Tag Archives: Trump

Public opinion favors Supreme Court decision striking down Trump tariffs

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In Jan. 63% said Court should rule against Trump, including 33% of Republicans

On Feb. 20 the United State Supreme Court ruled against President Trump’s authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. The case is Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump.

Public views of the case have been consistently in favor of upholding limits on the tariff authority since the Marquette Law School national poll first asked about this case in September. The table shows opinion over three national surveys.

The partisan divide on the tariff case is somewhat less stark than on many issues, with a significant minority of Republicans opposing the president’s position. A third of Republicans in the January poll wanted the Court to strike down the tariffs, an increase from 26% in November. More than two-thirds of independents favored overturning Trump’s use of tariffs, as did an overwhelming 92% of Democrats.

Approval of Trump’s handling of tariffs has consistently been below his overall approval rating in Marquette Law School national polls, with approval on tariffs below 40% in each of five polls since May 2025. In January, 26% of Republicans disapproved of Trump’s handling of tariffs, as did 71% of independents and 95% of Democrats.

A majority of the public, 56% say that tariffs hurt the U.S. economy, while 30% think they help the economy and 14% say tariffs don’t make much difference. Views of the effect of tariffs are related to opinion of how the Court should rule, as shown in the table below. Those who think tariffs help the economy are in favor of overturning the limits on the president’s authority, 77%, though even among this group more than one-in-five think the president’s authority should be limited, 23%. Among those who say tariffs harm the economy, 89% think the Court should limit presidential authority. Opinion is evenly divided among those who say tariffs don’t make much difference.

The Court and the President

A large majority of adults believe that the president must obey a Supreme Court decision, 82% with 17% who say the president can ignore a decision with which he disagrees. These views have been quite stable in 10 Marquette polls since 2019, never dipping below 76% saying the president must obey the Court, and not below 83% since Jan. 2025.

This belief in the authority of the Court is not a partisan matter. Among Republicans 76% say the president must obey the Court, as do 79% of independents and 90% of Democrats.

In January, a majority, 57% said the Court was going out of it’s way to avoid ruling against Trump, while 43% said the Court was not doing so. Among Republicans 34% thought the Court was avoiding ruling against Trump, as did 59% of independents and 78% of Democrats.

Approval of the Supreme Court

Approval of the U.S. Supreme Court has fallen since September, from 50% to 44% in January. Approval fell sharply in 2022 following the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision which overturned abortion rights established in Roe v. Wade. Net approval, the percentage approval minus disapproval, remained negative throughout the remainder of 2022 and through 2024. In January 2025 net approval moved up into positive territory before turning down in July. The table shows approval of the Court since September 2020.

About the Marquette Law School Poll

The survey was conducted Jan. 21-28, 2026, interviewing 1003 adults nationwide, with a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points.

Interviews were conducted using the SSRS Opinion Panel, a national probability sample with interviews conducted online. The detailed methodology statement, survey instrument, topline results, and crosstabs for this release are available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/category/results-and-data/

1 year of Trump 2.0

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Trump’s approval is bad enough. No need to exaggerate.

It’s the one year mark of Trump’s second term and everyone is posting year in review pieces. Here is mine.

The chart shows how all presidents in the polling era have varied in approval over their entire terms, plus year 1 of Trump 2.0. The boxes cover the middle 50% of all polls, and the “whiskers” extend out to their all time highs and lows of approval in Gallup polls. The bar in the box is the median poll, the 50th percentile. I stick to Gallup for consistency over time and for their unmatched historical depth.

What jumps out is the approval ratings of the last four presidents have varied considerably less than those of their predecessors. Trump 1.0 has the least variation (smallest standard deviation) of any of the other 14 presidents, with 2.0 the second smallest, so far. Both Obama and Biden varied a little more, but considerably less than either Bushes, Clinton, or Reagan. Trump’s median in 1.0 ties with Truman for the lowest median approval, 39%. So far, Trump 2.0 is the 3rd lowest, at 40.5%. (Truman, by the way, set the record for all time low at 22%. Trump hasn’t come close, with a low of 33%, so far.)

This shrinkage of variation in approval is one consequence of polarization, leading the out-party since George W. Bush’s 2nd term to consistently give approval ratings below 10%, while the in-party gives high approval, typically in the 80s, no matter what. The poor independents are left to shift the balance a bit between two largely unmovable partisan camps. V.O. Key famously said voters were “a rational god of vengeance and reward”, but that breaks down when one side will never reward good performance and the other will never condemn bad outcomes. Trump may never approach the lows of Truman, Nixon, Carter or both Bushes, all of whom had low points in the 20s. But he will never approach the highs of Obama, Clinton or Reagan either.

Here is a more conventional look at approval of each of the elected presidents from the polling era. The trends here are smoothed trend estimates. Gallup now polls approval only once a month, so Trump 2.0 is not smoothed, just the raw polls. Also, Gallup hasn’t released the January results, so December is the most recent reading.

Trump 2.0 has run a little better than 1.0 in Gallup’s data. The December point at 36% is a bit of an outlier. The major polling averages put Trump’s approval between 40% and 42% as of Jan. 20, 2026.

An alternate view breaks out each president for readability. Here I’m showing raw poll results with no smoothing.

Here is my polling average for all Trump polls in 2025. My trend estimate is 41.4% approval. For comparison, FiftyPlusOne.news has it at 40.0%, SilverBulletin is 42.0%, NYTimes is 42.0% and RealClearPolitics is 42.4%.

You will note dips below the general downward trend in April after the tariff announcement, then a little recovery after backing off those original “liberation day” tariffs. Then the downward trend returns, until another dip during and after the government shutdown in October and November. A bit of a rise in early December after which the general downtrend returns. This is steady, nearly linear, decline with a couple of short-term wiggles.

I have a beef with headlines that shout “Trump at all time low” or “Approval cratering.” Those either cherry pick particularly low polls, or exaggerate small departures from the general downward trend. Trump’s approval is bad enough. Historically low for other presidents at the end of one year. But the message I read in this trend is a steady decline in approval for an unpopular president, signaling a challenging midterm, and with no sustained upturn in the last 12 months. No need to exaggerate the problems this poses for the White House or Republicans generally.

All or nothing on liking Trump?

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After a year in office, opinions about Donald Trump are a bit more complicated than merely “approve” or “disapprove.” Those who disapprove find almost nothing to like, but those who approve are likely to express mixed feelings, reporting things they dislike even if on balance they approve of the job he is doing as president.

For over a year my Marquette Law School Poll national surveys have asked a pair of open-ended questions in each poll:

What do you like about Donald Trump?

and

What do you dislike about Donald Trump?

Respondents can write as much or as little as they wish. The record is over 900 words. Much more common than full op-ed length answers are “everything” and “nothing”, in either order.

The pure-admiration and pure-hate answers can be short or long, but each give insights into how people think about Trump. Still, a substantial number of people have mixed feelings. Among Trump supporters it is common to see approval of his actions or policies coupled with disliking “how he talks” or “how he deals with people” or “the Epstein files.” It is less common to find those who disapprove of Trump seeing anything to like. If the substance of the dislikes goes to his policies then we see fewer finding positive things as well.

In a year of polling these questions, we have seen a notable trend. Respondents with mixed feelings, giving both likes and dislikes, have declined from 51% to 44%, while those who don’t like anything have climbed from 35% to 42%. And the true Trump fans, who only find something to like and nothing to dislike, have slightly declined from a high of 14% to 10%.

This gives a different perspective on Trump’s approval ratings, which have held between 40% and 42% in the current polling averages, down from the start of the second term but hardly “collapsing” as some suggest.

Among those who disapprove, few exhibit mixed feelings in the open-ended responses. They see nothing positive and vary primarily in the length and detail of their vitriol. The past year has grown this group of people, irreconcilably opposed to Trump.

We often think Trump’s base is rock solid. Approval among Republicans remains around 85% a year into Trump 2.0. But the open-ended responses suggest a more complicated story. Among his supporters, those who approve of the job he is doing, the substantial majority have mixed feelings in the open-ended answers. This does not forecast a collapse of his approval, but it does remind us that the caricature of his base as mindlessly in love is not accurate. So far, they like more than they dislike. But it is not because they are blind to the president’s shortcomings.

Trump approval through Nov. 2025

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President Trump’s approval has declined in October and November, after holding pretty steady July-Sept. There was steady decline Jan-Mar, then a sharper fall after announcing tariffs in April. Approval rose in May after backing off on tariffs. Then a small decline in June. Current decline is across most pollsters.

Gallup November Trump approval: 36% approve, 60% disapprove, a 5 point drop in approval and 6 point increase in disapproval since Oct. Several points below my approval trend across all polls which puts approval at 40.5%, disapproval at 56.1%

Here is Gallup approval history since FDR

The GOP race that wasn’t

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A year ago there seemed to be a serious threat to Trump in the GOP. His name was DeSantis. 

In March 2023, DeSantis won 35% to Trump’s 40% of GOP registered voters. (Haley was at 5%)

But DeSantis only lost ground through the year, while Trump gained.

Still, Trump didn’t move much past 50% until after Jan. 2024 once the primary process began.

As of Feb 5-15, 2024, pre-South Carolina primary, Trump holds 73% nationally to Haley’s 15% and DeSantis is no longer a candidate.

Trump rose modestly in the spring, then more in the fall, with a big jump by February. Haley was slow to rise, then bumped up in Nov. and Feb., but to only 15%.

The race that could have been.

DeSantis not only started strong but was a threat to Trump from within the Trump wing of the party. In March 2023 DeSantis got 32% among Reps *favorable* to Trump, plus 45% among those unfavorable to Trump. 

Had DeSantis been able to expand that incursion into Trump land this could have been a real race.  He did not. Instead DeSantis’s support fell across both Trump-favorable and Trump-unfavorable Republicans. Whether because of Trump’s effective attacks on DeSantis or the failures of DeSantis, the race that could have been was not.

Nikki Haley instead is the last contender standing against Trump, and yet she fails to reach even 20% support. She never was a contender with those who like Trump, not reaching even 6% among the Trump-favorable Republicans. But she has captured the wing of the GOP that does not like Trump, winning 65% of those Republicans.

For her, the tragedy is that nothing in the campaign succeeded in increasing the share of those unfavorable to Trump. Instead the opposite occurred, Trump’s favorability hovered around 70% until July, then rose to 80% in Sept. and stands at 84% in February.

As Haley has won an increasing share, now 2/3rds, of Republicans unfavorable to Trump, that pool has declined by half, from 30% to 16%. Even taking all of this smaller pool cannot make an alternative to Trump competitive in the primaries. 

A year ago, 30% of Republicans were unfavorable to Trump, and DeSantis was eating into Trump-favorable Republicans. His effort failed. Haley has never won more than negligible support from the Trump-favorables, and even as she has consolidated the support of Trump-unfavorable Republicans, that group has been shrinking, to now less than one in five Republicans.

In March 2023 the GOP had a significant 30% who did not like Trump and a majority who supported someone else or were undecided. That moment has passed.

Trump indictments, revisited

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In my previous post I argued that the indictments of former president Donald Trump did not in fact boost his standing with voters, despite the often repeated claim that they did.

Two folks I respect pushed back on the NY indictment, though agreeing the others had no effect. Here I respond, and agree in part. In any case, I think this shows a positive discussion is possible over such matters! My bottom line is Trump may have gained support in the GOP primary following the NY indictment. But I don’t find evidence of any gain in overall favorability with all registered voters. My new analysis (thanks to Philip and Sam) finds some evidence that the Florida indictment lowered his support and favorability, something I did not mention in my original post..

Since my original post, Philip Bump at The Washington Post published a nice story looking at my claim, and concluding there was in fact a boost from the first indictment in New York but agreeing there were no boosts from the subsequent indictments. See his piece here. (Link should not be paywalled.)

Sam Wang posted a similar point on Bluesky (sorry, don’t know how to copy a link to that)

Let’s start with the strong case, a rise in Trump GOP primary support following the NY indictment. Here is Trump’s percentage i.n GOP primary polls before and after each indictment. (I’ve updated the most recent polls since my original post, which affects only the post-GA data.)

We all agree the post-New York support is higher than pre-indictment. The only disagreement is that there was a trend of rising Trump primary support before the indictment and that rise continued for over a month after the indictment. My original post claimed the post-NY increase was primary due to the pre-existing trend, rather than an indictment effect. Bump and Wang disagree and see an indictment effect. Here is the chart with the full trend.

The red line shows the overall trend across all polls, the dots are individual polls. The high-frequency polls from YouGov (85 in all) make up the dense set of dots mostly above the red trend line. Those dense dots DO show a bump up immediately after the NY indictment. In my original post I discounted that, thinking the red line was increasing before and after and I gave more weight to that. But I discounted the dense set of polls that do rise. Wang raises the point but Bump dives into this and does more substantial analysis that I now think supports a NY indictment effect.

Here are my finding on this, in response to their points, and finding myself now agreeing there was an independent effect of the NY indictment even considering the trend before and after.

I fit several models, but here are the two that make me conclude NY had an effect. The dependent variable is Trump percent in primary polls. You do NOT want to use his margin over DeSantis because the latter has been declining steadily, so the margin confounds Trump support with DeSantis’ weakening. As you can see in the chart, Trump has been pretty flat since mid-May.

The models I fit are a polynomial in time, which allows for the curve of the support trend, which rises, then flattens. Obviously not a constant linear trend. I fit one quadratic and one cubic fit (the latter probably overfitting the trend but our focus in on the coefficients for the indictments.)

The first model is the quadratic trend.

The NY coefficient is a 4.12 percentage point increase in Trump support after the indictment, and is a statistically significant effect. So this agrees with Bump and Wang, and shows I dismissed this effect too quickly.

The model also suggests that the Florida indictment may have lowered Trump’s support by 2.8 points, a marginally statistically significant result. There is no evidence that DC or GA indictments changed his support. Both have negative but non-significant estimates.

An issue is whether the quadratic trend is sufficient to capture the trend over time, independent of the indictments. As a check I reestimate the model with a cubic in time. That model is shown next.

The NY effect here is a 4.8 point increase, which remains statistically significant. The Florida effect remains negative but falls short of statistical significance. So either way, the NY indictment seems to have boosted Trump with GOP primary voters over and above the trend leading up to the indictment.

On the other hand, Trump’s favorability ratings with all registered voters don’t seem to have gone up with NY, but may have declined slightly with the FL indictment.

Here the trend is nearly flat since January, so I estimate one model that is linear in time, and one that is quadratic as a robustness check. The linear time model is

The time trend is virtually flat, with no evidence of a NY indictment effect. However, the Florida indictment seems to have lowered favorability by 3.6 points.

Using a quadratic in time is similar:

The Florida estimate is a 3.8 point decrease in favorability, and marginally significant, with no evidence for a more complicated time trend. As a final check I ran a cubic time trend with the FL coefficient of -3.5, but p=.056 so not as convincing an effect.

Bottom line is the NY indictment didn’t show any evidence of boosting Trump’s favorability among all registered voters, but it does seem to have improved his standing in the GOP primary by 4.1 to 4.8 points depending on the model.

My thanks to Philip and Sam for pushing this point and adding to the analysis.

Trump polling and his indictments

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To cut to the chase, the indictments of Donald Trump have not boosted him in the polls, either for favorability or for his support in the GOP primary. This claim keeps being repeated as if the data support it. It does not.

Net favorability nationally

Trump’s net favorability (percent favorable minus percent unfavorable) inched up 1.5-2 points following the first indictment in New York on March 30, 2023, from a median of -14.0 to -12.5, and mean of -14.2 to -12.2. This is the only period of a (slight) improvement compared to the pre-indictment period (Jan. 1 to Mar. 29), Following the Florida indictment the median fell to -18, then -19 after the DC indictment and rose -17.5 after Georgia. (Table of full results below.)

The net favorability is for the national population, so perhaps Trump gained substantially among Republican voters, but not the full population. His support in the GOP primary vote gives us that test.

Trump GOP Primary support

Compared to pre-indictment, Trump did have higher support among Republicans in the primary vote following the New York indictment, a median of 49% prior to the NY indictment and 57% after NY but before Florida. There was no further change after Florida (still 57%), or after DC (still 57%.) After the Georgia indictment the median is 58%. If there was in indictment effect boost at all (see below for why you should doubt that) it was over by the Florida documents case indictment.

The remaining doubt about indictment effects is provided by the trend chart below. Trump’s support for the nomination had been rising steadily since Jan. 1 through the spring. It rose at the same rate following the New York indictment as it had been rising prior to the indictment. The trend levels off in early May, a month after the NY indictment and about a month before the Florida indictment. Since mid-may there has been very little trend in Trump’s primary vote. (Each point in the chart is a national poll and the red line is a local regression trend estimate.) Trump’s margin over DeSantis has continued to climb but that is due entirely to DeSantis’ collapse in the polls, not to any gains by Trump since May. Trump’s current 58% support is more than enough to win the nomination. But it hasn’t been increasing for four months.

There are reports of surges in donations following the indictments. But if so, that hasn’t been reflected in the polling for either favorability or for GOP primary support.

The table below shows the median, mean and number of national polls used in the charts above. Note there are only 4 favorability polls completed between the DC and GA indictments, though there were 16 primary polls in the same interval.

“Indictments help Trump” is folklore that needs to be corrected. There is no polling evidence the indictments help, or hurt, Trump. Any effect of criminal trials remains to be seen.

Reference

Trump and Wisconsin Republicans

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First Choice for Nominee

Using Republicans and independents who lean Republicans, Trump gets 31% and DeSantis gets 30%, a surprisingly close race. Trump leads by considerably more in other states and in national polls. What’s going on in my June Wisconsin @MULawPoll?

One might ask if independents who lean Republican are distorting this. But no. Among “pure” Republicans, Trump gets 35% and DeSantis gets 34%. Among independents who lean Republican, there are more other and undecided choices but the margin is not much changed: Trump gets 23% and DeSantis 25%.

So the close first choice race is not because of including leaners: it is a 1 point Trump margin without leaners too. (Scroll right for full table)

GroupChris ChristieRon DeSantisLarry ElderNikki HaleyAsa HutchinsonMike PenceVivek RamaswamyTim ScottDonald TrumpHaven’t decided
All Rep+Leaners1300306353121
Rep1340105243518
Lean Rep1251617462327

Head-to-head second choice

DeSantis picks up a big margin in the head-to-head second choice question, DeSantis 57% to 41% for Trump. Who moves from the first choice?

Those who pick another named Republican candidate (other than DeSantis or Trump) break 74-25 for DeSantis on the 2nd choice. And the undecided on first choice break 65-28 for DeSantis. See Table 2.

Trump is a lot of Republican’s first choice, but barely a quarter switch to him as their 2nd choice.

1st choiceDonald TrumpRon DeSantisDon’t know
DeSantis1981
Trump9820
Other candidates25741
Undecided28657

Is this because Republicans have turned against Trump?

Despite getting just 31% of first choice votes, Wisconsin Republicans still like Trump. Of all Reps and leaners, Trump favorability is 68% and unfavorable is 30% with a tiny 2% who say they haven’t heard enough about him.

Favorability is a shade higher with pure Reps, 72%, and a good bit lower, though still net positive at 60%, among leaners. Those ratings are shown in Table 3 (a). In October 2022, Trump was 78% favorable among Reps and 62% favorable among leaners, so a little decline with both, but not massive change.

DeSantis favorabiity is shown in Table 3 (b). He is 1 point behind Trump overall, 2 points above Trump on favorable with pure Republicans, and 7 points below Trump among leaners, but with much more haven’t heard enough and less unfavorable.

So there may be a small recent decline in Trump’s favorable ratings with Reps and with leaners, it isn’t a lot compared to where he was in October 2022.

Table 3: Favorability by Rep and Lean Rep Party ID

GroupFavorableUnfavorableHaven’t heard enough
All Rep+Leaners68302
Rep72253
Lean Rep60390

GroupFavorableUnfavorableHaven’t heard enough
All Rep+Leaners671420
Rep741016
Lean Rep532126

Well, did they just not vote for him in 2020?

Maybe these are somehow less Trump supportive Reps than they should be.

Asked to recall their vote in 2020, 95% of Reps say they voted for Trump, as do 79% of the leaners. In our late October 2020 poll, 90% of Reps and 79% of leaners said they were voting for Trump. This is not a peculiarly anti-Trump sample of Republicans.

Table 4: 2020 vote recall by party id, and Oct. 2020 pre-election vote

GroupDonald TrumpJoe BidenSomeone else
All Rep+Leaners9055
Rep9541
Lean Rep79713

GroupDonald TrumpJoe BidenJo Jorgensen
All Rep+Leaners8673
Rep9061
Lean Rep7986

Maybe they just aren’t as into you as they once were

There is a clear long term change in GOP views of Trump in Wisconsin since 2020. While he retains a core of vigorous supporters, Republicans and leaners do not have as favorable a view of Trump as they did in 2020. Table 5 shows this trend since January of 2020 until June of 2023.

Poll datesFavorableUnfavorableHaven’t heard enoughDon’t know
1/8-12/20831601
2/19-23/20871011
3/24-29/20841203
5/3-7/2088911
6/14-18/20811333
8/4-9/20831412
8/30-9/3/20801531
9/30-10/4/20851321
10/21-25/20881110
8/3-8/21751833
10/26-31/21722324
2/22-27/22702135
4/19-24/22682434
6/14-20/22751933
8/10-15/22712125
9/6-11/22722404
10/3-9/22702226
10/24-11/1/22721726
6/8-13/23683021

For completeness, Table 6 shows the trends for pure Republicans and for leaners.

Table 6: Trump favorability, Jan. 2020-June 2023, among Replicans and leaners separately

Poll datesFavorableUnfavorableHaven’t heard enoughDon’t know
1/8-12/20871200
2/19-23/2091711
3/24-29/20881012
5/3-7/2092511
6/14-18/20841214
8/4-9/20851311
8/30-9/3/20841131
9/30-10/4/2090910
10/21-25/20891010
8/3-8/21831232
10/26-31/21771822
2/22-27/22801125
4/19-24/22731924
6/14-20/22811710
8/10-15/22771525
9/6-11/22791604
10/3-9/22781525
10/24-11/1/22781235
6/8-13/23722530
Poll datesFavorableUnfavorableHaven’t heard enoughDon’t know
1/8-12/20762211
2/19-23/20781813
3/24-29/20781705
5/3-7/20811611
6/14-18/20761761
8/4-9/20781623
8/30-9/3/20732520
9/30-10/4/20741952
10/21-25/20841410
8/3-8/21603045
10/26-31/21603126
2/22-27/22533754
4/19-24/22583542
6/14-20/22622378
8/10-15/22613316
9/6-11/22573904
10/3-9/22543527
10/24-11/1/22622618
6/8-13/23603901

Vote for Biden? Oh, goodness no.

Our GOP respondents aren’t as into Trump as in the past, but crossing over to vote for Biden remains a bridge too far. That goes for both Trump and DeSantis when matched against Biden, though DeSantis does a bit better with leaners, in Table 7.

Table 7: 2024 vote by party strength

Party stengthDonald TrumpJoe BidenHaven’t decidedDon’t knowRefused
Rep935100
Lean Rep7812613

Party stengthRon DeSantisJoe BidenHaven’t decidedDon’t knowRefused
Rep942210
Lean Rep8712200

Conclusions

Wisconsin Republicans are less attached to Trump than in 2020, are considering alternatives or are undecided, but not quick to embrace Trump if he isn’t already their 1st choice. But for the general election, they remain strongly Republican regardless of the candidates, and quite unwilling to vote for Biden.

Trump, DeSantis, Pence favorability by party ID

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With a lot of hot takes (pre-indictment) about Trump vs DeSantis, here is a “cold” take to bring some perspective on how voters have viewed each over the past 17 months. Perspective, like revenge, is a dish best served cold.

DeSantis and Trump favorable ratings by party over last 15 months (17 months for Trump). National @MULawPoll surveys of registered voters.(Trump & Pence since Nov 2021, DeSantis since Jan. 2022.)

And here are the same data in table form. (Yes, all “Table 1” because they come from separate reports.)

Who wants a rerun in 2024?

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A look at overall opinion shows that the public is not keen on either Biden or Trump running for president again in 2024. Of all registered voters interviewed in the November 2022 and January 2023 Marquette Law School Poll National surveys, 34% would like Biden to run and 29% would like Trump to run.

Among only registered voters who consider themselves Democrats or independents who lean Democrat, 49% would like Biden to run. Among registered voters who are Republican or independent but lean Republican, 53% would like Trump to run.

This even split in both parties comes despite generally favorable views of both Biden and Trump among registered voters of their party. Biden is viewed favorably by 82% of registered Democrats and Trump is viewed favorably by 68% of registered Republicans.

While Democrats are more favorable to Biden than Republicans are to Trump, there is reluctance among Democrats for a Biden run in 2024 even among those with a favorable opinion of him, 57% of whom wish him to run. Among Republicans who are favorable to Trump there is higher support for a run, 72%.

Strength of partisanship also plays a role with Democrats more supportive of a Biden candidacy than are independents who lean Democrat, and likewise for Trump among Republicans compared to independents who lean Republican.

Among all registered voters, 42% say they would like neither Biden nor Trump to run in 2024, 28% would like Biden but not Trump to run and 24% would like Trump but not Biden. And only 5% would like to see a rerun of 2024.

Methodology details: