The Public & the Supreme Court

It is “big decisions” week at the U.S. Supreme Court. While most people have an opinion about how the Court is handling its job, the details are often obscure to a substantial share of the public. This week’s decisions will come as surprises to many who don’t follow the Court’s docket.

The Court has suffered a substantial decline in approval since 2020, when fully 66% approved of the job the Court was doing. As of May, 2023, approval stands at 41%. All the data reported here is from the Marquette Law School Poll national surveys of adults.

Approval of the Court differs sharply by party identification, with Republicans maintaining a high approval rating around 60% but independents dropping into the 30s and Democrats into the 20s.

There has been considerable stability in views of the Dobbs decision, which struck down Roe v Wade in June 2022, at least among those who have an opinion on the case (more on those without an opinion below.) About 2/3rds oppose overturning Roe, while 1/3rd support the Dobbs decision.

Approval has changed in “sensible” directions, following party and shifting as the Court has issued major decisions. Disagreement with outcomes drives approval down, agreement with outcomes increases approval. Few of the public are aware of the details of legal reasoning in decision, though elite discourse may emphasize textualism or originalism or “history, text, and tradition” based arguments.

The limits of public attention to the Court is vividly illustrated by awareness of the balance of justices nominated by Republican and by Democratic presidents. Nominations have been intensely contested for over a decade (arguably longer) and the three Trump appointments followed in the wake of Obama’s nominee being denied hearings or a vote in 2016 following Justice Scalia’s death. If a lot of politics has been “all about the judges”, much of the public hasn’t followed the story.

Despite a long standing Republican-appointed majority on the Court, and the current 6-3 majority, 30% of the public believes a majority of the justices were appointed by Democratic presidents. About 40% say a majority was “probably” appointed by Republican presidents, and just 30% say a majority was “definitely” appointed by Republican presidents.

In the wake of the Dobbs decision there was a 10 point rise in the percent saying “definitely” Republican appointed majority, and a drop of 10 points in the percent incorrectly believing Democrats had appointed a majority. But this increased information has declined over the year since Dobbs, giving up all those gains to return to where it was, with 30% saying definitely Republican majority and 30% thinking Democratic appointees are the majority.

For those following, or reporting on, the Court, the share of the public unaware of the makeup of the majority is striking. Discussion of the Court generally assumes some facts are universally known, but this is not the case.

The Dobbs decision has shifted the policy landscape after 50 years of settled law, and has made abortion a central issue in many campaigns as state legislatures have adopted sharply differing laws, replacing the basic national standards for abortion rights under Roe and Casey that had prevailed.

The Dobbs case was clearly on the horizon for months before it was decided. Yet when we (the Marquette Law School Poll) asked about it in Sept. 2021, 30% said they “haven’t heard enough to have an opinion.”

Pre-decision
Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Overturn Roe versus Wade, thus strike down the 1973 decision that made abortion legal in all 50 states.

Post-decision
Do you favor or oppose the following recent Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Overturned Roe versus Wade, thus striking down the 1973 decision that made abortion legal in all 50 states.

The leak of the Dobbs opinion raised awareness about 8 points while the actual decision increased awareness another 10 points. By the fall of 2022, about 10% said they hadn’t heard of the Dobbs decision. This is an example of how an extraordinarily salient decision can reach almost all of the public, certainly more than the typical case or of the Court majority above.

This week, we expect a decision on the use of race as a factor in college admissions. This issue has been with us at least since the Bakke case in 1978, and has been revisited since, notably in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).

As of May, just over half of our national sample say they haven’t heard about the case or not enough to have an opinion.

Do you favor or oppose the following possible future Supreme Court decisions, or haven’t you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Rule that colleges cannot use race as one of several factors in deciding which applicants to admit.

Whatever decision the Court reaches, it will come as something of a surprise to half the public. When we poll in July, it will be interesting to see how many remain unaware of this decision. Will that fall sharply, as in Dobbs, or will a substantial minority remain unaware of the decision?

A similar lack of familiarity is clear in another much talked about case (among Court watchers), 303 Creative, which concerns a business owner’s right, based on 1st Amendment speech or religious liberty grounds, to deny services to LGBTQ customers. Here too, about 45% lack awareness of the pending decision.

While a plurality favor banning the use of race in admissions, a plurality oppose allowing businesses to deny services. But in both cases the largest group is those not familiar with the case.

Views of the justices

Despite recent coverage of the justices, most of the public says they either haven’t heard of each justice, or haven’t heard enough to have a favorable or unfavorable opinion. Here we encourage respondents to say if they lack an opinion. Our question reads:

Some justices of the Supreme Court are better known than others. For each of these names have you never heard of them, heard of them but don’t know enough to have an opinion of them, have a favorable opinion or have an unfavorable opinion?

In other surveys (including ours for different questions) “haven’t heard enough” or “don’t know” may not be an explicit option. Many respondents will offer an opinion in this case. Those responses may also contain valuable information, encouraging reluctant respondents to still venture an opinion. In light of our finding on awareness of the majority on the Court, and on specific cases, we choose to frame the question in a way that explicitly acknowledges the possibility that not every justice is well known.

As the chart makes clear, many people lack opinions of each justice. There is variation, with some better known than others, but the share of “haven’t heard enough” is higher than either favorable or unfavorable for all, if only slightly so for Justice Thomas.

More than 60% say they don’t have an opinion of Justice Alito. In November 2022 we asked respondents for their best guess as to which justice authored the Dobbs decision. A quarter correctly picked Alito, with another quarter picking Thomas, and a scattering among the other justices. This is a very difficult question for the general public, who do not as a rule rush to read opinions by their favorite justices. Perhaps it is impressive that as many as 1/4 got Alito right, and Thomas is not a bad guess, given his concurrence. Still, the point is most people don’t have specific information about individual justices even in the most visible decisions.

The May 2023 survey was conducted after a series of news stories concerning Justice Thomas’ financial disclosure statements, which did not report a real estate sale or certain travel expenses paid by others. Thirty-three percent said they had heard a lot about this, while 32% had heard a little and 35% had heard nothing at all. This was a prominent story in “Washington circles” but while 1/3rd heard a lot about it, just over 1/3rd heard nothing at all.

There is a substantial difference in awareness of the Court among those who generally pay attention to politics, which is nicely illustrated by awareness of the stories about Justice Thomas’s disclosure statements. About 36% in the May survey said they paid attention to politics “most of the time” while 64% pay attention less frequently.

News stories about Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’ financial disclosure reports. (Here are some recent topics in the news. How much have you heard or read about each of these?) By attention to politics.

Attention to politicsHeard a lotA littleNothing at all
Most of the time602812
Less often183448

In the most attentive 1/3rd of the public, awareness of the stories about Thomas’ disclosures were quite well known, but this dropped precipitously once we move beyond those most attentive to politics generally.

The lesson is an old one. Most people don’t pay as much attention to either politics or the Court as you, dear reader, or I. This means public reaction to Court decisions may not follow what elite expectations may be, simply because much of the public wasn’t expecting the cases to be decided. Even in Dobbs, a substantial 30% didn’t see the case coming as late as March 2022.

Further, given how much partisanship affects perceptions of the Court, the 25-30% who believe there is a majority appointed by Democratic presidents will have curiously distorted opinions of the court. In May, among Republicans who eroneously believed a majority of the Court were appointed by Democratic presidents, 57% disapproved of the Court. Among Democrats with the same misperception, 60% approved of the Court. Compare that with Republicans correctly saying there is definitely a Republican appointed majority: 76% approve, while among Democrats also saying there is definitely a Republican appointed majority: 14% approve.

There is a reporting and messaging lesson here. A substantial share of the audience you are trying to reach is likely unaware of some facts you take for granted. It is important to expand awareness of those facts by making them part of your story, even if they seem “obvious.”

If not Trump, who?

Which GOP candidates pose a threat to Donald Trump among Republican voters?

In May Trump had 72% favorable and 26% unfavorable (2% didn’t have an opinion of him) among registered Republicans and independents who lean Republican in the Marquette Law School national poll. That high favorability rating is Trump’s great strength in the party. His favorability has been consistently high, though it declined a bit in the fall of 2022 then turned back up in May.

The other GOP candidates are less well known than Trump, even Pence and DeSantis lack the universal recognition of Trump. But low name recognition at this point can be an opportunity for those less well known to introduce themselves to many voters for the first time. Only Christie, Hutchinson and Sununu (who took himself out after the poll was completed) have net negative ratings. Note they are also the most openly critical of Trump. The others are not known, rather than disliked. (The chart is sorted by % able to rate the candidate.)

DeSantis is the clear 2nd place for favorability among all Republicans, and has low unfavorable ratings as well. Pence has relatively high favorables but also unfavorables that are almost as high. With the launch of his presidential campaign, and apparent willingness to criticize Trump, at least in his kick-off speech, his break with Trump is now clearer.

But how do these Republicans who like Trump feel about the alternative candidates?

The next two charts shows favorability to each candidate among those Republicans who are favorable to Trump and among those unfavorable to Trump.

DeSantis jumps out in the “favorable to Trump” chart with especially strong ratings compared to the other candidates, while views of Pence are notable for the very close division in the party over him.

For Christie, those favorable to Trump are 18% favorable to Christie, 43% unfavorable (and 39% don’t have an opinion.) But those Republicans unfavorable to Trump don’t like Christie either! 17% fav, 38% unfav. So Christie doesn’t have am obvious strength among anti-Trump Republicans. Or, basically, anywhere in the GOP.

Compare DeSantis who is 67% fav and 12% unfav among those favorable to Trump, and 37-26 among those unfavorable to Trump. DeSantis’s strength is WITHIN the pro-Trump GOP, not really so much in the anti-Trump quarter of the party. That means DeSantis is a danger to Trump from “inside the house.” He would benefit if Trump voters started looking for an alternative. The trick of course is how does DeSantis make this happen without turning the pro-Trump folks against himself.

DeSantis’ appeal to pro-Trump Republicans looked especially strong earlier. He got increasingly favorable ratings among those favorable to Trump until recently. In our May data his favorability dropped sharply among those favorable to Trump as Trump’s criticism of DeSantis mounted. Yet DeSantis has never been especially popular with the anti-Trump wing of the party, so he can’t turn to them for a boost, at least not yet. Does his favorability continue down, especially if they go after one another? Can DeSantis actually hurt Trump’s standing with GOP voters?

This is where Christie could potentially help DeSantis or other single-digit candidates. He can criticize Trump without worrying about hurting himself because he is already so unpopular with all kinds of GOP voters. He could do the dirty work for DeSantis & Co. But would Christie’s criticism be effective when so many in the party have turned against him?

And consider Mike Pence. The second best known candidate divides the party sharply, with only a slightly net-favorable rating. Interestingly those favorable to Trump are also pretty favorable to Pence, despite Trump’s view of his former Vice-President. Should Pence take ths offensive against Trump he might carry more weight than the disliked Christie. But as with DeSantis, how can he turn GOP voters against Trump without creating self-inflicted wounds?

Tables with values plotted in the charts are shown below.

A more isolationist GOP?

GOP candidates have struggled a bit to find positions on Russia and international affairs they can be consistent on and that GOP voters want

The shift from the Reagan party to today is striking, but we might consider the future in which the GOP is America first, isolationist.

This comment by @StuPolitics prompted me to share data from my @MULawPoll _National_ data on opinion concerning Ukraine aid and the US role in the world.

“It really is amazing how quickly the GOP position on foreign policy/int’l relations has flipped. It has gone from tough against the USSR to soft and squishy against Russia.” — @StuPolitics

On aid to Ukraine, the balance of opinion hasn’t moved much since Nov. The largest group, 40-45%, says we are giving about the right amount, some 30-35% say too much and just under 25% say not enough aid.

The partisan divide though is pretty strong but also stable. Reps most likely to say too much, Dems least and inds in the middle. Roughly half Reps and Rep leaners say we are giving too much aid to Ukraine

Note the Lean Reps are slightly more anti-aid than Reps. More on that below.

We’ve also asked @MULawPoll respondents about the US role in the world.

Most say it is better for the future of the country if we play an active role in the world, 55-60%, with 40-45% saying stay out of world affairs. A little tightening on this since Nov. 2022.

When we look at the “stay out of world affairs” by party ID, those independents who lean Rep and pure independents jump to the top of the chart as the most isolationist, at 58-64%

Reps are less so, though still at near 50%

And Lean Dems are about 40%, with Dems under 30%

Back to @StuPolitics comment, consider the international successes of nuclear arms reduction under Reagan, collapse of USSR under GHWBush and the seeming spread of democracy under Clinton.

The last 23 years have not had much to claim as big success stories for either party.

Those negative views of the US role among independents and leaners (esp Rep leaners) represent an opportunity for “isolationism” to grow, most likely in GOP but possibly with Dems too

Leadership can shape these views, exploit them, or follow the crowd. It ain’t the 1980s no more.

DeSantis vs Biden update

Attention has focused on Ron DeSantis losing ground to Donald Trump in GOP primary polling since January. What has been largely overlooked is that DeSantis has also fallen in general election matchups against Biden. This is especially problematic for a claim that Trump is less electable. 

Let’s work through our standard “four-charts” to see what has happened in the Biden v DeSantis horserace. (For an explanation of the value of these four different pictures of the race see my earlier post here.)

The trend chart, showing support for each candidate, shows a clear downturn for DeSantis since January. In late fall he enjoyed a surge and Biden declined a bit in their matchups. But since early January, DeSantis’ trend has sloped down, with one brief upturn. Over this same period, Biden has maintained stable support (as he has vs Trump too). 

There is a lot of noise in the polls, as the mix of red and blue points in the chart shows. In January the candidates were tied but DeSantis’ decline has given Biden a consistent, though small, edge recently.

The clear change in direction of the trend is clearer in the margin trends in the second chart. Biden’s lead over DeSantis declined through the fall, but bounced in early January, changing direction quite clearly.  The size of the margin is still small, under 3 percentage points, so no one should read this as an insurmountable advantage. But the shift of momentum is striking, and mirrors DeSantis’ more widely remarked upon decline vs Trump in the nomination contest.

Charts 3 and 4 are the longer-term view of how the distribution of poll results has shifted. Here the focus is not on the “point estimate” of the trend line, but rather the wide range of polling over two 2-month periods. Polls vary a lot, and it is hard to appreciate how that wide variation none-the-less reveals change in the distribution of candidate support. Shifts in the distribution of support over a longer period is more convincing evidence of meaningful change than a brief shift in the trend line, let alone a single poll that may be an outlier.

Chart 3 shows the distribution of DeSantis and Biden support in January-February compared to the distribution in March through early May. In Jan.-Feb. the DeSantis and Biden distributions largely overlap, though there is more spread to DeSantis support with a fair bit of poor performance to the left and some strong performance to the right, compared to the somewhat less variable Biden support. But in the two months since March, the DeSantis distribution has clearly shifted to the left and Biden a little to the right, with most of the overlap of distributions now to DeSantis’ disadvantage. There is also still more spread to DeSantis’ support than for the somewhat more consistent Biden.

This shift is also clear with the distributions for the margin between the two candidates in Chart 4.  In Jan-Feb the distribution peaks very close to a tie, a margin of zero. Biden led in 19 polls and DeSantis in 13, with 4 ties. Since March the distribution has shifted to the right, with a peak at about a 2-point Biden advantage and considerably more polls showing Biden ahead, 28, than DeSantis, 11, with 3 ties.  

All four of these charts show the decline in DeSantis support vs Biden in the general election. That doesn’t mean the outcome is set. Races shift over time, sometimes (at least in the past) rather sharply. In the modern period we have seen closer races and less variability as partisans have found it close to impossible to bring themselves to cross over for the other party. So small margins are to be expected and modest changes signal momentum shifts. 

Ron DeSantis still has to defeat Donald Trump before he can face Joe Biden in November 2024. His recent weakening versus Biden undercuts his claim to be more electable than Trump. If he announces his candidacy in the coming weeks, as expected, he’ll have his chance to change the momentum once more. If he succeeds in that the charts will tell that story too.

Presidential General Election 2024 Update

I’ll be keeping track of the 2024 general election here and in subsequent posts under the “Pres2024” menu above. I’ll update regularly but not daily, let alone instantly for each new poll. Think of this as “slow polls” with some perspective, not “hot polls” for the latest shocking result.

I’ll be presenting three basic ways of looking at the horse-race trends. The first two are utterly familiar, but the third is not, and is my effort to give a better perspective on polling uncertainty than the usual. Give it a chance.

Biden vs Trump

The basic trend chart for each candidate shows both all the polls and the trend lines (estimated via local regression, as are all my trends). I scale these through Election Day to emphasize both where we are today and how much of the race is left to go.

A fundamental point is that I show these trends not to predict the outcome but to show how we get there. So much commentary either treats today’s polls as forecasts or dismisses them as meaningless. Neither is true. It is the ebb and flow of candidate support that defines the shape of the race but the outcome is uncertain even near the end. Don’t either overvalue or undervalue current polls. Watch how support is changing.

The candidate trends

The first “standard” figure shows the polls and trends for each candidate. This update shows Trump fell after the November elections, but has improved pretty steadily since January, closing the gap while Biden’s support has been flat. The Trump trend is now just slightly ahead of Biden. It is Trump’s gains over the last four months that are notable, not that Biden has fallen over that period, which he hasn’t. In fact, Biden’s support rose in the run-up to the 2022 elections and has remained at that (modestly) improved level compared to the first part of 2022 when Trump has a slight advantage.

The margin trend

The second standard trend is the margin between the candidates. I show Democrat minus Republican margin here. This is just the gap between the blue line and red line above, but focusing on the margin has a couple of advantages. First, “who’s ahead” matters, and this shows that directly. Movement in the margin may also be more apparent with just a single trend line than having to perceive the difference of two lines. Second, votes for 3rd party candidates or undecided responses can lower the support for both candidates but not affect the margin between them. I think that an advantage of the margin plot. (Some good folks disagree on this, but I say why choose between them? I show you both. Focus on what pleases you.)

The Biden minus Trump margin trend shows the tightening of the race since January. It also makes clear that Trump had a small advantage in 2022 until close to the election, after which Biden has generally had the edge, though the margin has tightened since January. Note here you can’t see which candidate changed, an advantage of the separate candidate trends above. But here you see how close the race has been and how the advantage has shifted regardless of who moved.

The distribution of support

One of the hardest things to get across is the uncertainty of polling results. Each new polls has the potential to upset the narrative, all the more so if it is an outlier. Stories and Tweets chase this new shiny object either saying it changes everything or it is a ridiculously flawed poll that means nothing. Alas, I’ve tried since Mark Blumenthal and I founded Pollster.com in 2006 to get people to appreciate the variability in polls and to stop freaking out over a single result. I have utterly failed in that mission. But not to let that stop me, here is another way to try for perspective on uncertainty.

In the trend plots above, I plot each individual poll to show how much variation there is around the trend line. This spread should draw the eye and invite the comparison of small trend changes and wide spread of individual polls around that trend. This was the fundamental contribution of Pollster.com’s graphics, compared to earlier simple lists of polls and an average.

But here is a third way to presenting how the polls vary and how the campaign changes. Let’s simply focus on the distribution of polls over a period of time and compare to another period.

The trend estimates give a line, the estimate at every point in time. Instead, let’s be a lot more modest and say “here is a group of 2 months worth of polls.” Instead of focusing on trend, let’s just pay attention to how those polls varied. And then let’s compare that with the next 2 months of poll. (I use 2 months to get enough polls in each group for the distribution to be reasonably clear.)

The third chart below shows these distributions for Biden and for Trump support for January & February 2023 and for March through the latest poll (May 7th). You can see how the Biden distribution was to the right of Trumps, even as some individual polls have Trump ahead in Jan-Feb. But in March-May 7, the two distributions have substantially converged, without a clear advantage for either candidate. The Biden distribution has shifted slightly to the left and Trump a little more to the right, producing the current overlap. (The little lines on the x axis are individuals polls for each candidate. Some overlap, obscuring the number of polls, which is shown in the subtitle of the char.)

You might also notice both distributions are a bit narrower in March-May, showing a little more agreement across polls.

The primary perspective is that over each of these 2 month groupings, each poll could be thought of as just a random draw from this distribution, so if you see polls varying by as much as shown in the chart, that just means “it’s Tuesday.” You can get more interested in how these distributions change over time though, because that IS showing you that the race is shifting. By grouping into 2 month periods, I want to de-emphasize daily noise that appears in the first two trend charts and encourage you to take a deep breath, be patient, but see more of the “real” evolution of the race that comes with a wider time interval and more appreciation for the variability in the polls.

The fourth and final chart shows the distribution of the margin between Biden and Trump, as the second chart shows the trend in margin. Here you again see the spread of poll margins in each 2 month period, and notice the shift to a closer race in March-May. I also add the number of polls with each candidate leading and the number of ties. The balance of number of leads also helps focus the mind that “your candidate” isn’t leading every poll (or trailing either.)

I don’t expect any of this to prevent the next freak-out over a surprising poll. I do hope those looking for a bit more perspective, even at the cost of momentary excitement, will find these charts helpful for appreciating the dynamics of the 2024 presidential campaign.

Party identification, leaners and strength

Gallup has an update on partisanship trends today. Links at end of this thread

I want to address the “leaned” vs “unleaded” party issue. Do “partisans” include independents who lean to a party, or not. Similarly, does “independents” include leaners or not, a how it matters

Gallup question wording is slightly different from the wording many academics use. “In politics as of today” vs “generally speaking” has modest difference but not the issue I care about which is how much difference is there between leaners and partisans.

Rep leaners are 11% and Dem leaners 13%. That close symmetry has been pretty stable. You get more partisans (obviously) if you include leaners as partisans, and more independents if you call them independents. The Gallup headline is based on calling them independent.

The “academic” question wording also asks partisans if they are “strong” or “not very strong” (ie “weak”) partisans. Here you also see 11-12% are weak & just under 20% are strong for each party.

Here are Gallup’s party ID trends since 2004, with leaners separate from partisans or pure independents.

How do these groups differ?

Some claim leaners are “really partisans”. That isn’t right.

They are more partisan than pure independents, but not as partisan as those who pick a party on the 1st question. I know nuance is hard, but leaners are indeed leaners and not committed partisans.

You also see lack of partisan commitment in the “someone else” and “wouldn’t vote” percentages that rise to the middle of the PID scales.

Also note how “weak” are different from “strong” partisans. Sometimes less partisan than lean, sometimes not.

Here is Biden approval by partisan lean and strength. Similar to the vote choice above, though Reps and lean Rep are quite similarly negative, and “weak Reps” a little more approving. More monotonic w Dem strength.

Here is a comparison of favorably to Trump and to Biden by Party ID with leaners.

Both partisans and leaners equally despise the other party’s guy.

But note in both parties leaners are less favorable to their party’s guy than are partisans.

Negative partisanship is strong.

Another big difference is attention to politics. More partisan means more attention, with pure independents especially less attentive, though “weak” partisans are close to pure inds

Among other things this means leaners & weak are slower to pick up on issues and candidates

It’s easy to focus on size of each group. Inds tend to grow in non-election years, then decline close to elections

But “are they independent or hidden partisans” is important & the answer is learners are in between. Less party loyalty in votes than partisans, but clearly lean.

In an election, partisans vote w party >90% but leaners typically in the 80s. They can also push that up or down depending on the candidates. They aren’t “swing voters” but that lower loyalty and potential for more or less loyalty is important in election outcomes.

Links to Gallup trends in partisanship, showing 49% “independent” but that includes leaners!

The tables are great and go back to 2004. Also have table w leaners as partisans. 43R-43D-14 Ind

Gallup trends link here

This Axios story is misleading. It combines independents who lean to a party with “purely” inds. Dem & Rep are modestly down, leaners up a bit, pure Ind still low teens. See full data 2004-23 below. Leaners vote w party but less than partisans

Axios story link here:

Philip Bump also has a story on this, in part emphasizing the changes are much less than the Axios headline.

Washington Post story link here

I don’t care for the WaPo headline. These aren’t “independents who vote party” but people who say they are independents AND who say they lean to a party and mostly vote that way, but less so than partisans, more so than independents who don’t lean.

Most important just look at the full data and there are not sharp or sudden shifts. Relative stability over 19 years with some modest but important shifts (a bit more leaners, bit fewer partisans) and little change in pure independents.

Ignore “big change” headlines.

Trump, DeSantis, Pence favorability by party ID

With a lot of hot takes (pre-indictment) about Trump vs DeSantis, here is a “cold” take to bring some perspective on how voters have viewed each over the past 17 months. Perspective, like revenge, is a dish best served cold.

DeSantis and Trump favorable ratings by party over last 15 months (17 months for Trump). National @MULawPoll surveys of registered voters.(Trump & Pence since Nov 2021, DeSantis since Jan. 2022.)

And here are the same data in table form. (Yes, all “Table 1” because they come from separate reports.)

The Iraq War at 20

March 20 marks the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War. Initially, the war had substantial majority support, saying it was “worth it”. But that fell rapidly and by July 2004 as many said it was “not worth it”. By 2008 we reached near 65% not worth it, which is little changed.

Three aspects of Iraq War opinion. (Created 11/5/2007).

Who wants a rerun in 2024?

A look at overall opinion shows that the public is not keen on either Biden or Trump running for president again in 2024. Of all registered voters interviewed in the November 2022 and January 2023 Marquette Law School Poll National surveys, 34% would like Biden to run and 29% would like Trump to run.

Among only registered voters who consider themselves Democrats or independents who lean Democrat, 49% would like Biden to run. Among registered voters who are Republican or independent but lean Republican, 53% would like Trump to run.

This even split in both parties comes despite generally favorable views of both Biden and Trump among registered voters of their party. Biden is viewed favorably by 82% of registered Democrats and Trump is viewed favorably by 68% of registered Republicans.

While Democrats are more favorable to Biden than Republicans are to Trump, there is reluctance among Democrats for a Biden run in 2024 even among those with a favorable opinion of him, 57% of whom wish him to run. Among Republicans who are favorable to Trump there is higher support for a run, 72%.

Strength of partisanship also plays a role with Democrats more supportive of a Biden candidacy than are independents who lean Democrat, and likewise for Trump among Republicans compared to independents who lean Republican.

Among all registered voters, 42% say they would like neither Biden nor Trump to run in 2024, 28% would like Biden but not Trump to run and 24% would like Trump but not Biden. And only 5% would like to see a rerun of 2024.

Methodology details: