… but approval of Trump barely budges

In November 2025 just 24% of American adults thought the U.S. “should attempt to remove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power” while 76% said the U.S. should “not get involved in Venezuela”. Among Republicans, 63% said we should not get involved, as did 79% of independents and 88% of Democrats. That was bipartisan lopsided opposition to military intervention to depose a foreign leader.

Then on January 3, 2026 President Donald Trump ordered military action that removed Maduro from power. In my January 21-28, 2026 Marquette Law School poll support for removing Maduro changed dramatically, more than doubling, with 55% saying removing Maduro was the right thing to do, and 45% saying it was the wrong thing to do. Among Republicans support skyrocketed to 87% and opposition cratered to 13%. Support among independents rose to 51% and even among Democrats support rose to 23%. See the chart.

This illustrates how weakly held opinions can change dramatically with presidential leadership and weak opposition messaging. See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Not all issues are like this, with weak initial positions followed by one-sided flows of information without countervailing narratives. Not all, but many, foreign policy matters are like this—remote from the daily concerns of most Americans and a realm of special presidential influence.

But what was the domestic political consequence of Trump’s success in removing Maduro? Did his deposing a foreign president, with support from a majority of the public (after the fact), win him accolades at home? Nope. Approval of Trump’s handling of his job slipped by a point, from 43% in Nov. to 42% in Jan. And approval among partisans similarly hardly changed at all, despite the large increase in support for removing Maduro seen above. GOP approval ticked down 2 points, independents down 2 points and Democrats up 1 point.

Most folks lack strong opinions about rare foreign policy events, but they have very strong views of Trump’s handling of his job. Even big moves in the former leave the latter untouched.

A similar result appears for the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites on June 21, 2025. We don’t have a pre-bombing opinion measure, but after the bombing in my July 7-16 national poll, 52% supported the air strikes while 48% opposed them. And 85% of Republicans supported them as did 43% of independents and 22% of Democrats. Not much different from the post-Maduro opinion in January.

But did this shift opinion of Trump’s handling of his job? It did not. Republican approval slipped a tad, independent approval rose a little and Democrats approved just a little less.

Nor did this military success in Iran translate to approval specifically of Trump’s handling of the Israel-Iran war. In fact, Republicans in July were a little less approving of Trump’s handling of the war than they were of his handling of his job overall, 79% approval for handling the war to 86% approval for Trump’s job overall. Independents were 1 point more approving of his handling the war than his job in general and Democrats showed a bigger difference–13% approval on the war, to 8% approval overall.

Nor did views of Trump’s handling of foreign policy shift at all from May to July: 43% approved and 57% disapproved in both months. And partisans hardly budged.

So what?

Long wars can be devastating to a presidency. Ask Lyndon Johnson or George W. Bush. And short ones can boost a president, at least temporarily. Ask George H. W. Bush. And short disasters can certainly be damaging. Ask Jimmy Carter about Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw.)

But even brief military actions that are seen as successes have surprisingly little effect on the broader approval of a president. Ask Barack Obama about killing Osama bin Laden.

Trump’s quick successes in bombing Iran nuclear sites in June and removing Maduro in January received majority, albeit slight majority, support after the fact, support above that of his overall job rating. But neither translated into any meaningful improvement in his overall job or his foreign policy job or his handling of the Israel-Iran war.

The question still on the table is will this new Iran war be a quick success or a prolonged engagement with declining support? By the initial polls, more people oppose the new Iran war than support it, with quite a few undecided. That’s not a position of strength with public opinion. A success and rapid deescalation could boost support for the decision to use military force. But the evidence above shows that even that best outcome won’t necessarily translate into higher approval of the president. I guess we’ll know in a month or six. If it is six months, and not a quick success, we will learn very close to election day.