GOP candidates have struggled a bit to find positions on Russia and international affairs they can be consistent on and that GOP voters want
The shift from the Reagan party to today is striking, but we might consider the future in which the GOP is America first, isolationist.
This comment by @StuPolitics prompted me to share data from my @MULawPoll _National_ data on opinion concerning Ukraine aid and the US role in the world.
“It really is amazing how quickly the GOP position on foreign policy/int’l relations has flipped. It has gone from tough against the USSR to soft and squishy against Russia.” — @StuPolitics
On aid to Ukraine, the balance of opinion hasn’t moved much since Nov. The largest group, 40-45%, says we are giving about the right amount, some 30-35% say too much and just under 25% say not enough aid.
The partisan divide though is pretty strong but also stable. Reps most likely to say too much, Dems least and inds in the middle. Roughly half Reps and Rep leaners say we are giving too much aid to Ukraine
Note the Lean Reps are slightly more anti-aid than Reps. More on that below.
We’ve also asked @MULawPoll respondents about the US role in the world.
Most say it is better for the future of the country if we play an active role in the world, 55-60%, with 40-45% saying stay out of world affairs. A little tightening on this since Nov. 2022.
When we look at the “stay out of world affairs” by party ID, those independents who lean Rep and pure independents jump to the top of the chart as the most isolationist, at 58-64%
Reps are less so, though still at near 50%
And Lean Dems are about 40%, with Dems under 30%
Back to @StuPolitics comment, consider the international successes of nuclear arms reduction under Reagan, collapse of USSR under GHWBush and the seeming spread of democracy under Clinton.
The last 23 years have not had much to claim as big success stories for either party.
Those negative views of the US role among independents and leaners (esp Rep leaners) represent an opportunity for “isolationism” to grow, most likely in GOP but possibly with Dems too
Leadership can shape these views, exploit them, or follow the crowd. It ain’t the 1980s no more.
Attention has focused on Ron DeSantis losing ground to Donald Trump in GOP primary polling since January. What has been largely overlooked is that DeSantis has also fallen in general election matchups against Biden. This is especially problematic for a claim that Trump is less electable.
Let’s work through our standard “four-charts” to see what has happened in the Biden v DeSantis horserace. (For an explanation of the value of these four different pictures of the race see my earlier post here.)
The trend chart, showing support for each candidate, shows a clear downturn for DeSantis since January. In late fall he enjoyed a surge and Biden declined a bit in their matchups. But since early January, DeSantis’ trend has sloped down, with one brief upturn. Over this same period, Biden has maintained stable support (as he has vs Trump too).
There is a lot of noise in the polls, as the mix of red and blue points in the chart shows. In January the candidates were tied but DeSantis’ decline has given Biden a consistent, though small, edge recently.
The clear change in direction of the trend is clearer in the margin trends in the second chart. Biden’s lead over DeSantis declined through the fall, but bounced in early January, changing direction quite clearly. The size of the margin is still small, under 3 percentage points, so no one should read this as an insurmountable advantage. But the shift of momentum is striking, and mirrors DeSantis’ more widely remarked upon decline vs Trump in the nomination contest.
Charts 3 and 4 are the longer-term view of how the distribution of poll results has shifted. Here the focus is not on the “point estimate” of the trend line, but rather the wide range of polling over two 2-month periods. Polls vary a lot, and it is hard to appreciate how that wide variation none-the-less reveals change in the distribution of candidate support. Shifts in the distribution of support over a longer period is more convincing evidence of meaningful change than a brief shift in the trend line, let alone a single poll that may be an outlier.
Chart 3 shows the distribution of DeSantis and Biden support in January-February compared to the distribution in March through early May. In Jan.-Feb. the DeSantis and Biden distributions largely overlap, though there is more spread to DeSantis support with a fair bit of poor performance to the left and some strong performance to the right, compared to the somewhat less variable Biden support. But in the two months since March, the DeSantis distribution has clearly shifted to the left and Biden a little to the right, with most of the overlap of distributions now to DeSantis’ disadvantage. There is also still more spread to DeSantis’ support than for the somewhat more consistent Biden.
This shift is also clear with the distributions for the margin between the two candidates in Chart 4. In Jan-Feb the distribution peaks very close to a tie, a margin of zero. Biden led in 19 polls and DeSantis in 13, with 4 ties. Since March the distribution has shifted to the right, with a peak at about a 2-point Biden advantage and considerably more polls showing Biden ahead, 28, than DeSantis, 11, with 3 ties.
All four of these charts show the decline in DeSantis support vs Biden in the general election. That doesn’t mean the outcome is set. Races shift over time, sometimes (at least in the past) rather sharply. In the modern period we have seen closer races and less variability as partisans have found it close to impossible to bring themselves to cross over for the other party. So small margins are to be expected and modest changes signal momentum shifts.
Ron DeSantis still has to defeat Donald Trump before he can face Joe Biden in November 2024. His recent weakening versus Biden undercuts his claim to be more electable than Trump. If he announces his candidacy in the coming weeks, as expected, he’ll have his chance to change the momentum once more. If he succeeds in that the charts will tell that story too.
I’ll be keeping track of the 2024 general election here and in subsequent posts under the “Pres2024” menu above. I’ll update regularly but not daily, let alone instantly for each new poll. Think of this as “slow polls” with some perspective, not “hot polls” for the latest shocking result.
I’ll be presenting three basic ways of looking at the horse-race trends. The first two are utterly familiar, but the third is not, and is my effort to give a better perspective on polling uncertainty than the usual. Give it a chance.
Biden vs Trump
The basic trend chart for each candidate shows both all the polls and the trend lines (estimated via local regression, as are all my trends). I scale these through Election Day to emphasize both where we are today and how much of the race is left to go.
A fundamental point is that I show these trends not to predict the outcome but to show how we get there. So much commentary either treats today’s polls as forecasts or dismisses them as meaningless. Neither is true. It is the ebb and flow of candidate support that defines the shape of the race but the outcome is uncertain even near the end. Don’t either overvalue or undervalue current polls. Watch how support is changing.
The candidate trends
The first “standard” figure shows the polls and trends for each candidate. This update shows Trump fell after the November elections, but has improved pretty steadily since January, closing the gap while Biden’s support has been flat. The Trump trend is now just slightly ahead of Biden. It is Trump’s gains over the last four months that are notable, not that Biden has fallen over that period, which he hasn’t. In fact, Biden’s support rose in the run-up to the 2022 elections and has remained at that (modestly) improved level compared to the first part of 2022 when Trump has a slight advantage.
The margin trend
The second standard trend is the margin between the candidates. I show Democrat minus Republican margin here. This is just the gap between the blue line and red line above, but focusing on the margin has a couple of advantages. First, “who’s ahead” matters, and this shows that directly. Movement in the margin may also be more apparent with just a single trend line than having to perceive the difference of two lines. Second, votes for 3rd party candidates or undecided responses can lower the support for both candidates but not affect the margin between them. I think that an advantage of the margin plot. (Some good folks disagree on this, but I say why choose between them? I show you both. Focus on what pleases you.)
The Biden minus Trump margin trend shows the tightening of the race since January. It also makes clear that Trump had a small advantage in 2022 until close to the election, after which Biden has generally had the edge, though the margin has tightened since January. Note here you can’t see which candidate changed, an advantage of the separate candidate trends above. But here you see how close the race has been and how the advantage has shifted regardless of who moved.
The distribution of support
One of the hardest things to get across is the uncertainty of polling results. Each new polls has the potential to upset the narrative, all the more so if it is an outlier. Stories and Tweets chase this new shiny object either saying it changes everything or it is a ridiculously flawed poll that means nothing. Alas, I’ve tried since Mark Blumenthal and I founded Pollster.com in 2006 to get people to appreciate the variability in polls and to stop freaking out over a single result. I have utterly failed in that mission. But not to let that stop me, here is another way to try for perspective on uncertainty.
In the trend plots above, I plot each individual poll to show how much variation there is around the trend line. This spread should draw the eye and invite the comparison of small trend changes and wide spread of individual polls around that trend. This was the fundamental contribution of Pollster.com’s graphics, compared to earlier simple lists of polls and an average.
But here is a third way to presenting how the polls vary and how the campaign changes. Let’s simply focus on the distribution of polls over a period of time and compare to another period.
The trend estimates give a line, the estimate at every point in time. Instead, let’s be a lot more modest and say “here is a group of 2 months worth of polls.” Instead of focusing on trend, let’s just pay attention to how those polls varied. And then let’s compare that with the next 2 months of poll. (I use 2 months to get enough polls in each group for the distribution to be reasonably clear.)
The third chart below shows these distributions for Biden and for Trump support for January & February 2023 and for March through the latest poll (May 7th). You can see how the Biden distribution was to the right of Trumps, even as some individual polls have Trump ahead in Jan-Feb. But in March-May 7, the two distributions have substantially converged, without a clear advantage for either candidate. The Biden distribution has shifted slightly to the left and Trump a little more to the right, producing the current overlap. (The little lines on the x axis are individuals polls for each candidate. Some overlap, obscuring the number of polls, which is shown in the subtitle of the char.)
You might also notice both distributions are a bit narrower in March-May, showing a little more agreement across polls.
The primary perspective is that over each of these 2 month groupings, each poll could be thought of as just a random draw from this distribution, so if you see polls varying by as much as shown in the chart, that just means “it’s Tuesday.” You can get more interested in how these distributions change over time though, because that IS showing you that the race is shifting. By grouping into 2 month periods, I want to de-emphasize daily noise that appears in the first two trend charts and encourage you to take a deep breath, be patient, but see more of the “real” evolution of the race that comes with a wider time interval and more appreciation for the variability in the polls.
The fourth and final chart shows the distribution of the margin between Biden and Trump, as the second chart shows the trend in margin. Here you again see the spread of poll margins in each 2 month period, and notice the shift to a closer race in March-May. I also add the number of polls with each candidate leading and the number of ties. The balance of number of leads also helps focus the mind that “your candidate” isn’t leading every poll (or trailing either.)
I don’t expect any of this to prevent the next freak-out over a surprising poll. I do hope those looking for a bit more perspective, even at the cost of momentary excitement, will find these charts helpful for appreciating the dynamics of the 2024 presidential campaign.
Gallup has an update on partisanship trends today. Links at end of this thread
I want to address the “leaned” vs “unleaded” party issue. Do “partisans” include independents who lean to a party, or not. Similarly, does “independents” include leaners or not, a how it matters
Gallup question wording is slightly different from the wording many academics use. “In politics as of today” vs “generally speaking” has modest difference but not the issue I care about which is how much difference is there between leaners and partisans.
Rep leaners are 11% and Dem leaners 13%. That close symmetry has been pretty stable. You get more partisans (obviously) if you include leaners as partisans, and more independents if you call them independents. The Gallup headline is based on calling them independent.
The “academic” question wording also asks partisans if they are “strong” or “not very strong” (ie “weak”) partisans. Here you also see 11-12% are weak & just under 20% are strong for each party.
Here are Gallup’s party ID trends since 2004, with leaners separate from partisans or pure independents.
How do these groups differ?
Some claim leaners are “really partisans”. That isn’t right.
They are more partisan than pure independents, but not as partisan as those who pick a party on the 1st question. I know nuance is hard, but leaners are indeed leaners and not committed partisans.
You also see lack of partisan commitment in the “someone else” and “wouldn’t vote” percentages that rise to the middle of the PID scales.
Also note how “weak” are different from “strong” partisans. Sometimes less partisan than lean, sometimes not.
Here is Biden approval by partisan lean and strength. Similar to the vote choice above, though Reps and lean Rep are quite similarly negative, and “weak Reps” a little more approving. More monotonic w Dem strength.
Here is a comparison of favorably to Trump and to Biden by Party ID with leaners.
Both partisans and leaners equally despise the other party’s guy.
But note in both parties leaners are less favorable to their party’s guy than are partisans.
Negative partisanship is strong.
Another big difference is attention to politics. More partisan means more attention, with pure independents especially less attentive, though “weak” partisans are close to pure inds
Among other things this means leaners & weak are slower to pick up on issues and candidates
It’s easy to focus on size of each group. Inds tend to grow in non-election years, then decline close to elections
But “are they independent or hidden partisans” is important & the answer is learners are in between. Less party loyalty in votes than partisans, but clearly lean.
In an election, partisans vote w party >90% but leaners typically in the 80s. They can also push that up or down depending on the candidates. They aren’t “swing voters” but that lower loyalty and potential for more or less loyalty is important in election outcomes.
Links to Gallup trends in partisanship, showing 49% “independent” but that includes leaners!
The tables are great and go back to 2004. Also have table w leaners as partisans. 43R-43D-14 Ind
This Axios story is misleading. It combines independents who lean to a party with “purely” inds. Dem & Rep are modestly down, leaners up a bit, pure Ind still low teens. See full data 2004-23 below. Leaners vote w party but less than partisans
I don’t care for the WaPo headline. These aren’t “independents who vote party” but people who say they are independents AND who say they lean to a party and mostly vote that way, but less so than partisans, more so than independents who don’t lean.
Most important just look at the full data and there are not sharp or sudden shifts. Relative stability over 19 years with some modest but important shifts (a bit more leaners, bit fewer partisans) and little change in pure independents.
With a lot of hot takes (pre-indictment) about Trump vs DeSantis, here is a “cold” take to bring some perspective on how voters have viewed each over the past 17 months. Perspective, like revenge, is a dish best served cold.
DeSantis and Trump favorable ratings by party over last 15 months (17 months for Trump). National @MULawPoll surveys of registered voters.(Trump & Pence since Nov 2021, DeSantis since Jan. 2022.)
And here are the same data in table form. (Yes, all “Table 1” because they come from separate reports.)
March 20 marks the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War. Initially, the war had substantial majority support, saying it was “worth it”. But that fell rapidly and by July 2004 as many said it was “not worth it”. By 2008 we reached near 65% not worth it, which is little changed.
Three aspects of Iraq War opinion. (Created 11/5/2007).
A look at overall opinion shows that the public is not keen on either Biden or Trump running for president again in 2024. Of all registered voters interviewed in the November 2022 and January 2023 Marquette Law School Poll National surveys, 34% would like Biden to run and 29% would like Trump to run.
Among only registered voters who consider themselves Democrats or independents who lean Democrat, 49% would like Biden to run. Among registered voters who are Republican or independent but lean Republican, 53% would like Trump to run.
This even split in both parties comes despite generally favorable views of both Biden and Trump among registered voters of their party. Biden is viewed favorably by 82% of registered Democrats and Trump is viewed favorably by 68% of registered Republicans.
While Democrats are more favorable to Biden than Republicans are to Trump, there is reluctance among Democrats for a Biden run in 2024 even among those with a favorable opinion of him, 57% of whom wish him to run. Among Republicans who are favorable to Trump there is higher support for a run, 72%.
Strength of partisanship also plays a role with Democrats more supportive of a Biden candidacy than are independents who lean Democrat, and likewise for Trump among Republicans compared to independents who lean Republican.
Among all registered voters, 42% say they would like neither Biden nor Trump to run in 2024, 28% would like Biden but not Trump to run and 24% would like Trump but not Biden. And only 5% would like to see a rerun of 2024.
Nate Cohn has a look at widely varying polls on Trump 2024, including my @MULawPoll. Worth a read.
It is hard to get apples-to-apples comparisons. Different question (long list of candidates or DeSantis-Trump head-to-head), RVs or likely primary voters, Reps or Reps+Lean.
I’d also stress value of comparative favorability among Reps.
And comparison of ONE poll over time with same methodology each time removes noise due to multiple pollsters w varying methodology. This emphasizes trend change w most comparable data available
Favs in @MULawPoll national surveys:
Another trend for want Trump to run, and shows the difference between those who are more partisan Republicans and those independents who lean Rep. (How these are included or not also affects the cross-pollster comparison in Nate’s article.)
Here is a comparison of want Trump and want DeSantis to run by party ID for the latest, January 2023 @MULawPoll national poll (all these tweets are based on our national polls, not our Wisconsin only polls.)
I think the most revealing results we have in @MULawPoll is DeSantis is very appealing to PRO-TRUMP Republicans. His fav rating is strong with those Reps also fav to Trump & those Reps who want Trump to run. His threat to Trump is that he’s popular inside Trump’s house.
It is really important to stress we are watching a dynamic process as it unfolds, NOT predicting final outcomes. Trump is ramping up criticism of DeSantis. Does that change things in upcoming polls? When (if) DeSantis enters the race is another test.
It took 15 ballots to elect a speaker, the most in 100 years. In the end, Kevin McCarthy won.
Notably, McCarthy’s support remained quite steady throughout the voting. Opposition held as well but cast votes for a variety of alternations to McCarthy across all the ballots.
Here are the total votes for each candidate on each round of balloting.
Democrats remained united behind Hakeem Jeffries throughout, with one Democratic member elect missing one vote (due to surgery.)
Here are the votes among Republicans who voted for someone other than McCarthy on at least one ballot.
