saying abortion should be legal in all or most cases, and for those saying it should be illegal in all cases.

The Court’s now official decision overturning Roe, and the subsequent political campaigns on the issue, may shift motivation and participation, but the leak of the draft of that opinion in May did not produce a measurable mobilization among those favoring abortion rights, contrary to some speculation.

State gun laws and public opinion

Abstract

Public opinion substantially favors allowing concealed carry of handguns with a permit or license required. This is true of both a constitutional right under the Second Amendment and as provided by state laws. In contrast, there is substantial majority opposition to laws allowing concealed carry without a licensing requirement, or “permitless” carry.

Nationwide, 66% of those with an opinion favor a Supreme Court ruling that the Second Amendment includes a right to possess a gun outside the home. For state laws, 62% favor laws that allow concealed carry of handguns with a license and 38% are opposed.

In contrast, permitless concealed carry without a license requirement is supported nationwide by 19% and opposed by 81%.

In the 25 states with permitlesss concealed carry laws, a minority of 28% of adults favor such laws, while 72% are opposed to them, based on a May 2022 Marquette Law School national survey.

State surveys in Texas and Tennessee, states with unlicensed concealed carry laws, found 34% and 39% favored these laws, respectively, with 59% opposed in both states.

State gun laws

In the following analysis, state gun laws are grouped into four categories.

  • Twenty-five states have adopted laws allowing “permitless” concealed carry, requiring no license or permit to have a concealed weapon. (This includes Alabama, Indiana and Ohio that have adopted such a law that will go into effect by Jan. 1, 2023.)
  • Ten states have “shall issue” laws that give no discretion over issuing a license or permit to an applicant meeting the criteria specified by law.
  • Seven states have “shall issue” laws that allow some discretion over issuing a license or permit if the applicant is judged to raise some public safety concerns.
  • Eight states and the District of Columbia have “may issue” laws that give authorities greater lattitude in determining when to issue a license or permit.

Classifications of states were based on these websites which were checked for consistency:

Wikipedia

Giffords.org

concealedguns.procon.org

Public opinion on concealed carry laws

The Marquette Law School Poll surveyed 1,004 adults nationwide May 9-19, 2022. The margin of error is +/-3.9 percentage points. The survey focused on the Supreme Court and included three items on opnion about the Second Amendment and concealed carry laws. The survey began before the mass shooting that killed 10 people in Buffalo, NY, and was completed before the mass shooting that killed 21 in a Uvalde, TX elementary school.

Full results of the Marquette Law School poll are available here.

Second Amendment

The Supreme Court is set to decide New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, which addresses whether the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a gun outside the home.

The survey asked

Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?: Rule that the 2nd Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” protects the right to carry a gun outside the home.

Among those with an opinion, 66% favor such a ruling and 34% are opposed.

Opinion on this extension of Second Amendment interpretation to include guns outside the home is more supportive in states with less restrictive gun laws, with large majorities favoring expanded rights to possess a gun, and less supportive in the most restrictive states, where opinion is evenly divided. These results are shown in Table 1.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless7723
Shall issue7030
Shall issue w limits6436
May issue4852
Table 1: Favor or oppose Supreme Court ruling that the 2nd Amendment right to ‘keep and bear arms’ protects the right to carry a gun outside the home, by state gun laws,among those with an opinion, May 2022

Concealed carry with a license

The Marquette Law School poll also asked about laws concerning concealed carry. Respondents were asked about licensed concealed carry laws:

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns?

These laws were favored by 62% and opposed by 38% nationwide.

Opinion by state gun laws finds over 60% majorities in favor of such laws in most states, and with a narrow majority in favor in the states with the most restrictive laws concerning concealed carry, as shown in Table 2.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless6535
Shall issue6634
Shall issue w limits6436
May issue5347
Table 2: Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns, by state gun laws, May 2022

Concealed carry without a license (“Permitless”)

Half of the states now allow concealed carry without requiring a license or a permit. Respondents were asked

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?

Opinion on this law is much more opposed than for licensed concealed carry. Nineteen percent favor unlicensed carry laws, while 81% are opposed to such laws.

Table 3 shows opinion on these laws by state gun laws. It is striking that even in the states that allow permitless concealed carry, 72% of adults are opposed to such a law. Opposition to these laws inceases in states with more restrictive gun laws.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless2872
Shall issue1981
Shall issue w limits1684
May issue1090
Table 3: Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?, by state gun laws, May 2022

Comparison with other national and state polls

National polls

In the Pew American Trends Panel wave 87, April 5-11, 2021 respondents were asked

Please indicate whether you would favor or oppose the following proposals about gun policy: Allowing people to carry concealed guns without a permit

In the Pew survey, permitless carry was favored by 20% and opposed by 79%, with 1% refusing to answer.

The May 2022 Marquette Law School national survey question asks

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?

In the MU Law Poll permitless carry was favored by 19% and opposed by 81%.

Pew does not release the state code as part of the public dataset, so it is not possible to merge the Pew data with state laws.

State polls

This is not a comprehensive collection of state polls on unlicensed concealed carry but is illustrative of state opinion in one “shall issue” state and two states with permitless concealed carry laws.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin is a “shall issue” state that does require a license for concealed carry. The Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters has asked about both licensed and unlicensed concealed carry. The results for licensed concealed carry are shown in Table 4 and for unlicensed carry in Table 5.

Poll datesFavorOpposeDon’t knowRefused
1/21-24/16633151
1/8-12/20702550
10/26-31/21622981
4/19-24/22692650
Table 4: Do you favor or oppose Wisconsin’s current law allowing residents to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns?, Wisconsin registered voters

Poll datesFavorOpposeDon’t knowRefused
10/26-31/21207630
4/19-24/22168220
Table 5: Do you favor or oppose a proposed law that would allow residents to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?, Wisconsin registered voters

Texas

Texas allows concealed carrry without requiring a license.

A Univerity of Texas/Texas Tribune poll conducted in April 2021 asked

Should adults be allowed to carry handguns in public without licenses or permits?

This was supported by 34% and opposed by 59% with 6% saying the don’t know.

Link: https://www.texastribune.org/2021/05/03/texas-voters-legislature-poll/

Tennessee

Tennessee allows concealed carrry without requiring a license.

A Vanderbilt University Tennessee poll in May 2021 asked

Do you approve or disapprove of a law that would make it legal for people age 21 and older to carry a handgun without a permit in Tennessee?

Thirty-nine percent approved of this law, while 59% disapproved, with 1 percent saying don’t know.

Link: Q22 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/Spring_2021_topline_final.pdf