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Family finances under Trump and Biden

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Family financial situation in Wisconsin

The cost of living, or “affordability”, is at the top of public concerns likely to shape the 2026 elections. Let’s look back over the last decade for some perspective.

For the past 10 years my Marquette Law School Poll has asked Wisconsin registered voters about their family’s financial situation:

Thinking about your family’s financial situation, would you say you are living comfortably, just getting by, or struggling to make ends meet?

The percentage saying they were living comfortably rose steadily during the first Trump administration, from around 50% in 2016 to over 60% by 2020. But as inflation rose in 2021 the trend reversed, falling to 44% near the end of the Biden administration in late 2024. In the first year of the second Trump term the percentage living comfortably has turned up modestly, standing at 50% as of October.

Those who say they are just getting by reverse the pattern for those living comfortably, declining from 2016-20, rising from 2021-24, with a slight downturn in 2025. Those struggling also move in rough parallel with those just getting by.

The decline in financial well-being during the Biden administration goes a long way to explaining Biden’s low approval rating during the last three years of his administration and Trump’s ability to win Wisconsin in 2024 by 0.9 percentage points, after having lost the state by 0.6 points in 2020.

The upturn in financial situation in 2025 contrasts with continued worries about inflation and the cost of living, which was the most cited problem in the October Marquette poll, at 27%, with an additional 9% citing the economy as most important. These concerns are substantial across the usual partisan lines: 23% of Republicans rank inflation as most important, as do 27% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Only Republicans rank another issue higher, immigration, at 31%.

What lies behind the changing sense of financial security or insecurity over the past decade? Partisanship plays a big role, as does income.

Family finances by party identification

The upturn in sense of living comfortably in 2025 is entirely due to Republicans who turned sharply more positive with the change of administration in January. By the end of the Biden administration only about 34% of Republicans said they were living comfortably, but by October this had soared to 63%.

In contrast, independents living comfortably declined throughout the Biden administration and show no upturn in 2025. Democrats viewed their financial situation as stable through the Biden years with a substantial downturn in 2025.

There is no evidence these changes in perceived financial situation reflect real fluctuations in income. In 2024, 37% of Republicans reported family incomes over $100,000, and 37% had that income in 2025. For independents, 28% had this level of income in both 2024 and 2025. Slightly more Democrats had incomes over $100,000 in 2025, 34%, than the 32% in 2024.

Family finances by income

This powerful effect of partisanship does not mean money doesn’t matter. Those living comfortably rises with income while those struggling goes down as income rises. More important is the changing sense of well-being over time and especially during the Biden years. Across each income level the percentage living comfortably fell during Biden’s term after rising during Trump’s first term. Those struggling declined or was flat during Trump’s first term but rose under Biden, especially for lower income families, though also for those of middle-income. For the high income group a decline in living comfortably translated into a rise in the feeling of just getting by. In 2025 all income groups show at least a small increase in sense of living comfortably and a downturn in those saying they are struggling.

Family finances by party ID and by income

We can disentangle the income and partisan effects a bit by looking at both simultaneously. Republicans, regardless of income, showed declining financial well-being throughout Biden’s term and have shown an improved outlook in 2025. (The data here are aggregated by year to provide enough cases to reliably estimate both partisan and income effects simultaneously.)

Both low- and high-income independents had declining finances in 2021-24 and continued down in 2025. Middle-income independents seem a bit better off in 2024 and 2025 than earlier in Biden’s term.

Low- and high-income Democrats held stable in their sense of family finances under Biden, with both dropping off a bit in 2025 under Trump. This contrasts with middle-income Democrats who felt increasingly worse off under Biden and are continuing down under Trump.

Not to be missed in all these details is that among Republicans and independents every income group felt their financial situation was better during Trump’s first term than during Biden’s. Democrats were more stable during the Biden years, with the important exception of middle-income Democrats who felt increasingly worse off.

Finances, party and the vote

The sage said, “it’s the economy, stupid” and this seems to hold up today as it did in the 1990s. If not the only thing that matters, these shifts in financial security from 2021-24 surely go a long way to pointing us to crucial groups who found themselves feeling worse off in 2024 than in 2020. This was especially true for middle-income people who reported being less secure regardless of party by 2024. For Republicans this reinforced their partisan inclinations while for Democrats greater insecurity is associated with a modest increase in votes for Trump, and likely reduced turnout: among Democrats living comfortably, 96% said they were certain to vote in 2024, while among those struggling 86% said the same. Turnout increased slightly for struggling Republicans vs comfortable ones, while turnout was lower for struggling independents than those living comfortably.

Voting for Trump was higher in 2024 for those struggling compared to the comfortable across parties, with modest differences among Republicans and Democrats but a large 40-point increase for Trump among struggling independents vs. comfortable ones.

The lesson for 2026 and beyond: “it’s the economy, stupid”.

Trump net approvals across issues, party and time

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While it is natural to follow presidential approval using the single “overall” job approval measure, this misses the substantial variation in support for the president across various issues. Likewise overall approval ignores differences by party and how trends over time vary by party. Let’s take a look.

The data are from my Marquette Law School Poll (MULawPoll) national surveys conducted since President Trump returned to office. Polls are done about every two months. The national samples are of about 1,000 adults in all 50 states. (Full results, including toplines, cross tabs and methodology are found in reverse chronological order at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/category/results-and-data/ )

Over the year we’ve tracked a number of topics, starting in May for the individual issues, and in February with overall approval. Some topics have only been asked once or twice, as issues come and go.

The chart shows net approval (approve minus disapprove) for 11 topics, including overall approval, by party, over time. Let’s start with overall approval as a baseline. Republican net approval has remained high, starting at +78 in February and standing at +70 in mid-November. That is a modest 4 point decline in approval (89% to 85%) and similar rise in disapproval (11% to 15%). A large majority of the GOP is standing by Trump in overall approval.

Independents are a different matter. In February the net approval among independents was -26 which declined to -50 in November, almost doubling. Independent approval now sits at 25% with 75% disapproval. Independents make up about 16% of our national adult sample. Independents to lean to a party are classified as partisans here, so this is “pure” independents.

Not surprisingly Democrats are overwhelmingly disapproving of Trump, though even a bit more now than in February. Democrats started Trump’s second term at -82 net and are at -90 in November. Their approval declined from 9% to 5% over the year. In a nice symmetry, both Republicans and Democrats have moved a net 8 points more disapproving of Trump over the year, though from radically different starting points.

While interesting, the variation across issues is more revealing. Trump has maintained relatively strong support on border security, with partisan differences but only modest changes over time. This is also a topic for which he is less negative among Democrats and comes close to breaking even with independents (despite their -50 overall net approval.)

Tariffs is another issue where net approval has remained relatively stable over the year, though with lower net approval among each partisan group than for border security. Republican net approval was +42 in May and +48 in November, while independents moved from -48 to -56 and Democrats ended as they began at -90.

On immigration, there are been some decline among Republicans, while independents and Democrats have held fairly steady over the year. Compare the GOP line for immigration with that for border security.

On the economy and inflation we see notable declines among Republicans and independents, while Democrats are consistently very low. On the economy Republicans have fallen from +60 in May to +40 in November; independents from -40 to -58; Democrats -84 to -86.

For inflation the Republican net drops from +36 to +12; independents -54 to -62 and Democrats unchanged at -92. These declines, especially among Republicans, highlight Trump’s increasing vulnerability on the two topics rated as the most important problems in my November poll, with 36% saying inflation and 20% saying the economy. This doesn’t mean the GOP is abandoning Trump (see the overall number) but it points to a significant and growing source of doubt among his base.

Republican support has also fallen considerably for Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war, dropping from +50 to +16. Independents and Democrats have changed little.

The one bright spot is high (relative) approval across partisan groups for the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement, with net positives from Republicans and independents and almost net positives from Democrats. This is a nice example that was strong as partisanship can be, on some clear successes, it is possible to get some credit from the opposition party. Rare, but possible.

Then there are three topics that are net negative with Republicans, independents and Democrats: the Epstein files, the federal shutdown, and economic aid to Argentina. Here finding Republicans in net negative territory is sticking given their net positive ratings on all the other topics. While GOP discontent over the Epstein files has received a lot of discussion, the even more negative rating on aid to Argentina is notable. That aid is certainly not as salient as the Epstein case, but it is an example that there are things the GOP will sharply disagree with Trump about.

As for the shutdown, a barely net negative rating from Republicans shows that the shutdown hurt Trump’s standing, even within his party. To be sure, GOP voters blame the Democrats (67%), just as Democrats blame the Republicans (72%). Independents blame both (75%). But the president doesn’t come off well from the shutdown either. (Most interviews for the November poll were completed before the Senate vote to end the shutdown, and all interviews were completed before the House vote.)

The takeaway here is that presidential approval isn’t one thing, and it varies considerably by topic. Likewise partisan opinion of the president isn’t monolithic. On most issues Trump has substantial net positive approval ratings among Republicans but there is substantial variation and a few cases of net negative opinion. Democrats are overwhelmingly negative, but on the cease-fire they split almost evenly and give a less negative rating on border security. than other topics. But watch the independent lines. Those have mostly trended down, with some strikingly negative ratings by November.

Hello World!

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Sixteen years ago this week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I launched PoliticalArithmetik, my first blog. This week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I’m (re)launching a website, PollsAndVotes.com.

After a year of PoliticalArithmetik, Mark Blumenthal (@mysterypollster) and I launched Pollster.com (with the support of Doug Rivers) and spent several years explaining polling and providing tracking of races, presidential approval and other topics in public opinion. In 2010 HuffPost bought Pollster and Mark had a good run with that. I departed and started PollsAndVotes.com in 2011, but have not maintained the site for a while. This is the relaunch of PollsAndVotes.com.

For some while now I’ve primarily posted analysis of polling on Twitter at @PollsAndVotes. As much as I like Twitter (most of the time) I think it is time to again have a PollsAndVotes website that allows longer posts, in one place, that can be easily found and searched for older posts, like from last week or last month. Having an editor to fix typos is also welcome.

I’ll be building out this site at a somewhat deliberate pace. I’ve decided not to import the old posts from the previous PollsAndVotes.com let alone from PoliticalArithmetik. I’ll update some of those, such as partisanship trends, but start fresh with the current data.

There will be a mix of topics here, but I’ll not be trying to replicate what Pollster.com did and what FiveThirtyEight.com and RealClearPolitics.com do well already. Most of the analysis here will be deeper dives into the national and state polling data that goes beyond trends. I also hope that my fellow academics will find graphics that may be useful in teaching.

The menu topics at the top of the page will (eventually!) provide a quick guide to analysis of “Polls” and “Votes” but also Wisconsin politics, party id, voter turnout, roll call votes and the US Supreme Court. Those first two will be something of a catch-all category. <;-)

Sixteen years ago I spent Labor Day weekend at home instead of the American Political Science Association annual meeting, keeping up with news of Katrina and launching PoliticalArithmetik. What started that weekend changed my life. I’ve still got a few days until this Labor Day weekend, and am not attending APSA, though I’ve been following the news on Ida. I hope you find the site interesting and useful.