House Retirements and Targeted Districts

While a substantial number of members of the House of Representatives are retiring, don’t expect these retirements to produce many flipped seats or shifts in the ideological makeup of either party.

As of January 13, 47 members of the House have announced their retirement, 21 Democrats and 26 Republicans. (I’m not counting resignations by Majorie Taylor Greene and Mikie Sherrill whose seats will be filled with special elections this year.)

The retirement rate has been running a bit ahead of recent cycles as of this date, which were 42, 34, 41, and 40 from 2018 to 2024. Still, I don’t think we are seeing extraordinarily high levels of retirements, as some commentary suggests. In the end those previous four cycles produced totals of 52, 36, 49 and 45 retirements, suggesting we may end up in the mid-to-upper 50s this year. Past retirements are from Ballotpedia.org.

The main point I want to make here is that the retirements are spread pretty widely throughout both Republican and Democratic caucuses by ideology and 2024 vote margin. The solid dots are retiring members. These are not endangered incumbents who barely scraped by in 2024, nor are they ideological outliers relative to their caucuses.

The figure shows all House members by vote margin and by left-right ideology, using Nokken-Poole dimension 1 ideology scores from VoteView.com. These scores are based on roll call votes by the members. Nokken-Poole is a variant of the widely used Nominate scores. Nokken-Poole scores range from -0.848 for the most liberal member to 0.986 for the most conservative member. Vote margin is the percentage for the Republican candidate minus the percentage for the Democrat, so negative margins are Democratic wins and positive ones are Republican victories.

Among Republicans, the median 2024 vote margin is 28.2 percentage points, and the median for retiring Republicans is 26.1 points. On ideology, the median Nokken-Poole score is 0.542 (higher scores are more conservative.) Among retiring Republicans the median is 0.581

Democratic retirees have somewhat larger vote margins, -36.8 percentage points, than their caucus as a whole, -27.0 points. On ideology, the retiring Democrats are also more liberal, -0.461, than the full Democratic caucus, -0.394. These are modest differences, however, and the figure makes clear retirements are well scattered throughout both caucuses.

The upshot of this distribution of retirements is that it does not open up many opportunities for turnover as most retirees enjoyed reasonably secure margins in 2024. Nor are retirements likely to significantly shift the ideological balance in the House given that retirees are ideologically pretty representative of their caucuses. While open races are less predictable than incumbent ones, the strong partisan lean of most of these districts means we should expect no more than a handful of these seats to potentially flip.

DCCC and NRCC target districts

Both the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committe (DCCC) and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) have released lists of districts being targeted as pick up opportunities. Compare this figure with the retirements above. The targeted districts are, as you would expect, far more concentrated in races that were narrowly decided in 2024. (These lists were released by the NRCC on March 17, and by the DCCC on April 8. They do not include changes or additions after some states redistricted in 2025. These are the members’ districts in the 119th congress.)

Republicans on the DCCC list have a median vote margin of 6.8 percentage points, much closer than the caucus median of 28.2 points. They are also less conservative, 0.384, than the full caucus, 0.542.

Democrats on the NRCC list also had much closer 2024 races, with a median of -3.2 percentage points compared to -27.0 for the full caucus. These Democrats are also less liberal than the caucus, with a median Nokken-Poole score of -0.221 compared to the caucus median of -0.394.

If you are looking for change in the House, look at the districts each of the parties are focusing on. They have a much greater chance of flipping than the seats of retiring members, and would be more likely to remove relatively moderate members of either party. The latter fact will also contribute to polarization in the House. Rather than target ideologically extreme members of the opposition party, both Democats and Republicans target close races, which also happen to be where the most relatively moderate members are.

Thirty years of Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections

Wisconsin’s Supreme Court elections were once low-key, low-turnout April affairs. Not so much any more. In 2023 total spending on the court race reached $50 million. Two years later, in 2025, total spending doubled that, passing $100 million. The big spending reflects the stakes in a shifting majority on the court. In the 2019-20 term, conservatives held a 5-2 majority. In 2020 liberals narrowed the conservative majority to 4-3. After the 2023 election it became a 4-3 liberal majority, which was maintained in 2025. With a retiring conservative justice, the 2026 election can either hold the 4-3 liberal majority or increase it to 5-2 for the 2026-27 term. (The seven justices are elected to 10 year terms.)

This recent shift contrasts with consistent conservative majorities from 1995 until the recent shifts. The figure shows the results of court elections since 1995. From 1995 through 2003 conservatives won 5 elections to 2 for liberals. From 2005 to 2013 conservatives again won 5 elections to 2 for liberals. But since 2015 liberals have won 5 seats to 3 for conservatives.

Since the 1990s Wisconsin Supreme Court elections have become far more partisan with voting patterns coming to be strongly linked to partisan elections and with the parties endorsing and financially supporting candidates in the formally non-partisan court races.

The next figure shows this changing partisan structure to court voting. As an example, I use Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, who won in 1995 and 2015 before retiring in 2025. (In 2005 she ran unopposed.) In 1995, there was a moderate correlation, .45, between how counties voted for the court race and how they voted in the previous presidential race. But by 2015, the correlation between Bradley’s vote and the 2012 presidential vote had risen to .78. In 2025 when Bradley retired, the correlation for liberal Susan Crawford with the 2024 presidential vote was an astonishing .99. This reflects the surge in party polarization in Wisconsin and the emergence of court races more tightly tied to partisan divisions.

This increase in partisan voting structure is not a sudden phenomena, but one which has grown steadily since the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s there was little partisan structure to court elections. Indeed, in 1978 the correlation was nil, .002. This rose sporadically in the 1990s, then grew steadily since 2007 to the current astonishingly high .99 of 2025.

This extremely high correlation doesn’t mean outcomes are locked in. Justice Brian Hagedorn, a conservative, won in 2019 by less than a 1 percentage point margin, with a correlation of .92 with the 2016 outcome, while Justice Rebecca Dallet, a liberal, won the year before with a 10 point margin and a correlation of .89 with the same 2016 presidential race. If all counties shift their votes up or down by the same amount, the correlation remains high though the outcome can shift, as in these two cases. Correlation tells us about the structure of the votes but not where the majority necessarily falls. What we have now is that the most Republican counties are now virtually certain to also be the most conservative in their court votes and the most Democratic counties the most liberal. That wasn’t the case before the 1990s when knowing a county’s presidential vote told us very little about their court vote.

The April 2026 election is likely to reflect this strong partisan structure of voting, though we can’t yet say if the net election forces will shift in the liberal or conservative direction.

The geography of the court vote has shifted dramatically over 30 years. In 1995, liberal Justice Bradley won with 55% of the vote. In 2025, liberal Justice Crawford replaced the retiring Bradley with a nearly identical 55% of the vote. But the sources of these two victories was dramatically different. In 1995, Bradley was strongly supported in the north, north-central, and southwestern parts of the state. Notably her vote was significantly less in Brown, Dane and Milwaukee counties. In 2025, Crawford lost badly in the north, north-central and most of the southeast, while she ran up large margins in Dane and Milwaukee, much more than Bradley’s 1995 totals in those counties. She also ran a little ahead in Brown, a county Bradley had lost badly in 1995. The maps shows how dramatically the geography of the vote has shifted even with identical vote margins in the two races.

With so much of the state shifting from blue to red, how is it that the vote margin is unchanged? Democratic gains have been large and come in counties with large populations. Republican gains are widespread but mostly in less populous counties. In large Republican leaning counties, Waukesha, for example, the conservative majority has increased but only slightly, with a larger increase in Washington, but a slight decrease in Ozaukee. Republicans have gained in Marathon, but the conservative margin is only moderate.In contrast, Dane has gone from pretty liberal to overwhelmingly liberal, and Milwaukee which was quite competitive has also become very liberal in its court vote. These shifts also highlight the greater geographic polarization in the 2020s compared to the 1990s, while not shifting the statewide balance at all.

Public opinion

Since 2023 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held a consistent net approval rating, though about 15% say they don’t have an opinion. Court approval slightly improved during and after the 2025 court election, declining slightly in October.

As of October, the candidates for the court in 2026 were little known to the public. This is not unusual in court elections and especially so with no incumbent. The Marquette Law School poll in October asked registered voters if they had a clear idea what the candidates stand for. For both candidates, 69% said they hadn’t heard enough, and only 10% or 11% said they did have a clear idea. With less than 3 months left before the April election, the campaigns have a lot of messaging to do.

Voters have a strong preference that candidates for the court discuss issues so voters know what they stand for, 83%, while only 17% say candidates should avoid discussing issues so as to not appear to have prejudged issues. On this, partisans and independents are in agreement.

The balance of the court

With the current balance of the court, and the justices coming up for election in the next 10 years, the liberal majority is assured until at least 2028. Should the liberal candidate win in 2026 the majority will remain in liberal hands until at least 2030 (absent an unscheduled vacancy occuring.)

After more than two decades of conservative majorities, the liberal victories in five of the last eight court elections has altered the balance, and created the prospect for continued majorities well into the 2020s or beyond.

The shifting balance of the court since 2019 is shown in the table below.

And for those who want way more detail (you know who you are), here are all Wisconsin Supreme Court elections since 1976. My ideological classification of justices may be debatable in some cases prior to 2000. In those less partisan times ideology played less of a role and moderate justices may be mislabled. The distinctions since 1995 are much more clear, though note that Hagedorn was elected as a conservative candidate but does not align strongly with either the liberal or conservative wings of the court in his decisions, siding with conservatives a little more than half the time in some terms and a little more than half with liberals in other terms. See the excellent SCOWstats.com for detailed analysis of court alignments since 1918.

Extending ACA Tax Credits in the House

On January 8, the House passed a bill to extend enhanced Affordable Care Act subsidies for three years. Despite leadership opposition, 17 Republicans voted for the extension, a notable break with the party majority. An additional 5 Republicans did not vote. The bill’s prospects in the Senate are unclear as negotiations in that chamber continue.

Those Republicans voting for the bill had closer elections in 2024, and are less conservative than the GOP caucus as a whole. The Republicans who did not vote had larger 2024 vote margins and are somewhat more conservative than those who voted for the bill. The figure shows all members of the House. Those voting Yea are solid circles, Nays are open circles and non-voters are solid triangles. All Democrats voted for the bill.

For Wisconsin readers (and The Downballot fans like me) I’ve highlighted Derrick Van Orden, WI03, the only Republican from Wisconsin voting for passage. Van Orden won by the smallest margin (2.7 percentage points) of Republican House members in the state in 2024, and is a target for Democrats’ efforts to win the House in 2026. As with others voting to extend the tax credits, Van Orden is less conservative than the GOP caucus and had a close 2024 race.

The table shows all Republicans who voted for the tax credit extension, and those who did not vote.

The geography of GOP defectors is interesting, especially three from New York (all in the south), three from Pennsylvania (all in the east) and three from Ohio (northeast and central). Also notable is the lack of defections through most of the south and west. (Credit the map to VoteView.com) (In the map OH15 looks like 2 districts because it has a very narrow waist connecting the east and west lobes of the district.)

Seventeen defectors hardly amounts to outright rebellion, though with the extraordinarily narrow GOP majority it easily swings the outcome of the roll call. These members have good reason to be concerned about their reelection prospects in November, and do not come from the most conservative wing of their party. Whether any suffer consequences from the leadership or the White House remains to be seen. When party unity has been so strong through 2025, this departure signals that members have concerns for voter reaction that can overcome party loyalty on some issues.

We also saw five Senate Republicans defect to advance a war powers resolution on January 8. And 35 Republicans voted to override Trump’s veto of a Colorado water project, with 24 voting to override a veto concerning tribal lands in Florida. While limited, this is more pushback from congressional Republicans than the Trump administration saw in the first year back in power.

Midterm seat losses, 1862-2022

The president’s party almost always suffers in the House

Midterms are less than a year away so it’s time to look back at the record. 

In the House, the president’s party has lost seats in all but four midterms since 1862, and one of those, 1902, was a year the House expanded so the Republican gains fell short of Democratic gains that year. After 1934 it wasn’t until 1998 that the president’s party gained seats, then the rare event repeated in 2002. Not since.

This regularity over 160 years is hard to attribute to the circumstances of the moment. Likewise the hope that “this year will be different” has been a forlorn one. The size of the seat loss, on the other hand, has varied considerably and is correlated with presidential approval (Clinton in 1998 and Bush in 2002 were unusually popular, as was Roosevelt in 1934) and the state of the economy. Popular presidents lose fewer seats, unpopular ones more. Good times go with smaller losses, bad times with greater losses. 

In 2026 we will have the unprecedented circumstance of a large number of mid-decade redistricting decisions as the parties battle to see who can gerrymander the most seats to their advantage. That landscape is still being painted.

In the Senate the pattern of losses are much less dependable than in the House. The president’s party usually loses seats, and the gains have been small since the 1940s. The vagaries of which seats are up and how many for each party adds uncertainty to the Senate picture. And, of course, prior to 1913 the Senate was not elected by popular vote.

In the House, the second midterm for a president produces barely grater losses than the first midterm (an average of 28.9 in the second, versus 24.9 in the first.) There isn’t a “six-year itch” on the House side. The Senate has been a different matter, with second midterm losses averaging 6 seats rather than 2 in the first midterm (since 1946.) One plausible explanation for the Senate is that the 6th year is the reelection of a Senate class elected with the president for his first term. To the extent a winning first term president brings along some partisan companions, they run without his coattails 6 years later. The table shows the seat changes and the averages since 1946.

Next year there will be inevitable discussion of whether 2026 is Trump’s second midterm. Obviously it is in one sense. But for the Senate, this will be the class elected with Joe Biden in 2020, not the class elected with Trump in 2016. This group had mild pro-Democratic national forces either helping or hurting them in 2020. Given this difference in the election cycle, the average 6 seat loss may not be as good a representation of expectations for Senate seats in 2026.

No second acts: Repeat performances in Wisconsin elections

Is the second time the charm?

They say there are no second acts in politics. In Wisconsin that has been the case for the last 27 years, at least when it comes to statewide contests for governor and U.S. Senate. Mandela Barnes’ entry in the 2026 governor’s race will attempt to break the dismal recent record.

Consider the examples of Tom Barrett (lost governor’s races in 2010 and 2012), Tim Michels (lost Senate race in 2004 and lost governor’s race in 2022), Russ Feingold (lost Senate races in 2010 and 2016), Eric Hovde (lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012, lost Senate race in 2024), and Mark Neumann (lost Senate race in 1998, lost GOP primary for governor in 2010 and lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012). Even Tommy Thompson, who won four races for governor, fell short 14 years later in his 2012 bid for the Senate. You have to go back to the 1970s to find a successful second act in Wisconsin statewide elections.

What does this record say about Barnes’ position in the 2026 race for governor? There are some advantages that are important. He will likely start out as the best known candidate in a field of some 7 or 8 candidates. In my Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin, Oct. 15-22, the three best known Democrats had name identification ranging from 22% (Hong) to 25% (Rodriguez) to 26% (Crowley), with the rest in the teens. Barnes was not included as he had not entered the race. At the end of his 2022 Senate race, Barnes had a name ID of 85%, though when he started that race as the sitting Lt. Governor his ID rate was 37% in Feb. 2022. There is falloff in ID between races. Barrett finished his 2010 governor’s race with 84% name recognition, which fell to 61% in Jan. 2012 at the start of the recall election. Feingold fell from 95% in 2010 to 75% in Jan. 2016.

In two recent polls that included his name (though unannounced at the time) Barnes was ahead in the Democratic primary field with 16% support in a Sept. 28-30 poll sponsored by Platform Communications and ahead with 21% in a TIPP poll conducted Nov. 17-21. In both polls all other candidates were below 10%, with a third to half of voters undecided. Those polls didn’t measure name recognition.

Barnes also has the advantage of having raised substantial money in his 2022 Senate bid, giving him a donor list to tap that none of the other candidates have.

Those are positive elements for Barnes and each gives him an initial advantage some eight months ahead of the primary.

The reason for doubt is the track record of candidates running statewide following a previous statewide loss. The second time around has not shown much improvement in general election vote percentage (though each won their second round primaries, except for Neumann).

Name ID

Repeat candidates begin their second races with lower name ID than when they finished their first race, with slippage of about 20 points for Barrett and Feingold. Hovde began both races with very low name ID. All ended their second races with high name ID, though Feingold didn’t quite reach the high levels he had in 2010.

Barnes began his 2022 Senate race with a name ID rate in the mid-30s, rising to the mid-80s. We don’t yet know how much that has declined since 2022.

The chart shows the changes in name ID across the year leading up to each election. There is need to rebuild name recognition in the second act, but candidates largely succeed in doing so, and start with a higher level than first time candidates.

Net favorable ratings

Each of these candidates has suffered declines in net favorability across their elections. Decline late in the campaign is apparent for each candidate. Feingold stands out for having net positive favorability in both races he lost. The others all ended in negative territory, with Barrett and Hovde more net negative in their second races than in their first. Feingold’s first and second are about equal.

Bottom line

We don’t know how the next eight months until the primary, and eleven months to the general election, will unfold. What these past second acts have shown in that initial advantages in name ID and campaign experience, including established donors, have not produced success in the second campaigns over the past quarter of a century. Barnes now has the chance to change that somewhat daunting record.