Consumer sentiment helped Trump in his 1st term, is damaging him now
At the risk of becoming repetitive, the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment hit another record low in May, falling to 44.8, down from 49.8 in April. The new final estimate for May is itself down from the preliminary estimate earlier in the month of 48.2, suggesting continuing decline throughout the month.
This is the lowest reading in the history of the Michigan survey, which stretches back to 1952. The previous low was 50 in June 2022, at the peak of the 2021-2022 inflation surge.
The political importance of this extremely low economic sentiment is seen in the yellow highlights in the figure. In the run-up to the midterms in the first Trump administration, consumer sentiment was consistently high, averaging 97.5 over the first two years of Trump 1. In the second term, that same measure of economic outlook is vastly lower, averaging just 55.0, and recently declining.
Consumer sentiment turned sharply negative in Biden’s summer of 2022, only beginning to rebound before his midterm in November 2022. So far, Trump’s second term looks notably worse.
Folks follow the presidential approval trends closely, but I think it is important to also consider other trends that either support or depress approval, and which are indicative of broader social and economic forces. In this case, economic opinion was quite positive throughout Trump’s first term leading to the midterm (and after, until Covid arrived). Trump’s approval fell steadily in his first year, but recovered a bit in his second year in 2018. While underwater in 2018 he was in better shape than his first year approval showed. The good economic sentiment surely provided support for him and for the GOP in the midterms, despite the eventual loss of 42 seats in the house.
Compare Obama’s 2010 midterm. His job approval in 2010 averaged 47.0% with disapproval at 45.7%, for a net +1.3. But consumer sentiment in his first 2 years averaged 71.6, considerably lower than Trump’s first two year average of 97.5. Despite slightly positive net approval, Democrats lost 64 House seats in 2010.
Trump’s net approval is currently -21.0, with consumer sentiment averaging 55.0 since the start of the second term. Both economic sentiment and approval are falling with just over 5 months until the midterms.
Trump’s approval recovery in his second year of 2018 shows no signs of recurring in 2026. And the economic pessimism is similarly declining without immediate signs of recovery. Together this points out that economic attitudes were a positive force among the public in his first term, helping approval to recover from the lows of 2017. Now those economic attitudes are an anchor pulling approval ever lower.
This does not mean we will see 60+ GOP seats lost in 2026, similar to Democratic losses in 2010. The GOP majority is far smaller than that enjoyed by Democrats going into 2010, and the number of tossup or lean seats are much smaller now than 16 years ago. As Amy Walter at the Cook Political Report reminds us, for a true wave election Republicans will have to lose seats in districts Trump won by 20 points or more in 2024. Not impossible, but much harder to do now with more seats designed for larger partisan majorities through redistricting.
The depressed economic sentiment does point to further trials for Trump’s approval and for support for Trump and GOP policies, making any policy agenda difficult.
I’ll close with a note on the Democratic “autopsy” that just came to light. A glance back to the consumer sentiment chart tells a clear story about the predicament Biden, Harris and the Democrats faced in 2024. While sentiment had recovered some from the lows of summer 2022, it never passed an index of 80 and fell in the months leading to Nov. 2024. In my polling and in every other poll, inflation and the cost of living topped the most important issue charts constantly from late 2021 through the 2024 election. I’m tired of the Carville quote, but you can’t ignore it: “It’s the economy, stupid.” What sunk Biden and Harris is now the same anchor around Trump and the GOP. There are others, of course, but the economy fundamentally helped Trump in term 1, and it is hurting him badly in term 2.
See also Elliott Morris on the Democratic autopsy’s incredible omission of inflation as a factor in Trump’s victory in 2024:
When we boot up the data, it’s obvious the main reason Harris lost — and the reason I am going to explore here, at this website, it being a data-driven website — is that 2024 simply had too much inflation-induced anti-incumbent sentiment for the incumbent party to overcome. This is curiously missing from its main diagnosis. The word “inflation” isn’t mentioned in the autopsy a single time (except in the context of inflation-adjusted ad spending).
See Elliott’s full post here.
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