Opinion of Trump’s military actions are malleable

… but approval of Trump barely budges

In November 2025 just 24% of American adults thought the U.S. “should attempt to remove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power” while 76% said the U.S. should “not get involved in Venezuela”. Among Republicans, 63% said we should not get involved, as did 79% of independents and 88% of Democrats. That was bipartisan lopsided opposition to military intervention to depose a foreign leader.

Then on January 3, 2026 President Donald Trump ordered military action that removed Maduro from power. In my January 21-28, 2026 Marquette Law School poll support for removing Maduro changed dramatically, more than doubling, with 55% saying removing Maduro was the right thing to do, and 45% saying it was the wrong thing to do. Among Republicans support skyrocketed to 87% and opposition cratered to 13%. Support among independents rose to 51% and even among Democrats support rose to 23%. See the chart.

This illustrates how weakly held opinions can change dramatically with presidential leadership and weak opposition messaging. See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Not all issues are like this, with weak initial positions followed by one-sided flows of information without countervailing narratives. Not all, but many, foreign policy matters are like this—remote from the daily concerns of most Americans and a realm of special presidential influence.

But what was the domestic political consequence of Trump’s success in removing Maduro? Did his deposing a foreign president, with support from a majority of the public (after the fact), win him accolades at home? Nope. Approval of Trump’s handling of his job slipped by a point, from 43% in Nov. to 42% in Jan. And approval among partisans similarly hardly changed at all, despite the large increase in support for removing Maduro seen above. GOP approval ticked down 2 points, independents down 2 points and Democrats up 1 point.

Most folks lack strong opinions about rare foreign policy events, but they have very strong views of Trump’s handling of his job. Even big moves in the former leave the latter untouched.

A similar result appears for the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites on June 21, 2025. We don’t have a pre-bombing opinion measure, but after the bombing in my July 7-16 national poll, 52% supported the air strikes while 48% opposed them. And 85% of Republicans supported them as did 43% of independents and 22% of Democrats. Not much different from the post-Maduro opinion in January.

But did this shift opinion of Trump’s handling of his job? It did not. Republican approval slipped a tad, independent approval rose a little and Democrats approved just a little less.

Nor did this military success in Iran translate to approval specifically of Trump’s handling of the Israel-Iran war. In fact, Republicans in July were a little less approving of Trump’s handling of the war than they were of his handling of his job overall, 79% approval for handling the war to 86% approval for Trump’s job overall. Independents were 1 point more approving of his handling the war than his job in general and Democrats showed a bigger difference–13% approval on the war, to 8% approval overall.

Nor did views of Trump’s handling of foreign policy shift at all from May to July: 43% approved and 57% disapproved in both months. And partisans hardly budged.

So what?

Long wars can be devastating to a presidency. Ask Lyndon Johnson or George W. Bush. And short ones can boost a president, at least temporarily. Ask George H. W. Bush. And short disasters can certainly be damaging. Ask Jimmy Carter about Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw.)

But even brief military actions that are seen as successes have surprisingly little effect on the broader approval of a president. Ask Barack Obama about killing Osama bin Laden.

Trump’s quick successes in bombing Iran nuclear sites in June and removing Maduro in January received majority, albeit slight majority, support after the fact, support above that of his overall job rating. But neither translated into any meaningful improvement in his overall job or his foreign policy job or his handling of the Israel-Iran war.

The question still on the table is will this new Iran war be a quick success or a prolonged engagement with declining support? By the initial polls, more people oppose the new Iran war than support it, with quite a few undecided. That’s not a position of strength with public opinion. A success and rapid deescalation could boost support for the decision to use military force. But the evidence above shows that even that best outcome won’t necessarily translate into higher approval of the president. I guess we’ll know in a month or six. If it is six months, and not a quick success, we will learn very close to election day.

ICE, Renee Good shooting, deportations and Trump approval

Plus party images, most important issues in new MULawPoll national survey

On Feb. 4 and 5 we released my latest Marquette Law School Poll national survey. The link to the full release, toplines, crosstabs and methodology are at the bottom of this post.

I’ll be posting a series of deeper dives on these results over the next week, each more narrowly focused but with more detail than the release is able to get into, so stay tuned. A quick look for now.

For new listeners, our national polls are released over two days. The first focuses on political topics while the second is devoted to topics related to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Thanks to SCOTUSblog’s newsletter for headlining our Court poll this morning.) 

This poll was in the field Jan. 21-28, 2026, interviewing 1003 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. The poll was conducted after the killing of Renee Good. About 2/3rds of the interviews were completed before the killing of Alex Pretti, with 1/3rd after. Therefore, this poll reflects reaction to the Good shooting but does not fully reflect opinion following the Pretti shooting.

In headlines, we find 60% disapprove of the way ICE is handling immigration enforcement, 40% approve. Sixty-two percent say the shooting of Good was not justified, and 37% say it was justified. Of seven recent news events, attention to the Good shooting was the most followed, with 76% saying they had read or heard a lot about it. 

On the other hand, support for deportations is virtually unchanged. We ask 2 questions, each to a separate half-sample:

  • Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries?

And

  • Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries even if they have lived here for a number of years, have jobs and no criminal record?

For the first item, with no qualifications, 56% favor deportations and 44% oppose them. That is down 2 points from 58%-42% in November. As for deportations of longtime residents with no criminal record, the numbers reverse, with 44% favoring such deportations and 56% opposed. That is unchanged from November.

Trump approval on immigration is 44% approve and 56% disapprove. That is slightly better than his overall job approval at 42% approve, 58% disapprove. Trump’s approval was at 41% approve, 58% disapprove in my September 2020 poll, shortly before his election loss to Joe Biden.

The generic congressional ballot finds a Democratic lead at 48% to 44% for Republicans among registered voters. That widens to 52% Democratic and 45% Republican among likely voters. 

Looking at which party would do a better job on each of eight issues, Republicans are seen as better on four, Democrats better on two and two issues are essentially tied. Between 1/4th and 1/3rd of adults says there is no difference or neither party is good on the issue.

And what do people care the most about? Inflation, the economy, and immigration top the list, with significant concern for health care and Medicare and Social Security,

I’ll be back in the coming days with much more detail on these topics plus data centers, grocery and gasoline prices, the economy, and “who do you trust?”  Stay tuned.

The full results, including press releases, toplines, crosstabs, the full instrument, and methodology are found at our website here. Note that entries are in reverse chronological order. The toplines and crosstabs under the Supreme Court release, “Court issues”, are complete, i.e. they include the political items also. Those under the “National issues” section do not include the Court items, which were held for the Court release. There are separate press releases for the Court and for National issues. 

1 year of Trump 2.0

Trump’s approval is bad enough. No need to exaggerate.

It’s the one year mark of Trump’s second term and everyone is posting year in review pieces. Here is mine.

The chart shows how all presidents in the polling era have varied in approval over their entire terms, plus year 1 of Trump 2.0. The boxes cover the middle 50% of all polls, and the “whiskers” extend out to their all time highs and lows of approval in Gallup polls. The bar in the box is the median poll, the 50th percentile. I stick to Gallup for consistency over time and for their unmatched historical depth.

What jumps out is the approval ratings of the last four presidents have varied considerably less than those of their predecessors. Trump 1.0 has the least variation (smallest standard deviation) of any of the other 14 presidents, with 2.0 the second smallest, so far. Both Obama and Biden varied a little more, but considerably less than either Bushes, Clinton, or Reagan. Trump’s median in 1.0 ties with Truman for the lowest median approval, 39%. So far, Trump 2.0 is the 3rd lowest, at 40.5%. (Truman, by the way, set the record for all time low at 22%. Trump hasn’t come close, with a low of 33%, so far.)

This shrinkage of variation in approval is one consequence of polarization, leading the out-party since George W. Bush’s 2nd term to consistently give approval ratings below 10%, while the in-party gives high approval, typically in the 80s, no matter what. The poor independents are left to shift the balance a bit between two largely unmovable partisan camps. V.O. Key famously said voters were “a rational god of vengeance and reward”, but that breaks down when one side will never reward good performance and the other will never condemn bad outcomes. Trump may never approach the lows of Truman, Nixon, Carter or both Bushes, all of whom had low points in the 20s. But he will never approach the highs of Obama, Clinton or Reagan either.

Here is a more conventional look at approval of each of the elected presidents from the polling era. The trends here are smoothed trend estimates. Gallup now polls approval only once a month, so Trump 2.0 is not smoothed, just the raw polls. Also, Gallup hasn’t released the January results, so December is the most recent reading.

Trump 2.0 has run a little better than 1.0 in Gallup’s data. The December point at 36% is a bit of an outlier. The major polling averages put Trump’s approval between 40% and 42% as of Jan. 20, 2026.

An alternate view breaks out each president for readability. Here I’m showing raw poll results with no smoothing.

Here is my polling average for all Trump polls in 2025. My trend estimate is 41.4% approval. For comparison, FiftyPlusOne.news has it at 40.0%, SilverBulletin is 42.0%, NYTimes is 42.0% and RealClearPolitics is 42.4%.

You will note dips below the general downward trend in April after the tariff announcement, then a little recovery after backing off those original “liberation day” tariffs. Then the downward trend returns, until another dip during and after the government shutdown in October and November. A bit of a rise in early December after which the general downtrend returns. This is steady, nearly linear, decline with a couple of short-term wiggles.

I have a beef with headlines that shout “Trump at all time low” or “Approval cratering.” Those either cherry pick particularly low polls, or exaggerate small departures from the general downward trend. Trump’s approval is bad enough. Historically low for other presidents at the end of one year. But the message I read in this trend is a steady decline in approval for an unpopular president, signaling a challenging midterm, and with no sustained upturn in the last 12 months. No need to exaggerate the problems this poses for the White House or Republicans generally.

All or nothing on liking Trump?

After a year in office, opinions about Donald Trump are a bit more complicated than merely “approve” or “disapprove.” Those who disapprove find almost nothing to like, but those who approve are likely to express mixed feelings, reporting things they dislike even if on balance they approve of the job he is doing as president.

For over a year my Marquette Law School Poll national surveys have asked a pair of open-ended questions in each poll:

What do you like about Donald Trump?

and

What do you dislike about Donald Trump?

Respondents can write as much or as little as they wish. The record is over 900 words. Much more common than full op-ed length answers are “everything” and “nothing”, in either order.

The pure-admiration and pure-hate answers can be short or long, but each give insights into how people think about Trump. Still, a substantial number of people have mixed feelings. Among Trump supporters it is common to see approval of his actions or policies coupled with disliking “how he talks” or “how he deals with people” or “the Epstein files.” It is less common to find those who disapprove of Trump seeing anything to like. If the substance of the dislikes goes to his policies then we see fewer finding positive things as well.

In a year of polling these questions, we have seen a notable trend. Respondents with mixed feelings, giving both likes and dislikes, have declined from 51% to 44%, while those who don’t like anything have climbed from 35% to 42%. And the true Trump fans, who only find something to like and nothing to dislike, have slightly declined from a high of 14% to 10%.

This gives a different perspective on Trump’s approval ratings, which have held between 40% and 42% in the current polling averages, down from the start of the second term but hardly “collapsing” as some suggest.

Among those who disapprove, few exhibit mixed feelings in the open-ended responses. They see nothing positive and vary primarily in the length and detail of their vitriol. The past year has grown this group of people, irreconcilably opposed to Trump.

We often think Trump’s base is rock solid. Approval among Republicans remains around 85% a year into Trump 2.0. But the open-ended responses suggest a more complicated story. Among his supporters, those who approve of the job he is doing, the substantial majority have mixed feelings in the open-ended answers. This does not forecast a collapse of his approval, but it does remind us that the caricature of his base as mindlessly in love is not accurate. So far, they like more than they dislike. But it is not because they are blind to the president’s shortcomings.

Trump net approvals across issues, party and time

While it is natural to follow presidential approval using the single “overall” job approval measure, this misses the substantial variation in support for the president across various issues. Likewise overall approval ignores differences by party and how trends over time vary by party. Let’s take a look.

The data are from my Marquette Law School Poll (MULawPoll) national surveys conducted since President Trump returned to office. Polls are done about every two months. The national samples are of about 1,000 adults in all 50 states. (Full results, including toplines, cross tabs and methodology are found in reverse chronological order at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/category/results-and-data/ )

Over the year we’ve tracked a number of topics, starting in May for the individual issues, and in February with overall approval. Some topics have only been asked once or twice, as issues come and go.

The chart shows net approval (approve minus disapprove) for 11 topics, including overall approval, by party, over time. Let’s start with overall approval as a baseline. Republican net approval has remained high, starting at +78 in February and standing at +70 in mid-November. That is a modest 4 point decline in approval (89% to 85%) and similar rise in disapproval (11% to 15%). A large majority of the GOP is standing by Trump in overall approval.

Independents are a different matter. In February the net approval among independents was -26 which declined to -50 in November, almost doubling. Independent approval now sits at 25% with 75% disapproval. Independents make up about 16% of our national adult sample. Independents to lean to a party are classified as partisans here, so this is “pure” independents.

Not surprisingly Democrats are overwhelmingly disapproving of Trump, though even a bit more now than in February. Democrats started Trump’s second term at -82 net and are at -90 in November. Their approval declined from 9% to 5% over the year. In a nice symmetry, both Republicans and Democrats have moved a net 8 points more disapproving of Trump over the year, though from radically different starting points.

While interesting, the variation across issues is more revealing. Trump has maintained relatively strong support on border security, with partisan differences but only modest changes over time. This is also a topic for which he is less negative among Democrats and comes close to breaking even with independents (despite their -50 overall net approval.)

Tariffs is another issue where net approval has remained relatively stable over the year, though with lower net approval among each partisan group than for border security. Republican net approval was +42 in May and +48 in November, while independents moved from -48 to -56 and Democrats ended as they began at -90.

On immigration, there are been some decline among Republicans, while independents and Democrats have held fairly steady over the year. Compare the GOP line for immigration with that for border security.

On the economy and inflation we see notable declines among Republicans and independents, while Democrats are consistently very low. On the economy Republicans have fallen from +60 in May to +40 in November; independents from -40 to -58; Democrats -84 to -86.

For inflation the Republican net drops from +36 to +12; independents -54 to -62 and Democrats unchanged at -92. These declines, especially among Republicans, highlight Trump’s increasing vulnerability on the two topics rated as the most important problems in my November poll, with 36% saying inflation and 20% saying the economy. This doesn’t mean the GOP is abandoning Trump (see the overall number) but it points to a significant and growing source of doubt among his base.

Republican support has also fallen considerably for Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war, dropping from +50 to +16. Independents and Democrats have changed little.

The one bright spot is high (relative) approval across partisan groups for the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement, with net positives from Republicans and independents and almost net positives from Democrats. This is a nice example that was strong as partisanship can be, on some clear successes, it is possible to get some credit from the opposition party. Rare, but possible.

Then there are three topics that are net negative with Republicans, independents and Democrats: the Epstein files, the federal shutdown, and economic aid to Argentina. Here finding Republicans in net negative territory is sticking given their net positive ratings on all the other topics. While GOP discontent over the Epstein files has received a lot of discussion, the even more negative rating on aid to Argentina is notable. That aid is certainly not as salient as the Epstein case, but it is an example that there are things the GOP will sharply disagree with Trump about.

As for the shutdown, a barely net negative rating from Republicans shows that the shutdown hurt Trump’s standing, even within his party. To be sure, GOP voters blame the Democrats (67%), just as Democrats blame the Republicans (72%). Independents blame both (75%). But the president doesn’t come off well from the shutdown either. (Most interviews for the November poll were completed before the Senate vote to end the shutdown, and all interviews were completed before the House vote.)

The takeaway here is that presidential approval isn’t one thing, and it varies considerably by topic. Likewise partisan opinion of the president isn’t monolithic. On most issues Trump has substantial net positive approval ratings among Republicans but there is substantial variation and a few cases of net negative opinion. Democrats are overwhelmingly negative, but on the cease-fire they split almost evenly and give a less negative rating on border security. than other topics. But watch the independent lines. Those have mostly trended down, with some strikingly negative ratings by November.

Trump approval through Nov. 2025

President Trump’s approval has declined in October and November, after holding pretty steady July-Sept. There was steady decline Jan-Mar, then a sharper fall after announcing tariffs in April. Approval rose in May after backing off on tariffs. Then a small decline in June. Current decline is across most pollsters.

Gallup November Trump approval: 36% approve, 60% disapprove, a 5 point drop in approval and 6 point increase in disapproval since Oct. Several points below my approval trend across all polls which puts approval at 40.5%, disapproval at 56.1%

Here is Gallup approval history since FDR