Party ID Trend, midyear update

The net balance of party identification has shifted in the Republican direction in 2022, by a little in Kaiser and Marist polls, but a lot in NBC and Quinnipiac polls. One might debate the size but the trend is clear. What it means is perhaps not quite as clear.

Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend

The party balance might most obviously shift because people are moving away from the Democratic Party and (likely) into independents, and (likely) from independents and into Republican. In short, real change in the margin.

Democratic approval of Biden has fallen over the year, while Republicans are united in disapproval of Biden (almost unanimously). Inflation is a dominant issue which favors Republicans and damages Democrats. And a Democratic congress has failed to deliver as much as many Democrats had hoped for in early 2021. That is all a recipe for marginal shifts in the party balance, especially at the boundaries between “independent” and either partisan group.

Or the shifts could be because Democrats are “discouraged” by the national political environment (largely for the same reason as above) and are just less anxious to talk to pollsters about politics. In this story the “real” party balance hasn’t changed but Democrats just don’t feel like talking about it. This is cold comfort to Democrats though, since discouraged Democrats not talking to pollsters are also likely Democrats less likely to vote in November, which is also damaging to party prospects.

The recent changes in margin between Democrats and Republican identification are rather large in comparison to shifts we’ve seen earlier in the time series for each pollster. Such trends could reverse before the elections, but time is growing short. And Biden’s job approval has shown no signs of improving, indeed his average continues to slowly decline, now below 40% approval.

Races for Senate and governor may hinge on candidates and the campaigns, so these partisan trends are not the whole story but they add to the national forces that are a drag on Democrats everywhere and a boost to Republicans.

Notes: I look here are “unleaned” party identification, those who say they are “Republicans” or “Democrats”, not including those who say they are independents who lean to either party. This is in part due to limits in the party measures reported by pollsters, with “unleaned” party being the lowest common denominator.

I also use high quality telephone polls that do NOT weight their samples to party ID. This has historically been the “standard” party measure. Most online polls, including Pew, now weight their samples to a party balance estimated from recent telephone polls, which makes tracking trends with samples weighted to party a complicated issue.

Here are the trends for Kaiser, Marist, NBC and Quinnipiac, first for each party and then for the net margin between the parties. Data include the latest polls as of July 5, 2022.

Kaiser Party ID Trend
Marist Party ID Trend
NBC Hart/Public Opinion Strategies Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Party ID Trend
Kaiser Net Party ID Trend
Marist Net Party ID Trend
NBC Net Party ID Trend
Quinnipiac Net Party ID Trend

Abortion and motivation to vote

Abortion policy, issue concern and enthusiasm to vote

Are abortion policy preferences linked to motivation to vote and to concern about the issue of abortion, and what role does partisanship play? I assess this using data from the Marquette Law School Poll of 803 Wisconsin registered voters, conducted June 14-20, 2022, a week before the US Supreme Court struck down the Roe v Wade decision on June 24, but well after the draft opinion in this case became public in May.

There has been a consistent majority of Wisconsin registered voters who favor legal abortions in all or most cases, and a minority who say abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. Surveys over the past decade have shown very little change in opinion, as shown in Table 1.

Poll datesLegal in all casesLegal in most casesIllegal in most casesIllegal in all cases
9/13-16/1226342313
9/27-30/1225352312
10/11-14/1225342512
10/25-28/1228322312
10/21-24/1326362510
10/23-26/1424342415
7/11-15/1827361811
9/12-16/182636219
10/24-28/1826292414
2/19-23/2018372215
10/26-31/2123382311
6/14-20/2227312411
Table 1: Trend in abortion policy preference, 2012-2022

There is little difference in enthusiasm to vote except among those who think abortion should be illegal in most cases. Those in the two pro-abortion categories, and those with the most anti-abortion preference are all equally motivated to vote. This gives no support for the idea that the abortion issue would be uniquely motivating to pro-abortion voters. Of course this could change, but the draft opinion does not appear to have motivated supporters of abortion to greater political engagement. Rather those who say abortion should be illegal in most cases are the more enthusiastic to vote in these data.

Abortion policy preferenceVery enthusiasticLess enthusiasticDK/Ref
Legal in all cases56422
Legal in most cases56421
Illegal in most cases68320
Illegal in all cases57430
Table 2: Enthusiasm to vote by abortion policy preference

Abortion policy preference and concern about the issue

Those who think abortion should always be legal or always be illegal are the most concerned about abortion policy, while those in the middle categories of legal in most cases or illegal in most cases are substantially less concerned.

Those with the strongest anti-abortion preference express more concern for abortion policy than do the strongest pro-abortion advocates by a small margin.

Abortion policy preferenceVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
Legal in all cases66340
Legal in most cases53461
Illegal in most cases51427
Illegal in all cases73270
Table 3: Concern about the issue of abortion by abortion policy preference

Age and abortion preference and concern

There is virtually no relationship between age and abortion preference. Only those 70 years old or older are a bit less supportive of abortion than the other age groups.

AgeLegal in all or mostIllegal in all or mostDon’t know
18-2962381
30-3960306
40-4960345
50-5960355
60-6957355
70+51407
Table 4: Abortion policy preference by age

Concern over the abortion issue is also not associated with age. Concern fluctuates across age groups but is not consistently higher among the young than it is among their elders. These results suggest it is unlikely that the abortion issue will be uniquely motivating for younger voters in the fall elections.

AgeVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
18-2962380
30-3946540
40-4955433
50-5966331
60-6955414
70+64324
Table 5: Concern about abortion policy by age

Partisanship and concern about abortion policy

Democrats say they are more concerned about the abortion issue, followed by Republicans while independents express less concern about the issue.

Party IDVery concernedLess concernedDK/Ref
Republican57412
Independent49492
Democrat73261
Table 6: Abortion policy concern by party identification

While Democrats express more concern about abortion, they are less likely than Republicans to say they are very enthusiastic about voting in November.

Party IDVery enthusiasticLess enthusiasticDK/Ref
Republican74260
Independent49491
Democrat60391
Table 7: Enthusiasm to vote by party identification

Enthusiasm to vote by party and abortion policy preference

Enthusiasm to vote is highest among Republicans, and equally so for pro- and anti-abortion policy preferences. Among independents, those opposed to abortion are more enthusiastic than those supporting abortion. Among Democrats who are pro-abortion, enthusiasm is less than among Republicans. There are very few Democrats who are anti-abortion, but among this group enthusiasm is low, about the same as for pro-abortion independents.

Party IDAbortion policyVery enthusiasticLess enthusiastic
RepublicanLegal all or most cases7327
RepublicanIllegal all or most cases7327
IndependentLegal all or most cases4553
IndependentIllegal all or most cases5743
DemocratLegal all or most cases6138
DemocratIllegal all or most cases4852
Table 8: Enthusiasm to vote by abortion policy preference and party identification

Conclusion

A week before the Supreme Court struck down Roe v Wade, Wisconsin Republicans were more motivated to vote than Democrats, and pro-abortion policy preference was not associated with greater enthusiasm to vote. Enthusiasm was higher among those saying abortion should be illegal in most cases while quite similar among those saying abortion should be legal in all or most cases, and for those saying it should be illegal in all cases.

The Court’s now official decision overturning Roe, and the subsequent political campaigns on the issue, may shift motivation and participation, but the leak of the draft of that opinion in May did not produce a measurable mobilization among those favoring abortion rights, contrary to some speculation.

State gun laws and public opinion

Abstract

Public opinion substantially favors allowing concealed carry of handguns with a permit or license required. This is true of both a constitutional right under the Second Amendment and as provided by state laws. In contrast, there is substantial majority opposition to laws allowing concealed carry without a licensing requirement, or “permitless” carry.

Nationwide, 66% of those with an opinion favor a Supreme Court ruling that the Second Amendment includes a right to possess a gun outside the home. For state laws, 62% favor laws that allow concealed carry of handguns with a license and 38% are opposed.

In contrast, permitless concealed carry without a license requirement is supported nationwide by 19% and opposed by 81%.

In the 25 states with permitlesss concealed carry laws, a minority of 28% of adults favor such laws, while 72% are opposed to them, based on a May 2022 Marquette Law School national survey.

State surveys in Texas and Tennessee, states with unlicensed concealed carry laws, found 34% and 39% favored these laws, respectively, with 59% opposed in both states.

State gun laws

In the following analysis, state gun laws are grouped into four categories.

  • Twenty-five states have adopted laws allowing “permitless” concealed carry, requiring no license or permit to have a concealed weapon. (This includes Alabama, Indiana and Ohio that have adopted such a law that will go into effect by Jan. 1, 2023.)
  • Ten states have “shall issue” laws that give no discretion over issuing a license or permit to an applicant meeting the criteria specified by law.
  • Seven states have “shall issue” laws that allow some discretion over issuing a license or permit if the applicant is judged to raise some public safety concerns.
  • Eight states and the District of Columbia have “may issue” laws that give authorities greater lattitude in determining when to issue a license or permit.

Classifications of states were based on these websites which were checked for consistency:

Wikipedia

Giffords.org

concealedguns.procon.org

Public opinion on concealed carry laws

The Marquette Law School Poll surveyed 1,004 adults nationwide May 9-19, 2022. The margin of error is +/-3.9 percentage points. The survey focused on the Supreme Court and included three items on opnion about the Second Amendment and concealed carry laws. The survey began before the mass shooting that killed 10 people in Buffalo, NY, and was completed before the mass shooting that killed 21 in a Uvalde, TX elementary school.

Full results of the Marquette Law School poll are available here.

Second Amendment

The Supreme Court is set to decide New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, which addresses whether the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a gun outside the home.

The survey asked

Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?: Rule that the 2nd Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” protects the right to carry a gun outside the home.

Among those with an opinion, 66% favor such a ruling and 34% are opposed.

Opinion on this extension of Second Amendment interpretation to include guns outside the home is more supportive in states with less restrictive gun laws, with large majorities favoring expanded rights to possess a gun, and less supportive in the most restrictive states, where opinion is evenly divided. These results are shown in Table 1.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless7723
Shall issue7030
Shall issue w limits6436
May issue4852
Table 1: Favor or oppose Supreme Court ruling that the 2nd Amendment right to ‘keep and bear arms’ protects the right to carry a gun outside the home, by state gun laws,among those with an opinion, May 2022

Concealed carry with a license

The Marquette Law School poll also asked about laws concerning concealed carry. Respondents were asked about licensed concealed carry laws:

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns?

These laws were favored by 62% and opposed by 38% nationwide.

Opinion by state gun laws finds over 60% majorities in favor of such laws in most states, and with a narrow majority in favor in the states with the most restrictive laws concerning concealed carry, as shown in Table 2.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless6535
Shall issue6634
Shall issue w limits6436
May issue5347
Table 2: Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns, by state gun laws, May 2022

Concealed carry without a license (“Permitless”)

Half of the states now allow concealed carry without requiring a license or a permit. Respondents were asked

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?

Opinion on this law is much more opposed than for licensed concealed carry. Nineteen percent favor unlicensed carry laws, while 81% are opposed to such laws.

Table 3 shows opinion on these laws by state gun laws. It is striking that even in the states that allow permitless concealed carry, 72% of adults are opposed to such a law. Opposition to these laws inceases in states with more restrictive gun laws.

State gun lawsFavorOppose
Permitless2872
Shall issue1981
Shall issue w limits1684
May issue1090
Table 3: Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?, by state gun laws, May 2022

Comparison with other national and state polls

National polls

In the Pew American Trends Panel wave 87, April 5-11, 2021 respondents were asked

Please indicate whether you would favor or oppose the following proposals about gun policy: Allowing people to carry concealed guns without a permit

In the Pew survey, permitless carry was favored by 20% and opposed by 79%, with 1% refusing to answer.

The May 2022 Marquette Law School national survey question asks

Do you favor or oppose laws that allow most people to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?

In the MU Law Poll permitless carry was favored by 19% and opposed by 81%.

Pew does not release the state code as part of the public dataset, so it is not possible to merge the Pew data with state laws.

State polls

This is not a comprehensive collection of state polls on unlicensed concealed carry but is illustrative of state opinion in one “shall issue” state and two states with permitless concealed carry laws.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin is a “shall issue” state that does require a license for concealed carry. The Marquette Law School poll of Wisconsin registered voters has asked about both licensed and unlicensed concealed carry. The results for licensed concealed carry are shown in Table 4 and for unlicensed carry in Table 5.

Poll datesFavorOpposeDon’t knowRefused
1/21-24/16633151
1/8-12/20702550
10/26-31/21622981
4/19-24/22692650
Table 4: Do you favor or oppose Wisconsin’s current law allowing residents to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns?, Wisconsin registered voters

Poll datesFavorOpposeDon’t knowRefused
10/26-31/21207630
4/19-24/22168220
Table 5: Do you favor or oppose a proposed law that would allow residents to carry concealed handguns without needing to obtain a license?, Wisconsin registered voters

Texas

Texas allows concealed carrry without requiring a license.

A Univerity of Texas/Texas Tribune poll conducted in April 2021 asked

Should adults be allowed to carry handguns in public without licenses or permits?

This was supported by 34% and opposed by 59% with 6% saying the don’t know.

Link: https://www.texastribune.org/2021/05/03/texas-voters-legislature-poll/

Tennessee

Tennessee allows concealed carrry without requiring a license.

A Vanderbilt University Tennessee poll in May 2021 asked

Do you approve or disapprove of a law that would make it legal for people age 21 and older to carry a handgun without a permit in Tennessee?

Thirty-nine percent approved of this law, while 59% disapproved, with 1 percent saying don’t know.

Link: Q22 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/Spring_2021_topline_final.pdf

Confidence & Doubt in 2020 vs 2022 elections

Confidence or doubt in the accuracy of the 2020 election has persisted as an issue since that vote. While substantial majorities of registered voters in Wisconsin are confident the election results were accurate, among Republicans the opposite is true– a majority of Republicans doubt the accuracy of the 2020 election. There has been little change in views of that election over the past nineteen months.

In April, Wisconsin held elections for a variety of state and local offices, including judges, mayors, school boards and other nonpartisan positions. These elections were not followed by widespread claims of fraud or manipulation by either party or by the losers of those elections.

How do Wisconsin registered voters perceive the accuracy of the April 2022 elections compared to the November 2020 election? If “faith in elections” has been seriously damaged by claims that 2020 was a fraud, we should see similar doubts of the 2022 election. If doubt in the 2020 election is primarily a sign of support for former President Donald Trump and his allies, then the reality is not doubt in elections generally but specifically only in the election Trump lost. The April 2022 Wisconsin vote gives us a chance to look at the evidence.

The Marquette Law School poll conducted April 19-24, 2022 followed the April 5 elections in the state. The sample size was 805 registered voters with a margin of error of +/-4.1 percentage points. Full results are available here. Respondents were asked parallel questions about this and the 2020 election:

On April 5, Wisconsin held elections for school boards, judges, local and county positions and other offices. How confident are you that, here in Wisconsin, these votes were accurately cast and counted in the April election?

Concerning the 2020 election they were asked

How confident are you that, here in Wisconsin, the votes for president were accurately cast and counted in the 2020 election?

Response options to both are “very confident”, “somewhat confident”, “not too confident” and “not at all confident.” In the tables below very and somewhat confident are combined as “confident” responses and “not too” or “not at all” confident are combined as “not confident.”

Table 1 shows the results for the April 2022 and November 2020 elections. Confidence in the April 2022 election is 84% compared to 64% confident in the 2020 vote. Only 13% doubt the April results while almost three times as many, 35%, say they doubt the November 2020 election results.

Response April 2022 November 2020 
Confident 84 64 
Not confident 13 35 
DK/Ref 
Table 1: Confidence in the accuracy of the April 2022 and November 2020 elections, Wisconsin registered voters, Marquette Law School poll, April 19-24, 2022

Views of the 2020 election differ dramatically by party, while partisan differences in confidence in the April 2022 elections is much more muted. Large majorities of each partisan group are confident in the April election results, including about three-quarters of Republicans and over 80% of independents. While 22% of Republicans still profess doubt in the April election that contrasts sharply with the 65% of Republicans who say they doubt the 2020 results.

Among independents, confidence is substantially higher in the April election, 82%, than in the 2020 outcome, 65%, though substantial majorities of independents are confident in both elections.

Democrats are nearly unanimous in their confidence in both elections.

Table 2 shows confidence by party for the April 2022 and November 2020 elections.

Table 2: Confidence in the April 2022 and November 2020 elections by party identification, , Wisconsin registered voters, Marquette Law School poll, April 19-24, 2022

Party ID Confident Not confident DK/Ref 
Republican 74 22 
Independent 82 14 
Democrat 97 
(a) April 2022 confidence

Party ID Confident Not confident DK/Ref 
Republican 33 65 
Independent 65 34 
Democrat 96 
(b) November 2020 confidence

Among those who are not confident in the 2020 vote, almost two-thirds, 63%, are confident in the 2022 outcome, with 33% who are not confident in the 2022 result. Virtually everyone confident in 2020 is also confident in 2022. Table 3 shows confidence in 2022 by confidence in 2020.

Confidence in 2020 Confident Not confident DK/Ref 
Confident 96 
Not confident 63 33 
Table 3: Confidence in the April 2022 by confidence in November 2020 elections, Wisconsin registered voters, Marquette Law School poll, April 19-24, 2022

We can also look at confidence in both elections as a percentage of all registered voters, shown in Table 4. The entries here are the “cell percentages”, the size of each cell as a percent of all respondents.

Confidence in 2020 Confident Not confident DK/Ref 
Confident 61 
Not confident 22 11 
Table 4: Percentage of all registered voters confident or not confident in both 2020 and 2022 elections, Wisconsin registered voters, Marquette Law School poll, April 19-24, 2022

Of all registered voters, 11% lack confidence in both elections, while 61% are confident in both. Twenty-two percent are not confident in 2020 but are confident in 2022. This is the crucial segment of the population who doubt Trump’s loss, but are still confident in an election he had no role in and which is not disputed by either party. Just 2% are confident in 2020 but not in 2022.

Conclusion

Supporters of Donald Trump have blamed his loss in 2020 on “election fraud” of some sort. But when considering a different election, one not disputed by either party, they are quite confident in the outcome. While there is some residual increase in doubt of 2022 among those who doubt the 2020 election, it is far short of a widespread “lack of faith in elections” generally.

While the April non-partisan elections in Wisconsin are revealing, the November partisan contests will provide another test of the inclination of parties to blame their losses on “fraud.”

Trump, DeSantis, Pence and the GOP

My new @MULawPoll national release is out. Link at end of this post. Here I want to highlight what I think are the most informative bits. Others have tweeted the toplines for DeSantis v Biden and Trump v Biden but the goal isn’t 2024 but the GOP today.

Trump remains very popular w Republicans, 74% fav, 25% unfav. That is formidable support. DeSantis, not nearly so well known is 52%-11% w Reps but 38% haven’t heard enough. Pence at 59-31 is net positive but only 10% lack an opinion. DeSantis at 5-1 fav, Trump 3-1, Pence 2-1.

Republican support for a Trump run in 2024 is 63%, w 37% not wanting him to run. So 74% are fav to Trump, and a smaller 63% want him to run. Still a solid majority but some hesitancy about a 2024 rerun even among those favorable to him.

Trump has defined doubts about the accuracy of the 2020 vote for Republicans, and 73% say they are not confident in the election (and 71% of those who lean Rep). That issue defines Trump in the party, and the 1 in 4 Reps who disagree are quite unfavorable to Trump.

Favorability to Trump w Reps + Rep leaners is 29% among those confident in the vote, and 88% among the not confident. For Pence, there is no relationship at all between confidence & favs. DeSantis fav is more tied to confidence, but lots of “confidents” are DK for him.

Clearly Trump retains a very strong base of support w Republican voters, who also overwhelmingly adopt his claims about the 2020 election and are very favorable toward him. But support for a rematch with Biden is lower than his fav rating.

Let’s turn back to the head to heads v Biden, but look at the party crosstab. Trump gets 77% of Rep votes, 73% of leaners. DeSantis gets 81% of Reps and 75% of leaners. Trump might well win a primary battle, but GOP voters would support DeSantis at least as much as Trump v Biden.

Takeaway: Trump remains the dominate figure in the GOP, but at least one alternative, DeSantis, performs as well v Biden, gains as much support w GOP and has a better fav-to-unfav ratio in GOP as Trump (But lots of DK) It is a long time to 2024, but how GOP divides sets the stage.

Links to full survey release from @mulawpoll national survey of adults, Jan 10-21, 2022.

Full release: https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/06_SCNationalIssuesPressRelease.pdf

Toplines, Crosstabs etc: https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2022/01/27/detailed-results-of-the-marquette-law-school-supreme-court-poll-january-10-21-2022/

Issue Polling… some evidence

A question from @Rufus_GB about the validity of issue polling is linked below.

Here is more of an answer than may have been wished for, largely via links to more thorough analysis than Tweets provide.

I question the value of issue polling, in general, because the results can vary so wildly based on the wording of the question. On Roe, it’s that issue plus the fact that I don’t believe many (most?) Americans understand what Roe actually does/doesn’t do. Thoughts?— Rufus (@Rufus_GB) December 7, 2021

On abortion, wording matters but don’t confound wording with substantively different aspects of the issue. If we ask about “for any reason” or about “serious defect” that is not just wording but different circumstances. Decades of work show the circumstances matter a lot.

See this review of abortion polling since 1972 by @pbump in @washingtonpost

The GSS has asked same questions since then, with 7 different circumstances. There are clear consistent differences. That is much more revealing than just “wording”. From @pbump article:

In my @MULawPoll Supreme Court surveys in Sept. & Nov. 71% of those with an opinion oppose striking down Roe, 29% favor striking it down. But 54% would uphold the 15 week ban in Dobbs, 46% oppose, again of those w an opinion.

Those are substantive differences and make sense.

Here is my analysis of that, including a look at who doesn’t have opinions on the abortion questions. Not all do, and that is also important for understanding issue polls.

The fact that people respond to issue polls differently when the questions raise different aspects of an issue seems an obvious strength of issue polling– circumstances matter, and respondents are sensitive to those circumstances.

If people responded the same way regardless of the circumstances presented in the question, we’d suspect they weren’t paying attention!

There has been a number of recent articles claiming that issue polls are “folly” or that they have seriously missed on state referenda. (And they have missed on some referenda, but the big misses are highlighted and better performance is ignored.)

The Sweep: The Folly of Issue Polling

There are important criticisms: public awareness of issues & information about the issues may be limited. Folks will give an answer but it may not mean much to them. Politicians don’t just “do what the majority wants” so policy doesn’t follow the polls very closely or quickly.

Some might say policy doesn’t mirror opinion polls, and blame polls. I’d think the elected officials might share the blame. They do respond to public opinion sometimes, but they are also responsive to interest groups and donors issue preferences. If they don’t adopt policy in line with public majorities, I’d look at those other influences for part of the story,

Issue polls often don’t have an objective “right answer.” That is what elections do for horse race polls: we know the final answer. But there isn’t a “true” measure of presidential approval or support for an issue. So how do we know?

Referenda provide a chance to measure issues

The most comprehensive analysis of referenda voting and polls was presented at AAPOR in May 2021 by @jon_m_rob @cwarshaw and @johnmsides

60 years of referenda and polling and accuracy and errros, w/o cherry picking.

See the full slide deck here.

The fit of outcomes to polls is pretty good, but there are also some systematic errors: more popular issues underperform on referenda, and more unpopular ones overperform, doing better than expected.

The fit varies across issues, but the relationship of polls to outcomes are positive in almost all issues.

Read the full set of slides. They highlight some of the criticism but provide the most comprehensive analysis of issue polls when we have an objective standard for accuracy. The results are pretty encouraging for issue polling’s relevance.

Issue polling may be criticized but those with policy interests use them. In the absence of public issue polls, the interest groups would know what they show but the public wouldn’t. That seems a good reason to have public issue polling.

There are plenty of examples. Here is one from the right, from HeritageAction.

Pew did a careful look at how much issue polls might be affected by the type of errors we see in election (horserace) polls. Probably not by very much.

Here is the Pew analysis.

Fivethirtyeight.com also looked at issue polls: Their analysis is here.

An election poll off by 6 points is a big miss & we saw a number of those in 2016 & 2020. But issues are not horseraces. If an issue poll shows a 6 point difference between pro- and anti-sides, 53-47, we’d characterize that as “closely divided opinion.” If it shows 66% in favor to 34% against, a 6 point error wouldn’t matter much. The balance of opinion would be clear regardless. Also, issue preference is not the same as intensity so good issue polling analysis needs to look at whether the issue has a demonstrable impact on other things like vote, or turnout, or if the issue dominates all others for some respondents. Plenty of issues have big majorities by low intensity or impact.

There are good reasons to be careful about interpreting issue polls. But the outright rejection of them is not grounded in empirical research. I suspect it is to deny that “my side” is ever in the minority. It is especially in the interest of interest groups to dismiss them, even as they rely on them.

Bob Dole as seen in the polls

Sen. Bob Dole died today. Many posts and stories about his life and service to the country.

My small addition is this look at his career in the eyes of public opinion.

In 3 parts. First his full career as captured by national favorable-unfavorable polls.

Most polls were conducted surrounding his presidential run in 1994-1996.

The two early lows reflect VP nominee in 1976 where he was the voice of GOP attacks.

Note also the rise in the few polls post-1996. 2003 is the last national poll I have for him.

Here I zoom in on the 1995-1997 period when there are the most polls. I also increase the sensitivity of the trend line to pick up some of the shorter term changes.

In the densest period of polls you can see some fluctuation but pretty limited range during the 1996 campaign.

Here I zoom in again on 1996 and increase the sensitivity of the trend line a little more. The oscillation in Aug to Nov is still clear.

The net fav trend remained positive, though a fair number of individual polls were net negative.

Those not of a “certain age” may not know that Dole resigned from the Senate while seeking the Presidency on June 11, 1996. There seems to be a short term rise in net favorable at that point, but it quickly dissipates.

Bob Dole was at times highly partisan, at other times a bipartisan partner on big policy accomplishments. Some loved him and some loathed him, and many were more balanced. His life of service, and sacrifice, was admirable. I wish we had more like him.

Who *doesn’t* have an opinion about Roe v Wade?

Given its prominence in political and legal debate for nearly 50 years, you might think everyone has an opinion about Roe v Wade. But there is variation in opinion holding that may surprise you.

Most telephone surveys ask about Roe without offering a “Don’t know” option, though if the respondent says “I don’t know” or “I haven’t thought about it” that is recorded. Typically this produces around 7-10% who volunteer that they don’t have an opinion. See examples here:

Academics have had a long running debate over whether surveys should explicitly offer “or haven’t you thought much about this?” as part of the question. Doing so substantially increases the percent who say they haven’t thought about an issue.

Despite more “don’t knows” when offered explicitly, the balance of opinion among those with an opinion doesn’t seem to vary with or without the DK option A debate remains if people have real opinions but opt out via DK or if when pushed will give answers but w weak opinions.

Online surveys present a new challenge. There is no way to “volunteer” a don’t know except to skip the item, which very few do. So should you offer DK explicitly and get more, or not offer it and get very few without an opinion?

In my @MULawPoll national Supreme Court Surveys we ask about a variety of Court cases. But obviously most people don’t follow the Court in detail so I believe we must explicitly offer “or haven’t you heard enough about this?” Doing so produces some 25-30% w/o an opinion on most cases.

So is the “haven’t heard enough/Don’t know” rate really around 10% or really around 30%? Clearly wording makes a big difference, but I think it pretty clear those who opt for “haven’t heard enough” are less engaged on an issue than those who give an opinion.

What is worth looking at here is not the absolute level of “haven’t heard” but how it varies across the population. The invitation to say haven’t heard opens this door to seeing how opinion holding varies, and at the very least shows those more and less engaged with the issue.

Here is opinion on overturning Roe, with 30.6% saying they “haven’t heard at all” or “haven’t heard enough” about the case. Of those WITH an option, 71% would uphold and 29% would strike down.

But look at who is more likely to say they haven’t heard enough and who is more likley to say they have an opinion.

To my surprise, it is the OLD who are more likely to have an option. The young at twice as likely to say haven’t heard enough.

I wonder if the intense battles over abortion in the 1970s-80s were seared into the political makeup of folks now in their 60s and up in a way that the issue simply hasn’t been for those in younger ages. A less interesting answer is the young simply pay less attention.

Other differences are more intuitive.

Ideological moderats are much more likely to say “haven’t heard” than those towards the endpoints of ideology.

But there is interesting asymmetry here with the left more engaged than the right.

Independents are more likely to say not heard than partisans, but as with ideology the assymetry shows Democrats more likely to have an opinion than Republicans. The salience of Texas SB8 as well as Dobbs has probably boosted Dem concern generally.

There is a small difference between born again Christians and all other respondents, but perhaps a surprise that slightly more born again folks say they haven’t heard enough about Roe.

White respondents are a bit less likely to say “haven’t heard” than are other racial and ethnic group members.

And finally, what about gender?

Hardly any difference in opinion holding.

To return to the academic literature on whether to offer a don’t know/haven’t heard or not, there is good evidence that pushing people to respond produces similar results and statistical structure as we see among those who offer opinions when DK is an offered option.

The variation we see in choosing “haven’t heard” also reflects willingness to respond beyond simply not having thought. Good work shows this general reluctance is part of the issue of non-response as well.

Those with intense positions on abortion naturally assume that most people are similarly intense. The results here show we should be cautious in assuming “everyone” has an opinion on Roe (or other issues.) And the variation in opinion holding is interesting, sometimes surprising.

Here is the wording we use for this item with all the response categories.

A followup on age: Older respondents are also more likely to have an opinion on a case concerning the 2nd Amendment and the right to carry a gun outside the home. It may be that younger people pay less attention to issues before the Court in general, and so the age effect on opinion holding on Roe may not be the generational difference I suggest above, but simply variation in attention to the Court.

However, this logit model of saying “haven’t heard” includes controls for education and voter turnout in 2020, with age continuing to play a role. That doesn’t prove it is socialization behind the effect, but does show that age effects remain statistically significant even when a number of other variables are included in the model.

Abortion cases, the Court and public opinion

On Dec. 1, 2021 the US Supreme Court heard arguments on Dobbs, the case challenging Mississippi’s ban on abortions after 15 weeks, and arguments to use the case to strike down Roe v Wade’s protection of abortion rights.

Some polling here.

The @MULawPoll national Supreme Court Survey asked in September and in November about both cases. I combine the data here as opinion did not change significantly between the two surveys.

We offer respondents the option to say “haven’t heard anything” or “haven’t heard enough” and about 30% pick that for each question (30.6% missing in table are the not heard.)

For Roe, of those with an opinion, 71% say the court should uphold Roe, 29% say strike it down.

There is more support, and a close division, on whether the Court should uphold Mississippi’s 15 week ban in Dobbs. 28% lack an opinion (missing).

Of those with an opinion on Dobbs, 54% would uphold the 15 week ban and 46% would strike down the law.

Looking an the joint response, of those w/ an opinion about both cases, half, 49.6%, would uphold Roe and strike down Dobbs. 29% would overturn Roe and uphold Dobbs

But 19% want to see Roe remain in effect yet accept greater limitations on abortion rights w Dobbs 15 week ban. Less than 3% would strike down both Roe and Dobbs.

The willingness to support Roe but accept restrictions has been common in polls about abortion. A majority of respondents say either “legal in most circumstances” or “illegal in most” but not legal or illegal in all cases.

Pew national survey data from May 2021 is typical of responses to this question. About 60% are in the “most but not all” categories, with 25% legal in all cases and 13% saying illegal in all cases.

As for what structures opinions about Roe and about Dobbs in my @MULawPoll national surveys, it is ideology that has the strongest effect, with party a bit less strong.

This chart shows the estimated probability of favoring overturning Roe and of upholding Dobbs by ideology.

The green line shows that across ideology people are less likely to say Roe should be overturned while the higher purple line shows the greater probability they favor upholding Dobbs. Ideology has a strong effect on both but upholding Dobbs has more support than striking Roe.

A similar pattern holds across partisanship, though the slopes are less steep than for ideology.

The contrast between Dems vs Reps and for very liberal vs very conservative is quite sharp in both charts.

Finally, here are multivariate models for opinion on striking down Roe and for upholding Dobbs. Education plays more of a role in structuring Dobbs but not for opinion on Roe. Born again Christians are more opposed to Roe and in favor of Dobbs, as one would expect.

Roe Model:

Dobbs Model:

The effects of race and marital status vary between the two cases, while gender is not statistically significant in either model, nor is age.

Our divisions over abortion are unlikely to, shall I say will not, go away regardless of how the Court rules. How much the ruling changes the status quo, and what new political movements it sets in motion, will be a topic for next summer and beyond as the Court’s decision sinks in.

Parties, partisans & perceptions: liberal-conservative locations 1972-2020

I’ve seen a cartoon going around showing the liberal-conservative ideology of the self and Dem and Rep parties. In the cartoon, the self and Rep party stay fixed while the Dem party moves far to the left. It is an effective graphic & rhetoric but how does it fit with data?

The American National Election Studies (ANES) has measured ideology of self & both parties on a 7-point scale since 1972. The points are labelled “extremely liberal”, “liberal”, “slightly liberal”, “moderate”, “slightly conservative”, “conservative” and “extremely conservative”.

How have ideological self-perceptions & party perceptions changed over time? Here are the means from 1972 to 2020. A mean of 4 is “moderate”. Until 2000 both parties were a point or so away from 4, Dems a little closer to 4 than Reps. Since 2000 both have moved out from the center.

In 2020 the Dem party was just over 1.5 points to the left of 4 and the Rep party was just over 1.5 points to the right of 4. Voters self-location has hardly moved, slightly right of center. The parties remain roughly symmetric though further left or right.

But what about how partisans see themselves, their party and the other party? Here self and own party match closely, with the other party far away. Dems see themselves & the party as more moderate than does the general public, 1 point or less to the left.

Dems used to see themselves as quite moderate, less than half a point to the left but have drifted left since 1998 so they now see themselves as 1 point to the left.

Dems also see the Rep party about where the general public sees it, just over 1.5 points to the right of center. How do Republicans see themselves & the parties? Next tweet please.

Republicans see themselves & their party as close together, and again about 1.5 points to the right, as does the general public. But they see the Dem party as considerably further to the left than does the general public, over 2 points to the left of center.

Reps see themselves & their party drifting right from 1 point right of center in 1992 to just over 1.5 to the right now.

Dems think themselves more moderate & their party more moderate than the general public does. They don’t push Rep party to the right, however. Reps put themselves & their party about where the public sees the GOP but perceive the Dem party much further to left than general public.

How about independents? they put themselves very close to the moderate center, and perceive each party about where the general public does, and roughly symmetrically, each party now about 1.5 points to left or right of center.

So what about that cartoon that’s been going around Twitter? It doesn’t reflect how the general public perceives the parties over time. The public sees both parties moving a bit out from the center over the last 20 years, but equally so.

But the cartoon does reflect the perceptions of Republicans of the Dem party pushing it well to the left of where the general public, or independents, sees it.

Data from American National Election Studies (ANES) 1952-2016 cumulative data file and ANES 2020 survey. There have been mode changes in recent years, with 2020 primarily conducted by web, with a mix in 2016. I’ve ignored these issues in the analysis here. Those failing to place themselves or the parties on the liberal conservative scale are set to missing and excluded from the analysis.

ANES website: https://electionstudies.org