Sen. Bob Dole died today. Many posts and stories about his life and service to the country.
My small addition is this look at his career in the eyes of public opinion.
In 3 parts. First his full career as captured by national favorable-unfavorable polls.
Most polls were conducted surrounding his presidential run in 1994-1996.
The two early lows reflect VP nominee in 1976 where he was the voice of GOP attacks.
Note also the rise in the few polls post-1996. 2003 is the last national poll I have for him.
Here I zoom in on the 1995-1997 period when there are the most polls. I also increase the sensitivity of the trend line to pick up some of the shorter term changes.
In the densest period of polls you can see some fluctuation but pretty limited range during the 1996 campaign.
Here I zoom in again on 1996 and increase the sensitivity of the trend line a little more. The oscillation in Aug to Nov is still clear.
The net fav trend remained positive, though a fair number of individual polls were net negative.
Those not of a “certain age” may not know that Dole resigned from the Senate while seeking the Presidency on June 11, 1996. There seems to be a short term rise in net favorable at that point, but it quickly dissipates.
Bob Dole was at times highly partisan, at other times a bipartisan partner on big policy accomplishments. Some loved him and some loathed him, and many were more balanced. His life of service, and sacrifice, was admirable. I wish we had more like him.
Given its prominence in political and legal debate for nearly 50 years, you might think everyone has an opinion about Roe v Wade. But there is variation in opinion holding that may surprise you.
Most telephone surveys ask about Roe without offering a “Don’t know” option, though if the respondent says “I don’t know” or “I haven’t thought about it” that is recorded. Typically this produces around 7-10% who volunteer that they don’t have an opinion. See examples here:
Academics have had a long running debate over whether surveys should explicitly offer “or haven’t you thought much about this?” as part of the question. Doing so substantially increases the percent who say they haven’t thought about an issue.
Despite more “don’t knows” when offered explicitly, the balance of opinion among those with an opinion doesn’t seem to vary with or without the DK option A debate remains if people have real opinions but opt out via DK or if when pushed will give answers but w weak opinions.
Online surveys present a new challenge. There is no way to “volunteer” a don’t know except to skip the item, which very few do. So should you offer DK explicitly and get more, or not offer it and get very few without an opinion?
In my @MULawPoll national Supreme Court Surveys we ask about a variety of Court cases. But obviously most people don’t follow the Court in detail so I believe we must explicitly offer “or haven’t you heard enough about this?” Doing so produces some 25-30% w/o an opinion on most cases.
So is the “haven’t heard enough/Don’t know” rate really around 10% or really around 30%? Clearly wording makes a big difference, but I think it pretty clear those who opt for “haven’t heard enough” are less engaged on an issue than those who give an opinion.
What is worth looking at here is not the absolute level of “haven’t heard” but how it varies across the population. The invitation to say haven’t heard opens this door to seeing how opinion holding varies, and at the very least shows those more and less engaged with the issue.
Here is opinion on overturning Roe, with 30.6% saying they “haven’t heard at all” or “haven’t heard enough” about the case. Of those WITH an option, 71% would uphold and 29% would strike down.
But look at who is more likely to say they haven’t heard enough and who is more likley to say they have an opinion.
To my surprise, it is the OLD who are more likely to have an option. The young at twice as likely to say haven’t heard enough.
I wonder if the intense battles over abortion in the 1970s-80s were seared into the political makeup of folks now in their 60s and up in a way that the issue simply hasn’t been for those in younger ages. A less interesting answer is the young simply pay less attention.
Other differences are more intuitive.
Ideological moderats are much more likely to say “haven’t heard” than those towards the endpoints of ideology.
But there is interesting asymmetry here with the left more engaged than the right.
Independents are more likely to say not heard than partisans, but as with ideology the assymetry shows Democrats more likely to have an opinion than Republicans. The salience of Texas SB8 as well as Dobbs has probably boosted Dem concern generally.
There is a small difference between born again Christians and all other respondents, but perhaps a surprise that slightly more born again folks say they haven’t heard enough about Roe.
White respondents are a bit less likely to say “haven’t heard” than are other racial and ethnic group members.
And finally, what about gender?
Hardly any difference in opinion holding.
To return to the academic literature on whether to offer a don’t know/haven’t heard or not, there is good evidence that pushing people to respond produces similar results and statistical structure as we see among those who offer opinions when DK is an offered option.
The variation we see in choosing “haven’t heard” also reflects willingness to respond beyond simply not having thought. Good work shows this general reluctance is part of the issue of non-response as well.
Those with intense positions on abortion naturally assume that most people are similarly intense. The results here show we should be cautious in assuming “everyone” has an opinion on Roe (or other issues.) And the variation in opinion holding is interesting, sometimes surprising.
Here is the wording we use for this item with all the response categories.
A followup on age: Older respondents are also more likely to have an opinion on a case concerning the 2nd Amendment and the right to carry a gun outside the home. It may be that younger people pay less attention to issues before the Court in general, and so the age effect on opinion holding on Roe may not be the generational difference I suggest above, but simply variation in attention to the Court.
However, this logit model of saying “haven’t heard” includes controls for education and voter turnout in 2020, with age continuing to play a role. That doesn’t prove it is socialization behind the effect, but does show that age effects remain statistically significant even when a number of other variables are included in the model.
On Dec. 1, 2021 the US Supreme Court heard arguments on Dobbs, the case challenging Mississippi’s ban on abortions after 15 weeks, and arguments to use the case to strike down Roe v Wade’s protection of abortion rights.
Some polling here.
The @MULawPoll national Supreme Court Survey asked in September and in November about both cases. I combine the data here as opinion did not change significantly between the two surveys.
We offer respondents the option to say “haven’t heard anything” or “haven’t heard enough” and about 30% pick that for each question (30.6% missing in table are the not heard.)
For Roe, of those with an opinion, 71% say the court should uphold Roe, 29% say strike it down.
There is more support, and a close division, on whether the Court should uphold Mississippi’s 15 week ban in Dobbs. 28% lack an opinion (missing).
Of those with an opinion on Dobbs, 54% would uphold the 15 week ban and 46% would strike down the law.
Looking an the joint response, of those w/ an opinion about both cases, half, 49.6%, would uphold Roe and strike down Dobbs. 29% would overturn Roe and uphold Dobbs
But 19% want to see Roe remain in effect yet accept greater limitations on abortion rights w Dobbs 15 week ban. Less than 3% would strike down both Roe and Dobbs.
The willingness to support Roe but accept restrictions has been common in polls about abortion. A majority of respondents say either “legal in most circumstances” or “illegal in most” but not legal or illegal in all cases.
Pew national survey data from May 2021 is typical of responses to this question. About 60% are in the “most but not all” categories, with 25% legal in all cases and 13% saying illegal in all cases.
As for what structures opinions about Roe and about Dobbs in my @MULawPoll national surveys, it is ideology that has the strongest effect, with party a bit less strong.
This chart shows the estimated probability of favoring overturning Roe and of upholding Dobbs by ideology.
The green line shows that across ideology people are less likely to say Roe should be overturned while the higher purple line shows the greater probability they favor upholding Dobbs. Ideology has a strong effect on both but upholding Dobbs has more support than striking Roe.
A similar pattern holds across partisanship, though the slopes are less steep than for ideology.
The contrast between Dems vs Reps and for very liberal vs very conservative is quite sharp in both charts.
Finally, here are multivariate models for opinion on striking down Roe and for upholding Dobbs. Education plays more of a role in structuring Dobbs but not for opinion on Roe. Born again Christians are more opposed to Roe and in favor of Dobbs, as one would expect.
Roe Model:
Dobbs Model:
The effects of race and marital status vary between the two cases, while gender is not statistically significant in either model, nor is age.
Our divisions over abortion are unlikely to, shall I say will not, go away regardless of how the Court rules. How much the ruling changes the status quo, and what new political movements it sets in motion, will be a topic for next summer and beyond as the Court’s decision sinks in.
I’ve seen a cartoon going around showing the liberal-conservative ideology of the self and Dem and Rep parties. In the cartoon, the self and Rep party stay fixed while the Dem party moves far to the left. It is an effective graphic & rhetoric but how does it fit with data?
The American National Election Studies (ANES) has measured ideology of self & both parties on a 7-point scale since 1972. The points are labelled “extremely liberal”, “liberal”, “slightly liberal”, “moderate”, “slightly conservative”, “conservative” and “extremely conservative”.
How have ideological self-perceptions & party perceptions changed over time? Here are the means from 1972 to 2020. A mean of 4 is “moderate”. Until 2000 both parties were a point or so away from 4, Dems a little closer to 4 than Reps. Since 2000 both have moved out from the center.
In 2020 the Dem party was just over 1.5 points to the left of 4 and the Rep party was just over 1.5 points to the right of 4. Voters self-location has hardly moved, slightly right of center. The parties remain roughly symmetric though further left or right.
But what about how partisans see themselves, their party and the other party? Here self and own party match closely, with the other party far away. Dems see themselves & the party as more moderate than does the general public, 1 point or less to the left.
Dems used to see themselves as quite moderate, less than half a point to the left but have drifted left since 1998 so they now see themselves as 1 point to the left.
Dems also see the Rep party about where the general public sees it, just over 1.5 points to the right of center. How do Republicans see themselves & the parties? Next tweet please.
Republicans see themselves & their party as close together, and again about 1.5 points to the right, as does the general public. But they see the Dem party as considerably further to the left than does the general public, over 2 points to the left of center.
Reps see themselves & their party drifting right from 1 point right of center in 1992 to just over 1.5 to the right now.
Dems think themselves more moderate & their party more moderate than the general public does. They don’t push Rep party to the right, however. Reps put themselves & their party about where the public sees the GOP but perceive the Dem party much further to left than general public.
How about independents? they put themselves very close to the moderate center, and perceive each party about where the general public does, and roughly symmetrically, each party now about 1.5 points to left or right of center.
So what about that cartoon that’s been going around Twitter? It doesn’t reflect how the general public perceives the parties over time. The public sees both parties moving a bit out from the center over the last 20 years, but equally so.
But the cartoon does reflect the perceptions of Republicans of the Dem party pushing it well to the left of where the general public, or independents, sees it.
Data from American National Election Studies (ANES) 1952-2016 cumulative data file and ANES 2020 survey. There have been mode changes in recent years, with 2020 primarily conducted by web, with a mix in 2016. I’ve ignored these issues in the analysis here. Those failing to place themselves or the parties on the liberal conservative scale are set to missing and excluded from the analysis.
Since 2019 the Marquette Law School Supreme Court survey has asked national samples about their views on three frequently raised options for changing the structure of the U.S. Supreme Court, expansion of the Court, limiting the terms of the justices and limiting Supreme Court review of acts of Congress.SC
Expansion of the Court has become increasingly partisan with Democratic support rising by over 20 percentage points since 2019 while Republican opposition has grown by 10 points with little change among independents.
Majorities of all partisan groups favor term limits for the justices (despite the constitutional issues involved in such a change). Democrats have become more supportive by 10 points and Republicans 8 points less supportive, with no change among independents.
A third option, limiting the ability of the Court to review acts of Congress is opposed by about 60% of adults with no overall trend though Democrats are 9 points more favorable and Republicans 9 points more opposed than in 2019.
Expansion of the Court
How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Increase the number of justices on the US Supreme Court?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Poll dates
Total favor
Total oppose
Strongly favor
Favor
Oppose
Strongly oppose
9/3-13/19
43
56
8
35
39
17
9/8-15/20
46
53
10
36
39
14
7/16-26/21
48
51
12
36
28
23
9/7-16/21
48
51
16
32
20
31
Favor or oppose expanding Supreme Court by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Party ID
Poll dates
Total favor
Total oppose
Strongly favor
Favor
Oppose
Strongly oppose
Republican
9/3-13/19
31
67
3
28
41
26
Republican
9/8-15/20
34
65
7
27
44
21
Republican
7/16-26/21
26
74
7
19
31
43
Republican
9/7-16/21
23
77
5
18
17
60
Independent
9/3-13/19
44
54
9
35
37
17
Independent
9/8-15/20
41
58
7
34
42
16
Independent
7/16-26/21
44
56
8
36
31
25
Independent
9/7-16/21
48
52
12
36
22
30
Democrat
9/3-13/19
49
49
10
39
39
10
Democrat
9/8-15/20
61
39
15
46
32
7
Democrat
7/16-26/21
73
26
22
51
23
3
Democrat
9/7-16/21
71
28
32
39
21
7
Limit terms of justices
How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Have judges serve a fixed term on the court rather than serving life terms?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Poll dates
Total favor
Total oppose
Strongly favor
Favor
Oppose
Strongly oppose
9/3-13/19
71
27
33
38
20
7
9/8-15/20
75
25
35
40
18
7
9/7-16/21
72
27
40
32
15
12
Favor or oppose limiting term of Supreme Court justices by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Party ID
Poll dates
Total favor
Total oppose
Strongly favor
Favor
Oppose
Strongly oppose
Republican
9/3-13/19
68
30
34
34
22
8
Republican
9/8-15/20
74
25
33
41
17
8
Republican
9/7-16/21
60
40
28
32
19
21
Independent
9/3-13/19
71
28
33
38
20
8
Independent
9/8-15/20
73
26
34
39
19
7
Independent
9/7-16/21
70
30
40
30
16
14
Democrat
9/3-13/19
75
24
34
41
18
6
Democrat
9/8-15/20
77
22
36
41
17
5
Democrat
9/7-16/21
85
13
52
33
10
3
Limit jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Limit the ability of the Supreme Court to review and set aside acts of Congress as unconstitutional?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Poll dates
Total favor
Total oppose
Strongly favor
Favor
Oppose
Strongly oppose
9/3-13/19
38
61
8
30
42
19
9/8-15/20
41
58
7
34
42
16
9/7-16/21
41
59
10
31
30
29
Favor or oppose limiting Supreme Court review of legislation by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021
Sometimes it is good to see presidential approval over the very long haul– like since the birth of polling! Here are all Gallup presidential approval polls since Franklin Roosevelt, thanks to the Roper Center for the long term data and FiveThirtyEight.com for recent polls.
Gallup doesn’t do nearly as many approval polls now as they did in the past, so not many Biden polls. But the recent decline in approval is notable in comparison with past presidents. Yes, you need to zoom in.
Here are all polls of Biden approval, with my fit to the trend. See your favorate aggregation site for alternative averages. The gradual decline through July sharply accelerated in August. Not that this is news. However the decline in August continued at about the same rate in September, so no sign yet of flattening out.
The congressional generic ballot is one of the few indicators with a long history of non-presidential vote outcomes we have. I’ll look at how good a predictor it is at another time. Here is simply a review of the trends over each election cycle. The chart above shows each cycle since 1999-2000 until the current cycle, as of Oct. 5, 2021.
And for the obsessive, here is a chart of each cycle since 1945-46. It Is unreadable without zooming in, so download it and zoom as you wish.
It is well known that the combination of race, education and gender has become a powerful predictor of partisanship, vote and presidential approval. For Biden approval the contrast is sharp between whites (regardless of gender) without a college degree and those with a degree. But what deserves some attention is the opinion of Biden among non-white, non-college, males.
Non-white males without a degree are notably less approving of Biden than are any other category of non-white respondents. This echos some evidence that Biden underperformed with this group in the 2020 vote as well.
The approval pattern is somewhat more distinctive than the partisanship pattern.
White college graduates are more Republican than Democratic in partisanship, but notably more approving of Biden than are their non-college equivalents.
Non-white, non-college males who are evenly divided on Biden approval are heavily Democratic vs Republican, though a majority consider themselves independent. This contrasts with other non-white groups.
While the partisan differences are less substantial, the status of Biden approval among non-white, non-college males is a potential vulnerability for Biden, who already suffers badly among non-college whites.
Here comes a bit about survey question wording. For those just tuning in, NPORS=National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) from Pew, which released their 2021 update today (Sept 24) (thanks, Pew!)
According to my national @MULawPoll released this week 56% say “most people can be trusted” and 44% say “most people can’t be trusted”. But today Pew released their NPORS survey conducted this summer and find just 32% say most can be trusted. What’s going on??
This difference, of course, scared the bejeezus out of me. How can Pew’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey differ so much from mine, conducted at a similar time and on a question we would expect to be a stable attitude?? Question wording, my friends. Question wording.
My question is worded “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or most people can’t be trusted?” That was, in fact, the wording Pew used as recently as March 2020 and July 2020. In those 2 Pew got 58% and 53% most can be trusted, close to my 56%
So did the world go all “untrusty” since 2020? Pew changed the question in 2021. Now they asked “Which statement comes closer to your view even if neither is exactly right: Most people can be trusted or You can’t be too careful in dealing with people”
And the marginals flipped: With this wording 32% most can be trusted, 68% you can’t be too careful. A year ago in Pew’s July, with the previous wording: 58% most can be trusted, 39% most cannot be trusted. So which wording should we trust?
Pew’s original wording produced pretty consistent results (with slight differences in the stem to the question but not to response options): Nov 2018 52-47, March 2020 53-46, July 2020 58-39. So quite a change to 32-68 with the “new” wording.
But (as they say) the “new” wording is actually the one Pew generally used before the 2018-2020 polls cited above. They had generally used the “you can’t be too careful” as the alternative. And it makes a big difference.
Here are Pew studies with “can’t be too careful”: Apr 2017: 42 (trusted)-57 (can’t be too careful); Apr 2017 42-58; Feb 2016 43-56; Aug 2014 52-48(a); Aug 2014 47-51(b); Apr 2012 37-59. ( (a)Web, (b)Phone, same field dates)
This isn’t a “house” issue with Pew. The GSS has asked the “can’t be too careful” version for a while: GSS-NORC 2018 32-63; GSS-NORC 2016 31-64; GSS-NORC 2014 30-65; GSS-NORC 2012 32-64. The stability we’d expect on this item over time and close to Pew’s current 32-68.
So… both wordings appear stable and across survey houses (my 56-44, Pew’s 58-39, 53-46, 52-47) but also GSS and Pew’s flipped 32-63, 31-64, 30-65, 32-64 and 32-68.
Which wording we should use is less clear. The “most can’t be trusted” is clear and direct, “can’t be too careful” touches on suspicion. A much deeper analysis is needed of this issue. But this is a great example of seemingly similar items producing big differences.
I think there is a lot to be said for consistency, so I don’t expect to change my wording. Also this isn’t a complaint about Pew. The variation in wording they used actually allows us to understand the effect of question wording. A big help.
The Pew NPORS is a major service to the survey research world. But question wording matters and we need to take it into account, especially with a “reference survey” that influences all of us. Also the trust item was not included in the NPORS for 2020, so surprised me.
There are other issues to consider where question wording and item construction differs in the NPORS (looking at you, party ID and leaners!) so let’s all take advantage of this great resource. But as someone said: “Trust, but verify.”
Sixteen years ago this week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I launched PoliticalArithmetik, my first blog. This week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I’m (re)launching a website, PollsAndVotes.com.
After a year of PoliticalArithmetik, Mark Blumenthal (@mysterypollster) and I launched Pollster.com (with the support of Doug Rivers) and spent several years explaining polling and providing tracking of races, presidential approval and other topics in public opinion. In 2010 HuffPost bought Pollster and Mark had a good run with that. I departed and started PollsAndVotes.com in 2011, but have not maintained the site for a while. This is the relaunch of PollsAndVotes.com.
For some while now I’ve primarily posted analysis of polling on Twitter at @PollsAndVotes. As much as I like Twitter (most of the time) I think it is time to again have a PollsAndVotes website that allows longer posts, in one place, that can be easily found and searched for older posts, like from last week or last month. Having an editor to fix typos is also welcome.
I’ll be building out this site at a somewhat deliberate pace. I’ve decided not to import the old posts from the previous PollsAndVotes.com let alone from PoliticalArithmetik. I’ll update some of those, such as partisanship trends, but start fresh with the current data.
There will be a mix of topics here, but I’ll not be trying to replicate what Pollster.com did and what FiveThirtyEight.com and RealClearPolitics.com do well already. Most of the analysis here will be deeper dives into the national and state polling data that goes beyond trends. I also hope that my fellow academics will find graphics that may be useful in teaching.
The menu topics at the top of the page will (eventually!) provide a quick guide to analysis of “Polls” and “Votes” but also Wisconsin politics, party id, voter turnout, roll call votes and the US Supreme Court. Those first two will be something of a catch-all category. <;-)
Sixteen years ago I spent Labor Day weekend at home instead of the American Political Science Association annual meeting, keeping up with news of Katrina and launching PoliticalArithmetik. What started that weekend changed my life. I’ve still got a few days until this Labor Day weekend, and am not attending APSA, though I’ve been following the news on Ida. I hope you find the site interesting and useful.