Parties, partisans & perceptions: liberal-conservative locations 1972-2020

I’ve seen a cartoon going around showing the liberal-conservative ideology of the self and Dem and Rep parties. In the cartoon, the self and Rep party stay fixed while the Dem party moves far to the left. It is an effective graphic & rhetoric but how does it fit with data?

The American National Election Studies (ANES) has measured ideology of self & both parties on a 7-point scale since 1972. The points are labelled “extremely liberal”, “liberal”, “slightly liberal”, “moderate”, “slightly conservative”, “conservative” and “extremely conservative”.

How have ideological self-perceptions & party perceptions changed over time? Here are the means from 1972 to 2020. A mean of 4 is “moderate”. Until 2000 both parties were a point or so away from 4, Dems a little closer to 4 than Reps. Since 2000 both have moved out from the center.

In 2020 the Dem party was just over 1.5 points to the left of 4 and the Rep party was just over 1.5 points to the right of 4. Voters self-location has hardly moved, slightly right of center. The parties remain roughly symmetric though further left or right.

But what about how partisans see themselves, their party and the other party? Here self and own party match closely, with the other party far away. Dems see themselves & the party as more moderate than does the general public, 1 point or less to the left.

Dems used to see themselves as quite moderate, less than half a point to the left but have drifted left since 1998 so they now see themselves as 1 point to the left.

Dems also see the Rep party about where the general public sees it, just over 1.5 points to the right of center. How do Republicans see themselves & the parties? Next tweet please.

Republicans see themselves & their party as close together, and again about 1.5 points to the right, as does the general public. But they see the Dem party as considerably further to the left than does the general public, over 2 points to the left of center.

Reps see themselves & their party drifting right from 1 point right of center in 1992 to just over 1.5 to the right now.

Dems think themselves more moderate & their party more moderate than the general public does. They don’t push Rep party to the right, however. Reps put themselves & their party about where the public sees the GOP but perceive the Dem party much further to left than general public.

How about independents? they put themselves very close to the moderate center, and perceive each party about where the general public does, and roughly symmetrically, each party now about 1.5 points to left or right of center.

So what about that cartoon that’s been going around Twitter? It doesn’t reflect how the general public perceives the parties over time. The public sees both parties moving a bit out from the center over the last 20 years, but equally so.

But the cartoon does reflect the perceptions of Republicans of the Dem party pushing it well to the left of where the general public, or independents, sees it.

Data from American National Election Studies (ANES) 1952-2016 cumulative data file and ANES 2020 survey. There have been mode changes in recent years, with 2020 primarily conducted by web, with a mix in 2016. I’ve ignored these issues in the analysis here. Those failing to place themselves or the parties on the liberal conservative scale are set to missing and excluded from the analysis.

ANES website: https://electionstudies.org

Public opinion on Supreme Court reform

Since 2019 the Marquette Law School Supreme Court survey has asked national samples about their views on three frequently raised options for changing the structure of the U.S. Supreme Court, expansion of the Court, limiting the terms of the justices and limiting Supreme Court review of acts of Congress.SC

Expansion of the Court has become increasingly partisan with Democratic support rising by over 20 percentage points since 2019 while Republican opposition has grown by 10 points with little change among independents.

Majorities of all partisan groups favor term limits for the justices (despite the constitutional issues involved in such a change). Democrats have become more supportive by 10 points and Republicans 8 points less supportive, with no change among independents.

A third option, limiting the ability of the Court to review acts of Congress is opposed by about 60% of adults with no overall trend though Democrats are 9 points more favorable and Republicans 9 points more opposed than in 2019.

Expansion of the Court

How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Increase the number of justices on the US Supreme Court?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Poll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
9/3-13/1943568353917
9/8-15/20465310363914
7/16-26/21485112362823
9/7-16/21485116322031

 Favor or oppose expanding Supreme Court by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Party IDPoll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
Republican9/3-13/1931673284126
Republican9/8-15/2034657274421
Republican7/16-26/2126747193143
Republican9/7-16/2123775181760
Independent9/3-13/1944549353717
Independent9/8-15/2041587344216
Independent7/16-26/2144568363125
Independent9/7-16/21485212362230
Democrat9/3-13/19494910393910
Democrat9/8-15/2061391546327
Democrat7/16-26/2173262251233
Democrat9/7-16/2171283239217

Limit terms of justices

How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Have judges serve a fixed term on the court rather than serving life terms?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Poll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
9/3-13/1971273338207
9/8-15/2075253540187
9/7-16/21722740321512

 Favor or oppose limiting term of Supreme Court justices by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Party IDPoll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
Republican9/3-13/1968303434228
Republican9/8-15/2074253341178
Republican9/7-16/21604028321921
Independent9/3-13/1971283338208
Independent9/8-15/2073263439197
Independent9/7-16/21703040301614
Democrat9/3-13/1975243441186
Democrat9/8-15/2077223641175
Democrat9/7-16/2185135233103

Limit jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

How much do you favor or oppose the following proposals affecting the Supreme Court: Limit the ability of the Supreme Court to review and set aside acts of Congress as unconstitutional?’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Poll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
9/3-13/1938618304219
9/8-15/2041587344216
9/7-16/21415910313029

Favor or oppose limiting Supreme Court review of legislation by partisanship’, Marquette Law School Supreme Court Survey, 2019-2021

Party IDPoll datesTotal favorTotal opposeStrongly favorFavorOpposeStrongly oppose
Republican9/3-13/19435412313717
Republican9/8-15/2043557364015
Republican9/7-16/2137639282241
Independent9/3-13/1935648274420
Independent9/8-15/2038606324119
Independent9/7-16/2138627313131
Democrat9/3-13/1936614324318
Democrat9/8-15/2041578334512
Democrat9/7-16/21455412333816

Presidential Approval Since FDR

Sometimes it is good to see presidential approval over the very long haul– like since the birth of polling! Here are all Gallup presidential approval polls since Franklin Roosevelt, thanks to the Roper Center for the long term data and FiveThirtyEight.com for recent polls.

Gallup doesn’t do nearly as many approval polls now as they did in the past, so not many Biden polls. But the recent decline in approval is notable in comparison with past presidents. Yes, you need to zoom in.

Here are all polls of Biden approval, with my fit to the trend. See your favorate aggregation site for alternative averages. The gradual decline through July sharply accelerated in August. Not that this is news. However the decline in August continued at about the same rate in September, so no sign yet of flattening out.

Generic Congressional Ballot Review

The congressional generic ballot is one of the few indicators with a long history of non-presidential vote outcomes we have. I’ll look at how good a predictor it is at another time. Here is simply a review of the trends over each election cycle. The chart above shows each cycle since 1999-2000 until the current cycle, as of Oct. 5, 2021.

And for the obsessive, here is a chart of each cycle since 1945-46. It Is unreadable without zooming in, so download it and zoom as you wish.

The .pdf version is best for zooming in. You can download it here.

Updated 2021-10-06 to correct errors in 1981-82 chart.Thanks to @SteveEvets8 for spotting the errors.

Race, education and gender, Biden and Dems

It is well known that the combination of race, education and gender has become a powerful predictor of partisanship, vote and presidential approval. For Biden approval the contrast is sharp between whites (regardless of gender) without a college degree and those with a degree. But what deserves some attention is the opinion of Biden among non-white, non-college, males.

Non-white males without a degree are notably less approving of Biden than are any other category of non-white respondents. This echos some evidence that Biden underperformed with this group in the 2020 vote as well.

The approval pattern is somewhat more distinctive than the partisanship pattern.

White college graduates are more Republican than Democratic in partisanship, but notably more approving of Biden than are their non-college equivalents.

Non-white, non-college males who are evenly divided on Biden approval are heavily Democratic vs Republican, though a majority consider themselves independent. This contrasts with other non-white groups.

While the partisan differences are less substantial, the status of Biden approval among non-white, non-college males is a potential vulnerability for Biden, who already suffers badly among non-college whites.

Trust and Question Wording

Here comes a bit about survey question wording. For those just tuning in, NPORS=National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) from Pew, which released their 2021 update today (Sept 24) (thanks, Pew!)

According to my national @MULawPoll released this week 56% say “most people can be trusted” and 44% say “most people can’t be trusted”. But today Pew released their NPORS survey conducted this summer and find just 32% say most can be trusted. What’s going on??

This difference, of course, scared the bejeezus out of me. How can Pew’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey differ so much from mine, conducted at a similar time and on a question we would expect to be a stable attitude?? Question wording, my friends. Question wording.

My question is worded “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or most people can’t be trusted?” That was, in fact, the wording Pew used as recently as March 2020 and July 2020. In those 2 Pew got 58% and 53% most can be trusted, close to my 56%

So did the world go all “untrusty” since 2020? Pew changed the question in 2021. Now they asked “Which statement comes closer to your view even if neither is exactly right: Most people can be trusted or You can’t be too careful in dealing with people”

And the marginals flipped: With this wording 32% most can be trusted, 68% you can’t be too careful. A year ago in Pew’s July, with the previous wording: 58% most can be trusted, 39% most cannot be trusted. So which wording should we trust?

Pew’s original wording produced pretty consistent results (with slight differences in the stem to the question but not to response options): Nov 2018 52-47, March 2020 53-46, July 2020 58-39. So quite a change to 32-68 with the “new” wording.

But (as they say) the “new” wording is actually the one Pew generally used before the 2018-2020 polls cited above. They had generally used the “you can’t be too careful” as the alternative. And it makes a big difference.

Here are Pew studies with “can’t be too careful”: Apr 2017: 42 (trusted)-57 (can’t be too careful); Apr 2017 42-58; Feb 2016 43-56; Aug 2014 52-48(a); Aug 2014 47-51(b); Apr 2012 37-59. ( (a)Web, (b)Phone, same field dates)

This isn’t a “house” issue with Pew. The GSS has asked the “can’t be too careful” version for a while: GSS-NORC 2018 32-63; GSS-NORC 2016 31-64; GSS-NORC 2014 30-65; GSS-NORC 2012 32-64. The stability we’d expect on this item over time and close to Pew’s current 32-68.

So… both wordings appear stable and across survey houses (my 56-44, Pew’s 58-39, 53-46, 52-47) but also GSS and Pew’s flipped 32-63, 31-64, 30-65, 32-64 and 32-68.

Which wording we should use is less clear. The “most can’t be trusted” is clear and direct, “can’t be too careful” touches on suspicion. A much deeper analysis is needed of this issue. But this is a great example of seemingly similar items producing big differences.

I think there is a lot to be said for consistency, so I don’t expect to change my wording. Also this isn’t a complaint about Pew. The variation in wording they used actually allows us to understand the effect of question wording. A big help.

The Pew NPORS is a major service to the survey research world. But question wording matters and we need to take it into account, especially with a “reference survey” that influences all of us. Also the trust item was not included in the NPORS for 2020, so surprised me.

There are other issues to consider where question wording and item construction differs in the NPORS (looking at you, party ID and leaners!) so let’s all take advantage of this great resource. But as someone said: “Trust, but verify.”

Hello World!

Sixteen years ago this week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I launched PoliticalArithmetik, my first blog. This week a hurricane hit New Orleans and I’m (re)launching a website, PollsAndVotes.com.

After a year of PoliticalArithmetik, Mark Blumenthal (@mysterypollster) and I launched Pollster.com (with the support of Doug Rivers) and spent several years explaining polling and providing tracking of races, presidential approval and other topics in public opinion. In 2010 HuffPost bought Pollster and Mark had a good run with that. I departed and started PollsAndVotes.com in 2011, but have not maintained the site for a while. This is the relaunch of PollsAndVotes.com.

For some while now I’ve primarily posted analysis of polling on Twitter at @PollsAndVotes. As much as I like Twitter (most of the time) I think it is time to again have a PollsAndVotes website that allows longer posts, in one place, that can be easily found and searched for older posts, like from last week or last month. Having an editor to fix typos is also welcome.

I’ll be building out this site at a somewhat deliberate pace. I’ve decided not to import the old posts from the previous PollsAndVotes.com let alone from PoliticalArithmetik. I’ll update some of those, such as partisanship trends, but start fresh with the current data.

There will be a mix of topics here, but I’ll not be trying to replicate what Pollster.com did and what FiveThirtyEight.com and RealClearPolitics.com do well already. Most of the analysis here will be deeper dives into the national and state polling data that goes beyond trends. I also hope that my fellow academics will find graphics that may be useful in teaching.

The menu topics at the top of the page will (eventually!) provide a quick guide to analysis of “Polls” and “Votes” but also Wisconsin politics, party id, voter turnout, roll call votes and the US Supreme Court. Those first two will be something of a catch-all category. <;-)

Sixteen years ago I spent Labor Day weekend at home instead of the American Political Science Association annual meeting, keeping up with news of Katrina and launching PoliticalArithmetik. What started that weekend changed my life. I’ve still got a few days until this Labor Day weekend, and am not attending APSA, though I’ve been following the news on Ida. I hope you find the site interesting and useful.