Wisconsin Assembly Top Races in 2026

Democrats must virtually run the table of competitive races to win a majority of seats

The redistricting of 2024 created a more competitive landscape for Wisconsin Democrats in the state Assembly. However, Republicans held on to the majority in 2024, winning 54 seats to 45 for Democrats. Prior to redistricting, in 2022 Republicans held 64 seats to 35 for Democrats. The ten seat swing has put the chamber in competitive territory for the first time since 2010, but Democrats must pick up five more seats to take the majority. To do that they must virtually run the table of competitive races.

The 2024 district lines, drawn from a plan of Democratic Gov. Tony Evers, made substantial changes to the 2022 lines, which were in turn very similar to the 2011 map adopted by the Republican trifecta under Gov. Scott Walker. The new maps have a more nearly even party balance given the voting history of the districts, with a slight Republican lean. The figure shows how each of the 99 districts has voted in 13 statewide races since 2012, plus the outcome of the 2024 Assembly election. Each open circle is a statewide race and the solid dots are the 2024 Assembly vote.

Districts are ordered by the number of Democratic victories in the 14 races, and by average Democratic minus Republican margin within the number of Democratic wins. There are 38 seats that have been won only by Republicans since 2012, and 35 that only Democrats have won. The potentially competive seats that have had mixed partisan outcomes amount to 26 districts, just over a quarter of the Assembly.

These mixed outcome seats produced 16 Republican wins and 10 for Democrats in 2024 under the new maps.

The next figure zooms in on just the mixed outcome seats. The asterisks mark the 9 seats that seem to potentially be the most competitive. Challengers, and potential incumbent retirements, are not yet clear across the races, so this analysis is simply looking at the voting history in these district.

Five of the nine most competitive seats are held by Republicans, with 4 Democrats. The table shows these seats and recent outcomes, sorted by Assembly vote margin in 2024. None won by as much as 3.5 percentage points, and all five Republicans are from districts Kamala Harris won in 2024, while one Democrat’s district was won by Donald Trump. On actual vote margin, all nine won by less than 1,200 votes.

Four of the five Republicans are from districts that voted for the Democrat for president in 2024 and for governor and U.S. Senate in 2022. One Republican district voted Republican for the Senate but Democratic in the other recent races. One Democrat is from a Trump district which split the 2022 vote, Democrat for governor but Republican for Senate. The other three Democrats are from districts with consistent Democratic majorities recently.Despite their somewhat Democratic leaning districts, each of these Republicans won in 2024. The Republican with the most challenging district, Todd Novak, in fact won with the largest margin of any of these races. Novak has successfully held a Democratic leaning district under the previous district lines as well. A reminder that candidates can win even in less congenial settings.

Some of these districts have been shifting over time, putting incumbents more at risk. The next figure shows how each district has voted since 2012, with the 2024 Assembly vote highlighted for comparison.

Four of the Republican seats have an obvious shift towards the Democrats over time: the 21st-Rodriguez, the 53rd-Kaufert, the 61st-Donovan, and the 88th-Franklin. Novak’s 51st is quite Democratic but hasn’t trended up or down since 2012. Based on the statewide races and trends, Franklin has the most competitive seat, while the other four Republicans are at significant disadvantage. Yet they each outperformed their party in 2024. Franklin’s extremely close race was still slightly better than Trump’s performance.

Of the Democrats, none of the districts are trending in a Republican direction, with all moving at least somewhat more Democratic. These Democratic incumbents closely matched Harris in 2024, while Doyle in the 94th did just enough better to win despite a 2-point Trump win. Whereas the Republican incumbents all outperformed their party, the Democrats fell a bit below where the partisan trend in their districts would expect.

Given the lean and trends in the districts, these five Republicans each face uphill battles in 2026, especially if they should draw strong Democratic challengers. Their incumbency advantage will be put to the test. For the Democrats, they have lagged their party a bit but don’t face hostile partisan environments.

Why not some other races?

The other districts that have a history of mixed-party outcomes could produce some competitive races in 2026, but their partisan environments are much less likely to flip a seat. The next figure shows the other 19 seats with mixed histories. Note the vertical scale is about twice as large as the previous figure, a tip-off that these are overall much less competitive seats even if they once in a while vote for both parties in statewide races.

Only a few of these suggest close districts, and none reveal a clear mismatch of incumbent and partisan lean. The ones that bear attention include Zimmerman in the 31st, Snyder in the 85th and Moses in the 92nd. Recent elections in Zimmerman’s seat have been close, with a slight Republican advantage, one that Zimmerman overperformed a little in 2024. Snyder’s 85th has a slight trend in a Democratic direction, though recent statewide races have all be close, with Snyder overperforming a bit. The 92nd, with Moses, shows a consistently close district with no trend up or down. Close enough to be potentially competitive in 2026.

Of the Democratic incumbents in the figure, Palmeri in the 54th somewhat underperformed in a pretty solidly Democratic district that shows no signs of moving toward the GOP. Likewise, Rivera-Wagner had a closer 2024 race than partisan patterns would suggest. In both these cases the significant partisan lean of the districts make it seem unlikely these would be good Republican pick-up opportunities.

The table shows these three Republican “maybe” seats, in the same format as above for the top races. While average margins have been relatively tight, only Gov. Tony Evers has managed to eke out two Democratic wins recently, and those by tiny margins. If incumbents retire, these might be Democratic pick up opportunities, but with a need for both good candidates and favorable national and statewide forces.

Bottom line

While Democrats have a shot at the Assembly majority, to do so they need to flip five Republican seats and not lose any current Democratic seats. The five Republican incumbents in the most competitive districts could provide those seats, though Doyle’s 94th district is a tough one for Democrats to hold on to. There could potentially be a close race in the “maybe” category of districts, but they are close districts with small GOP tilts. Possible retirements and quality of challengers will also make these races more (or less) competitive. There are also national and state level forces at play which favored Democrats in the 2025 elections elsewhere in the country. In short, the Democrats need a good year to run the table in competitive districts, and Republicans have a decent chance of preventing that given their candidates’ overperformances in the 2024 Assembly races.

No second acts: Repeat performances in Wisconsin elections

Is the second time the charm?

They say there are no second acts in politics. In Wisconsin that has been the case for the last 27 years, at least when it comes to statewide contests for governor and U.S. Senate. Mandela Barnes’ entry in the 2026 governor’s race will attempt to break the dismal recent record.

Consider the examples of Tom Barrett (lost governor’s races in 2010 and 2012), Tim Michels (lost Senate race in 2004 and lost governor’s race in 2022), Russ Feingold (lost Senate races in 2010 and 2016), Eric Hovde (lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012, lost Senate race in 2024), and Mark Neumann (lost Senate race in 1998, lost GOP primary for governor in 2010 and lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012). Even Tommy Thompson, who won four races for governor, fell short 14 years later in his 2012 bid for the Senate. You have to go back to the 1970s to find a successful second act in Wisconsin statewide elections.

What does this record say about Barnes’ position in the 2026 race for governor? There are some advantages that are important. He will likely start out as the best known candidate in a field of some 7 or 8 candidates. In my Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin, Oct. 15-22, the three best known Democrats had name identification ranging from 22% (Hong) to 25% (Rodriguez) to 26% (Crowley), with the rest in the teens. Barnes was not included as he had not entered the race. At the end of his 2022 Senate race, Barnes had a name ID of 85%, though when he started that race as the sitting Lt. Governor his ID rate was 37% in Feb. 2022. There is falloff in ID between races. Barrett finished his 2010 governor’s race with 84% name recognition, which fell to 61% in Jan. 2012 at the start of the recall election. Feingold fell from 95% in 2010 to 75% in Jan. 2016.

In two recent polls that included his name (though unannounced at the time) Barnes was ahead in the Democratic primary field with 16% support in a Sept. 28-30 poll sponsored by Platform Communications and ahead with 21% in a TIPP poll conducted Nov. 17-21. In both polls all other candidates were below 10%, with a third to half of voters undecided. Those polls didn’t measure name recognition.

Barnes also has the advantage of having raised substantial money in his 2022 Senate bid, giving him a donor list to tap that none of the other candidates have.

Those are positive elements for Barnes and each gives him an initial advantage some eight months ahead of the primary.

The reason for doubt is the track record of candidates running statewide following a previous statewide loss. The second time around has not shown much improvement in general election vote percentage (though each won their second round primaries, except for Neumann).

Name ID

Repeat candidates begin their second races with lower name ID than when they finished their first race, with slippage of about 20 points for Barrett and Feingold. Hovde began both races with very low name ID. All ended their second races with high name ID, though Feingold didn’t quite reach the high levels he had in 2010.

Barnes began his 2022 Senate race with a name ID rate in the mid-30s, rising to the mid-80s. We don’t yet know how much that has declined since 2022.

The chart shows the changes in name ID across the year leading up to each election. There is need to rebuild name recognition in the second act, but candidates largely succeed in doing so, and start with a higher level than first time candidates.

Net favorable ratings

Each of these candidates has suffered declines in net favorability across their elections. Decline late in the campaign is apparent for each candidate. Feingold stands out for having net positive favorability in both races he lost. The others all ended in negative territory, with Barrett and Hovde more net negative in their second races than in their first. Feingold’s first and second are about equal.

Bottom line

We don’t know how the next eight months until the primary, and eleven months to the general election, will unfold. What these past second acts have shown in that initial advantages in name ID and campaign experience, including established donors, have not produced success in the second campaigns over the past quarter of a century. Barnes now has the chance to change that somewhat daunting record.