Midterm seat losses, 1862-2022

The president’s party almost always suffers in the House

Midterms are less than a year away so it’s time to look back at the record. 

In the House, the president’s party has lost seats in all but four midterms since 1862, and one of those, 1902, was a year the House expanded so the Republican gains fell short of Democratic gains that year. After 1934 it wasn’t until 1998 that the president’s party gained seats, then the rare event repeated in 2002. Not since.

This regularity over 160 years is hard to attribute to the circumstances of the moment. Likewise the hope that “this year will be different” has been a forlorn one. The size of the seat loss, on the other hand, has varied considerably and is correlated with presidential approval (Clinton in 1998 and Bush in 2002 were unusually popular, as was Roosevelt in 1934) and the state of the economy. Popular presidents lose fewer seats, unpopular ones more. Good times go with smaller losses, bad times with greater losses. 

In 2026 we will have the unprecedented circumstance of a large number of mid-decade redistricting decisions as the parties battle to see who can gerrymander the most seats to their advantage. That landscape is still being painted.

In the Senate the pattern of losses are much less dependable than in the House. The president’s party usually loses seats, and the gains have been small since the 1940s. The vagaries of which seats are up and how many for each party adds uncertainty to the Senate picture. And, of course, prior to 1913 the Senate was not elected by popular vote.

In the House, the second midterm for a president produces barely grater losses than the first midterm (an average of 28.9 in the second, versus 24.9 in the first.) There isn’t a “six-year itch” on the House side. The Senate has been a different matter, with second midterm losses averaging 6 seats rather than 2 in the first midterm (since 1946.) One plausible explanation for the Senate is that the 6th year is the reelection of a Senate class elected with the president for his first term. To the extent a winning first term president brings along some partisan companions, they run without his coattails 6 years later. The table shows the seat changes and the averages since 1946.

Next year there will be inevitable discussion of whether 2026 is Trump’s second midterm. Obviously it is in one sense. But for the Senate, this will be the class elected with Joe Biden in 2020, not the class elected with Trump in 2016. This group had mild pro-Democratic national forces either helping or hurting them in 2020. Given this difference in the election cycle, the average 6 seat loss may not be as good a representation of expectations for Senate seats in 2026.

No second acts: Repeat performances in Wisconsin elections

Is the second time the charm?

They say there are no second acts in politics. In Wisconsin that has been the case for the last 27 years, at least when it comes to statewide contests for governor and U.S. Senate. Mandela Barnes’ entry in the 2026 governor’s race will attempt to break the dismal recent record.

Consider the examples of Tom Barrett (lost governor’s races in 2010 and 2012), Tim Michels (lost Senate race in 2004 and lost governor’s race in 2022), Russ Feingold (lost Senate races in 2010 and 2016), Eric Hovde (lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012, lost Senate race in 2024), and Mark Neumann (lost Senate race in 1998, lost GOP primary for governor in 2010 and lost GOP primary for Senate in 2012). Even Tommy Thompson, who won four races for governor, fell short 14 years later in his 2012 bid for the Senate. You have to go back to the 1970s to find a successful second act in Wisconsin statewide elections.

What does this record say about Barnes’ position in the 2026 race for governor? There are some advantages that are important. He will likely start out as the best known candidate in a field of some 7 or 8 candidates. In my Marquette Law School Poll of Wisconsin, Oct. 15-22, the three best known Democrats had name identification ranging from 22% (Hong) to 25% (Rodriguez) to 26% (Crowley), with the rest in the teens. Barnes was not included as he had not entered the race. At the end of his 2022 Senate race, Barnes had a name ID of 85%, though when he started that race as the sitting Lt. Governor his ID rate was 37% in Feb. 2022. There is falloff in ID between races. Barrett finished his 2010 governor’s race with 84% name recognition, which fell to 61% in Jan. 2012 at the start of the recall election. Feingold fell from 95% in 2010 to 75% in Jan. 2016.

In two recent polls that included his name (though unannounced at the time) Barnes was ahead in the Democratic primary field with 16% support in a Sept. 28-30 poll sponsored by Platform Communications and ahead with 21% in a TIPP poll conducted Nov. 17-21. In both polls all other candidates were below 10%, with a third to half of voters undecided. Those polls didn’t measure name recognition.

Barnes also has the advantage of having raised substantial money in his 2022 Senate bid, giving him a donor list to tap that none of the other candidates have.

Those are positive elements for Barnes and each gives him an initial advantage some eight months ahead of the primary.

The reason for doubt is the track record of candidates running statewide following a previous statewide loss. The second time around has not shown much improvement in general election vote percentage (though each won their second round primaries, except for Neumann).

Name ID

Repeat candidates begin their second races with lower name ID than when they finished their first race, with slippage of about 20 points for Barrett and Feingold. Hovde began both races with very low name ID. All ended their second races with high name ID, though Feingold didn’t quite reach the high levels he had in 2010.

Barnes began his 2022 Senate race with a name ID rate in the mid-30s, rising to the mid-80s. We don’t yet know how much that has declined since 2022.

The chart shows the changes in name ID across the year leading up to each election. There is need to rebuild name recognition in the second act, but candidates largely succeed in doing so, and start with a higher level than first time candidates.

Net favorable ratings

Each of these candidates has suffered declines in net favorability across their elections. Decline late in the campaign is apparent for each candidate. Feingold stands out for having net positive favorability in both races he lost. The others all ended in negative territory, with Barrett and Hovde more net negative in their second races than in their first. Feingold’s first and second are about equal.

Bottom line

We don’t know how the next eight months until the primary, and eleven months to the general election, will unfold. What these past second acts have shown in that initial advantages in name ID and campaign experience, including established donors, have not produced success in the second campaigns over the past quarter of a century. Barnes now has the chance to change that somewhat daunting record.