Tag Archives: trump approval

Cease-fire good; war bad

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New MULawPoll national survey finds widespread dissatisfaction with the Iran war

My new Marquette Law School Poll national survey is out this morning. We were in the field April 8-16, starting the day after the cease-fire agreement with Iran went into place.  In today’s post I focus on the results related to the war. Tomorrow I’ll turn to the economy and how President Donald Trump is handling various aspects of his job. 

TLDR? Cease-fire popular, war not. Haven’t accomplished goals, not sufficient reasons for the war. Trump approval on war: 32%. And among Republicans 65% approve of war, that’s 13 points below Republican approval of how he handles his job in general, itself the lowest among Republicans in the second term.

The Marquette Law School Poll national survey finds 75% approve of the cease-fire in the U.S.-Iran war and 24% disapprove. At the same time, only 21% say the U.S. has achieved its goals in the war, while 78% say the goals have not been met. The public overall does not think that there were sufficient reasons for the war, with 63% saying there were not sufficient reasons and 36% saying there were.

There is bipartisan approval of the cease-fire that went into effect on April 7. Among Republicans, 82% approve of the cease-fire, as do 71% of Democrats and 67% of independents. There is also a bipartisan sentiment, with some partisan variation, that the goals of the war have not been achieved. Among Republicans, 64% say the United States has failed to achieve its goals, compared to 94% of Democrats and 78% of independents.

Bipartisanship breaks down on the question of the justification for the war. Seventy-one percent of Republicans say there was sufficient reason for the war, while 94% of Democrats say there was not. Among independents, 75% say there was not enough reason to go to war.

Thirty-two percent approve of the way President Donald Trump has handled the war, while 68% disapprove. Among Republicans, approval for Trump’s handling of the war stands at 65%, which is notably less than the 78% of Republicans who approve of Trump’s handling of his job as president in general. Among independents, 82% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war, along with 96% of Democrats.

The survey was conducted April 8-16, 2026, interviewing 982 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. For registered voters, the sample size was 870, with a margin of error of +/-3.6. For likely voters, the sample size was 576, with a margin of error of +/-4.4 percentage points.

Feelings toward Iran are quite negative, with 12% having a favorable opinion, 73% holding unfavorable views, and 14% saying they haven’t heard enough to say. The U.S. partner in the war, Israel, is seen favorably by 33% and unfavorably by 54%, with 14% who say they haven’t heard enough. Views of Israel have turned more negative over the past year. In March 2025, 43% held favorable views of Israel, compared to 43% unfavorable, with 14% lacking an opinion.

Trump threatened to bomb bridges and power plants across Iran in the days before the cease-fire went into effect. These are seen as legitimate military targets by 38% of respondents, while 62% say they are primarily civilian infrastructure that should not be attacked. Sixty-six percent of Republicans view these as legitimate military targets, while 34% disagree. Among independents, 70% say these are civilian locations and should not be attacked, as do 88% of Democrats.

The Iran war comes after the United States has destroyed dozens of alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, sent military forces into Venezuela to seize President Nicolás Maduro in January, and threatened to take control of Greenland. Respondents were asked whether they support or oppose Trump’s use of the military to force change in other countries.

  • Thirty-two percent support this use of the military, while 68% are opposed. 
  • As with approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran war, Republicans divide, though not evenly, with 64% in support of forcing change in other countries and 36% opposed. 
  • Eighty-three percent of independents and 94% of Democrats are opposed to such use of military force.
  • In this poll, 68% of Republicans are favorable to MAGA and 30% are not favorable to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Among Republicans favorable to the MAGA movement, 78% support using the military to force countries to change, while among Republicans who are not favorable to MAGA, 34% support this use of the military. 

The public does not see the United States as a force for stability in the world. While 39% say the U.S. is a force for stability, 60% say it is causing instability. Here, too, there is a partisan divide, with 73% of Republicans who say the U.S. is a stabilizing force, while 72% of independents and 90% of Democrats say it is causing instability.

A majority, 57%, say it is better for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs, while 43% say it is better to stay out of world affairs. Support for an active role peaked in March 2025 when 64% favored an active role in the world—the highest in 18 Marquette Law School Poll national surveys since 2022.

Partisan views of the U.S. role in the world have shifted during Trump’s second term. In February 2025, 55% of Republicans said the U.S. should be active in the world. That rose to 68% in this poll. Independents are most reluctant to support an international role, with support among independents declining from 54% in early 2025 to 32% this month. Democrats have consistently been most supportive of an active role across the previous 17 polls since 2022, but have shifted substantially, especially since the Iran war began. In February 2025, 71% favored an active role; that fell to 64% in January 2026 and to 54% in April.

Attention to news about the Iran war

The public has paid substantial attention to the Iran war. In April, 76% had read or heard a lot about the war, 21% had heard a little, and 3% had heard nothing at all. That is more attention than was paid to the U.S. airstrikes on Iran nuclear facilities in June 2025, when 63% said they had heard a lot in July.

The only comparably high levels of attention in polling during Trump’s second term have been to the imposition of tariffs in April 2025, when 81% said they had heard a lot, and the fatal shooting of Renee Good by an ICE officer in Minneapolis in January, when 76% had heard a lot. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to say they heard a lot about the current Iran war, 82% and 80% respectively, while independents have paid considerably less attention, with 51% hearing a lot.

Attention is also relatively high concerning Iran limiting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Sixty percent say have heard a lot about this, 27% have heard a little, and 13% have heard nothing at all. As with the war in general, Democrats and Republicans are equally attentive, while independents are much less so.

Significantly fewer Americans paid close attention to the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose airplane was shot down over Iran, leading to a large number of ground troops being dispatch inside Iran to rescue the second airman. About this, only 45% said they had heard a lot, 34% heard a little, and 21% heard nothing. While 58% of Republicans heard a lot about this, 39% of Democrats did, and just 24% of independents.

The toplines and crosstabs for the poll are on the poll website here.  Tomorrow I’ll run down views of the economy and of Trump’s handling of various issues.

Second Term Worse than the First

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Consumer sentiment is far worse in 2nd term than in 1st

Analysts of President Donald Trump’s second term, and the outlook for the midterm elections on Nov. 3, have reasonably focused on Trump’s job approval. After holding above the first term approval trend, the second term approval fell below the first term in January and has recently fallen more after the start of the Iran war.

This is well known and I have nothing to add.

What is less often considered are opinions of the economy and especially the comparison of first and second term opinion. This deserves more attention.

The University of Michigan’s index of consumer sentiment is a long-running monthly survey of how Americans feel about the economy. As an index, high values reflect optimism and positive feelings, low values show pessimism and negative feelings. An index value of 100 (where the index stood in 1966) reflects quite positive views of the economy including current conditions and future expectations. As an index, values can be above or below 100, i.e. this is not a percentage.

On April 10, the Michigan survey reported consumer sentiment at 47.6, a record low in polling dating back to 1952. Four of the 5 lowest values ever have come in the last 4 years, with two in the Biden administration in June and July 2022 at 50.0 and 51.5 respectively (at the peak of the inflation surge), and in November 2025 with an index at 51.0, in addition to the current all time low. The 5th lowest index ever was 51.7 in May 1980. In short, despite objective measures of GDP, unemployment and inflation having been far worse in some earlier years, Americans are stunningly sour on the economy,

The comparison of consumer sentiment in the first Trump administration and in the second is the point of this post. The chart highlights the first term up to the 2018 midterms and the second term so far. The average sentiment in the first 23 months of term 1 was 97.5. The average so far in term 2 is 55.5, with the most recent reading at 47.6. That is a 42 point drop from average to average and a 49.9 point drop from average to current reading.

To state the obvious: economic sentiment was a tremendous advantage in the first Trump term and is a tremendous burden in the second.

Sentiment plummeted when the Covid pandemic arrived in early 2020, then began to recover into 2021 before the spike in inflation in the second half of 2021 drove sentiment to the then all-time low of 50 in June 2022. Sentiment recovered somewhat through most of the 2nd half of the Biden administration though it dipped in the run-up to the 2024 election. That persistent negative view of the economy was a constant weight on Biden’s support and ultimately on Harris’ vote.

During Trump’s second term the trend has been sharply down from a peak of 74.0 in December 2024 immediately after his reelection, to 64.7 in the first month of the new term with irregular month to month movements and an overall downward trend.

The low consumer sentiment index means the economy is virtually guaranteed to remain the top concern for voters, and therefore the issue all candidates have to discuss (and claim to fix, with more or less persuasiveness). Above all, this economic gloom will be the atmosphere of the election.

Whatever Trump’s approval rating was in the first term, he could count on an electorate optimistic about the economy. In the second term economic pessimism can only be a drag on his approval and the fortunes of the Republican party in November.

Low consumer sentiment doesn’t guarantee big GOP seat losses in November. While it is correlated with seat loss the fit is quite loose. Presidential approval is a better predictor of seat loss. But economic concerns write the script for the 2026 election.

Let’s do take a moment to reiterate what all have said before: compare Trump approval in term 1 and term 2. While there has been steady decline in net approval in the second term, the first year of the first term was lower and reached what is still the lowest point of either term at -19.4. My estimate of the lowest net approval of the second term is -16.8 on April 6. As of April 9 the net approval estimate is -16.5. You can, of course, consult the many other websites on Substack and elsewhere for alternate estimates of the approval trends. These are mine. Some are a little better for Trump and some a little worse. We all tell the same qualitative story and show very similar bumps and wiggles.

I’ve added annotation for some significant events around the times of movement in approval. See Elliott Morris’s look at consequential events for Trump 2 approval at his Strength in NumbersSubstack. I have slightly different notable events based on my judgement rather than statistical fits.

In the first term approval fell around Trump’s effort to replace Obamacare, and continued down until the passage of the Ryan tax cut package in December 2017. After that, net approval rose until it stabilized at about -10 where it remained through the midterms.

In the second term so far, we’ve not seen a sustained recovery in net approval. After the negative reaction to “Liberation Day” tariffs, approval declined until Trump announced he was pausing the tariffs and negotiating. That bought back some approval points in the late spring, only to again start declining by June. Likewise the October government shutdown coincided with a drop in approval, with some recovery after the shutdown ended. The most recent period of decline has not seen a similar recovery period so far.

This is not to say there can be no approval recovery. We know not what events may occur over the next 207 days until the election. But we do know that inflation and the cost of living has been the most important problem in surveys since the inflation spike in 2021-22, and it has remained the number one problem throughout Trump’s second term. The vast difference in consumer sentiment in the second term compared to the first shows vividly that the economy is not the life preserver the president and his party seek.

Opinion of the Iran War in Wisconsin

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Most groups oppose the war; Trump loyalists approve

Today I take a look at opinion of the Iran war in the swing state of Wisconsin. As I wrote this, President Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran. And the liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court won by 20 points (with 95% of the vote in), double the margin in each of the three previous Court races. While I doubt the Court vote was directly driven by opinion of the war, opposition to the war, and to Trump, almost certainly played a role in motivating Democrats to turn out.

In my March 11-18 Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters we asked if the respondent approved or disapproved of the war with Iran. Overall, 39% approved of the war and 61% disapproved.

Today I want to show how a number of demographic and attitudinal groups line up on the war. There are some groups that are strongly supportive of the war. These groups are also mostly part of the core Trump base. They include Republicans who are also favorable to MAGA, those who describe themselves as very conservative, Trump 2024 voters, and Republicans in general. Even among these and other Trump base groups there is variation in support for the war. For example 88% of MAGA Republicans approve of the war. That slips to 75% among all Republicans and to 61% among born-again protestants.

At the opposite end of high opposition to the war, almost all Democratic groups are over 95% opposed to the war, as are both somewhat liberal and very liberal groups.

There is more interesting variation within some categories. White, males, without a college degree are fairly supportive of the war, 56% approve. But their white, female, non-college counterparts are solidly opposed, 61%, which is similar to white, males with a college degree, 64%, while white, female college grads are still more opposed, 68%. Given the support for Trump from white, non-college women in 2024 (51% for Trump in the MULawPoll, 53% in the Wisconsin exit poll) this is notable slippage among an important swing group.

The war evenly divides rural Wisconsin voters while those in the suburbs are solidly opposed, 66%, and those in urban areas more opposed, 70%. Trump won rural voters in Wisconsin by 23 percentage points and by 2 points in the suburbs, losing urban voters by 21 points.

There is a considerable split by age with those 45 and older only slightly opposed to the war while those under 45 are strongly opposed.

By ideology the expected liberal and conservative alignments are strong, but among moderates, 75% disapprove of the war, as do 73% of independents.

The chart shows these groups and more. It provides a review of many crosstabs in a single figure. At the top are those groups that most approve of the war with decreasing approval as one reads down the rows.

The cease-fire, assuming it holds, will allow the end of active bombing and a resumption of oil shipments, perhaps reducing the oil shock of the past five and a half weeks. It is a long 210 days to election day as I write this. Will memories of an unpopular war and its economic price tag linger for some seven months, or will we have moved on to new topics by the fall? At this moment, there are few groups of Wisconsin voters who can be said to have thought the war a good idea.

The paradox that an unpopular Democratic party keeps winning

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Democrats have reservations about their party but unite in opposing Trump

The Democratic party is less popular than the Republican party in both Wisconsin and national Marquette Law School polls since Jan. 2025. Yet Democrats keep strongly over-performing in both general and special elections in 2025 and 2026. Most recently Democrats flipped the Florida legislative seat that includes Mar-a-Lago, a district that went +11 for Trump in 2024 but went +2 for the Democratic legislative candidate on March 24. How can this paradox be explained?

I previously looked at this in my national polling here. Today let’s look at the most competitive state in the nation since 2016, Wisconsin. Data are from Marquette Law School polls of registered voters in October 2025, and February and March 2026.

Both parties are underwater, but Democrats more so

Both parties have net negative favorability ratings, meaning more have unfavorable than favorable views of each party. Since October there has been little change in overall favorability for each, with Democratic party favorability more net negative than for the Republican party. GOP net favorability has been around -10 points while Democratic net favorability has been twice as large, in the -20s.

Where does this added negativity to the Democrats come from? Not from the opposite party. Republicans have extremely negative views of Democrats and Democrats return the favor with equally net negative views of Republicans. Likewise this difference between parties doesn’t come from independents, who strongly dislike both parties though they give Republicans an 8 point more net negative rating than they give Democrats.

The partisan gap comes in feelings about voters’ own party. Republicans give the GOP a net positive +74 point rating, but Democrats give their party just a +56 point rating. Our partisans hate the other party equally but don’t love themselves equally.

As in horror movies, “the call is coming from inside the house.”

The same result is seen in my national polling where we also ask about approval of the job Democrats in Congress and Republicans in Congress are doing. Partisans strongly disapprove of the other congressional party but Democrats are less approving of congressional Democrats while Republicans are more approving of their party in Congress. Democratic discontent applies equally to favorability of the party in general and specifically to the job performance of the congressional party.

This asymmetry in partisan views take a different turn when the question is about President Donald Trump. Across the three polls since October Trump’s overall approval is 44% and disapproval is 54%, for a net rating of -10 percentage points. Here, though, Democrats are stunningly united in disapproval. Republicans strongly approve but not so much as Democrats disapprove. And independents are also strong in their disapproval of the president. This negative balance, seen in both Wisconsin and national Marquette polls, explains why Republican candidates have suffered in elections in 2025 and 2026 despite Trump winning the presidency in 2024.

Democrats are less thrilled with their party but virtually all are agreed in their dislike for Trump. This, plus strong independent dissatisfaction with Trump, has powered Democratic over-performance and wins in the 2025 general elections in Virginia and New Jersey and in special elections throughout the country.

Where dissatisfaction comes from within each party

Which Democrats are less satisfied with their party, and where does Republican dissatisfaction arise in the GOP?

Very few Republicans consider themselves to be liberal or very liberal, and very few Democrats describe themselves as conservative or very conservative. I lump these few outliers in with moderates in each party. (To see how that has changed over the past 15 years in Wisconsin see my earlier post here.)

Here we look at very conservative to moderate Republicans and at moderate to very liberal Democrats and their favorability to their own parties.

In the GOP those who are very conservative have the highest net positive feelings for the Republican party, and those who are conservative are almost as positive. Where there is less positivity is with moderate Republicans, who remain solidly positive but considerably less so than either type of conservative.

For the Democrats, those who are very liberal are the least positive to the party, just +24 points net favorable, while liberals are most positive and moderates pretty positive but not enormously so. Comparing Democrats with Republicans, very liberal Democrats are much less favorable to the Democratic party than very conservative Republicans are to their party. And liberal Democrats are less positive than conservative Republicans to their respective parties. Only among moderates does the Democratic party enjoy a modest advantage in net favorability, a +56 vs +45 among Republicans.

The asymmetry between parties is not only with one ideological camp, but the strikingly low favorability among very liberal Democrats reflects the ongoing debate within the party between those urging moderation and those pushing for a more clearly liberal or progressive party.

Some of these discrepancies are likely due to the natural frustration of a minority party unable to control the congressional agenda and able at best to block or stall legislation in the Senate. But the differences by ideology also point to a divide over the direction of the Democratic party.

These are the things that explain why the Democratic party has consistently less favorable ratings than the Republican party, and that the discrepancy is substantially due to differences within the parties.

The paradox unriddled

The paradox of strong electoral performance by the less popular party is driven by opposite forces. Democrats differ about themselves but they nearly unanimously oppose Donald Trump, and they are joined by solid opposition to Trump among independents. Republicans have maintained very strong support for Trump within their party, but not so strong as Democratic opposition and with quite weak appeal among independents.

Democrats may not agree on what they are for, and are frustrated by their party’s inability to block Trump, but they absolutely know what (or who) they are against. This has provided a strong electoral advantage when Republican candidates across the country have so closely tied themselves to President Trump, and where dissent brings presidential condemnation and primary challenges. November is seven months away and the details of candidates and issues are not yet certain, but it is against this background that the less popular party nonetheless enjoys a midterm advantage.

Opinion of Trump’s military actions are malleable

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… but approval of Trump barely budges

In November 2025 just 24% of American adults thought the U.S. “should attempt to remove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power” while 76% said the U.S. should “not get involved in Venezuela”. Among Republicans, 63% said we should not get involved, as did 79% of independents and 88% of Democrats. That was bipartisan lopsided opposition to military intervention to depose a foreign leader.

Then on January 3, 2026 President Donald Trump ordered military action that removed Maduro from power. In my January 21-28, 2026 Marquette Law School poll support for removing Maduro changed dramatically, more than doubling, with 55% saying removing Maduro was the right thing to do, and 45% saying it was the wrong thing to do. Among Republicans support skyrocketed to 87% and opposition cratered to 13%. Support among independents rose to 51% and even among Democrats support rose to 23%. See the chart.

This illustrates how weakly held opinions can change dramatically with presidential leadership and weak opposition messaging. See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Not all issues are like this, with weak initial positions followed by one-sided flows of information without countervailing narratives. Not all, but many, foreign policy matters are like this—remote from the daily concerns of most Americans and a realm of special presidential influence.

But what was the domestic political consequence of Trump’s success in removing Maduro? Did his deposing a foreign president, with support from a majority of the public (after the fact), win him accolades at home? Nope. Approval of Trump’s handling of his job slipped by a point, from 43% in Nov. to 42% in Jan. And approval among partisans similarly hardly changed at all, despite the large increase in support for removing Maduro seen above. GOP approval ticked down 2 points, independents down 2 points and Democrats up 1 point.

Most folks lack strong opinions about rare foreign policy events, but they have very strong views of Trump’s handling of his job. Even big moves in the former leave the latter untouched.

A similar result appears for the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites on June 21, 2025. We don’t have a pre-bombing opinion measure, but after the bombing in my July 7-16 national poll, 52% supported the air strikes while 48% opposed them. And 85% of Republicans supported them as did 43% of independents and 22% of Democrats. Not much different from the post-Maduro opinion in January.

But did this shift opinion of Trump’s handling of his job? It did not. Republican approval slipped a tad, independent approval rose a little and Democrats approved just a little less.

Nor did this military success in Iran translate to approval specifically of Trump’s handling of the Israel-Iran war. In fact, Republicans in July were a little less approving of Trump’s handling of the war than they were of his handling of his job overall, 79% approval for handling the war to 86% approval for Trump’s job overall. Independents were 1 point more approving of his handling the war than his job in general and Democrats showed a bigger difference–13% approval on the war, to 8% approval overall.

Nor did views of Trump’s handling of foreign policy shift at all from May to July: 43% approved and 57% disapproved in both months. And partisans hardly budged.

So what?

Long wars can be devastating to a presidency. Ask Lyndon Johnson or George W. Bush. And short ones can boost a president, at least temporarily. Ask George H. W. Bush. And short disasters can certainly be damaging. Ask Jimmy Carter about Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw.)

But even brief military actions that are seen as successes have surprisingly little effect on the broader approval of a president. Ask Barack Obama about killing Osama bin Laden.

Trump’s quick successes in bombing Iran nuclear sites in June and removing Maduro in January received majority, albeit slight majority, support after the fact, support above that of his overall job rating. But neither translated into any meaningful improvement in his overall job or his foreign policy job or his handling of the Israel-Iran war.

The question still on the table is will this new Iran war be a quick success or a prolonged engagement with declining support? By the initial polls, more people oppose the new Iran war than support it, with quite a few undecided. That’s not a position of strength with public opinion. A success and rapid deescalation could boost support for the decision to use military force. But the evidence above shows that even that best outcome won’t necessarily translate into higher approval of the president. I guess we’ll know in a month or six. If it is six months, and not a quick success, we will learn very close to election day.

ICE, Renee Good shooting, deportations and Trump approval

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Plus party images, most important issues in new MULawPoll national survey

On Feb. 4 and 5 we released my latest Marquette Law School Poll national survey. The link to the full release, toplines, crosstabs and methodology are at the bottom of this post.

I’ll be posting a series of deeper dives on these results over the next week, each more narrowly focused but with more detail than the release is able to get into, so stay tuned. A quick look for now.

For new listeners, our national polls are released over two days. The first focuses on political topics while the second is devoted to topics related to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Thanks to SCOTUSblog’s newsletter for headlining our Court poll this morning.) 

This poll was in the field Jan. 21-28, 2026, interviewing 1003 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. The poll was conducted after the killing of Renee Good. About 2/3rds of the interviews were completed before the killing of Alex Pretti, with 1/3rd after. Therefore, this poll reflects reaction to the Good shooting but does not fully reflect opinion following the Pretti shooting.

In headlines, we find 60% disapprove of the way ICE is handling immigration enforcement, 40% approve. Sixty-two percent say the shooting of Good was not justified, and 37% say it was justified. Of seven recent news events, attention to the Good shooting was the most followed, with 76% saying they had read or heard a lot about it. 

On the other hand, support for deportations is virtually unchanged. We ask 2 questions, each to a separate half-sample:

  • Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries?

And

  • Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries even if they have lived here for a number of years, have jobs and no criminal record?

For the first item, with no qualifications, 56% favor deportations and 44% oppose them. That is down 2 points from 58%-42% in November. As for deportations of longtime residents with no criminal record, the numbers reverse, with 44% favoring such deportations and 56% opposed. That is unchanged from November.

Trump approval on immigration is 44% approve and 56% disapprove. That is slightly better than his overall job approval at 42% approve, 58% disapprove. Trump’s approval was at 41% approve, 58% disapprove in my September 2020 poll, shortly before his election loss to Joe Biden.

The generic congressional ballot finds a Democratic lead at 48% to 44% for Republicans among registered voters. That widens to 52% Democratic and 45% Republican among likely voters. 

Looking at which party would do a better job on each of eight issues, Republicans are seen as better on four, Democrats better on two and two issues are essentially tied. Between 1/4th and 1/3rd of adults says there is no difference or neither party is good on the issue.

And what do people care the most about? Inflation, the economy, and immigration top the list, with significant concern for health care and Medicare and Social Security,

I’ll be back in the coming days with much more detail on these topics plus data centers, grocery and gasoline prices, the economy, and “who do you trust?”  Stay tuned.

The full results, including press releases, toplines, crosstabs, the full instrument, and methodology are found at our website here. Note that entries are in reverse chronological order. The toplines and crosstabs under the Supreme Court release, “Court issues”, are complete, i.e. they include the political items also. Those under the “National issues” section do not include the Court items, which were held for the Court release. There are separate press releases for the Court and for National issues. 

1 year of Trump 2.0

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Trump’s approval is bad enough. No need to exaggerate.

It’s the one year mark of Trump’s second term and everyone is posting year in review pieces. Here is mine.

The chart shows how all presidents in the polling era have varied in approval over their entire terms, plus year 1 of Trump 2.0. The boxes cover the middle 50% of all polls, and the “whiskers” extend out to their all time highs and lows of approval in Gallup polls. The bar in the box is the median poll, the 50th percentile. I stick to Gallup for consistency over time and for their unmatched historical depth.

What jumps out is the approval ratings of the last four presidents have varied considerably less than those of their predecessors. Trump 1.0 has the least variation (smallest standard deviation) of any of the other 14 presidents, with 2.0 the second smallest, so far. Both Obama and Biden varied a little more, but considerably less than either Bushes, Clinton, or Reagan. Trump’s median in 1.0 ties with Truman for the lowest median approval, 39%. So far, Trump 2.0 is the 3rd lowest, at 40.5%. (Truman, by the way, set the record for all time low at 22%. Trump hasn’t come close, with a low of 33%, so far.)

This shrinkage of variation in approval is one consequence of polarization, leading the out-party since George W. Bush’s 2nd term to consistently give approval ratings below 10%, while the in-party gives high approval, typically in the 80s, no matter what. The poor independents are left to shift the balance a bit between two largely unmovable partisan camps. V.O. Key famously said voters were “a rational god of vengeance and reward”, but that breaks down when one side will never reward good performance and the other will never condemn bad outcomes. Trump may never approach the lows of Truman, Nixon, Carter or both Bushes, all of whom had low points in the 20s. But he will never approach the highs of Obama, Clinton or Reagan either.

Here is a more conventional look at approval of each of the elected presidents from the polling era. The trends here are smoothed trend estimates. Gallup now polls approval only once a month, so Trump 2.0 is not smoothed, just the raw polls. Also, Gallup hasn’t released the January results, so December is the most recent reading.

Trump 2.0 has run a little better than 1.0 in Gallup’s data. The December point at 36% is a bit of an outlier. The major polling averages put Trump’s approval between 40% and 42% as of Jan. 20, 2026.

An alternate view breaks out each president for readability. Here I’m showing raw poll results with no smoothing.

Here is my polling average for all Trump polls in 2025. My trend estimate is 41.4% approval. For comparison, FiftyPlusOne.news has it at 40.0%, SilverBulletin is 42.0%, NYTimes is 42.0% and RealClearPolitics is 42.4%.

You will note dips below the general downward trend in April after the tariff announcement, then a little recovery after backing off those original “liberation day” tariffs. Then the downward trend returns, until another dip during and after the government shutdown in October and November. A bit of a rise in early December after which the general downtrend returns. This is steady, nearly linear, decline with a couple of short-term wiggles.

I have a beef with headlines that shout “Trump at all time low” or “Approval cratering.” Those either cherry pick particularly low polls, or exaggerate small departures from the general downward trend. Trump’s approval is bad enough. Historically low for other presidents at the end of one year. But the message I read in this trend is a steady decline in approval for an unpopular president, signaling a challenging midterm, and with no sustained upturn in the last 12 months. No need to exaggerate the problems this poses for the White House or Republicans generally.

All or nothing on liking Trump?

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After a year in office, opinions about Donald Trump are a bit more complicated than merely “approve” or “disapprove.” Those who disapprove find almost nothing to like, but those who approve are likely to express mixed feelings, reporting things they dislike even if on balance they approve of the job he is doing as president.

For over a year my Marquette Law School Poll national surveys have asked a pair of open-ended questions in each poll:

What do you like about Donald Trump?

and

What do you dislike about Donald Trump?

Respondents can write as much or as little as they wish. The record is over 900 words. Much more common than full op-ed length answers are “everything” and “nothing”, in either order.

The pure-admiration and pure-hate answers can be short or long, but each give insights into how people think about Trump. Still, a substantial number of people have mixed feelings. Among Trump supporters it is common to see approval of his actions or policies coupled with disliking “how he talks” or “how he deals with people” or “the Epstein files.” It is less common to find those who disapprove of Trump seeing anything to like. If the substance of the dislikes goes to his policies then we see fewer finding positive things as well.

In a year of polling these questions, we have seen a notable trend. Respondents with mixed feelings, giving both likes and dislikes, have declined from 51% to 44%, while those who don’t like anything have climbed from 35% to 42%. And the true Trump fans, who only find something to like and nothing to dislike, have slightly declined from a high of 14% to 10%.

This gives a different perspective on Trump’s approval ratings, which have held between 40% and 42% in the current polling averages, down from the start of the second term but hardly “collapsing” as some suggest.

Among those who disapprove, few exhibit mixed feelings in the open-ended responses. They see nothing positive and vary primarily in the length and detail of their vitriol. The past year has grown this group of people, irreconcilably opposed to Trump.

We often think Trump’s base is rock solid. Approval among Republicans remains around 85% a year into Trump 2.0. But the open-ended responses suggest a more complicated story. Among his supporters, those who approve of the job he is doing, the substantial majority have mixed feelings in the open-ended answers. This does not forecast a collapse of his approval, but it does remind us that the caricature of his base as mindlessly in love is not accurate. So far, they like more than they dislike. But it is not because they are blind to the president’s shortcomings.

Trump net approvals across issues, party and time

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While it is natural to follow presidential approval using the single “overall” job approval measure, this misses the substantial variation in support for the president across various issues. Likewise overall approval ignores differences by party and how trends over time vary by party. Let’s take a look.

The data are from my Marquette Law School Poll (MULawPoll) national surveys conducted since President Trump returned to office. Polls are done about every two months. The national samples are of about 1,000 adults in all 50 states. (Full results, including toplines, cross tabs and methodology are found in reverse chronological order at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/category/results-and-data/ )

Over the year we’ve tracked a number of topics, starting in May for the individual issues, and in February with overall approval. Some topics have only been asked once or twice, as issues come and go.

The chart shows net approval (approve minus disapprove) for 11 topics, including overall approval, by party, over time. Let’s start with overall approval as a baseline. Republican net approval has remained high, starting at +78 in February and standing at +70 in mid-November. That is a modest 4 point decline in approval (89% to 85%) and similar rise in disapproval (11% to 15%). A large majority of the GOP is standing by Trump in overall approval.

Independents are a different matter. In February the net approval among independents was -26 which declined to -50 in November, almost doubling. Independent approval now sits at 25% with 75% disapproval. Independents make up about 16% of our national adult sample. Independents to lean to a party are classified as partisans here, so this is “pure” independents.

Not surprisingly Democrats are overwhelmingly disapproving of Trump, though even a bit more now than in February. Democrats started Trump’s second term at -82 net and are at -90 in November. Their approval declined from 9% to 5% over the year. In a nice symmetry, both Republicans and Democrats have moved a net 8 points more disapproving of Trump over the year, though from radically different starting points.

While interesting, the variation across issues is more revealing. Trump has maintained relatively strong support on border security, with partisan differences but only modest changes over time. This is also a topic for which he is less negative among Democrats and comes close to breaking even with independents (despite their -50 overall net approval.)

Tariffs is another issue where net approval has remained relatively stable over the year, though with lower net approval among each partisan group than for border security. Republican net approval was +42 in May and +48 in November, while independents moved from -48 to -56 and Democrats ended as they began at -90.

On immigration, there are been some decline among Republicans, while independents and Democrats have held fairly steady over the year. Compare the GOP line for immigration with that for border security.

On the economy and inflation we see notable declines among Republicans and independents, while Democrats are consistently very low. On the economy Republicans have fallen from +60 in May to +40 in November; independents from -40 to -58; Democrats -84 to -86.

For inflation the Republican net drops from +36 to +12; independents -54 to -62 and Democrats unchanged at -92. These declines, especially among Republicans, highlight Trump’s increasing vulnerability on the two topics rated as the most important problems in my November poll, with 36% saying inflation and 20% saying the economy. This doesn’t mean the GOP is abandoning Trump (see the overall number) but it points to a significant and growing source of doubt among his base.

Republican support has also fallen considerably for Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war, dropping from +50 to +16. Independents and Democrats have changed little.

The one bright spot is high (relative) approval across partisan groups for the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement, with net positives from Republicans and independents and almost net positives from Democrats. This is a nice example that was strong as partisanship can be, on some clear successes, it is possible to get some credit from the opposition party. Rare, but possible.

Then there are three topics that are net negative with Republicans, independents and Democrats: the Epstein files, the federal shutdown, and economic aid to Argentina. Here finding Republicans in net negative territory is sticking given their net positive ratings on all the other topics. While GOP discontent over the Epstein files has received a lot of discussion, the even more negative rating on aid to Argentina is notable. That aid is certainly not as salient as the Epstein case, but it is an example that there are things the GOP will sharply disagree with Trump about.

As for the shutdown, a barely net negative rating from Republicans shows that the shutdown hurt Trump’s standing, even within his party. To be sure, GOP voters blame the Democrats (67%), just as Democrats blame the Republicans (72%). Independents blame both (75%). But the president doesn’t come off well from the shutdown either. (Most interviews for the November poll were completed before the Senate vote to end the shutdown, and all interviews were completed before the House vote.)

The takeaway here is that presidential approval isn’t one thing, and it varies considerably by topic. Likewise partisan opinion of the president isn’t monolithic. On most issues Trump has substantial net positive approval ratings among Republicans but there is substantial variation and a few cases of net negative opinion. Democrats are overwhelmingly negative, but on the cease-fire they split almost evenly and give a less negative rating on border security. than other topics. But watch the independent lines. Those have mostly trended down, with some strikingly negative ratings by November.

Trump approval through Nov. 2025

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President Trump’s approval has declined in October and November, after holding pretty steady July-Sept. There was steady decline Jan-Mar, then a sharper fall after announcing tariffs in April. Approval rose in May after backing off on tariffs. Then a small decline in June. Current decline is across most pollsters.

Gallup November Trump approval: 36% approve, 60% disapprove, a 5 point drop in approval and 6 point increase in disapproval since Oct. Several points below my approval trend across all polls which puts approval at 40.5%, disapproval at 56.1%

Here is Gallup approval history since FDR